build(deps): bump golang.org/x/net from 0.55.0 to 0.56.0

Bumps [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net) from 0.55.0 to 0.56.0. - [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.55.0...v0.56.0) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: golang.org/x/net dependency-version: 0.56.0 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-07-13 09:02:09 -04:00 · 2026-06-24 08:45:01 +00:00
parent c361da5c9d
commit ef203cb2db
39 changed files with 1098 additions and 306 deletions
--- a/go.mod
+++ b/go.mod
@@ -102,13 +102,13 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/stdout/stdouttrace v1.44.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.44.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.44.0
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0
 	golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260410095643-746e56fc9e2f
 	golang.org/x/image v0.40.0
-	golang.org/x/net v0.55.0
+	golang.org/x/net v0.56.0
 	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0
-	golang.org/x/term v0.43.0
+	golang.org/x/term v0.44.0
 	golang.org/x/text v0.38.0
 	google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api v0.0.0-20260526163538-3dc84a4a5aaa
 	google.golang.org/grpc v1.81.1
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ require (
 	go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 // indirect
 	go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/genproto v0.0.0-20260128011058-8636f8732409 // indirect
--- a/go.sum
+++ b/go.sum
@@ -1361,8 +1361,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220622213112-05595931fe9d/go.mod h1:IxCIyHEi3zRg3s0
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0/go.mod h1:MVFd36DqK4CsrnJYDkBA3VC4m2GkXAM0PvzMCn4JQf4=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.19.0/go.mod h1:Iy9bg/ha4yyC70EfRS8jz+B6ybOBKMaSxLj6P6oBDfU=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.21.0/go.mod h1:0BP7YvVV9gBbVKyeTG0Gyn+gZm94bibOW5BjDEYAOMs=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0 h1:RMs7fP2rXdep0CftQlK8Uf+kibLm7qkCcradZWYz988=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0/go.mod h1:1QgfPxDqh0T2M/elOJtp9RvuR95kVjir0e6/BvEmGbc=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0 h1:QZ4Muo8THX6CizN2vPPd5fBGHyogrdK9fG4wLPFUsto=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0/go.mod h1:DNLU434OwVakk9PzuwV8w62mAJpRJL3vsgcfp4Qnsio=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190306152737-a1d7652674e8/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190510132918-efd6b22b2522/go.mod h1:ZjyILWgesfNpC6sMxTJOJm9Kp84zZh5NQWvqDGG3Qr8=
@@ -1452,8 +1452,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.6.0/go.mod h1:2Tu9+aMcznHK/AK1HMvgo6xiTLG5rD5rZLDS+rp2Bjs=
 golang.org/x/net v0.10.0/go.mod h1:0qNGK6F8kojg2nk9dLZ2mShWaEBan6FAoqfSigmmuDg=
 golang.org/x/net v0.21.0/go.mod h1:bIjVDfnllIU7BJ2DNgfnXvpSvtn8VRwhlsaeUTyUS44=
 golang.org/x/net v0.23.0/go.mod h1:JKghWKKOSdJwpW2GEx0Ja7fmaKnMsbu+MWVZTokSYmg=
-golang.org/x/net v0.55.0 h1:bcvxaJn3e1U6InsFWt1JUq1aSjnRxLzT2rtD2KfkDF8=
-golang.org/x/net v0.55.0/go.mod h1:L5U2KuzuOe1lY7Z+aWVIKK6qEeJXnXV9yzGA+WCHJww=
+golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o=
+golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20180821212333-d2e6202438be/go.mod h1:N/0e6XlmueqKjAGxoOufVs8QHGRruUQn6yWY3a++T0U=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190604053449-0f29369cfe45/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
@@ -1559,8 +1559,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.13.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.17.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.18.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.21.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0 h1:dO4czNzziLiiXplLQgBCEpCvXQ3dnkn0SdaZSYdQ+FY=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201117132131-f5c789dd3221/go.mod h1:Nr5EML6q2oocZ2LXRh80K7BxOlk5/8JxuGnuhpl+muw=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
@@ -1569,8 +1569,8 @@ golang.org/x/term v0.8.0/go.mod h1:xPskH00ivmX89bAKVGSKKtLOWNx2+17Eiy94tnKShWo=
 golang.org/x/term v0.13.0/go.mod h1:LTmsnFJwVN6bCy1rVCoS+qHT1HhALEFxKncY3WNNh4U=
 golang.org/x/term v0.17.0/go.mod h1:lLRBjIVuehSbZlaOtGMbcMncT+aqLLLmKrsjNrUguwk=
 golang.org/x/term v0.18.0/go.mod h1:ILwASektA3OnRv7amZ1xhE/KTR+u50pbXfZ03+6Nx58=
-golang.org/x/term v0.43.0 h1:S4RLU2sB31O/NCl+zFN9Aru9A/Cq2aqKpTZJ6B+DwT4=
-golang.org/x/term v0.43.0/go.mod h1:lrhlHNdQJHO+1qVYiHfFKVuVioJIheAc3fBSMFYEIsk=
+golang.org/x/term v0.44.0 h1:0rLvDRCtNj0gZkyIXhCyOb2OAzEhLVqc4B+hrsBhrmc=
+golang.org/x/term v0.44.0/go.mod h1:7ze4MdzUzLXpSAoFP1H0bOI9aXDqveSvatT5vKcFh2Y=
 golang.org/x/text v0.0.0-20170915032832-14c0d48ead0c/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.1-0.20180807135948-17ff2d5776d2/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
 	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"

 	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
 )
@@ -307,17 +308,50 @@ func parseKey(in []byte) (out *Key, rest []byte, err error) {
 	}, record.Rest, nil
 }

+// pipelineMaxInFlight is the maximum number of outstanding requests the
+// client will pipeline to the agent before applying backpressure.
+const pipelineMaxInFlight = 32
+
 // client is a client for an ssh-agent process.
+//
+// Exactly one of pipeline / (mu, conn) is set, chosen by NewClient
+// based on whether the underlying transport implements io.Closer.
 type client struct {
-	// conn is typically a *net.UnixConn
+	// pipeline, if non-nil, dispatches requests over a pipelined
+	// connection: requests are written as soon as the wire is
+	// available and responses are routed back to per-call reply
+	// channels in FIFO order by a background reader goroutine.
+	pipeline *pipeline
+
+	// mu and conn are used in fully-serialized mode, when the
+	// transport does not implement io.Closer. Each call takes mu,
+	// writes its request, reads the matching response, and releases
+	// mu before returning. There is no background goroutine.
+	mu   sync.Mutex
 	conn io.ReadWriter
-	// mu is used to prevent concurrent access to the agent
-	mu sync.Mutex
 }

 // NewClient returns an Agent that talks to an ssh-agent process over
 // the given connection.
+//
+// If rw also implements io.Closer (like *net.UnixConn and ssh.Channel
+// do), the returned client pipelines concurrent requests over the
+// connection: callers can issue Sign and other operations from
+// multiple goroutines and they will be written to the agent as soon
+// as the wire is available, rather than waiting for the previous
+// responses. The ssh-agent protocol still requires responses to be
+// returned in request order, so a slow request delays subsequent
+// responses on the same connection (head-of-line blocking).
+//
+// Pipelining requires io.Closer because, on a Write error, the
+// background reader goroutine must be unblocked by closing the
+// underlying connection. When rw does not implement io.Closer
+// this is not possible, so NewClient falls back to fully
+// serializing each request: a single in-flight call at a time.
 func NewClient(rw io.ReadWriter) ExtendedAgent {
+	if rwc, ok := rw.(io.ReadWriteCloser); ok {
+		return &client{pipeline: newPipeline(rwc)}
+	}
 	return &client{conn: rw}
 }

@@ -340,6 +374,16 @@ func (c *client) call(req []byte) (reply interface{}, err error) {
 // bytes of the response are returned; no unmarshalling is
 // performed on the response.
 func (c *client) callRaw(req []byte) (reply []byte, err error) {
+	if c.pipeline != nil {
+		return c.pipeline.call(req)
+	}
+	return c.serialCall(req)
+}
+
+// serialCall implements the fully-serialized request/response path
+// used when the transport is not an io.Closer. It writes req under mu
+// and reads the matching response before returning.
+func (c *client) serialCall(req []byte) (reply []byte, err error) {
 	c.mu.Lock()
 	defer c.mu.Unlock()

