## What
The lockfile resolution verifier now confirms that a registry entry pinning an explicit `tarball` URL points at the artifact the registry's own metadata lists for that `name@version`. A mismatch — or any entry that can't be confirmed against the registry — is rejected with `ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH`.
## Why
Follow-up to the design discussion on #12122. The verifier checked the age/trust of `name@version` against the registry packument but never bound the lockfile's `tarball` URL to it. For the non-standard entries pnpm preserves a tarball URL for (npm Enterprise, GitHub Packages — see `toLockfileResolution`), pnpm fetches straight from that URL. So a **tampered lockfile could pair a trusted `name@version` with an attacker-chosen tarball URL** (plus a matching integrity for the attacker's bytes); verification passed against the legitimate version while the install fetched the attacker's bytes. Defending a checked-in lockfile is explicitly in this feature's threat model.
## How
- For a registry-keyed entry that pins an explicit `tarball`, fetch the packument and assert the URL equals `versions[v].dist.tarball`. The comparison canonicalizes away benign differences — http/https scheme, default ports (`:443`/`:80`), and `%2f` scope-separator encoding (case-insensitive) — so only real mismatches are flagged. The packument is fetched from the user's configured registry (the lockfile's tarball host can't redirect it), and named-registry routing uses the same canonicalization so a scheme/`%2f`-only difference doesn't route to the wrong packument.
- **The binding is unconditional.** It runs regardless of `minimumReleaseAge`/`trustPolicy` and is **not** narrowed by their exclude lists, because it guards *integrity*, not *maturity/trust*. Disabling the age/trust policies must not silently disable anti-tamper. (`createNpmResolutionVerifier` therefore always returns a verifier.)
- **It is fail-closed.** An entry passes only when the registry metadata affirmatively lists the version with a matching tarball URL. If the metadata can't be fetched, doesn't list the version, or omits `dist.tarball`, the entry is rejected — otherwise a tampered lockfile could smuggle a malicious URL past the check by pointing it at a `name@version` the registry can't vouch for.
- **Behavior change:** as a result, an install that re-verifies a lockfile (its content changed since the last verified run, so the verification cache no longer short-circuits) now requires the configured registry to be reachable. `trustLockfile` is the opt-out for environments that treat the on-disk lockfile as already trusted.
- **Verification cache.** The policy snapshot records a `tarballUrlBinding` marker and `canTrustPastCheck` requires it, so a cache record written before this rule existed is re-verified rather than trusted (closing an upgrade-time bypass).
- Entries with no explicit `tarball` reconstruct the URL from name+version+registry and are inherently bound (no check). `file:`/git-hosted resolutions stay out of scope (#12122).
- Threads `nonSemverVersion` to the verifier so URL-keyed tarball deps (a remote `https:` tarball that carries a semver `version` copied from its manifest) are recognized as deliberate non-registry deps and skipped — also fixing a latent release-age over-match on them. The candidate dedupe key includes `nonSemverVersion` so a registry snapshot and a URL-keyed snapshot sharing a `name@version` and serialized resolution stay distinct.
Mirrored in pacquet (`create_npm_resolution_verifier`). The dedupe-key change is TS-only: pacquet's candidate `version` comes from the lockfile key suffix, so the two shapes never share a key there.
## Tests
- TS: confirmed mismatch → violation; non-standard URL matching metadata → pass; default-port/scheme difference → pass; URL-keyed dep → skipped; URL binding runs (and fails closed) with no age/trust policy configured; `canTrustPastCheck` rejects a cache record lacking the binding marker. Regression-verified (the mismatch test fails when the check is disabled).
- pacquet: mirror tests + the no-policy / `minimumReleaseAge: 0` / `trustPolicy: off` cases, default-port/scheme equivalence, and the missing-`tarballUrlBinding` cache rejection. A few install-dispatch / resolution-reuse tests that pin a deliberately bogus tarball URL (or run against an unreachable registry to prove resolution reuse) now set `trustLockfile`, since the always-on fail-closed tarball-URL check would otherwise flag the fixture before the path under test runs.
- `clippy --deny warnings`, `fmt`, and `dylint` clean.
Fixes#11887.
Staged publishes now have a signal in the packument: `approver`.
If this is set, the package is more trustworthy than a "trusted publisher" package, since it requires 2FA publish approvals.
## Changes
**pnpm (TypeScript)**
- `getTrustEvidence` recognizes `_npmUser.approver` and classifies it as a new `stagedPublish` trust evidence, ranked above `trustedPublisher` and `provenance`.
- Trust-downgrade detection treats `stagedPublish` as the strongest rank, and the resolution verifier's PII-minimizing metadata projection retains the approver *signal* (without keeping the approver's name/email).
**pacquet (Rust port)**
- Ported the same staged-publish support: an `Approver` registry type, a `StagedPublish` trust evidence (rank 3 — above `TrustedPublisher`/`Provenance`), detection, pretty-printing, and the PII-stripping trust-meta projection.
- Wired `trustPolicy='no-downgrade'` enforcement into the **resolver-time** path, not just the lockfile verifier. Previously pacquet only re-checked entries already in `pnpm-lock.yaml`; fresh resolutions weren't gated. The npm resolver now runs `fail_if_trust_downgraded` on each freshly picked version (full metadata is already forced under this policy), mirroring pnpm's resolver-time `failIfTrustDowngraded` call.
- Ported the matching `trustChecks` tests for full parity with the TypeScript suite (staged-publish classification/downgrade, plus previously-unported `trustedPublisher → none`, no-evidence-anywhere, and exclude + missing-time cases).
---------
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Kochan <z@kochan.io>
Skip the publishedBy file-mtime fast path for fully excluded packages so stale abbreviated metadata cannot pin older versions, and add matching regression tests.
`pnpm install` (non-frozen) used to react to `ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_INTEGRITY` by logging the error, silently re-resolving from the registry, and overwriting the locked integrity. The lockfile's integrity was effectively advisory by default — a compromised registry, proxy, or republished version could substitute attacker-controlled content on a clean machine even though the project shipped a committed `pnpm-lock.yaml`.
Integrity mismatches against the lockfile now fail by default.
The **only** opt-in is **`pnpm install --update-checksums`** — a new flag, narrowly scoped to refreshing the locked integrity values. Mirrors yarn's flag of the same name. A warning still prints when the bypass takes effect so the rewrite stays auditable.
`--force` and `pnpm update` deliberately do **not** bypass the integrity check. They are routine refresh operations; silently overwriting a locked integrity in those flows would erase the protection a committed lockfile is supposed to provide. `--frozen-lockfile` behavior is unchanged. `--fix-lockfile` keeps its documented purpose (filling in missing lockfile entries) and is also not a bypass. Combining `--frozen-lockfile` with `--update-checksums` errors out — frozen mode refuses to rewrite the lockfile, which is exactly what `--update-checksums` is for.
`--update-checksums` also bypasses the resolver's on-disk metadata cache fast path (`pickPackage.ts:271`, `pick_package.rs:531`). Without that, a stale on-disk packument that already contained the pinned version would short-circuit the registry entirely and the flag would silently no-op on dev machines. With the gate, every first-encounter goes through a conditional GET; the in-memory cache is left alone so second-and-onward references within the same install still hit cached fresh data (one network round-trip per *unique* package, not per reference).
## Reported by
Reported privately via the security channel. The reproduction:
1. Publish `example-package@1.0.0` with content `v1` and install with pnpm; lockfile records the `v1` integrity.
2. Replace the registry's tarball+metadata for the same `1.0.0` with content `v2`.
3. On a clean store/cache, run `pnpm install`. Before this fix, pnpm logged `ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_INTEGRITY` but exited 0 with `v2` installed and the lockfile rewritten to the new integrity. After this fix, the same install exits non-zero.
