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## What The lockfile resolution verifier now confirms that a registry entry pinning an explicit `tarball` URL points at the artifact the registry's own metadata lists for that `name@version`. A mismatch — or any entry that can't be confirmed against the registry — is rejected with `ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH`. ## Why Follow-up to the design discussion on #12122. The verifier checked the age/trust of `name@version` against the registry packument but never bound the lockfile's `tarball` URL to it. For the non-standard entries pnpm preserves a tarball URL for (npm Enterprise, GitHub Packages — see `toLockfileResolution`), pnpm fetches straight from that URL. So a **tampered lockfile could pair a trusted `name@version` with an attacker-chosen tarball URL** (plus a matching integrity for the attacker's bytes); verification passed against the legitimate version while the install fetched the attacker's bytes. Defending a checked-in lockfile is explicitly in this feature's threat model. ## How - For a registry-keyed entry that pins an explicit `tarball`, fetch the packument and assert the URL equals `versions[v].dist.tarball`. The comparison canonicalizes away benign differences — http/https scheme, default ports (`:443`/`:80`), and `%2f` scope-separator encoding (case-insensitive) — so only real mismatches are flagged. The packument is fetched from the user's configured registry (the lockfile's tarball host can't redirect it), and named-registry routing uses the same canonicalization so a scheme/`%2f`-only difference doesn't route to the wrong packument. - **The binding is unconditional.** It runs regardless of `minimumReleaseAge`/`trustPolicy` and is **not** narrowed by their exclude lists, because it guards *integrity*, not *maturity/trust*. Disabling the age/trust policies must not silently disable anti-tamper. (`createNpmResolutionVerifier` therefore always returns a verifier.) - **It is fail-closed.** An entry passes only when the registry metadata affirmatively lists the version with a matching tarball URL. If the metadata can't be fetched, doesn't list the version, or omits `dist.tarball`, the entry is rejected — otherwise a tampered lockfile could smuggle a malicious URL past the check by pointing it at a `name@version` the registry can't vouch for. - **Behavior change:** as a result, an install that re-verifies a lockfile (its content changed since the last verified run, so the verification cache no longer short-circuits) now requires the configured registry to be reachable. `trustLockfile` is the opt-out for environments that treat the on-disk lockfile as already trusted. - **Verification cache.** The policy snapshot records a `tarballUrlBinding` marker and `canTrustPastCheck` requires it, so a cache record written before this rule existed is re-verified rather than trusted (closing an upgrade-time bypass). - Entries with no explicit `tarball` reconstruct the URL from name+version+registry and are inherently bound (no check). `file:`/git-hosted resolutions stay out of scope (#12122). - Threads `nonSemverVersion` to the verifier so URL-keyed tarball deps (a remote `https:` tarball that carries a semver `version` copied from its manifest) are recognized as deliberate non-registry deps and skipped — also fixing a latent release-age over-match on them. The candidate dedupe key includes `nonSemverVersion` so a registry snapshot and a URL-keyed snapshot sharing a `name@version` and serialized resolution stay distinct. Mirrored in pacquet (`create_npm_resolution_verifier`). The dedupe-key change is TS-only: pacquet's candidate `version` comes from the lockfile key suffix, so the two shapes never share a key there. ## Tests - TS: confirmed mismatch → violation; non-standard URL matching metadata → pass; default-port/scheme difference → pass; URL-keyed dep → skipped; URL binding runs (and fails closed) with no age/trust policy configured; `canTrustPastCheck` rejects a cache record lacking the binding marker. Regression-verified (the mismatch test fails when the check is disabled). - pacquet: mirror tests + the no-policy / `minimumReleaseAge: 0` / `trustPolicy: off` cases, default-port/scheme equivalence, and the missing-`tarballUrlBinding` cache rejection. A few install-dispatch / resolution-reuse tests that pin a deliberately bogus tarball URL (or run against an unreachable registry to prove resolution reuse) now set `trustLockfile`, since the always-on fail-closed tarball-URL check would otherwise flag the fixture before the path under test runs. - `clippy --deny warnings`, `fmt`, and `dylint` clean.