@@ -577,6 +621,9 @@ func (c *client) insertKey(s interface{}, comment string, constraints []byte) er
 			Constraints: constraints,
 		})
 	case ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		if len(k) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("agent: bad ED25519 key size: %d", len(k))
+		}
 		req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519KeyMsg{
 			Type:        ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
 			Pub:         []byte(k)[32:],
@@ -588,6 +635,9 @@ func (c *client) insertKey(s interface{}, comment string, constraints []byte) er
 	// general idiom is to pass ed25519.PrivateKey by value, not by pointer.
 	// We still support the pointer variant for backwards compatibility.
 	case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		if len(*k) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("agent: bad ED25519 key size: %d", len(*k))
+		}
 		req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519KeyMsg{
 			Type:        ssh.KeyAlgoED25519,
 			Pub:         []byte(*k)[32:],
@@ -712,6 +762,9 @@ func (c *client) insertCert(s interface{}, cert *ssh.Certificate, comment string
 			Constraints: constraints,
 		})
 	case ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		if len(k) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("agent: bad ED25519 key size: %d", len(k))
+		}
 		req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519CertMsg{
 			Type:        cert.Type(),
 			CertBytes:   cert.Marshal(),
@@ -724,6 +777,9 @@ func (c *client) insertCert(s interface{}, cert *ssh.Certificate, comment string
 	// general idiom is to pass ed25519.PrivateKey by value, not by pointer.
 	// We still support the pointer variant for backwards compatibility.
 	case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		if len(*k) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+			return fmt.Errorf("agent: bad ED25519 key size: %d", len(*k))
+		}
 		req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519CertMsg{
 			Type:        cert.Type(),
 			CertBytes:   cert.Marshal(),
@@ -861,3 +917,170 @@ func (c *client) Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error

 	return buf, nil
 }
+
+// pipelineResult carries either a raw agent reply or an error back to a
+// caller waiting on the response channel.
+type pipelineResult struct {
+	reply []byte
+	err   error
+}
+
+// pipeline implements request pipelining over a single agent connection.
+//
+// Writers serialize on writeMu to both register a reply channel in the
+// pending FIFO queue and write the request bytes on the wire; the two
+// must be atomic so the queue order matches the wire order. A single
+// reader goroutine decodes responses from the connection and dispatches
+// each one to the channel at the head of the queue.
+//
+// pending is a chan-of-chan acting as a FIFO queue with a fixed
+// capacity of pipelineMaxInFlight. The outer channel provides ordering
+// (reads happen in send order) and natural backpressure (a full queue
+// blocks new writers). Each inner channel is buffered with capacity
+// one and is sent to exactly once: either by the reader goroutine
+// with the agent reply, or by shutdown with the terminal error during
+// drain. The cap-one buffer makes the producer's send non-blocking,
+// so the reader and shutdown never have to wait for the caller to be
+// scheduled on the receive.
+//
+// When the reader goroutine exits (on read error or protocol
+// violation), it closes exitCh to wake any writer blocked on the
+// pending queue, then serializes with any in-flight writer to close
+// the pending channel, and finally drains the remaining entries
+// delivering the terminal error to each waiting caller. The
+// pipeline relies on conn implementing io.Closer so a writer that
+// hits a Write error can close the connection to unblock the reader
+// goroutine; NewClient is responsible for only constructing a
+// pipeline when this guarantee holds.
+type pipeline struct {
+	conn io.ReadWriteCloser
+
+	writeMu sync.Mutex
+	// pending is the FIFO queue of reply channels with capacity
+	// pipelineMaxInFlight. See type-level documentation.
+	pending chan chan pipelineResult
+	exitCh  chan struct{}
+
+	// err carries the terminal error to callers blocked on a closed
+	// pipeline. It is stored exactly once by the reader goroutine
+	// before exitCh is closed; every read happens after observing
+	// exitCh closed, so the load synchronises through the close and
+	// is guaranteed to return the stored value (never nil).
+	err atomic.Pointer[error]
+}
+
+func newPipeline(conn io.ReadWriteCloser) *pipeline {
+	p := &pipeline{
+		conn:    conn,
+		pending: make(chan chan pipelineResult, pipelineMaxInFlight),
+		exitCh:  make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+	go p.readLoop()
+	return p
+}
+
+// readLoop decodes responses from conn and dispatches them in FIFO order
+// to reply channels in pending. On any failure it invokes shutdown.
+func (p *pipeline) readLoop() {
+	var finalErr error
+	for {
+		var sizeBuf [4]byte
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(p.conn, sizeBuf[:]); err != nil {
+			finalErr = err
+			break
+		}
+		respSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(sizeBuf[:])
+		if respSize > maxAgentResponseBytes {
+			finalErr = errors.New("response too large")
+			break
+		}
+		buf := make([]byte, respSize)
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(p.conn, buf); err != nil {
+			finalErr = err
+			break
+		}
+		// Successful writes always enqueue before sending bytes, so
+		// pending has a waiting channel for this response.
+		ch := <-p.pending
+		// The reply channel is buffered with capacity 1 and is only
+		// ever written to once, so this send cannot block.
+		ch <- pipelineResult{reply: buf}
+	}
+	p.shutdown(clientErr(finalErr))
+}
+
+// shutdown is called exactly once, from readLoop, when the reader is
+// terminating. It unblocks pending writers and fails all in-flight
+// requests with finalErr.
+func (p *pipeline) shutdown(finalErr error) {
+	// Publish the terminal error before closing exitCh so any
+	// writer that subsequently observes exitCh closed sees err.
+	p.err.Store(&finalErr)
+
+	// Wake any writer blocked waiting for a slot in the pending queue.
+	close(p.exitCh)
+
+	// Wait for any writer currently inside its critical section to
+	// complete. After this lock, no new writer can reach the send on
+	// pending: they will observe exitCh closed in the select and bail
+	// out before attempting the send.
+	p.writeMu.Lock()
+	close(p.pending)
+	p.writeMu.Unlock()
+
+	// Drain entries that were enqueued but never answered, delivering
+	// the terminal error to their waiting callers. The reply channels
+	// are buffered (cap 1) and written to exactly once, so these sends
+	// cannot block.
+	for ch := range p.pending {
+		ch <- pipelineResult{err: finalErr}
+	}
+}
+
+// call sends req to the agent and returns the matching raw response.
+func (p *pipeline) call(req []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	replyCh := make(chan pipelineResult, 1)
+
+	p.writeMu.Lock()
+
+	// Priority check: if the reader has already finished shutdown,
+	// pending is closed and sending to it would panic. Bail out now.
+	// Once we pass this check while holding writeMu, shutdown cannot
+	// complete close(pending) until we release writeMu, so the send
+	// below is safe against concurrent closure.
+	select {
+	case <-p.exitCh:
+		p.writeMu.Unlock()
+		return nil, *p.err.Load()
+	default:
+	}
+
+	// Enqueue the reply channel before writing the request, so FIFO
+	// order on the wire matches FIFO order in the pending queue. The
+	// exitCh arm handles the case where the reader errors while we
+	// block on a full queue.
+	select {
+	case p.pending <- replyCh:
+	case <-p.exitCh:
+		p.writeMu.Unlock()
+		return nil, *p.err.Load()
+	}
+
+	msg := make([]byte, 4+len(req))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg, uint32(len(req)))
+	copy(msg[4:], req)
+	_, werr := p.conn.Write(msg)
+	p.writeMu.Unlock()
+
+	if werr != nil {
+		// The connection is in an undefined state. Close it so the
+		// reader unblocks promptly and triggers shutdown for every
+		// other in-flight caller. NewClient guarantees conn is a
+		// real io.Closer when the pipeline is in use.
+		p.conn.Close()
+		return nil, clientErr(werr)
+	}
+
+	res := <-replyCh
+	return res.reply, res.err
+}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go
@@ -240,13 +240,35 @@ func setConstraints(key *AddedKey, constraintBytes []byte) error {
 	return nil
 }

+// checkRSAKeyParams enforces the same bounds as parseRSA in the ssh
+// package, and additionally caps the prime factors. Without this,
+// the rsa.PrivateKey built from an Add request would call Precompute()
+// on arbitrary inputs; the CRT coefficient recomputation is cubic in
+// |p| and can consume excessive CPU on oversized keys.
+func checkRSAKeyParams(N, E, P, Q *big.Int) error {
+	if N.BitLen() > 8192 {
+		return errors.New("agent: RSA modulus too large")
+	}
+	if P.BitLen() > 4096 || Q.BitLen() > 4096 {
+		return errors.New("agent: RSA prime too large")
+	}
+	if E.BitLen() > 24 {
+		return errors.New("agent: RSA public exponent too large")
+	}
+	e := E.Int64()
+	if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 {
+		return errors.New("agent: incorrect RSA public exponent")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func parseRSAKey(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) {
 	var k rsaKeyMsg
 	if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if k.E.BitLen() > 30 {
-		return nil, errors.New("agent: RSA public exponent too large")
+	if err := checkRSAKeyParams(k.N, k.E, k.P, k.Q); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}
 	priv := &rsa.PrivateKey{
 		PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{
@@ -399,8 +421,8 @@ func parseRSACert(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: Unmarshal failed to parse public key: %v", err)
 	}

-	if rsaPub.E.BitLen() > 30 {
-		return nil, errors.New("agent: RSA public exponent too large")
+	if err := checkRSAKeyParams(rsaPub.N, rsaPub.E, k.P, k.Q); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}

 	priv := rsa.PrivateKey{
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go
@@ -634,7 +634,10 @@ func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (boo
 	drain:
 		for {
 			select {
-			case <-ch.msg:
+			case _, ok := <-ch.msg:
+				if !ok {
+					break drain
+				}
 			default:
 				break drain
 			}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go
@@ -88,6 +88,32 @@ func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan
 	return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil
 }