## Prior art
- **npm** ([sebhastian](https://sebhastian.com/npm-err-code-eintegrity/)): hard-fails with `EINTEGRITY`. No dedicated override flag — recovery is `npm cache clean --force`, manually editing the lockfile, or deleting it.
- **yarn** ([Sean C Davis](https://www.seancdavis.com/posts/fix-yarn-integrity-check-failed/)): hard-fails with "Integrity check failed". Has a dedicated **`yarn install --update-checksums`** flag — pnpm now adopts the same name.
## Pacquet parity
Pacquet was already fail-hard on integrity mismatch by default (no auto-repair path to remove). This PR brings the rest of the surface into line so `pnpm install --update-checksums` keeps working when pacquet is the materialization target, and `pacquet install --update-checksums` behaves identically standalone:
- New `--update-checksums` flag on `pacquet install` (`crates/cli/src/cli_args/install.rs`), plumbed through `Install` and `InstallWithFreshLockfile` into the resolver.
- When the flag is set, pacquet skips the frozen-lockfile fast path and routes through the fresh-resolve path so locked integrity values get rewritten from the registry.
- `--frozen-lockfile + --update-checksums` errors with `pacquet_package_manager::frozen_lockfile_with_outdated_lockfile`, mirroring pnpm's `ERR_PNPM_FROZEN_LOCKFILE_WITH_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE`.
- `pacquet_tarball::verify_checksum_error` now carries a help hint pointing at `--update-checksums` and calling out the supply-chain implication, matching the updated pnpm `TarballIntegrityError`.
- The disk fast-path gate is mirrored in `crates/resolving-npm-resolver/src/pick_package.rs:531`, with the flag threaded from `ResolveOptions` → `PickPackageOptions`.
* fix(config/reader): drop user-level default auth when workspace overrides registry
When a workspace `.npmrc` overrides `registry=` to a different value than the
user's `~/.npmrc` or `~/.config/pnpm/auth.ini` would have set, do not bind
unscoped/default credentials (`_authToken`, `_auth`, `username`/`_password`)
from the user-level config to the workspace-selected registry. The previous
behavior leaked user-trusted credentials to whatever registry an untrusted
workspace `.npmrc` pointed at. Reported by JUNYI LIU.
* chore(cspell): allow JUNYI in changeset and tests
* fix(config/reader): also defend when pnpm-workspace.yaml overrides registry
Move the rebind defense to after all config layers (CLI, env vars,
pnpm-workspace.yaml, .npmrc) have settled. Compare the final resolved
default registry against what the user-level config alone would produce,
and skip the check entirely if the user requested a registry via CLI/env
themselves.
* feat(config/reader): deprecate unscoped authentication credentials
Emit a per-file warning whenever an .npmrc or auth.ini contains an
unscoped auth value (_authToken, _auth, username, _password,
tokenHelper). URL-scoped tokens have been npm's recommended pattern
since npm@9, and unscoped credentials are slated for removal in a
future major. The warning fires independently of whether the rebind
defense rejects the credentials, so users see the deprecation even when
their setup happens to be safe today.
* refactor(config/reader): rescope unscoped credentials at load time instead of detecting rebinds post-merge
Each .npmrc / auth.ini / CLI source's unscoped credential keys
(_authToken, _auth, username, _password, tokenHelper) are rewritten to
their URL-scoped equivalent during load, using the same source's
registry= value (or the npmjs default if it declares none). A later
layer overriding registry= can no longer rebind a credential to its own
registry — the credential is already pinned to the URL its author
intended.
This removes the post-merge source-tracking defense and replaces it
with the simpler per-source normalization. Each rescope emits a
deprecation warning so users migrate to writing the URL-scoped form
directly.
* refactor(network/auth-header): drop empty-string default-registry slot
After load-time rescoping, no source can populate configByUri[''] —
every credential is either URL-scoped from the start or rewritten to
the URL-scoped form during the .npmrc / auth.ini / CLI parse. The
runtime fallback that re-keyed configByUri[''] onto the merged default
registry, and the publish-side fallback that read it, are both dead
code.
Removed:
- empty-string handling in getAuthHeadersFromCreds, including its
defaultRegistry parameter
- defaultRegistry parameter from createGetAuthHeaderByURI
- the corresponding dedicated unit test
- the configByUri['']?.creds fallback in publishPackedPkg.ts
- empty-key assertions in config/reader tests
Updated all ~16 call sites of createGetAuthHeaderByURI to drop the now
unused second argument.
* feat(config/reader): extend per-source rescoping to client TLS cert/key
The same trust-boundary issue that affected unscoped credentials applies
to client TLS settings: an unscoped cert=/key= would be presented to
whatever registry the merged config settles on, even if a later layer
(workspace .npmrc, pnpm-workspace.yaml, CLI flag) overrode it. The
existing rescope helper now also rewrites unscoped `cert` and `key`
to their URL-scoped form, pinning them to the registry their author
named in the same source.
`ca`/`cafile` are intentionally left unscoped: they're trust anchors,
not credentials, and corporate MITM-proxy setups depend on them
applying to every HTTPS request. The default-registry override can't
weaponize an unscoped CA — the attacker would need a cert signed by it.
`certfile`/`keyfile` (file-path variants) are not rescoped either:
`certfile` isn't read unscoped by pnpm today (asymmetric vs. `keyfile`
in NPM_AUTH_SETTINGS), and supporting only one of them would be
confusing. Users wanting the path form can write it URL-scoped
directly.
* chore(config/reader): remove dead unscoped `keyfile` allowlist entry
`keyfile` was listed in NPM_AUTH_SETTINGS so unscoped `keyfile=<path>`
passed the .npmrc filter and ended up in authConfig — but nothing in
the codebase ever read it from there. The dispatcher uses `opts.key`
(inline PEM) and `configByUri[host].tls.key` (URL-scoped path/inline
content), neither of which is populated from unscoped `keyfile=`.
`certfile` was already absent from the allowlist for the same reason,
so this also removes the asymmetry between the two file-path variants.
URL-scoped `//host/:certfile=...` and `//host/:keyfile=...` continue
to work via `tryParseSslKey` and are unaffected.
* test(network/auth-header): drop test for removed default-registry slot
This test exercised the configByUri[''] re-keying path that was
removed in the rescope-at-load refactor. With createGetAuthHeaderByURI
no longer accepting a defaultRegistry parameter and unscoped
credentials no longer reaching the merged config, the scenario the
test described is structurally unreachable.
* fix(config/reader): handle empty/invalid registry value in rescope
Two CI fixes:
1. When a source's `registry=` resolves to an empty string (e.g. an
unresolved `${ENV_VAR}` placeholder), `new URL(...)` inside
`nerfDart` throws. Guard the call with try/catch: drop the
unscoped per-registry keys (a bare token has nowhere safe to bind)
and emit a warning naming the offending source.
2. Update `.npmrc does not load pnpm settings` to expect the rescoped
form of unscoped `_authToken`/`username` in `authConfig` — they
now appear as `//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken` etc. since the
test's .npmrc declares no `registry=` of its own.
* chore(cspell): allow "rescoping"
* test(installing/deps-installer): drop "legacy way" auth test
This test passed credentials via the configByUri[''] empty-string slot,
which the auth-header layer re-keyed to the merged default registry at
request time. That slot was removed in the rescope-at-load refactor —
credentials are now always URL-scoped before they reach configByUri,
so the empty-key entry is unreachable from any code path.
The scenario the test covered (basicAuth via username/password) is
already exercised by the existing "installing a package that need
authentication, using password" test using the URL-scoped form.
* fix: require provenance for trusted publisher evidence
* test: align provenance fixtures with registry types
* chore: include pnpm CLI in changeset
The repo guideline requires every changeset that touches a published
package to list the pnpm CLI explicitly so the fix appears in the CLI's
release notes.
