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Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrew Tridgell
2c7777aaa6 Preparing for release of 3.4.3 [buildall] 2026-05-20 10:07:26 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
6af41d2357 version.h: bump to 3.4.3 for the release
Drops the "dev" suffix on RSYNC_VERSION ahead of the
2026-05-20 00:00 UTC public release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
a0b9a8e989 NEWS: prepare 3.4.3 release entry with six CVEs
Set the date to 20 May 2026, add a SECURITY FIXES section listing
all six May 2026 CVEs (CVE-2026-29518, -43617, -43618, -43619,
-43620, -45232) with reach, root cause, fix and reporter for each,
plus a note on the defence-in-depth hardening that goes with them.
Also list the new symlink-race regression tests under DEVELOPER
RELATED.
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
ac692b199c util1: handle out-of-range times in timestring 2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
147e9bea8c main: reject hyphen-prefixed remote-shell hostnames 2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
a5fc5ebe7a socket: reject over-long proxy response line
fixes a one byte stack overflow when using RSYNC_PROXY with a
malicious proxy.

Reach: only when RSYNC_PROXY is set and a malicious or MITM'd
proxy returns the pathological response.  The byte written is
always '\0' and the attacker doesn't choose the offset, so impact
is corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
misbehaviour or crash -- no information disclosure beyond the
existing rprintf of buffer contents.

Reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
c79cb81a4f rsync.h: lower MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT to avoid signed-int overflow in read_del_stats
read_del_stats() in main.c accumulates 5 wire-supplied counts into
the int32 stats.deleted_files field:

    stats.deleted_files  = read_varint_bounded(..., MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, ...);
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs     = ...;
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = ...;
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices  = ...;
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = ...;

With the previous MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT = 2^30 (1.07 GB) the worst-case
sum is 5 * 2^30 = 5.37 GB; three maximal values already exceed
INT32_MAX = 2.15 GB on the third "+=", triggering signed integer
overflow (C99 6.5/5 -- undefined behaviour, the compiler may assume
it cannot happen and elide subsequent checks).

The bound was introduced in f0155902 ("defence-in-depth: bound
wire-supplied counts and lengths") with a commit message claiming
"per-summand cap so the total can't overflow", but 2^30 * 5 does
overflow.  Lower the per-summand cap to 2^28 (= 268M) so the worst
case is 5 * 2^28 = 1.34 GB < INT32_MAX with margin.  2^28 deletions
per category is still vastly above any plausible real transfer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
650643109e defence-in-depth: receiver block-index bounds + read_delay_line null check
Two assorted audit findings:

  - receive_data() never bounds-checked the block index returned
    by recv_token() against sum.count before computing offset2
    and feeding it to map_ptr(). An out-of-bounds index from a
    hostile sender produces invalid memory access. Add a
    sum.count bounds check.

  - read_delay_line()'s strchr() call could return NULL when no
    space was found, but the code unconditionally added 1 to the
    result before dereferencing. Low impact (just a disconnect on
    exit of the client-specific forked process) but the NULL
    deref is real. Guard the NULL.

Both reported by Joshua Rogers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
4cf08983e8 defence-in-depth: guard cumulative snprintf against length underflow
Two cumulative-snprintf patterns in log.c (rsyserr) and main.c
(output_itemized_counts) had the shape

    len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, ...);
    len += snprintf(buf+len, sizeof buf - len, ...);

with no guard between calls. snprintf returns the would-have-been
length on truncation, so a truncated first call leaves
"sizeof buf - len" as a negative-then-promoted-to-size_t value,
underflowing into a huge size_t and writing past buf.

Realistic exposure is small in both cases (log header well under
buffer, only ~5 itemized iterations writing ~25 chars each into a
1024-byte buffer) but the defect class matches bb0a8118 and the
fix is cheap. Guard before each subsequent call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
8112445318 defence-in-depth: bound wire-supplied counts and lengths
Multiple receiver-side fields read from the wire were trusted
without upper-bound checks. A hostile peer could either request
extreme allocations (DoS via --max-alloc) or, on platforms where
read_varint returned a negative value, push ~SIZE_MAX through the
size_t conversion to wrap downstream length checks.

Introduce read_int_bounded(), read_varint_bounded() and
read_varint_size() in io.c so wire-derived integer ranges are
checked at the read site rather than scattered across each
caller, with RERR_PROTOCOL on out-of-range input.