+// NewControlClientConn establishes an SSH connection over an OpenSSH
+// ControlMaster socket c in proxy mode.
+//
+// Note that this package only implements the client side of the multiplexing
+// protocol. The provided net.Conn must be a local, secure connection (such as a
+// Unix domain socket) connected to an already-running OpenSSH process acting as
+// the ControlMaster.
+//
+// WARNING: Because proxy mode bypasses the standard cryptographic handshake
+// passing a standard network connection (e.g., TCP) will result in plaintext
+// data leakage.
+//
+// The Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced or the connection
+// will hang.
+func NewControlClientConn(c net.Conn) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
+	conn := &connection{
+		sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
+	}
+	var err error
+	if conn.transport, err = handshakeControlProxy(c); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: control proxy handshake failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport)
+	return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil
+}
+
 // clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section
 // 7.
 func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error {
@@ -197,6 +223,59 @@ type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error
 // the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server.
 type BannerCallback func(message string) error

+// ClientAuthContext contains information about the current state of the
+// authentication process, passed to [ClientAuthCallback].
+type ClientAuthContext struct {
+	// Metadata contains the connection metadata.
+	Metadata ConnMetadata
+
+	// Algorithms contains the negotiated algorithms.
+	Algorithms NegotiatedAlgorithms
+
+	// AllowedMethods lists the authentication methods currently accepted
+	// by the server. These are the protocol-level names defined in RFC 4252
+	// such as "publickey", "password".
+	AllowedMethods []string
+
+	// PartialSuccessMethods lists the authentication methods that have already
+	// succeeded, indicating a multi-step authentication flow. This list
+	// represents the exact sequence of partial successes and may contain
+	// duplicates if the same method succeeded multiple times.
+	PartialSuccessMethods []string
+
+	// TriedMethods lists the methods that have already been attempted and
+	// failed during this session. This list represents the exact sequence of
+	// failures and may contain duplicates. This allows the callback to also
+	// track the number of failed attempts for a specific method.
+	TriedMethods []string
+}
+
+// ClientAuthCallback is a hook invoked before each authentication attempt. It
+// allows the client to dynamically select an authentication method based on the
+// current context, server capabilities, or previous failures.
+//
+// The callback is invoked after the initial "none" authentication method, once
+// the server's supported authentication methods are known.
+//
+// Return values:
+//   - (AuthMethod, nil): The client will attempt this specific method next.
+//     The returned method does NOT need to be present in [ClientConfig.Auth].
+//     This allows for dynamic authentication strategies (e.g., prompting
+//     for a password only if public key auth fails). Callers should inspect
+//     [ClientAuthContext.TriedMethods] to avoid repeatedly returning the
+//     same failing method.
+//   - (nil, nil): The client selects from [ClientConfig.Auth] the first
+//     instance of a method that has not been tried yet, or aborts if none
+//     are left. If authentication is not successful, the callback is invoked
+//     again before the following attempt.
+//   - (nil, error): The authentication process is aborted immediately,
+//     causing the ongoing SSH handshake to fail with the provided error.
+//
+// To bound resource use, the client caps the total number of authentication
+// attempts (failures and partial successes combined) at 64. If the cap is
+// exceeded the handshake aborts with an error.
+type ClientAuthCallback func(ctx *ClientAuthContext) (AuthMethod, error)
+
 // A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be
 // modified after having been passed to an SSH function.
 type ClientConfig struct {
@@ -210,6 +289,9 @@ type ClientConfig struct {
 	// Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the
 	// server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will
 	// be used during authentication.
+	//
+	// If AuthCallback is set, these AuthMethod are only used if the
+	// callback returns nil.
 	Auth []AuthMethod

 	// HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic
@@ -240,6 +322,9 @@ type ClientConfig struct {
 	//
 	// A Timeout of zero means no timeout.
 	Timeout time.Duration
+
+	// AuthCallback, if non-nil, is invoked before each authentication attempt.
+	AuthCallback ClientAuthCallback
 }

 // InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ const (
 	authSuccess
 )

+// maxAuthClientTried bounds the total number of authentication attempts
+// (failures and partial successes combined) the client makes before
+// aborting the loop, to prevent unbounded growth when an AuthCallback
+// keeps supplying methods.
+const maxAuthClientTried = 64
+
 // clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252.
 func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
 	// initiate user auth session
@@ -67,32 +73,62 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
 	// then any untried methods suggested by the server.
 	var tried []string
 	var lastMethods []string
+	var partialSuccess []string

 	sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID()
 	for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; {
 		ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions)
 		if err != nil {
 			// On disconnect, return error immediately
-			if _, ok := err.(*disconnectMsg); ok {
+			if _, isDisconnect := err.(*disconnectMsg); isDisconnect {
 				return err
 			}
-			// We return the error later if there is no other method left to
-			// try.
+			// We return the error later if there is no other method
+			// left to try.
 			ok = authFailure
 		}
-		if ok == authSuccess {
-			// success
+
+		switch ok {
+		case authSuccess:
 			return nil
-		} else if ok == authFailure {
-			if m := auth.method(); !slices.Contains(tried, m) {
-				tried = append(tried, m)
-			}
+		case authPartialSuccess:
+			partialSuccess = append(partialSuccess, auth.method())
+		case authFailure:
+			tried = append(tried, auth.method())
 		}
+		if len(partialSuccess)+len(tried) > maxAuthClientTried {
+			return fmt.Errorf("ssh: too many authentication attempts (%d), aborting",
+				len(partialSuccess)+len(tried))
+		}
+
 		if methods == nil {
 			methods = lastMethods
 		}
 		lastMethods = methods

+		// If AuthCallback is set it takes precedence: it picks the next
+		// AuthMethod dynamically. The returned method need not be in
+		// config.Auth. If the callback returns (nil, nil) we fall back to
+		// selecting the next untried method from config.Auth below; on
+		// (nil, error) the handshake aborts.
+		if config.AuthCallback != nil {
+			ctx := &ClientAuthContext{
+				Metadata:              c,
+				Algorithms:            c.Algorithms(),
+				AllowedMethods:        slices.Clone(methods),
+				PartialSuccessMethods: slices.Clone(partialSuccess),
+				TriedMethods:          slices.Clone(tried),
+			}
+			altAuth, cbErr := config.AuthCallback(ctx)
+			if cbErr != nil {
+				return cbErr
+			}
+			if altAuth != nil {
+				auth = altAuth
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+
 		auth = nil

 	findNext:
@@ -377,11 +413,11 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
 			return authFailure, nil, err
 		}

-		// If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not
-		// contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any
-		// other keys.  According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when
-		// additional authentication methods are required.
-		if success == authSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) {
+		// If authentication succeeds or partially succeeds, return immediately
+		// so the caller can select the next auth method. According to RFC 4252
+		// Section 7, if the server no longer lists "publickey" among its
+		// allowed methods, do not attempt to authenticate with any other keys.
+		if success == authSuccess || success == authPartialSuccess || !slices.Contains(methods, cb.method()) {
 			return success, methods, err
 		}
 	}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go
@@ -91,9 +91,17 @@ func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) {
 	}
 }

+// A connTransport represents the transport for a connection.
+type connTransport interface {
+	packetConn
+	getAlgorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms
+	getSessionID() []byte
+	waitSession() error
+}
+
 // A connection represents an incoming connection.
 type connection struct {
-	transport *handshakeTransport
+	transport connTransport
 	sshConn