* fix(resolving-npm-resolver): require provenance for trusted publisher evidence
Ports pnpm's fea5fd41da: `get_trust_evidence` now only returns
`TrustedPublisher` when the version carries both
`_npmUser.trustedPublisher` *and* `dist.attestations.provenance`.
Without the attestation, the publisher flag is metadata a staged
publish could mint, so it can't be ranked above plain provenance.
Refs #11887.
---------
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Kochan <z@kochan.io>
* fix: cap lockfile verification memory and add trustLockfile opt-out
Verifying a multi-thousand-entry lockfile against `minimumReleaseAge`
or `trustPolicy: no-downgrade` retained every fetched packument in a
per-install cache for the entire install. On large workspaces this
OOM'd CI runners with a 2GB heap cap. Project both caches down to just
the fields each check reads (per-version trust evidence + the `time`
map for trust; package-level `modified` + version-name set for the
abbreviated shortcut) so the bulk packument is GC'd as soon as the
fetch returns.
Also adds a `trustLockfile` setting (default `false`) that skips the
verification pass entirely for environments where the lockfile is
already part of the trusted base. Mirrored in pacquet. Closes#11860.
* perf: share resolver packument cache with the lockfile verifier
The verifier kept its own per-install dedup Maps and re-fetched every
packument the resolver had already pulled during the same install.
Plumb the resolver's per-install `PackageMetaCache` through to the
verifier (via `createNpmResolutionVerifier` / `build_resolution_verifiers`)
so a name already in the resolver's LRU short-circuits the verifier's
disk/network round-trip — fast path only, the cached document is
projected for the trust check so the verifier's memory footprint stays
bounded.
In pnpm, `installing/client` now constructs one LRU and hands it to
both `createResolver` and `createResolutionVerifiers`. In pacquet, the
`InMemoryPackageMetaCache` is lifted to `Install::dispatch` and passed
to both `build_resolution_verifiers` and `InstallWithFreshLockfile`.
`pnpm outdated` and `pnpm update --interactive` previously skipped runtime dependencies (`node`/`deno`/`bun` installed via the `runtime:` protocol). Both commands go through `outdatedDepsOfProjects` → `outdated()`, and the inner loop bailed out for anything `parseBareSpecifier` couldn't parse — which is everything `runtime:`-shaped. A runtime was only ever reported if the current install differed from the wanted lockfile entry, so the latest available version was never surfaced. The same gap silently affected `jsr:` and named-registry deps too.
Commits, smallest fix first → progressively cleaner architecture:
1. **`feat(outdated)`** — minimal fix: special-case runtime deps in `outdated.ts` so they appear in the table and the interactive update picker.
2. **`refactor(outdated)`** — per-resolver dispatch. Each protocol resolver gets its own "what's the latest?" function; `@pnpm/resolving.default-resolver` composes them.
3. **`refactor(outdated)`** — rename to `resolveLatest` (the function returns info regardless of whether the dep is outdated; "outdated" described a state, not an action).
4. **`refactor(outdated)`** — let the local-resolver own the `link:`/`file:` skip, drop the matching short-circuit in `outdated.ts`.
5. **`refactor(outdated)`** — slim `LatestQuery` / `LatestInfo` to the bare essentials; move `pickRegistryForPackage` into the npm-resolver where it belongs; derive `current`/`wanted` display from `pkgSnapshot.version` in `outdated.ts`.
6. **`chore(outdated)`** — drop stale tsconfig project reference left behind by #5.
7. **`refactor(outdated)`** — drop `wantedRef` from the query; resolvers detect protocol from `bareSpecifier` alone.
## Final architecture
`@pnpm/resolving.resolver-base` defines a single tiny protocol:
```ts
interface LatestQuery {
wantedDependency: WantedDependency
compatible?: boolean
}
interface LatestInfo {
latestManifest?: PackageManifest
}
type ResolveLatestFunction = (query: LatestQuery, opts: ResolveOptions) =>
Promise<LatestInfo | undefined>
```
- `undefined` from a resolver means "I don't claim this dep — try the next one."
- `{}` means "I claim it, but I can't tell you what's latest" (policy-blocked, network unavailable, or a protocol with no concept of latest — git/tarball).
- `{ latestManifest }` is the happy path.
Each protocol resolver (npm/jsr/named-registry, git, tarball, local, node/bun/deno runtimes) exports its own `resolveLatest*` function alongside its `resolve*`. `@pnpm/resolving.default-resolver` composes them into a single first-match dispatcher, surfaced through `@pnpm/installing.client` as `createResolver(...).resolveLatest`.
`outdated.ts` is protocol-agnostic: dispatches, then derives `current`/`wanted` display from `pkgSnapshot.version` (falling back to the raw ref for URL-shaped refs where the URL is the only diff signal between commits), uses raw `wantedRef !== currentRef` for the lockfile-shifted check, and pulls `packageName` from `dp.parse(relativeDepPath).name` so aliased deps still report under the real package name.
Per-resolver responsibilities:
- **npm-resolver** (`resolveLatestFromNpm` / `resolveLatestFromJsr` / `resolveLatestFromNamedRegistry`): match their respective spec shapes, call the matching `resolveFromX` with `'latest'` (or the original spec under `--compatible`), handle `MINIMUM_RELEASE_AGE_VIOLATION` and `ERR_PNPM_NO_MATCHING_VERSION` so policy-blocked deps don't surface as available updates. Picks the per-package registry internally via its ctx.
- **node/bun/deno runtime resolvers**: claim deps via `bareSpecifier.startsWith('runtime:')` + alias match, query their release sources for the latest version (only the version — no asset-hash fetches), return `{ latestManifest }`.
- **git / tarball resolvers**: claim deps via spec shape, return `{}` (no concept of "latest"); the caller still surfaces a ref-mismatch report if the lockfile shifted to a different commit/URL.
- **local-resolver**: returns `undefined` so `link:`/`file:`/`workspace:` deps fall through and get silently skipped.
Three coordinated changes that close the silent-bypass gap in loose `minimumReleaseAge` mode AND the discover-by-loop UX problem in strict mode (#10488), plus a parallel hardening of the lockfile verifier:
1. **Auto-collect into `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` (loose mode)** — fresh resolutions that fall back to a version newer than the cutoff are auto-recorded into the workspace manifest's `minimumReleaseAgeExclude`. A single info message lists what was persisted. The workspace manifest writer dedupes against existing entries.
2. **Lockfile verifier runs in loose mode too** — `createNpmResolutionVerifier` no longer gates on `minimumReleaseAgeStrict`. With auto-collect keeping the exclude list explicit, every accepted-immature pin must be on the list — same contract strict mode enforces. Lockfiles produced under a weaker (or absent) policy that still hold immature entries are rejected the same way strict mode would.
3. **Strict mode prompts on the aggregate set instead of throwing on the first** — the resolver always collects every immature direct and transitive in one pass; the install command's `handleResolutionPolicyViolations` checkpoint decides what to do with the set. Interactive (TTY) prompts the user once with the full list (default = No) and asks whether to add them all to `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` and proceed. Approve → install continues, persisted at the end. Decline → resolution aborts before the lockfile, package.json, or modules dir is touched. Non-interactive (CI) keeps `ERR_PNPM_NO_MATURE_MATCHING_VERSION` as the exit code but lists every offending entry instead of just the first one the resolver happened to hit.
4. **The lockfile verifier now also covers `trustPolicy: 'no-downgrade'`.** The same post-resolution gate that re-checks `minimumReleaseAge` on lockfile entries now re-runs `failIfTrustDowngraded` for every npm-registry entry whose name isn't on `trustPolicyExclude`. The two checks share a single full-metadata fetch per package, so the extra coverage doesn't cost an extra round trip when both policies are active. Resolver-time trust checks still run as before — this just closes the gap when an entry bypasses resolution (peek path, `--frozen-lockfile`, restored CI cache).
