mirror of
https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync.git
synced 2026-04-14 11:16:58 -04:00
Added a way to specify where the chroot should occur in the module's
path, which allows a daemon admin to have chroot protection and still have files that are outside the transfer area (such as libraries).
This commit is contained in:
5
NEWS
5
NEWS
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ Changes since 2.6.9:
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translation is not desired. See the daemon's "numeric ids" parameter
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for full details.
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- A chroot daemon can now indicate which part of its path should affect the
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chroot call, and which part should become an inside-chroot path for the
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module. This allows you to have outside-the-transfer paths (such as for
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libraries) even when you enable chroot protection.
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- If a file's data arrived successfully on the receiving side but the
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rename of the temporary file to the destination file failed AND the
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--remove-source-files (or the deprecated --remove-sent-files) option
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@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ int munge_symlinks = 0;
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struct chmod_mode_struct *daemon_chmod_modes;
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/* module_dirlen is the length of the module_dir string when in daemon
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* mode, not chrooted, and the path is not "/"; otherwise 0. */
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* mode and module_dir is not "/"; otherwise 0. (Note that a chroot-
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* enabled module can have a non-"/" module_dir these days.) */
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char *module_dir = NULL;
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unsigned int module_dirlen = 0;
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@@ -379,7 +380,7 @@ static int read_arg_from_pipe(int fd, char *buf, int limit)
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static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, char *addr, char *host)
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{
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int argc, opt_cnt;
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char **argv;
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char **argv, *chroot_path = NULL;
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char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
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uid_t uid = (uid_t)-2; /* canonically "nobody" */
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gid_t gid = (gid_t)-2;
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@@ -483,14 +484,29 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, char *addr, char *host)
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* to make sure that the module's path is absolute. After this
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* check, module_dir will be set to an absolute path. */
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module_dir = lp_path(i);
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if (use_chroot) {
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if ((p = strstr(module_dir, "/./")) != NULL) {
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*p = '\0';
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p += 2;
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} else if ((p = strdup("/")) == NULL)
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out_of_memory("rsync_module");
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}
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strlcpy(line, curr_dir, sizeof line);
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if (!push_dir(module_dir, 1))
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goto chdir_failed;
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if (strcmp(curr_dir, module_dir) != 0)
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module_dir = strdup(curr_dir);
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if (strcmp(curr_dir, module_dir) != 0
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&& (module_dir = strdup(curr_dir)) == NULL)
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out_of_memory("rsync_module");
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push_dir(line, 1); /* Restore curr_dir. */
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if (use_chroot || (module_dirlen = strlen(module_dir)) == 1) {
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if (use_chroot) {
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chroot_path = module_dir;
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module_dir = p; /* p is "/" or our inside-chroot path */
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}
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module_dirlen = clean_fname(module_dir, CFN_COLLAPSE_DOT_DOT_DIRS | CFN_DROP_TRAILING_DOT_DIR);
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if (module_dirlen == 1) {
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module_dirlen = 0;
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set_filter_dir("/", 1);
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} else
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@@ -523,8 +539,17 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, char *addr, char *host)
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if (*lp_prexfer_exec(i) || *lp_postxfer_exec(i)) {
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char *modname, *modpath, *hostaddr, *hostname, *username;
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int status;
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if (!use_chroot)
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p = module_dir;
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else if (module_dirlen) {
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pathjoin(line, sizeof line, chroot_path, module_dir+1);
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p = line;
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} else
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p = chroot_path;
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if (asprintf(&modname, "RSYNC_MODULE_NAME=%s", name) < 0
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|| asprintf(&modpath, "RSYNC_MODULE_PATH=%s", module_dir) < 0
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|| asprintf(&modpath, "RSYNC_MODULE_PATH=%s", p) < 0
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|| asprintf(&hostaddr, "RSYNC_HOST_ADDR=%s", addr) < 0
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|| asprintf(&hostname, "RSYNC_HOST_NAME=%s", host) < 0
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|| asprintf(&username, "RSYNC_USER_NAME=%s", auth_user) < 0)
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@@ -624,13 +649,15 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, char *addr, char *host)
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* a warning, unless a "require chroot" flag is set,
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* in which case we fail.