 	// The connection protocol.
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/control.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/control.go
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+// Copyright 2026 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package ssh
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+const (
+	muxProtocolVersion = 4
+
+	muxMsgHello = 0x00000001
+	muxCProxy   = 0x1000000f
+	muxSProxy   = 0x8000000f
+)
+
+const controlProxyRequestID = 0
+
+// handshakeControlProxy attempts to establish a transport connection with an
+// OpenSSH ControlMaster socket in proxy mode. For details see:
+// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.mux
+func handshakeControlProxy(rw io.ReadWriteCloser) (connTransport, error) {
+	if err := controlProxyWritePacket(rw, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddUint32(muxMsgHello)
+		b.AddUint32(muxProtocolVersion)
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux hello write failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := controlProxyWritePacket(rw, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddUint32(muxCProxy)
+		b.AddUint32(controlProxyRequestID)
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux client proxy write failed: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	messageType, body, err := controlProxyReadMessage(rw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux hello read failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	if messageType != muxMsgHello {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected hello response, got %v", messageType)
+	}
+	var v uint32
+	if !body.ReadUint32(&v) {
+		return nil, errors.New("EOF reading mux protocol version")
+	}
+	if v != muxProtocolVersion {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux server has unsupported version %v", v)
+	}
+	messageType, body, err = controlProxyReadMessage(rw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mux server proxy read failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	if messageType != muxSProxy {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected server proxy response, got %v", messageType)
+	}
+	var reqID uint32
+	if !body.ReadUint32(&reqID) {
+		return nil, errors.New("EOF reading request id")
+	}
+	if reqID != controlProxyRequestID {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected request id %v, got %v", controlProxyRequestID, reqID)
+	}
+	return &controlProxyTransport{rw}, nil
+}
+
+// controlProxyTransport implements the connTransport interface for
+// ControlMaster connections. Each controlMessage has zero length padding and
+// no MAC.
+type controlProxyTransport struct {
+	rw io.ReadWriteCloser
+}
+
+func (p *controlProxyTransport) Close() error {
+	return p.rw.Close()
+}
+
+func (p *controlProxyTransport) writePacket(controlMessage []byte) error {
+	return controlProxyWritePacket(p.rw, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddUint8(0) // Padding length.
+		b.AddBytes(controlMessage)
+	})
+}
+
+func (p *controlProxyTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) {
+	buf, err := controlProxyReadPacket(p.rw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: error reading control message: %w", err)
+	}
+	// Discard the padding length.
+	if len(buf) < 1 {
+		return nil, errors.New("ssh: EOF reading padding length")
+	}
+	if buf[0] != 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("ssh: unexpected non-zero padding in control message")
+	}
+	return buf[1:], nil
+}
+
+func (p *controlProxyTransport) getAlgorithms() NegotiatedAlgorithms {
+	return NegotiatedAlgorithms{}
+}
+
+func (p *controlProxyTransport) getSessionID() []byte {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p *controlProxyTransport) waitSession() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func controlProxyWritePacket(w io.Writer, f cryptobyte.BuilderContinuation) error {
+	var buf []byte
+	b := cryptobyte.NewBuilder(buf)
+	b.AddUint32LengthPrefixed(f)
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(out)
+	return err
+}
+
+func controlProxyReadPacket(r io.Reader) (cryptobyte.String, error) {
+	var l uint32
+	if err := binary.Read(r, binary.BigEndian, &l); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if l > maxPacket {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("message length %v exceeds maximum %v", l, maxPacket)
+	}
+	buf := make([]byte, l)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return buf, nil
+}
+
+func controlProxyReadMessage(r io.Reader) (messageType uint32, body cryptobyte.String, err error) {
+	body, err = controlProxyReadPacket(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading message body: %w", err)
+	}
+	if !body.ReadUint32(&messageType) {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("EOF reading message type")
+	}
+	return messageType, body, nil
+}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
 	"slices"
+	"sync"

 	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
 )
@@ -718,15 +719,9 @@ func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshak
 			kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits, kexDHGexRequest.PreferredBits)
 	}

-	var p *big.Int
-	// We hardcode sending Oakley Group 14 (2048 bits), Oakley Group 15 (3072
-	// bits) or Oakley Group 16 (4096 bits), based on the requested max size.
-	if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 3072 {
-		p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup14, 16)
-	} else if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < 4096 {
-		p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup15, 16)
-	} else {
-		p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(oakleyGroup16, 16)
+	p, err := chooseDH(kexDHGexRequest)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}

 	g := big.NewInt(2)
@@ -805,3 +800,65 @@ func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshak
 		Hash:      gex.hashFunc,
 	}, err
 }
+
+type dhKEXGroup struct {
+	size int
+	p    *big.Int
+}
+
+// supportedDHKEXGroups returns the DH groups the server is willing to offer
+// for diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchanges. The list is built lazily
+// on first use to keep the hex-to-big.Int parse out of package initialization.
+var supportedDHKEXGroups = sync.OnceValue(func() []dhKEXGroup {
+	specs := []struct {
+		size int
+		hex  string
+	}{
+		{2048, oakleyGroup14},
+		{3072, oakleyGroup15},
+		{4096, oakleyGroup16},
+	}
+	out := make([]dhKEXGroup, 0, len(specs))
+	for _, s := range specs {
+		p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(s.hex, 16)
+		out = append(out, dhKEXGroup{size: s.size, p: p})
+	}
+	return out
+})
+
+// chooseDH picks a DH group for the given client request, mirroring the
+// algorithm used by OpenSSH's choose_dh in dh.c: prefer the smallest known
+// group larger than  or equal to the client's PreferredBits, and otherwise pick
+// the largest group within the accepted [MinBits, MaxBits] range.
+func chooseDH(req kexDHGexRequestMsg) (*big.Int, error) {
+	var best *big.Int
+	bestSize := 0
+	wantBits := int(req.PreferredBits)
+
+	for _, group := range supportedDHKEXGroups() {
+		if uint32(group.size) < req.MinBits || uint32(group.size) > req.MaxBits {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if bestSize == 0 {
+			best = group.p
+			bestSize = group.size
+			continue
+		}
+
+		closerFromAbove := group.size >= wantBits && group.size < bestSize
+		closerFromBelow := group.size > bestSize && bestSize < wantBits
+
+		if closerFromAbove || closerFromBelow {
+			best = group.p
+			bestSize = group.size
+		}
+	}
+
+	if bestSize == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: no suitable DH group found for request min: %d, preferred: %d, max: %d",
+			req.MinBits, req.PreferredBits, req.MaxBits)
+	}
+
+	return best, nil
+}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err err
 	case InsecureKeyAlgoDSA:
 		return parseDSA(in)
 	case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521:
-		return parseECDSA(in)
+		return parseECDSA(in, algo)
 	case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256:
 		return parseSKECDSA(in)
 	case KeyAlgoED25519:
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool {
 }

 // parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1.
-func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
+func parseECDSA(in []byte, expectedType string) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
 	var w struct {
 		Curve    string
 		KeyBytes []byte
@@ -817,6 +817,12 @@ func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
 		return nil, nil, err
 	}

+	actualType := "ecdsa-sha2-" + w.Curve
+	if expectedType != actualType {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm type mismatch: expected %q, found curve %q (type %q)",
+			expectedType, w.Curve, actualType)
+	}
+
 	key := new(ecdsa.PublicKey)

 	switch w.Curve {
@@ -1466,6 +1472,17 @@ func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase []byte) openSSHDecryptFunc {
 			return nil, err
 		}

+		// OpenSSH does not impose an upper bound on the bcrypt round count
+		// stored in the key file, but bcrypt_pbkdf cost is linear in rounds:
+		// the default is 16, ssh-keygen lets users pick anything up to
+		// INT_MAX. Cap at 2048 (128x the default, a few seconds of CPU) so
+		// that an oversized value in the file cannot tie up the caller for
+		// months.
+		const maxRounds = 1 << 11
+		if opts.Rounds > maxRounds {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: bcrypt KDF rounds %d exceed maximum %d", opts.Rounds, maxRounds)
+		}
+
 		k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, []byte(opts.Salt), int(opts.Rounds), 32+16)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
@@ -1635,10 +1652,28 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv
 			return nil, err
 		}

+		// Mirror the validation done in parseRSA for public keys: cap the
+		// modulus at the same limit enforced by crypto/tls, reject oversized
+		// or invalid exponents, and additionally bound the prime factors to
+		// avoid the expensive CRT coefficient recomputation in pk.Precompute.
+		if key.N.BitLen() > 8192 {
+			return nil, errors.New("ssh: rsa modulus too large")
+		}
+		if key.P.BitLen() > 4096 || key.Q.BitLen() > 4096 {
+			return nil, errors.New("ssh: rsa prime too large")
+		}
+		if key.E.BitLen() > 24 {
+			return nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large")
+		}
+		e := key.E.Int64()
+		if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.New("ssh: incorrect exponent")
+		}
+
 		pk := &rsa.PrivateKey{
 			PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{
 				N: key.N,
-				E: int(key.E.Int64()),
+				E: int(e),
 			},
 			D:      key.D,
 			Primes: []*big.Int{key.P, key.Q},
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func nextWord(line []byte) (string, []byte) {
 		return string(line), nil
 	}

-	return string(line[:i]), bytes.TrimSpace(line[i:])
+	return string(line[:i]), trimSpace(line[i:])
 }

 func parseLine(line []byte) (marker, host string, key ssh.PublicKey, err error) {
@@ -188,12 +188,17 @@ func parseLine(line []byte) (marker, host string, key ssh.PublicKey, err error)
 	}

 	host, line = nextWord(line)
+	// If the extracted 'host' starts with '@', it means we either encountered
+	// a second marker (e.g., "@cert-authority @revoked") or an unknown marker
+	// (e.g., "@unknown"). Both are invalid.
+	if len(host) > 0 && host[0] == '@' {
+		return "", "", nil, fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: unexpected marker: %q", host)
+	}
 	if len(line) == 0 {
 		return "", "", nil, errors.New("knownhosts: missing host pattern")
 	}

-	// ignore the keytype as it's in the key blob anyway.
-	_, line = nextWord(line)
+	wantType, line := nextWord(line)
 	if len(line) == 0 {
 		return "", "", nil, errors.New("knownhosts: missing key type pattern")
 	}
@@ -209,6 +214,10 @@ func parseLine(line []byte) (marker, host string, key ssh.PublicKey, err error)
 		return "", "", nil, err
 	}