The steady-state flows:
- **Loose mode, `pnpm add foo@immature`**: lockfile clean, verifier no-op, resolver picks via lowest-version fallback, `foo@immature` lands in `minimumReleaseAgeExclude`, install succeeds. Subsequent `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` in CI verifies against the populated list and succeeds.
- **Strict mode (interactive), security bump to `next@15.5.9`**: resolver collects `next@15.5.9` AND every immature `@next/swc-*@15.5.9` shim. pnpm prompts once with the full list. User approves → install completes, all entries persisted in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. CI then runs the populated config cleanly.
- **Strict mode (non-interactive / CI)**: aborts with `ERR_PNPM_NO_MATURE_MATCHING_VERSION` listing every immature entry's `name@version` and publish time — no more discover-by-loop dance.
- **Teammate commits a poisoned lockfile**: single-policy batches reject with `ERR_PNPM_MINIMUM_RELEASE_AGE_VIOLATION` (or `ERR_PNPM_TRUST_DOWNGRADE`); a batch that trips both policies escalates to the generic `ERR_PNPM_LOCKFILE_RESOLUTION_VERIFICATION` and lists each entry's per-policy code in the breakdown.
### Implementation
- The npm resolver always falls back to the lowest matching version when no mature version satisfies the range, and flags the result with `ResolveResult.policyViolation` instead of throwing `NO_MATURE_MATCHING_VERSION`. `deferImmatureDecision` and `strictPublishedByCheck` are gone — every caller (install, dlx, outdated, self-update) inspects the violation and decides what to do.
- `policyViolation` flows from `ResolveResult` → `PackageResponse.body.policyViolation` → a shared accumulator in `ResolutionContext` → the `resolutionPolicyViolations` field on `resolveDependencyTree`'s return → out through `mutateModules` / `addDependenciesToPackage` to the install command.
- The violation type lives in `@pnpm/resolving.resolver-base` as `ResolutionPolicyViolation`; the npm resolver exports the two built-in codes (`MINIMUM_RELEASE_AGE_VIOLATION_CODE`, `TRUST_DOWNGRADE_VIOLATION_CODE`) as constants so consumers reference one source of truth.
- `handleResolutionPolicyViolations` runs between `resolveDependencyTree` and `resolvePeers` — the resolver-agnostic checkpoint where the install command's plan prompts (TTY) or aborts (no-TTY) with the full violation list.
- `setupPolicyHandlers` (in `installing/commands/src/policyHandlers.ts`) composes per-policy handlers behind a uniform plan interface: each handler has its own `handleResolutionPolicyViolations` (filter by code, decide what to do) and `pickManifestUpdates` (return a typed `WorkspaceManifestPolicyUpdates` patch the install command spreads into `updateWorkspaceManifest`). Today the only registered handler is `createMinimumReleaseAgeHandler` — strict + TTY prompts via `enquirer`, strict no-TTY throws `ERR_PNPM_NO_MATURE_MATCHING_VERSION` with every entry listed, loose mode auto-persists at the tail. Strict + `--no-save` is rejected up-front via `ERR_PNPM_STRICT_MIN_RELEASE_AGE_REQUIRES_SAVE`. Future policies plug in via a sibling factory + push into the handlers list, with no changes to `installDeps.ts` / `recursive.ts`.
- `installDeps` / `recursive` drain `pickManifestUpdates` after install and spread the patch into `updateWorkspaceManifest`. Plain `pnpm install` (no `--update`, no params) now still updates the workspace manifest when any handler contributes a patch. The `install` command's CLI schema gained `save: Boolean` so `--no-save` actually flows through to `opts.save = false` instead of being silently dropped by nopt.
- `makeResolutionStrict` (in `installing/client`) wraps a `ResolveFunction` and rethrows any `policyViolation` as a `PnpmError`. Used by `dlx` and `self-update` under strict `minimumReleaseAge` OR `trustPolicy: 'no-downgrade'`, since one-shot callers have nowhere to defer a violation to. Violation-code → error-code mapping lives in one place so future violation kinds get consistent UX.
- `createNpmResolutionVerifier` extends its check to `trustPolicy: 'no-downgrade'` — same per-entry fan-out, same cache key, sharing the full-metadata fetch with the maturity check. Trust-fetch errors now propagate up so the violation reason carries the underlying message (network code, 404 detail) instead of a generic "metadata is unavailable".
- `verifyLockfileResolutions`'s aggregate throw uses the per-policy code when every violation in the batch shares it, and escalates to a generic `LOCKFILE_RESOLUTION_VERIFICATION` (with per-entry codes in the breakdown) for mixed batches.
- The pnpm agent path refuses installs under `trustPolicy: 'no-downgrade'` (`ERR_PNPM_TRUST_POLICY_INCOMPATIBLE_WITH_AGENT`) — the agent has no server-side counterpart to that check yet, so silently allowing it would land a lockfile the local verifier would later reject. `minimumReleaseAge` is forwarded to the agent and enforced server-side, so that combination is fine.
### Pacquet parity
Pacquet only carries a stub reference to `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` (see `pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/version_policy.rs`); the broader `minimumReleaseAge` and `trustPolicy` policies aren't ported yet, so this feature is outside pacquet's current surface area. It'll come along when pacquet ports the policies.
### Closes
- Closes#10488 (resolves the discover-by-loop dance for security bumps without needing `withTransitives`).
Follow-up to #11691 — item 2 from #11687, plus a related shortcut.
## What
When the `minimumReleaseAge` lockfile verification gate needs to know when a version was published, it used to fetch a multi-MB full metadata document per package just to read one timestamp. This PR replaces that single-step path with a four-layer lookup that pays the cheapest viable source first:
1. **Abbreviated metadata's `modified` field** — the resolver already fetches this for resolution. If the package as a whole hasn't been modified within the policy cutoff, every version it contains is at least that old; return `modified` as a conservative upper-bound and skip the rest of the chain.
2. **Local `FULL_META_DIR` mirror** — exact per-version times if a previous verification populated it.
3. **npm attestation endpoint** (`/-/npm/v1/attestations/<name>@<version>`) — a tens-of-KB Sigstore bundle whose Rekor inclusion time stands in for publish time. Wins on cold cache when the package was published with provenance.
4. **Full metadata fetch** — last resort.
## Why
The verification cache from #11691 made repeat installs against an unchanged lockfile effectively free. The remaining cost is the *first* verification on a fresh CI runner with no restored cache — particularly `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, where every locked package's publish timestamp has to be confirmed. Fetching the full metadata document for each package is wasteful when:
- The resolver has usually already cached abbreviated metadata, whose `modified` field alone is enough to clear stable packages (the common case).
- For recently-modified packages, the per-version attestation endpoint is orders of magnitude smaller than full metadata.
## How
### Abbreviated `modified` shortcut
`fetchFullMetadataCached` is refactored to share an internal helper with a new `fetchAbbreviatedMetadataCached`. Both do conditional GETs against their respective on-disk mirrors. On a non-frozen install the abbreviated mirror is already populated by the resolver, so the shortcut hits the local cache at headers-only cost. On `--frozen-lockfile` the fetch is still cheaper than full metadata.
If `Date.parse(modified) < cutoff`, return `modified` — it's an upper bound on every version's publish time in this package, and the verifier's `published < cutoff` check passes trivially.
### Attestation endpoint
`fetchAttestationPublishedAt` (new module) hits `/-/npm/v1/attestations/<name>@<version>`, parses the response, and reads the earliest `bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries[].integratedTime` across the attestation bundles. That's the Rekor inclusion time — a couple of seconds after publish, well within tolerance for a policy that operates in minutes/hours/days. Returns `undefined` on 404 / network error / malformed body so the caller falls back.