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*/
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if (chroot(module_dir)) {
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rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot %s failed", module_dir);
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if (chroot(chroot_path)) {
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rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot %s failed", chroot_path);
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io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: chroot failed\n");
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return -1;
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}
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if (!push_dir("/", 0))
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if (!push_dir(module_dir, 0))
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goto chdir_failed;
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if (module_dirlen)
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sanitize_paths = 1;
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} else {
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if (!push_dir(module_dir, 0)) {
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chdir_failed:
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@@ -642,7 +669,7 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, char *addr, char *host)
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}
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if ((munge_symlinks = lp_munge_symlinks(i)) < 0)
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munge_symlinks = !use_chroot;
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munge_symlinks = !use_chroot || module_dirlen;
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if (munge_symlinks) {
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STRUCT_STAT st;
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if (stat(SYMLINK_PREFIX, &st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
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@@ -135,13 +135,26 @@ holes, but it has the disadvantages of requiring super-user privileges,
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of not being able to follow symbolic links that are either absolute or outside
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of the new root path, and of complicating the preservation of users and groups
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by name (see below).
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When "use chroot" is false, rsync will: (1) munge symlinks by
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As an additional safety feature, you can specify a dot-dir in the module's
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"path" to indicate the point where the chroot should occur. This allows rsync
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to run in a chroot with a non-"/" path for the top of the transfer hierarchy.
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Doing this guards against unintended library loading (since those absolute
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paths will not be inside the transfer hierarchy unless you have used an unwise
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pathname), and lets you setup libraries for the chroot that are outside of the
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transfer. For example, specifying "/var/rsync/./module1" will chroot to the
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"/var/rsync" directory and set the inside-chroot path to "/module1". If you
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had omitted the dot-dir, the chroot would have used the whole path, and the
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inside-chroot path would have been "/".
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When "use chroot" is false or the inside-chroot path is not "/", rsync will:
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(1) munge symlinks by
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default for security reasons (see "munge symlinks" for a way to turn this
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off, but only if you trust your users), (2) substitute leading slashes in
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absolute paths with the module's path (so that options such as
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bf(--backup-dir), bf(--compare-dest), etc. interpret an absolute path as
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rooted in the module's "path" dir), and (3) trim ".." path elements from
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args if rsync believes they would escape the chroot.
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args if rsync believes they would escape the module hierarchy.
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The default for "use chroot" is true, and is the safer choice (especially
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if the module is not read-only).
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@@ -182,7 +195,7 @@ dit(bf(munge symlinks)) The "munge symlinks" option tells rsync to modify
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all incoming symlinks in a way that makes them unusable but recoverable
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(see below). This should help protect your files from user trickery when
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your daemon module is writable. The default is disabled when "use chroot"
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is on and enabled when "use chroot" is off.
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is on and the inside-chroot path is "/", otherwise it is enabled.
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If you disable this option on a daemon that is not read-only, there
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are tricks that a user can play with uploaded symlinks to access
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@@ -194,8 +207,9 @@ The way rsync disables the use of symlinks is to prefix each one with
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the string "/rsyncd-munged/". This prevents the links from being used
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as long as that directory does not exist. When this option is enabled,
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rsync will refuse to run if that path is a directory or a symlink to
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a directory. When using the "munge symlinks" option in a chroot area,
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you should add this path to the exclude setting for the module so that
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a directory. When using the "munge symlinks" option in a chroot area
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that has an inside-chroot path of "/", you should add "/rsyncd-munged/"
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to the exclude setting for the module so that
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a user can't try to create it.
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Note: rsync makes no attempt to verify that any pre-existing symlinks in
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@@ -206,7 +220,8 @@ every symlink's value. There is a perl script in the support directory
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of the source code named "munge-symlinks" that can be used to add or remove
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this prefix from your symlinks.
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When this option is disabled on a writable module and "use chroot" is off,
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When this option is disabled on a writable module and "use chroot" is off
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(or the inside-chroot path is not "/"),
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incoming symlinks will be modified to drop a leading slash and to remove ".."
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path elements that rsync believes will allow a symlink to escape the module's
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hierarchy. There are tricky ways to work around this, though, so you had
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@@ -635,21 +650,21 @@ A more sophisticated example would be:
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verb(
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uid = nobody
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gid = nobody
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use chroot = no
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use chroot = yes
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max connections = 4
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syslog facility = local5
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pid file = /var/run/rsyncd.pid
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[ftp]
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path = /var/ftp/pub
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path = /var/ftp/./pub
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comment = whole ftp area (approx 6.1 GB)
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[sambaftp]
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path = /var/ftp/pub/samba
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path = /var/ftp/./pub/samba
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comment = Samba ftp area (approx 300 MB)
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[rsyncftp]
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path = /var/ftp/pub/rsync
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path = /var/ftp/./pub/rsync
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comment = rsync ftp area (approx 6 MB)
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[sambawww]
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