+	if key.Type() != wantType {
+		return "", "", nil, fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: key type mismatch: found %q, want %q", key.Type(), wantType)
+	}
+
 	return marker, host, key, nil
 }

@@ -387,7 +396,7 @@ func (db *hostKeyDB) Read(r io.Reader, filename string) error {
 	for scanner.Scan() {
 		lineNum++
 		line := scanner.Bytes()
-		line = bytes.TrimSpace(line)
+		line = trimSpace(line)
 		if len(line) == 0 || line[0] == '#' {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -535,3 +544,10 @@ func newHashedHost(encoded string) (*hashedHost, error) {
 func (h *hashedHost) match(a addr) bool {
 	return bytes.Equal(hashHost(Normalize(a.String()), h.salt), h.hash)
 }
+
+// trimSpace removes leading and trailing ASCII whitespace (space and tab). It
+// is used instead of bytes.TrimSpace to match OpenSSH behavior, which strictly
+// parses only ASCII space (0x20) and tab (0x09) as whitespace.
+func trimSpace(in []byte) []byte {
+	return bytes.Trim(in, " \t")
+}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go
@@ -155,7 +155,10 @@ func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []
 	drain:
 		for {
 			select {
-			case <-m.globalResponses:
+			case _, ok := <-m.globalResponses:
+				if !ok {
+					break drain
+				}
 			default:
 				break drain
 			}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ type Permissions struct {
 	ExtraData map[any]any
 }

+// GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes the server callbacks for gssapi-with-mic
+// authentication. If either field is nil, gssapi-with-mic is considered not
+// configured.
 type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
 	// AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic
 	// authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the
@@ -68,6 +71,10 @@ type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
 	Server GSSAPIServer
 }

+func gssapiWithMICConfigured(config *GSSAPIWithMICConfig) bool {
+	return config != nil && config.AllowLogin != nil && config.Server != nil
+}
+
 // SendAuthBanner implements [ServerPreAuthConn].
 func (s *connection) SendAuthBanner(msg string) error {
 	return s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthBannerMsg{
@@ -382,8 +389,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
 	}

 	if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil &&
-		config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil ||
-		config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) {
+		config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && !gssapiWithMICConfigured(config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig) {
 		return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
 	}

@@ -607,6 +613,15 @@ func (b *BannerError) Error() string {
 	return b.Err.Error()
 }

+// maxAuthServerAttempts caps the total number of SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+// messages the server will process on a single connection, regardless of
+// outcome (failure, partial success, public key query, or none). It is a
+// backstop against clients that drive the authentication loop indefinitely
+// without ever incurring a real failure — for example by repeatedly
+// triggering PartialSuccessError or by spamming public key offer queries —
+// neither of which increment the MaxAuthTries failure counter.
+const maxAuthServerAttempts = 128
+
 func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
 	if config.PreAuthConnCallback != nil {
 		config.PreAuthConnCallback(s)
@@ -617,6 +632,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, err
 	var perms *Permissions

 	authFailures := 0
+	authAttempts := 0
 	noneAuthCount := 0
 	var authErrs []error
 	var calledBannerCallback bool
@@ -645,6 +661,19 @@ userAuthLoop:
 			return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
 		}

+		if authAttempts >= maxAuthServerAttempts {
+			discMsg := &disconnectMsg{
+				Reason:  2,
+				Message: "too many authentication attempts",
+			}
+			if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			authErrs = append(authErrs, discMsg)
+			return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
+		}
+		authAttempts++
+
 		var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg
 		if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
 			if err == io.EOF {
@@ -846,7 +875,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
 				}
 			}
 		case "gssapi-with-mic":
-			if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
+			if !gssapiWithMICConfigured(authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig) {
 				authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured")
 				break
 			}
@@ -979,8 +1008,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
 		if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
 			failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
 		}
-		if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
-			authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
+		if gssapiWithMICConfigured(authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig) {
 			failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
 		}

--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go
@@ -423,6 +423,9 @@ func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error {
 	for msg := range reqs {
 		switch msg.Type {
 		case "exit-status":
+			if len(msg.Payload) < 4 {
+				return errors.New("ssh: malformed exit-status request")
+			}
 			wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload))
 		case "exit-signal":
 			var sigval struct {
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/entity.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/entity.go
@@ -2156,9 +2156,8 @@ var entity = map[string]rune{

 // HTML entities that are two unicode codepoints.
 var entity2 = map[string][2]rune{
-	// TODO(nigeltao): Handle replacements that are wider than their names.
-	// "nLt;":                     {'\u226A', '\u20D2'},
-	// "nGt;":                     {'\u226B', '\u20D2'},
+	"nLt;":                     {'\u226A', '\u20D2'},
+	"nGt;":                     {'\u226B', '\u20D2'},
 	"NotEqualTilde;":           {'\u2242', '\u0338'},
 	"NotGreaterFullEqual;":     {'\u2267', '\u0338'},
 	"NotGreaterGreater;":       {'\u226B', '\u0338'},
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/escape.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/escape.go
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package html

 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 )
@@ -50,25 +51,24 @@ var replacementTable = [...]rune{
 	// 0x0D->'\u000D' is a no-op.
 }

-// unescapeEntity reads an entity like "&lt;" from b[src:] and writes the
-// corresponding "<" to b[dst:], returning the incremented dst and src cursors.
-// Precondition: b[src] == '&' && dst <= src.
-// attribute should be true if parsing an attribute value.
-func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) {
+// unescapeEntity attempts to consume a character reference from s[src:],
+// returning the rune, potential second rune, and number of bytes consumed
+// (which indicates the length of the character reference). It is assumed that
+// the first byte of s is '&'. attribute should be true if parsing an attribute
+// value.
+func unescapeEntity(s []byte, attribute bool) (rune, rune, int) {
 	// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#consume-a-character-reference

 	// i starts at 1 because we already know that s[0] == '&'.
-	i, s := 1, b[src:]
+	i := 1

 	if len(s) <= 1 {
-		b[dst] = b[src]
-		return dst + 1, src + 1
+		return '&', 0, 1
 	}

 	if s[i] == '#' {
-		if len(s) <= 3 { // We need to have at least "&#.".
-			b[dst] = b[src]
-			return dst + 1, src + 1
+		if len(s) <= 2 { // We need to have at least "&#".
+			return '&', 0, 1
 		}
 		i++
 		c := s[i]
@@ -78,34 +78,43 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) {
 			i++
 		}

+		i0 := i
 		x := '\x00'
 		for i < len(s) {
 			c = s[i]
-			i++
+			var d rune
+			var mult rune
 			if hex {
+				mult = 16
 				if '0' <= c && c <= '9' {
-					x = 16*x + rune(c) - '0'
-					continue
+					d = rune(c) - '0'
 				} else if 'a' <= c && c <= 'f' {
-					x = 16*x + rune(c) - 'a' + 10
-					continue
+					d = rune(c) - 'a' + 10
 				} else if 'A' <= c && c <= 'F' {
-					x = 16*x + rune(c) - 'A' + 10
-					continue
+					d = rune(c) - 'A' + 10
+				} else {
+					break
+				}
+			} else {
+				mult = 10
+				if '0' <= c && c <= '9' {
+					d = rune(c) - '0'
+				} else {
+					break
 				}
-			} else if '0' <= c && c <= '9' {
-				x = 10*x + rune(c) - '0'
-				continue
 			}
-			if c != ';' {
-				i--
+			if x <= 0x10FFFF {
+				x = mult*x + d
 			}
-			break
+			i++
 		}

-		if i <= 3 { // No characters matched.
-			b[dst] = b[src]
-			return dst + 1, src + 1
+		if i == i0 { // No characters matched.
+			return '&', 0, 1
+		}
+
+		if i < len(s) && s[i] == ';' {
+			i++
 		}

 		if 0x80 <= x && x <= 0x9F {
@@ -116,7 +125,7 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) {
 			x = '\uFFFD'
 		}

-		return dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x), src + i
+		return x, 0, i
 	}

 	// Consume the maximum number of characters possible, with the
@@ -141,10 +150,9 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) {
 	} else if attribute && entityName[len(entityName)-1] != ';' && len(s) > i && s[i] == '=' {
 		// No-op.
 	} else if x := entity[entityName]; x != 0 {
-		return dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x), src + i
+		return x, 0, i
 	} else if x := entity2[entityName]; x[0] != 0 {
-		dst1 := dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x[0])
-		return dst1 + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst1:], x[1]), src + i
+		return x[0], x[1], i
 	} else if !attribute {
 		maxLen := len(entityName) - 1
 		if maxLen > longestEntityWithoutSemicolon {
@@ -152,35 +160,67 @@ func unescapeEntity(b []byte, dst, src int, attribute bool) (dst1, src1 int) {
 		}
 		for j := maxLen; j > 1; j-- {
 			if x := entity[entityName[:j]]; x != 0 {
-				return dst + utf8.EncodeRune(b[dst:], x), src + j + 1
+				return x, 0, j + 1
 			}
 		}
 	}

-	dst1, src1 = dst+i, src+i
-	copy(b[dst:dst1], b[src:src1])
-	return dst1, src1
+	return '&', 0, 1
 }