### Per-install dedup
The lookup carries a `PublishedAtLookupContext` with four memo maps: abbreviated meta per (registry, name), local full meta per (registry, name), full meta network fetch per (registry, name), final published-at per (registry, name, version). Verifying many versions of the same package only pays the disk/network costs once.
## Trust model
**No Sigstore signature verification on the attestation path.** The trust model is identical to reading the registry's `time` field on the full metadata document — we already trust the registry to serve correct publish timestamps for the gate's purpose. The win is purely bandwidth.
Full Sigstore verification (Fulcio cert chain + Rekor inclusion proof) would harden the timestamp against a compromised registry. It pulls in the `sigstore` npm package and the TUF root — a separate dependency-surface discussion, parked as future work.
## Tests
- **13 unit tests** in `resolving/npm-resolver/test/fetchAttestationPublishedAt.test.ts`: ISO timestamp extraction, URL construction (scoped + unscoped), 404 / 5xx / network error / malformed JSON / missing fields → undefined, earliest-of-multiple-attestations, defensive number-as-integratedTime, auth header forwarding, trailing-slash normalization.
- Existing `minimumReleaseAge` + `verifyLockfileResolutions` integration suites (45 tests) still pass — the fallback chain preserves end-to-end behavior when the new shortcuts don't apply.
Closes#11687.
## What
Cache the result of the post-resolution lockfile verification gate (#11583) so repeat installs against an unchanged lockfile skip the per-package registry round trips entirely. Persisted as JSON Lines at `<cacheDir>/lockfile-verified.jsonl`.
The cache layer is policy-neutral. Today there's one verifier (`minimumReleaseAge`); future resolver-side verifiers (jsr trust, attestation, …) plug in by declaring their own `policy` slot and `canTrustPastCheck` comparator — no install-side changes.
## Why
#11583 re-hits the registry on every install for every locked (name, version) pair. On warm/repeat installs where the lockfile hasn't moved, that's a stack of per-package round trips with nothing to show for them. This change makes the steady-state case effectively free without weakening the protection — the gate still runs in full whenever the lockfile changes, any verifier's policy tightens, or no record exists.
## How
### Cache lookup, in order
The cache is **indexed by content hash** so git worktrees with identical lockfile bytes share a cache entry. A secondary path-keyed index drives the same-machine stat shortcut.
1. **`stat()` shortcut** — when a previous record for this exact `lockfilePath` matches today's `size + mtime + inode`, trust the cached hash without reading anything. Zero I/O beyond the stat. Microseconds.
2. **Content lookup** — hash the in-memory lockfile (not the file bytes — we already have the parsed object) and look up by content hash. Catches worktrees (same content, different path) and CI checkouts (same content, reset stat). On hit, append a refreshed path/stat entry so the next install at this path takes the stat shortcut.
3. **Any active verifier rejects the cached `policy`** — run the full gate.
4. **No record** — run the full gate.
The in-memory object is hashed with `hashObject` from `@pnpm/crypto.object-hasher` (streaming, key-order-stable).
### Record shape
```json
{
"lockfile": {
"hash": "<sha256 base64>",
"path": "/abs/path/to/pnpm-lock.yaml",
"size": 154,
"mtimeNs": "1736245123000000000",
"inode": "12345"
},
"verifiedAt": "2026-05-17T...",
"policy": { "minimumReleaseAge": 1440 }
}
```
`policy` is the union of every active verifier's `policy` contribution. Verifiers checking the same logical policy (e.g. `minimumReleaseAge` honored by multiple registries) name it the same and share the slot — no resolver namespacing.
### File semantics
- **Sync fs throughout** — the cache is consulted once before verification fan-out and recorded once after. No concurrent install work to overlap with; keeping the call sites straight-line.
- **JSONL appends are atomic** on POSIX/NTFS, so parallel pnpm processes (monorepo installs, CI matrices sharing a cache) write without coordination. Latest record per `(path, hash)` tuple wins on read.
- **Bounded file** — capped at ~1000 entries; compaction is triggered by a single `stat()` of the cache file (1.5 MiB byte budget) so we never parse the file on the steady-state path. When triggered, the tail is rewritten via tempfile + rename.
- **No record on rejection** — a failing verification deliberately doesn't write a record; the next install must rerun the gate.
- **Single hash per install** — the in-memory hash is computed lazily and reused: `tryLockfileVerificationCache` returns the precomputed stat+hash to `recordVerification` on a miss, and the stat-shortcut hit forwards the cached record's hash unchanged.
## Plumbing
The verifier contract changed alongside the cache to make this composable without install-side knowledge of each policy:
- **`@pnpm/resolving.resolver-base`** — `ResolutionVerifier` is now `{ verify, policy, canTrustPastCheck }` (was a bare function in #11583). Each resolver-side verifier owns its policy snapshot and the comparator that decides whether a cached policy is still trustworthy.
- **`@pnpm/resolving.npm-resolver`** — `createNpmResolutionVerifier` returns the new shape: `policy: { minimumReleaseAge }`, `canTrustPastCheck` reads `minimumReleaseAge` from the merged cached bag.
- **`@pnpm/resolving.default-resolver`** — `createResolutionVerifier` (singular, returning a combined function) → `createResolutionVerifiers` (plural, returning a `ResolutionVerifier[]`). No combinator; each verifier handles its own protocol short-circuit inside `verify`, so dispatch happens naturally at the install side.
- **`@pnpm/installing.client`** — `Client.verifyResolution?` → `Client.resolutionVerifiers: ResolutionVerifier[]`. Same rename propagates through `@pnpm/store.connection-manager`, `@pnpm/testing.temp-store`, and `StrictInstallOptions`.
- **`@pnpm/installing.deps-installer`** — new `verifyLockfileResolutionsCache.ts` (`tryLockfileVerificationCache` + `recordVerification`). `verifyLockfileResolutions` takes the verifier list plus `cacheDir` + `lockfilePath` as flat options; the cache fires when both are present, otherwise the gate runs without memoization. The dedup key for in-flight candidates includes a serialization of `resolution` so two entries sharing a (name, version) but pinned via different protocols don't collapse.
Breaking but safe — `@pnpm/resolving.npm-resolver` hasn't been released since #11583 introduced the verifier abstraction, so no downstream consumer is on the old shape.
## Tests
- **17 unit tests** in `verifyLockfileResolutionsCache.ts`: cache miss/hit, stat shortcut, size mismatch falling through to hash lookup, hash-fallback on reset stat, content change with matching size, stricter/weaker policy, missing-field policy rejection, multi-verifier policy merge (shared field stored once), worktree case (same content, different path), JSONL append semantics, malformed-line tolerance.
- **12 integration tests** in `verifyLockfileResolutions.ts`: dedup of peer/patch-suffix variants, distinct-resolution dedup at the same (name, version), stable violation ordering, the 20-entry cap, multi-verifier fan-out (first failure wins), cache short-circuit on a passing run, no cache write on a rejecting run, empty-verifier-list passthrough.
- **1 e2e test** in `pnpm/test/install/minimumReleaseAge.ts`: bundled CLI plumbing — install once to seed the lockfile, enable `minimumReleaseAge` + `cacheDir`, install again, assert the cache file lands at `<cacheDir>/lockfile-verified.jsonl` with the documented record shape.
- Existing `minimumReleaseAge` (13) and `frozenLockfile` (12) suites still pass.
Closes#10438.
## What
Re-verify every entry in `pnpm-lock.yaml` against the policies the resolver chain was configured with — today: `minimumReleaseAge` in strict mode — right after the lockfile is loaded from disk and before any tarball is fetched. A locked version that fails the policy aborts the install with `ERR_PNPM_MINIMUM_RELEASE_AGE_VIOLATION`; `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` is honored.