-// unescape unescapes b's entities in-place, so that "a&lt;b" becomes "a<b".
-// attribute should be true if parsing an attribute value.
+// unescape unescapes b's entites, so that "a&lt;b" becomes "a<b". It attempts
+// to do so in place, but if the unescaped value is longer than the input it
+// allocates a new slice. attribute should be true if parsing an attribute
+// value.
 func unescape(b []byte, attribute bool) []byte {
-	for i, c := range b {
-		if c == '&' {
-			dst, src := unescapeEntity(b, i, i, attribute)
-			for src < len(b) {
-				c := b[src]
-				if c == '&' {
-					dst, src = unescapeEntity(b, dst, src, attribute)
-				} else {
-					b[dst] = c
-					dst, src = dst+1, src+1
-				}
-			}
-			return b[0:dst]
-		}
+	firstAmp := slices.Index(b, '&')
+	if firstAmp == -1 {
+		return b
 	}
-	return b
+
+	out := b[:firstAmp]
+	src := firstAmp
+	reusingB := true
+	for src < len(b) {
+		if b[src] != '&' {
+			out = append(out, b[src])
+			src++
+			continue
+		}
+
+		r1, r2, entityNameLen := unescapeEntity(b[src:], attribute)
+		if entityNameLen == 1 && r1 == '&' {
+			// Not an entity
+			out = append(out, '&')
+			src++
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Compute replacement length
+		replLen := utf8.RuneLen(r1)
+		if r2 != 0 {
+			replLen += utf8.RuneLen(r2)
+		}
+
+		// If the name of the entity is shorter than the width of the
+		// replacement runes then we need to expand the output slice to
+		// fit the replacement.
+		if replLen > entityNameLen {
+			if reusingB {
+				out = slices.Clone(out)
+				reusingB = false
+			}
+			out = slices.Grow(out, replLen)
+		}
+		out = utf8.AppendRune(out, r1)
+		if r2 != 0 {
+			out = utf8.AppendRune(out, r2)
+		}
+
+		src += entityNameLen
+	}
+
+	return out
 }

 // lower lower-cases the A-Z bytes in b in-place, so that "aBc" becomes "abc".
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/foreign.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/foreign.go
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func adjustForeignAttributes(aa []Attribute) {
 		}
 		switch a.Key {
 		case "xlink:actuate", "xlink:arcrole", "xlink:href", "xlink:role", "xlink:show",
-			"xlink:title", "xlink:type", "xml:base", "xml:lang", "xml:space", "xmlns:xlink":
+			"xlink:title", "xlink:type", "xml:lang", "xml:space", "xmlns:xlink":
 			j := strings.Index(a.Key, ":")
 			aa[i].Namespace = a.Key[:j]
 			aa[i].Key = a.Key[j+1:]
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/parse.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/parse.go
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func (p *parser) top() *Node {
 // Stop tags for use in popUntil. These come from section 12.2.4.2.
 var (
 	defaultScopeStopTags = map[string][]a.Atom{
-		"":     {a.Applet, a.Caption, a.Html, a.Table, a.Td, a.Th, a.Marquee, a.Object, a.Template},
+		"":     {a.Applet, a.Caption, a.Html, a.Table, a.Td, a.Th, a.Marquee, a.Object, a.Template, a.Select},
 		"math": {a.AnnotationXml, a.Mi, a.Mn, a.Mo, a.Ms, a.Mtext},
 		"svg":  {a.Desc, a.ForeignObject, a.Title},
 	}
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ const (
 	tableScope
 	tableRowScope
 	tableBodyScope
-	selectScope
 )

 // popUntil pops the stack of open elements at the highest element whose tag
@@ -133,10 +132,6 @@ func (p *parser) indexOfElementInScope(s scope, matchTags ...a.Atom) int {
 				if tagAtom == a.Html || tagAtom == a.Table || tagAtom == a.Template {
 					return -1
 				}
-			case selectScope:
-				if tagAtom != a.Optgroup && tagAtom != a.Option {
-					return -1
-				}
 			default:
 				panic(fmt.Sprintf("html: internal error: indexOfElementInScope unknown scope: %d", s))
 			}
@@ -460,21 +455,6 @@ func (p *parser) resetInsertionMode() {
 		}

 		switch n.DataAtom {
-		case a.Select:
-			if !last {
-				for ancestor, first := n, p.oe[0]; ancestor != first; {
-					ancestor = p.oe[p.oe.index(ancestor)-1]
-					switch ancestor.DataAtom {
-					case a.Template:
-						p.im = inSelectIM
-						return
-					case a.Table:
-						p.im = inSelectInTableIM
-						return
-					}
-				}
-			}
-			p.im = inSelectIM
 		case a.Td, a.Th:
 			// TODO: remove this divergence from the HTML5 spec.
 			//
@@ -1002,7 +982,10 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool {
 			p.popUntil(buttonScope, a.P)
 			p.addElement()
 		case a.Button:
-			p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Button)
+			if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Button) {
+				p.generateImpliedEndTags()
+				p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Button)
+			}
 			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
 			p.addElement()
 			p.framesetOK = false
@@ -1040,7 +1023,18 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool {
 			p.framesetOK = false
 			p.im = inTableIM
 			return true
-		case a.Area, a.Br, a.Embed, a.Img, a.Input, a.Keygen, a.Wbr:
+		case a.Area, a.Br, a.Embed, a.Img, a.Keygen, a.Wbr:
+			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
+			p.addElement()
+			p.oe.pop()
+			p.acknowledgeSelfClosingTag()
+			p.framesetOK = false
+		case a.Input:
+			if p.fragment && p.context.DataAtom == a.Select {
+				// Ignore the token.
+				return true
+			}
+			p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Select)
 			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
 			p.addElement()
 			p.oe.pop()
@@ -1061,7 +1055,13 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool {
 			p.oe.pop()
 			p.acknowledgeSelfClosingTag()
 		case a.Hr:
-			p.popUntil(buttonScope, a.P)
+			if p.elementInScope(buttonScope, a.P) {
+				p.generateImpliedEndTags("p")
+				p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.P)
+			}
+			if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Select) {
+				p.generateImpliedEndTags()
+			}
 			p.addElement()
 			p.oe.pop()
 			p.acknowledgeSelfClosingTag()
@@ -1095,13 +1095,30 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool {
 			// Don't let the tokenizer go into raw text mode when scripting is disabled.
 			p.tokenizer.NextIsNotRawText()
 		case a.Select:
+			if p.fragment && p.context.DataAtom == a.Select {
+				// Ignore the token.
+				return true
+			} else if p.popUntil(defaultScope, a.Select) {
+				return true
+			}
 			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
 			p.addElement()
 			p.framesetOK = false
-			p.im = inSelectIM
 			return true
-		case a.Optgroup, a.Option:
-			if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option {
+		case a.Option:
+			if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Select) {
+				p.generateImpliedEndTags("optgroup")
+				// If oe has option element in scope, parse error?
+			} else if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option {
+				p.oe.pop()
+			}
+			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
+			p.addElement()
+		case a.Optgroup:
+			if p.elementInScope(defaultScope, a.Select) {
+				p.generateImpliedEndTags()
+				// If oe has option or optgroup element in scope, parse error?
+			} else if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option {
 				p.oe.pop()
 			}
 			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
@@ -1149,7 +1166,12 @@ func inBodyIM(p *parser) bool {
 				return false
 			}
 			return true
-		case a.Address, a.Article, a.Aside, a.Blockquote, a.Button, a.Center, a.Details, a.Dialog, a.Dir, a.Div, a.Dl, a.Fieldset, a.Figcaption, a.Figure, a.Footer, a.Header, a.Hgroup, a.Listing, a.Main, a.Menu, a.Nav, a.Ol, a.Pre, a.Search, a.Section, a.Summary, a.Ul:
+		case a.Address, a.Article, a.Aside, a.Blockquote, a.Button, a.Center, a.Details, a.Dialog, a.Dir, a.Div, a.Dl, a.Fieldset, a.Figcaption, a.Figure, a.Footer, a.Header, a.Hgroup, a.Listing, a.Main, a.Menu, a.Nav, a.Ol, a.Pre, a.Search, a.Section, a.Select, a.Summary, a.Ul:
+			if !p.elementInScope(defaultScope, p.tok.DataAtom) {
+				// Ignore the token.
+				return true
+			}
+			p.generateImpliedEndTags()
 			p.popUntil(defaultScope, p.tok.DataAtom)
 		case a.Form:
 			if p.oe.contains(a.Template) {
@@ -1488,17 +1510,6 @@ func inTableIM(p *parser) bool {
 			}
 			p.addElement()
 			p.form = p.oe.pop()
-		case a.Select:
-			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
-			switch p.top().DataAtom {
-			case a.Table, a.Tbody, a.Tfoot, a.Thead, a.Tr:
-				p.fosterParenting = true
-			}
-			p.addElement()
-			p.fosterParenting = false
-			p.framesetOK = false
-			p.im = inSelectInTableIM
-			return true
 		}
 	case EndTagToken:
 		switch p.tok.DataAtom {
@@ -1547,12 +1558,6 @@ func inCaptionIM(p *parser) bool {
 			p.clearActiveFormattingElements()
 			p.im = inTableIM
 			return false
-		case a.Select:
-			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
-			p.addElement()
-			p.framesetOK = false
-			p.im = inSelectInTableIM
-			return true
 		}
 	case EndTagToken:
 		switch p.tok.DataAtom {
@@ -1762,12 +1767,6 @@ func inCellIM(p *parser) bool {
 			}
 			// Ignore the token.
 			return true
-		case a.Select:
-			p.reconstructActiveFormattingElements()
-			p.addElement()
-			p.framesetOK = false
-			p.im = inSelectInTableIM
-			return true
 		}
 	case EndTagToken:
 		switch p.tok.DataAtom {
@@ -1798,118 +1797,6 @@ func inCellIM(p *parser) bool {
 	return inBodyIM(p)
 }

-// Section 12.2.6.4.16.
-func inSelectIM(p *parser) bool {
-	switch p.tok.Type {
-	case TextToken:
-		p.addText(strings.Replace(p.tok.Data, "\x00", "", -1))
-	case StartTagToken:
-		switch p.tok.DataAtom {
-		case a.Html:
-			return inBodyIM(p)
-		case a.Option:
-			if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option {
-				p.oe.pop()
-			}
-			p.addElement()
-		case a.Optgroup:
-			if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option {
-				p.oe.pop()
-			}
-			if p.top().DataAtom == a.Optgroup {
-				p.oe.pop()
-			}
-			p.addElement()
-		case a.Select:
-			if !p.popUntil(selectScope, a.Select) {
-				// Ignore the token.
-				return true
-			}
-			p.resetInsertionMode()
-		case a.Input, a.Keygen, a.Textarea:
-			if p.elementInScope(selectScope, a.Select) {
-				p.parseImpliedToken(EndTagToken, a.Select, a.Select.String())
-				return false
-			}
-			// In order to properly ignore <textarea>, we need to change the tokenizer mode.
-			p.tokenizer.NextIsNotRawText()
-			// Ignore the token.
-			return true
-		case a.Script, a.Template:
-			return inHeadIM(p)
-		case a.Iframe, a.Noembed, a.Noframes, a.Noscript, a.Plaintext, a.Style, a.Title, a.Xmp:
-			// Don't let the tokenizer go into raw text mode when there are raw tags
-			// to be ignored. These tags should be ignored from the tokenizer
-			// properly.
-			p.tokenizer.NextIsNotRawText()
-			// Ignore the token.
-			return true
-		}
-	case EndTagToken:
-		switch p.tok.DataAtom {
-		case a.Option:
-			if p.top().DataAtom == a.Option {
-				p.oe.pop()
-			}
-		case a.Optgroup:
-			i := len(p.oe) - 1
-			if p.oe[i].DataAtom == a.Option {
-				i--
-			}
-			if p.oe[i].DataAtom == a.Optgroup {
-				p.oe = p.oe[:i]
-			}
-		case a.Select:
-			if !p.popUntil(selectScope, a.Select) {
-				// Ignore the token.
-				return true
-			}
-			p.resetInsertionMode()
-		case a.Template:
-			return inHeadIM(p)
-		}
-	case CommentToken:
-		p.addChild(&Node{
-			Type: CommentNode,
-			Data: p.tok.Data,
-		})
-	case DoctypeToken:
-		// Ignore the token.
-		return true
-	case ErrorToken:
-		return inBodyIM(p)
-	}
-
-	return true
-}
-
-// Section 12.2.6.4.17.
-func inSelectInTableIM(p *parser) bool {
-	switch p.tok.Type {
-	case StartTagToken, EndTagToken:
-		switch p.tok.DataAtom {
-		case a.Caption, a.Table, a.Tbody, a.Tfoot, a.Thead, a.Tr, a.Td, a.Th:
-			if p.tok.Type == EndTagToken && !p.elementInScope(tableScope, p.tok.DataAtom) {
-				// Ignore the token.
-				return true
-			}
-			// This is like p.popUntil(selectScope, a.Select), but it also
-			// matches <math select>, not just <select>. Matching the MathML
-			// tag is arguably incorrect (conceptually), but it mimics what
-			// Chromium does.
-			for i := len(p.oe) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
-				if n := p.oe[i]; n.DataAtom == a.Select {
-					p.oe = p.oe[:i]
-					break
-				}
-			}
-			p.resetInsertionMode()
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return inSelectIM(p)
-}
-
 // Section 12.2.6.4.18.
 func inTemplateIM(p *parser) bool {
 	switch p.tok.Type {
@@ -2174,7 +2061,7 @@ func ignoreTheRemainingTokens(p *parser) bool {

 const whitespaceOrNUL = whitespace + "\x00"

-// Section 12.2.6.5
+// Section 13.2.6.5
 func parseForeignContent(p *parser) bool {
 	switch p.tok.Type {
 	case TextToken:
@@ -2189,28 +2076,26 @@ func parseForeignContent(p *parser) bool {
 			Data: p.tok.Data,
 		})
 	case StartTagToken:
-		if !p.fragment {
-			b := breakout[p.tok.Data]
-			if p.tok.DataAtom == a.Font {
-			loop:
-				for _, attr := range p.tok.Attr {
-					switch attr.Key {
-					case "color", "face", "size":
-						b = true
-						break loop
-					}
+		b := breakout[p.tok.Data]
+		if p.tok.DataAtom == a.Font {
+		loop:
+			for _, attr := range p.tok.Attr {
+				switch attr.Key {
+				case "color", "face", "size":
+					b = true
+					break loop
 				}
 			}
-			if b {
-				for i := len(p.oe) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
-					n := p.oe[i]
-					if n.Namespace == "" || htmlIntegrationPoint(n) || mathMLTextIntegrationPoint(n) {
-						p.oe = p.oe[:i+1]
-						break
-					}
+		}
+		if b {
+			for i := len(p.oe) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+				n := p.oe[i]
+				if n.Namespace == "" || htmlIntegrationPoint(n) || mathMLTextIntegrationPoint(n) {
+					p.oe = p.oe[:i+1]
+					break
 				}
-				return false
 			}
+			return p.im(p)
 		}
 		current := p.adjustedCurrentNode()
 		switch current.Namespace {
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/token.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/html/token.go
@@ -704,7 +704,11 @@ func (z *Tokenizer) readMarkupDeclaration() TokenType {
 	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
 		c[i] = z.readByte()
 		if z.err != nil {
+			// bogus comment
 			z.data.end = z.raw.end
+			if i == 1 && c[0] == '>' {
+				z.data.end--
+			}
 			return CommentToken
 		}
 	}
@@ -732,6 +736,13 @@ func (z *Tokenizer) readDoctype() bool {
 	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
 		c := z.readByte()
 		if z.err != nil {
+			if z.err == io.EOF {
+				// Back up to read the fragment of "DOCTYPE" again, reset
+				// z.err to signal EOF on the next call
+				z.raw.end = z.data.start
+				z.err = nil
+				return false
+			}
 			z.data.end = z.raw.end
 			return false
 		}
@@ -757,6 +768,13 @@ func (z *Tokenizer) readCDATA() bool {
 	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
 		c := z.readByte()
 		if z.err != nil {
+			if z.err == io.EOF {
+				// Back up to read the fragment of "[CDATA[" again, reset
+				// z.err to signal EOF on the next call
+				z.raw.end = z.data.start
+				z.err = nil
+				return false
+			}
 			z.data.end = z.raw.end
 			return false
 		}
@@ -883,7 +901,7 @@ func (z *Tokenizer) readTag(saveAttr bool) {
 		z.readTagAttrKey()
 		z.readTagAttrVal()
 		// Save pendingAttr if saveAttr and that attribute has a non-empty key, and the key hasn't been seen before.
-		key := strings.ToLower(string(z.buf[z.pendingAttr[0].start:z.pendingAttr[0].end]))
+		key := string(lower(bytes.Clone(z.buf[z.pendingAttr[0].start:z.pendingAttr[0].end])))
 		if saveAttr && z.pendingAttr[0].start != z.pendingAttr[0].end && !z.attrNames[key] {
 			z.attr = append(z.attr, z.pendingAttr)
 			z.attrNames[key] = true
@@ -1206,7 +1224,7 @@ func (z *Tokenizer) TagName() (name []byte, hasAttr bool) {
 	if z.data.start < z.data.end {
 		switch z.tt {
 		case StartTagToken, EndTagToken, SelfClosingTagToken:
-			s := z.buf[z.data.start:z.data.end]
+			s := bytes.ReplaceAll(z.buf[z.data.start:z.data.end], nul, replacement)
 			z.data.start = z.raw.end
 			z.data.end = z.raw.end
 			return lower(s), z.nAttrReturned < len(z.attr)
@@ -1224,8 +1242,8 @@ func (z *Tokenizer) TagAttr() (key, val []byte, moreAttr bool) {
 		case StartTagToken, SelfClosingTagToken:
 			x := z.attr[z.nAttrReturned]
 			z.nAttrReturned++
-			key = z.buf[x[0].start:x[0].end]
-			val = z.buf[x[1].start:x[1].end]
+			key = bytes.ReplaceAll(z.buf[x[0].start:x[0].end], nul, replacement)
+			val = bytes.ReplaceAll(z.buf[x[1].start:x[1].end], nul, replacement)
 			return lower(key), unescape(convertNewlines(val), true), z.nAttrReturned < len(z.attr)
 		}
 	}
@@ -1282,9 +1300,22 @@ func NewTokenizerFragment(r io.Reader, contextTag string) *Tokenizer {
 		attrNames: make(map[string]bool),
 	}
 	if contextTag != "" {
+		// Per the "Parsing HTML Fragments" portion of the spec:
+		//    For performance reasons, an implementation that does not report errors
+		//    and that uses the actual state machine described in this specification
+		//    directly could use the PLAINTEXT state instead of the RAWTEXT and script
+		//    data states where those are mentioned in the list above. Except for
+		//    rules regarding parse errors, they are equivalent, since there is no
+		//    appropriate end tag token in the fragment case, yet they involve far
+		//    fewer state transitions.
+		//
+		// As such we just set everything to plaintext, which makes some complex parsing
+		// cases somewhat simpler.
 		switch s := strings.ToLower(contextTag); s {
-		case "iframe", "noembed", "noframes", "noscript", "plaintext", "script", "style", "title", "textarea", "xmp":
+		case "title", "textarea":
 			z.rawTag = s
+		case "style", "xmp", "iframe", "noembed", "noframes", "script", "noscript", "plaintext":
+			z.rawTag = "plaintext"
 		}
 	}
 	return z
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/server_wrap.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/server_wrap.go
@@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ package http2