## Why
The policy only fires while pnpm is *choosing* a version. Once a version is pinned in the lockfile — e.g. a developer disabled the policy locally and committed a fresh dependency, or a CI cache restored a stale lockfile — every later `pnpm install` (including `--frozen-lockfile` and `pnpm fetch`) installs it without re-checking, which defeats the supply-chain protection the setting is supposed to provide.
The threat model is **a lockfile someone else resolved**, not local resolution: local resolution is already covered by the resolver's own per-version filter. bun fixed the same shape of bug in [oven-sh/bun#30526](https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/pull/30526); this PR is the pnpm side.
## How
The fix introduces a generic `ResolutionVerifier` abstraction in the resolver chain — each resolver factory can ship a sibling verifier factory, exactly the way each resolver ships a `resolve` function. Today there's one verifier (npm); the shape leaves room for future ones (jsr, attestation-based, etc.) without changing the install-side interface.
- **`@pnpm/resolving.resolver-base`** exports the `ResolutionVerifier` / `ResolutionVerification` types — the shared contract.
- **`@pnpm/resolving.npm-resolver`** exports `createNpmResolutionVerifier`. Returns `undefined` when no policy is active, so callers can cheaply decide whether to iterate at all. When active, it inspects each lockfile entry, handles `minimumReleaseAgeExclude`, routes through named-registry prefixes (built-ins like `gh:` merged in), and uses `fetchFullMetadataCached` to fetch full registry metadata — decoupled from the resolver pipeline so neither `peekManifestFromStore` nor abbreviated metadata can hide the publish timestamp.
- **`@pnpm/resolving.default-resolver`** exports `createResolutionVerifier`, a combinator that asks each underlying verifier (today: npm) if it has work and returns `undefined` when none does. Designed so that adding more verifiers later doesn't change the install side.
- **`@pnpm/installing.client`** exposes `verifyResolution` on `Client`, built from the same `fetchFromRegistry` / `getAuthHeader` the resolver chain already uses — **no second fetcher is constructed**.
- **`@pnpm/store.connection-manager`** and **`@pnpm/testing.temp-store`** surface `verifyResolution` alongside the store controller they hand back, so it reaches `mutateModules` through the existing plumbing.
- **`@pnpm/installing.deps-installer`** gains one option on `StrictInstallOptions`: `verifyResolution?: ResolutionVerifier`. `mutateModules` invokes `verifyLockfileResolutions(ctx.wantedLockfile, opts.verifyResolution)` **once**, right after `getContext` returns the on-disk lockfile and before any path branches. When the verifier is `undefined`, the call is a no-op. The iteration is policy-neutral: dedupes by `(name, version)`, applies `pLimit(16)`, sorts violations stably, caps the printed list at 20 with an `…and N more` summary, throws a `PnpmError` carrying the verifier-supplied error code.
The error includes a recovery hint that points at `pnpm clean --lockfile` followed by `pnpm install` — the safe way to throw away a poisoned lockfile and rebuild from fresh resolution.
## Tests
- **9 unit tests** for `verifyLockfileResolutions` against a mock `ResolutionVerifier` — dedup, aggregation, stable ordering, the 20-entry cap, no-op behavior, the verifier-supplied error code surfacing in `PnpmError`.
- **13 integration tests** in `installing/deps-installer/test/install/minimumReleaseAge.ts` via the real `install()` entry — `testDefaults()` wires `verifyResolution` from `createTempStore` → `createClient`, so the npm verifier runs end-to-end at the install boundary. Covers the rejection scenario, `minimumReleaseAgeExclude`, the strict-mode toggle, the existing `minimumReleaseAge` resolver-side suite, and a `pnpm add` scenario where a pre-existing entry would otherwise survive resolution.
- **3 e2e tests** in `pnpm/test/install/minimumReleaseAge.ts` against the bundled CLI: rejection path with the right `ERR_PNPM_*` code and `pnpm clean --lockfile` hint in output, `minimumReleaseAgeExclude` honored, and the strict-off path (which now requires an explicit `minimumReleaseAgeStrict: false` since the config reader auto-enables strict mode when `minimumReleaseAge` is set).
- Existing `frozenLockfile` suite (12 tests) and npm-resolver suite (179 tests) still pass.
---------
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Kochan <z@kochan.io>
* fix(npm-resolver): dont rethrow ERR_PNPM_MISSING_TIME from version-spec cache
* fix(npm-resolver): upgrade cached abbreviated metadata on 304 for minimumReleaseAge
* fix(npm-resolver): expand abbreviated-meta upgrade to in-memory cache and preferOffline paths
* fix(npm-resolver): address Copilot review feedback on pickPackage
- Extract `persistUpgradedMeta` helper and call it from all three sites
(in-memory cache hit, preferOffline disk-cache hit, 304 path) so a fresh
process doesn't repeat the upgrade fetch.
- Forward `etag`/`modified` to the upgrade fetch in
`maybeUpgradeAbbreviatedMetaForReleaseAge` so the registry can answer 304.
- Extract `shouldRethrowFromFastPathCache` so the two fast-path catch sites
can't drift on the MISSING_TIME-vs-strict invariant.
- Document the deliberate choice to upgrade-fetch when `meta.modified` is
absent or unparseable (correctness over saving a network call).
- Add a companion test that exercises the catch fix with the default
`ignoreMissingTimeField` so the invariant holds regardless of that flag.
- Fix the existing `bareSpecifier: '3.1.0'` test setup: 3.1.0 was published
2016-01-11, after the test's `publishedBy` of 2015-08-17, so strict mode
correctly rejected it. Switch to 3.0.0 (released 2015-07-10).
* chore(npm-resolver): replace 'unparseable' with 'malformed' for cspell
* style(npm-resolver): declare pickPackage helpers after their caller
---------
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Kochan <z@kochan.io>
Resolves the 15 open alerts on https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/code-scanning by addressing all four categories that CodeQL flagged.
### Prototype-polluting assignment (3 alerts, product code)
- `pkg-manifest/utils/src/convertEnginesRuntimeToDependencies.ts`: the inner write now dispatches over a literal `switch` on `runtimeName`, so the assignment is always keyed by `'node' | 'deno' | 'bun'`.
- `pkg-manifest/utils/src/updateProjectManifestObject.ts`: added an `isProtoPollutionKey` barrier at the top of the loop so `packageSpec.alias` can never reach the dynamic property write with `__proto__` / `constructor` / `prototype`.
- `installing/deps-installer/src/uninstall/removeDeps.ts`: the package list is filtered through `isProtoPollutionKey` once up front, and the dependency record is captured into a local before the loop.
### Polynomial ReDoS (2 alerts)
- `deps/inspection/list/src/renderDependentsTree.ts`: `replace(/\n+$/, '')` swapped for a constant-time `charCodeAt` trim.
- `resolving/npm-resolver/src/fetch.ts`: removed the super-linear-backtracking `semverRegex` and replaced it with an O(n) `stripTrailingSemverSuffix` that splits on the rightmost `@` and `semver.valid`s, with a digit-block fallback so `foo1.0.0`-style names still produce the existing "Did you mean foo?" hint.
### Bad code sanitization (8 alerts, test infrastructure)
- `__utils__/test-ipc-server/src/TestIpcServer.ts`: the `JSON.stringify(...).slice(1, -1)` smell at the source of all 8 test-file alerts is gone. Both `sendLineScript` and `generateSendStdinScript` now build the JS source with plain `JSON.stringify` and delegate shell wrapping to a new `wrapNodeEval` helper that escapes `\\` and `"` for the outer double-quoted shell argument.