 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
 	"errors"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"slices"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -44,6 +46,20 @@ func configureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
 			h2.IdleTimeout = h1.ReadTimeout
 		}
 	}
+
+	// Register h2 and http/1.1 ALPN protocols on s.TLSConfig, matching
+	// the pre-wrapping implementation in server.go, so that TLS listeners
+	// built from s.TLSConfig still negotiate HTTP/2.
+	if s.TLSConfig == nil {
+		s.TLSConfig = new(tls.Config)
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, NextProtoTLS) {
+		s.TLSConfig.NextProtos = append(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, NextProtoTLS)
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1") {
+		s.TLSConfig.NextProtos = append(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1")
+	}
+
 	conf.state = &serverInternalState{
 		s1: s,
 	}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/transport_wrap.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/transport_wrap.go
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ import (
 )

 func configureTransport(t1 *http.Transport) error {
-	// ConfigureTransport is a no-op: The http.Transport already supports HTTP/2.
-	return nil
+	_, err := configureTransports(t1)
+	return err
 }

 func configureTransports(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
@@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ func configureTransports(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
 	// linked to the http.Transport's.
 	tr2 := &Transport{}
 	tr2.configure(t1)
+	// Enable HTTP/2 on the transport, as the pre-wrapping implementation did:
+	// net/http does not auto-enable it for a transport with a custom
+	// TLSClientConfig or dialer.
+	if t1.TLSClientConfig == nil {
+		t1.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{}
+	}
+	if t1.Protocols == nil {
+		t1.Protocols = new(http.Protocols)
+		t1.Protocols.SetHTTP1(true)
+	}
+	t1.Protocols.SetHTTP2(true)
 	return tr2, nil
 }

--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux.go
@@ -6397,3 +6397,79 @@ const (
 	MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY      = 0x5
 	MPOL_WEIGHTED_INTERLEAVE = 0x6
 )
+
+const (
+	GPIO_V2_GET_LINEINFO_IOCTL       = 0xc100b405
+	GPIO_V2_GET_LINE_IOCTL           = 0xc250b407
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_GET_VALUES_IOCTL    = 0xc010b40e
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_SET_VALUES_IOCTL    = 0xc010b40f
+	GPIO_V2_GET_LINEINFO_WATCH_IOCTL = 0xc100b406
+	GPIO_GET_LINEINFO_UNWATCH_IOCTL  = 0xc004b40c
+)
+const (
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_ATTR_ID_FLAGS         = 0x1
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_ATTR_ID_OUTPUT_VALUES = 0x2
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_ATTR_ID_DEBOUNCE      = 0x3
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_CHANGED_REQUESTED     = 0x1
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_CHANGED_RELEASED      = 0x2
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_CHANGED_CONFIG        = 0x3
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_EVENT_RISING_EDGE     = 0x1
+	GPIO_V2_LINE_EVENT_FALLING_EDGE    = 0x2
+)
+
+type GPIOChipInfo struct {
+	Name  [32]byte
+	Label [32]byte
+	Lines uint32
+}
+type GPIOV2LineValues struct {
+	Bits uint64
+	Mask uint64
+}
+type GPIOV2LineAttribute struct {
+	Id    uint32
+	_     uint32
+	Flags uint64
+}
+type GPIOV2LineConfigAttribute struct {
+	Attr GPIOV2LineAttribute
+	Mask uint64
+}
+type GPIOV2LineConfig struct {
+	Flags     uint64
+	Num_attrs uint32
+	_         [5]uint32
+	Attrs     [10]GPIOV2LineConfigAttribute
+}
+type GPIOV2LineRequest struct {
+	Offsets           [64]uint32
+	Consumer          [32]byte
+	Config            GPIOV2LineConfig
+	Num_lines         uint32
+	Event_buffer_size uint32
+	_                 [5]uint32
+	Fd                int32
+}
+type GPIOV2LineInfo struct {
+	Name      [32]byte
+	Consumer  [32]byte
+	Offset    uint32
+	Num_attrs uint32
+	Flags     uint64
+	Attrs     [10]GPIOV2LineAttribute
+	_         [4]uint32
+}
+type GPIOV2LineInfoChanged struct {
+	Info         GPIOV2LineInfo
+	Timestamp_ns uint64
+	Event_type   uint32
+	_            [5]uint32
+}
+type GPIOV2LineEvent struct {
+	Timestamp_ns uint64
+	Id           uint32
+	Offset       uint32
+	Seqno        uint32
+	Line_seqno   uint32
+	_            [6]uint32
+}
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_386.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_386.go
@@ -711,3 +711,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_          uint32
 	_          uint32
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_amd64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_amd64.go
@@ -725,3 +725,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_arm.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_arm.go
@@ -705,3 +705,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_          uint32
 	_          uint32
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_arm64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_arm64.go
@@ -704,3 +704,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_loong64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_loong64.go
@@ -705,3 +705,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips.go
@@ -710,3 +710,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	Ctime_high uint16
 	_          uint16
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips64.go
@@ -707,3 +707,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips64le.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips64le.go
@@ -707,3 +707,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mipsle.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mipsle.go
@@ -710,3 +710,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	Ctime_high uint16
 	_          uint16
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc.go
@@ -718,3 +718,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_          uint32
 	_          [4]byte
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc64.go
@@ -713,3 +713,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc64le.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc64le.go
@@ -713,3 +713,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_riscv64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_riscv64.go
@@ -792,3 +792,7 @@ const (
 	RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_ZICBOZ_BLOCK_SIZE  = 0x6
 	RISCV_HWPROBE_WHICH_CPUS             = 0x1
 )
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_s390x.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_s390x.go
@@ -727,3 +727,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x8044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_sparc64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_sparc64.go
@@ -708,3 +708,7 @@ type SysvShmDesc struct {
 	_      uint64
 	_      uint64
 }
+
+const (
+	GPIO_GET_CHIPINFO_IOCTL = 0x4044b401
+)
--- a/vendor/modules.txt
+++ b/vendor/modules.txt
@@ -2413,7 +2413,7 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v2
 # go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
 ## explicit; go 1.16
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3
-# golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0
+# golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0
 ## explicit; go 1.25.0
 golang.org/x/crypto/argon2
 golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt
@@ -2470,7 +2470,7 @@ golang.org/x/image/webp
 golang.org/x/mod/internal/lazyregexp
 golang.org/x/mod/module
 golang.org/x/mod/semver
-# golang.org/x/net v0.55.0
+# golang.org/x/net v0.56.0
 ## explicit; go 1.25.0
 golang.org/x/net/bpf
 golang.org/x/net/context
@@ -2504,7 +2504,7 @@ golang.org/x/oauth2/internal
 golang.org/x/sync/errgroup
 golang.org/x/sync/semaphore
 golang.org/x/sync/singleflight
-# golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0
+# golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
 ## explicit; go 1.25.0
 golang.org/x/sys/cpu
 golang.org/x/sys/execabs
@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry
 golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc
 golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc/eventlog
 golang.org/x/sys/windows/svc/mgr
-# golang.org/x/term v0.43.0
+# golang.org/x/term v0.44.0
 ## explicit; go 1.25.0
 golang.org/x/term
 # golang.org/x/text v0.38.0