### Incomplete sanitization (2 alerts, test file)
- `releasing/commands/test/publish/oidcProvenance.test.ts`: `.replace('/', '%2f')` → `.replaceAll(...)` on both flagged lines.
## Summary
- The local resolver's path-shape match was claiming any specifier containing `/` as a local directory, so `pnpm add bit:@teambit/bit` (with `bit` configured under `namedRegistries`) installed a bogus link to `bit:@teambit/bit/` instead of resolving from the configured registry.
- Split the local resolver into two exports: `resolveFromLocalScheme` (handles `file:`/`link:`/`workspace:`/`path:`) and `resolveFromLocalPath` (path-shape match — tarball extension, `path.sep`, `isFilespec`). `resolveFromLocal` is removed.
- Re-order the default-resolver chain so the scheme pass runs *before* `resolveFromNamedRegistry` and the path pass runs *after*. Explicit local protocols still win even when a user configures a colliding `namedRegistries` alias; named-registry aliases reach their configured URL.
Repro before the fix:
```
$ cat pnpm-workspace.yaml
namedRegistries:
bit: https://node-registry.bit.cloud/
$ pnpm add bit:@teambit/bit
[WARN] Installing a dependency from a non-existent directory: /private/tmp/.../bit:@teambit/bit
dependencies:
+ bit 0.0.0 <- bit:@teambit/bit
```
After the fix, the same command resolves `@teambit/bit 1.13.173` from `https://node-registry.bit.cloud/` and writes `"@teambit/bit": "bit:^1.13.173"` to `package.json`.
* **New Features**
* `pnpm view` now shows publish age (e.g., "published 2 hours ago") and, when available, publisher attribution ("by …"); invalid or future timestamps fall back to "just now".
* Console styling for package metadata (name/version, license, counts, links, dependencies, maintainers) was improved for readability.
* **Tests**
* Added tests verifying the published timestamp and publisher attribution appear in `pnpm view` output.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
- Upgrade `@pnpm/semver-diff` and `@pnpm/colorize-semver-diff` to v2, which expose the helpers as named exports.
- Update the call sites in `@pnpm/deps.inspection.commands` and `@pnpm/installing.commands` from `semverDiff.default(...)` / `colorizeSemverDiff.default(...)` to plain `semverDiff(...)` / `colorizeSemverDiff(...)`.
- Refactor `buildPkgChoice` in `getUpdateChoices.ts` to build the row as a `string[]`. Previously the row was an object whose values relied on `nextVersion` being inferred as `any` (a side effect of the broken `.default` access poisoning the type) — that masked `outdatedPkg.current` and `outdatedPkg.workspace` being `string | undefined`. With the v2 named imports the types tighten up, and `Object.values(lineParts)` would no longer assign cleanly to `string[]`.
The previous v1 packages exported their helpers as `module.exports.default = fn`, so `.default(...)` only worked through the legacy CJS interop — and it broke under Node.js ESM (which is what the Jest runner uses with `--experimental-vm-modules`). Most of the `deps/inspection/commands` outdated tests had been silently failing on `main` with `TypeError: semverDiff.default is not a function`; this change brings them back.
* fix(git-resolver): avoid encoded slash in GitLab tarball URL
hosted-git-info's default GitLab tarball URL routes through
`/api/v4/projects/<user>%2F<project>/...`. The `%2F` survives into the
virtual store directory name (depPathToFilename only escapes raw `/`,
not `%`), and Node refuses to import any module whose path contains an
encoded slash. The same URL is also intermittently rejected by GitLab
with a 406.
Override the GitLab tarballtemplate to the `/-/archive/` URL, which works
for both public and private repos and contains no encoded slashes.
Closes#11533
* test: avoid cspell-flagged words
* test: keep existing gitlab assertions, only add new ones
Restore the skipped tests' original API-URL assertions; they document the
old expected shape and weren't running anyway. Add the new `/-/archive/`
URL to the pick-fetcher fixture as an additional case so both shapes are
exercised.
For git-hosted tarballs (`codeload.github.com` / `gitlab.com` / `bitbucket.org`) the fetcher dropped the integrity it computed while downloading, so the lockfile only ever stored the URL. A compromised git host or man-in-the-middle could serve a substituted tarball on subsequent installs and pnpm would install it — the lockfile had no hash to compare against.
This pins the SHA-512 SRI of the raw tarball in the lockfile, in the same `sha512-<base64>` form npm-registry tarballs use. The only difference is the source: for npm we pass through `dist.integrity`, for git we compute it locally from the downloaded buffer. Subsequent installs validate the download against that integrity in the worker (`addTarballToStore` → `parseIntegrity` → hash compare), so a tampered tarball fails with `TarballIntegrityError`.
## Why git-hosted stays on `gitHostedStoreIndexKey`
The lockfile pins integrity for security, but the *store key* for git-hosted resolutions stays on `gitHostedStoreIndexKey(pkgId, { built })` rather than collapsing under the integrity-based key. Reason: git-hosted tarballs are post-processed (`preparePackage` / `packlist`), so the cached file set depends on whether build scripts ran during fetch. The integrity-only key would fold the built and not-built variants into a single slot, letting one overwrite the other and serving the wrong content if `ignoreScripts` was toggled between runs. Keeping git-hosted on the existing key shape preserves that dimension; the integrity is still validated on every fresh download.
## How the routing stays clean
The naive way to express "use gitHostedStoreIndexKey for git-hosted, integrity key for npm" is to call `isGitHostedPkgUrl(resolution.tarball)` everywhere a store key is computed — fragile, scattered, and easy to forget when adding new readers (Copilot caught two of those during review). Instead, a typed annotation: `TarballResolution` gets an optional `gitHosted: boolean` field. The git resolver sets it; the lockfile loader (`convertToLockfileObject`) backfills it for entries written by older pnpm versions; `toLockfileResolution` carries it through on serialize. Every consumer reads `resolution.gitHosted` directly. URL detection lives in exactly two places — the resolver and the loader — instead of seven.
## Changes
### Security fix
- `fetching/tarball-fetcher/src/gitHostedTarballFetcher.ts` — return the `integrity` that the inner remote-tarball fetch already computed (was being silently dropped by the destructure).
### Lockfile schema (additive)
- `@pnpm/lockfile.types` and `@pnpm/resolving.resolver-base` — `TarballResolution` gains optional `gitHosted: boolean`.
- `@pnpm/resolving.git-resolver` — sets `gitHosted: true` on every git-hosted tarball it produces.
- `@pnpm/lockfile.fs` (`convertToLockfileObject`) — backfills the field on load for older lockfiles via inlined URL detection.
- `@pnpm/lockfile.utils` (`toLockfileResolution`, `pkgSnapshotToResolution`) — preserve / read the field.
### Store-key consumers (now one-line typed reads, dropped the URL-sniffing dep)
- `installing/package-requester` (`getFilesIndexFilePath`)
- `store/pkg-finder` (`readPackageFileMap`)
- `modules-mounter/daemon` (`createFuseHandlers`)
- `building/after-install` (side-effects-cache lookup + write)
- `store/commands/storeStatus`
- `installing/deps-installer` (agent-mode store-controller wrapper)
### Fetcher routing
- `fetching/pick-fetcher` — `pickFetcher` prefers `resolution.gitHosted`; URL fallback retained for ad-hoc resolutions.
### Tests
- New integrity-validation test in `tarball-fetcher` (mismatched `integrity` on the resolution must throw `TarballIntegrityError`).
- New git-hosted lookup test in `pkg-finder` asserting routing through `gitHostedStoreIndexKey` even when integrity is present.
- New `toLockfileResolution` test asserting `gitHosted: true` flows through serialization.
- `fromRepo.ts` lockfile snapshot updated for the now-pinned integrity + `gitHosted: true`.
- `git-resolver` tests updated to assert `gitHosted: true` in produced resolutions.
This is consistent with #9358, but implements support for the GitHub Packages npm registry and, more broadly, for vlt-style https://docs.vlt.sh/cli/registries for any registry.
This PR adds a built-in gh: specifier that resolves against the GitHub Packages npm registry, plus a namedRegistries config key so a project can map its own aliases to arbitrary registries. A project can mix public npm packages and private GitHub Packages (or self-hosted) ones without applying a scope-wide registry override to every @scope/* package.
- pnpm add gh:@acme/private writes "@acme/private": "gh:^1.0.0" and resolves from https://npm.pkg.github.com/.
- pnpm add gh:@acme/private@^1.0.0 (with or without an alias) is also supported. Aliased form writes "my-alias": "gh:@acme/private@^1.0.0".
- Auth comes from the existing per-URL .npmrc mechanism, e.g. //npm.pkg.github.com/:_authToken=${GITHUB_TOKEN}. No new auth surface.
- @github is intentionally not defaulted to https://npm.pkg.github.com/ - hardcoding that would hijack installs of the public @github/* packages on npmjs.org (e.g. @github/relative-time-element) for users without a scope-wide override. Use gh: to install from GitHub Packages, or configure @github:registry=... yourself if that's really what you want.
- Additional named registries (a self-hosted proxy, GitHub Enterprise Server, etc.) can be configured in pnpm-workspace.yaml:
```yml
namedRegistries:
gh: https://npm.pkg.github.example.com/ # optional: overrides the built-in `gh` alias for GHES
work: https://npm.work.example.com/
```
- Then work:@corp/lib@^2.0.0 resolves against https://npm.work.example.com/, and the built-in gh alias can be redirected to a GHES host.
- Env-var substitution (${VAR}) is supported in namedRegistries values, mirroring the .npmrc convention.
- Reserved alias names (npm, jsr, github, workspace, catalog, file, git, http, https, link, patch, and related git host shorthands) cannot be redefined as user-named registries - the resolver throws ERR_PNPM_RESERVED_NAMED_REGISTRY_ALIAS at startup rather than silently shadowing another protocol. Malformed URLs throw ERR_PNPM_INVALID_NAMED_REGISTRY_URL at startup too, instead of failing as a confusing 404 during resolution.
- On publish, createExportableManifest strips any named-registry prefix (both the built-in gh: and any user-configured alias) so npm and yarn consumers can still resolve the dependency via their own scope-registry configuration - mirroring the user-facing requirement when installing such a dep without the prefix.
The prefix is gh: rather than github: because github: is reserved by npm-package-arg / hosted-git-info as a git host shorthand (e.g. github:owner/repo) - reusing it would be a deviation from the specs used by the npm CLI. gh: is shorter, matches vlt's convention, and cannot collide with any existing npm scheme.
Unlike jsr:, gh: (and any other named-registry alias) does not rewrite the package name - gh:@acme/foo resolves @acme/foo from the GitHub Packages registry as-is. This also means npm/yarn consumers see the original name after the prefix is stripped on publish.
---------
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Kochan <z@kochan.io>
* chore: upgrade @typescript/native-preview to 7.0.0-dev.20260421.2
- Add explicit `types: ["node"]` to the shared tsconfig because tsgo
20260421 no longer auto-acquires `@types/*` from `node_modules`.
- Refactor test files to explicitly import jest globals (`describe`,
`it`, `test`, `expect`, `beforeEach`, etc.) from `@jest/globals`
instead of relying on `@types/jest` ambient declarations. Under the
new tsgo build, `import { jest } from '@jest/globals'` shadows the
ambient `jest` namespace, breaking `@types/jest`'s `declare var
describe: jest.Describe;` globals.
- Add `@jest/globals` to each package's devDependencies where tests
now import from it, and add `@types/node` to packages that need it
but were relying on hoisted resolution.
- Replace `fail()` calls with `throw new Error(...)` since `fail` is
no longer globally available.
* chore: fix remaining tsgo type-strictness errors
- Strip `as <PnpmType>` casts on objects passed to toMatchObject /
toStrictEqual / toEqual; @jest/globals rejects the typed objects
(which include AsymmetricMatchers) vs. the repo-specific type.
- Type `jest.fn<...>()` explicitly where the mock's signature matters
for toHaveBeenCalledWith.
- Replace `beforeEach(() => X)` with `beforeEach(() => { X })` so the
return value is void, as the stricter jest typing requires.
- Use `expect.objectContaining({...})` in one place where the full
expected object triggered stricter type resolution.
- Cast `prompt.mock.calls` arg through `as unknown as Record<...>[]`
for patch.test.ts's nested-array matchers.
- Fix off-by-one `<reference path>` in pnpm/test/getConfig.test.ts
that only surfaced now.
- Move `@jest/globals` from devDependencies to dependencies in the
two `__utils__` packages that import it from `src/`.
- Clean up unused imports from the @jest/globals migration.
* chore: address Copilot review on #11332
- Move misplaced `@jest/globals` imports to the top import block in
checkEngine, run.ts, and workspace/root-finder tests where the
script dropped them below executable code.
- Replace `try { await x(); throw new Error('should have thrown') } catch`
in bins/linker, lockfile/fs, and resolving/local-resolver tests with
`await expect(x()).rejects.toMatchObject({...})`. The old pattern
swallowed an unrelated `throw` if the under-test call silently
succeeded, which would fail on the catch-block assertion with a
misleading message.
* chore: upgrade @typescript/native-preview to 7.0.0-dev.20260421.2
- Add explicit `types: ["node"]` to the shared tsconfig because tsgo
20260421 no longer auto-acquires `@types/*` from `node_modules`.
- Refactor test files to explicitly import jest globals (`describe`,
`it`, `test`, `expect`, `beforeEach`, etc.) from `@jest/globals`
instead of relying on `@types/jest` ambient declarations. Under the
new tsgo build, `import { jest } from '@jest/globals'` shadows the
ambient `jest` namespace, breaking `@types/jest`'s `declare var
describe: jest.Describe;` globals.
- Add `@jest/globals` to each package's devDependencies where tests
now import from it, and add `@types/node` to packages that need it
but were relying on hoisted resolution.
- Replace `fail()` calls with `throw new Error(...)` since `fail` is
no longer globally available.
* chore: fix remaining tsgo type-strictness errors
- Strip `as <PnpmType>` casts on objects passed to toMatchObject /
toStrictEqual / toEqual; @jest/globals rejects the typed objects
(which include AsymmetricMatchers) vs. the repo-specific type.
- Type `jest.fn<...>()` explicitly where the mock's signature matters
for toHaveBeenCalledWith.
- Replace `beforeEach(() => X)` with `beforeEach(() => { X })` so the
return value is void, as the stricter jest typing requires.
- Use `expect.objectContaining({...})` in one place where the full
expected object triggered stricter type resolution.
- Cast `prompt.mock.calls` arg through `as unknown as Record<...>[]`
for patch.test.ts's nested-array matchers.
- Fix off-by-one `<reference path>` in pnpm/test/getConfig.test.ts
that only surfaced now.
- Move `@jest/globals` from devDependencies to dependencies in the
two `__utils__` packages that import it from `src/`.
- Clean up unused imports from the @jest/globals migration.
* chore: address Copilot review on #11332
- Move misplaced `@jest/globals` imports to the top import block in
checkEngine, run.ts, and workspace/root-finder tests where the
script dropped them below executable code.
- Replace `try { await x(); throw new Error('should have thrown') } catch`
in bins/linker, lockfile/fs, and resolving/local-resolver tests with
`await expect(x()).rejects.toMatchObject({...})`. The old pattern
swallowed an unrelated `throw` if the under-test call silently
succeeded, which would fail on the catch-block assertion with a
misleading message.