Apply the bounded primitives to:
  - sum->count (checksum count -- previously could overflow
    (size_t)count * xfer_sum_len on 32-bit with raised max-alloc)
  - xattrs: count, name_len, datum_len, plus rel_pos overflow
    detect to stop chain wrapping the num accumulator
  - acls: ida-entry count
  - flist: file mode S_IFMT validation, modtime_nsec range check
  - delete-stat counters in main: per-summand cap so the total
    can't overflow a signed 32-bit accumulator

Reporters include Joshua Rogers (checksum-count overflow finding).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
c38f20c5ff clientserver: fix hostname ACL bypass when using daemon chroot
On an rsync daemon configured with "daemon chroot", the reverse-DNS
lookup of the connecting client was performed *after* the chroot
had been entered. If the chroot did not contain the files glibc
needs for resolution (/etc/resolv.conf, /etc/nsswitch.conf,
/etc/hosts, NSS service modules), the lookup failed and
client_name() returned "UNKNOWN". Hostname-based deny rules
("hosts deny = *.evil.example") therefore could not match, and
an attacker controlling their PTR record could connect from a
hostname the administrator had intended to deny. IP-based ACLs
were unaffected.

Do the reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid; client_name()
caches its result, so the post-chroot call uses the cached value
and hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
post-chroot.

Adds testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test as end-to-end regression
coverage. The test sets up an empty chroot directory, configures
"hosts deny = <localhost-resolved-name>" with daemon chroot, and
asserts the connection is refused with @ERROR access denied.
Uses unshare --user --map-root-user for non-root CAP_SYS_CHROOT;
skips cleanly on non-Linux or when user namespaces aren't
available.

Reporter: Joshua Rogers (MegaManSec).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
0cf200ecbb receiver: add parent_ndx<0 guard, mirroring 797e17f
Commit 797e17f ("fixed an invalid access to files array") added a
parent_ndx < 0 guard to send_files() in sender.c, but the visually-
identical block in recv_files() in receiver.c was not updated. A
malicious rsync:// server can therefore drive any connecting client
into the same out-of-bounds dir_flist->files[-1] read followed by a
file_struct dereference in f_name() one line later.

Reach: protocol-30+ default (inc_recurse) makes flist.c:2745 set
parent_ndx = -1 on the first received flist when the sender omits a
leading "." entry; rsync.c flist_for_ndx() does not reject ndx == 0
in that state because the range check evaluates 0 < 0 = false; and
read_ndx_and_attrs() only validates ndx with the ITEM_TRANSFER bit
set, so iflags=ITEM_IS_NEW (or any other non-transfer iflag word)
bypasses the check.

Apply the same guard receiver-side. Confirmed: the same PoC (a
minimal Python rsyncd that handshakes with CF_INC_RECURSE, sends a
no-leading-"." flist, and emits ndx=0 with ITEM_IS_NEW) crashes
unpatched 3.4.2 with SEGV_MAPERR si_addr=0x4101a-class in the
receiver child; with this guard it exits cleanly with code 2
(RERR_PROTOCOL).

The attack surface delta over the sender variant is large:
the original was malicious-client -> daemon, this is
malicious-server -> any rsync client doing a normal rsync://
or remote-shell pull.

Reported by Pratham Gupta (alchemy1729).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
e4c681fefd testsuite: cover 'refuse options = compress' for the daemon
Add a daemon-refuse-compress test that builds a module configured with
'refuse options = compress' and asserts that:
  1. an attempted -z transfer to that module fails with an error
     mentioning --compress, and
  2. the same transfer without -z still succeeds.

This pins down the documented way to disable all compression on a
daemon, which previously had no automated coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
c44c90e946 token: harden compressed-token decoding against integer overflow
The receiver's three compressed-token decoders --
recv_deflated_token (zlib), recv_zstd_token, and
recv_compressed_token (lz4) -- accumulated rx_token (a 32-bit
signed counter) without overflow checking. A malicious sender
could craft a compressed-token stream that walked rx_token past
INT32_MAX, with careful manipulation leaking process memory
contents to the wire (environment variables, passwords, heap
pointers, library pointers -- significantly weakening ASLR
and facilitating further exploitation).

Cap rx_token at MAX_TOKEN_INDEX = 0x7ffffffe. Fold the
bookkeeping into recv_compressed_token_num() and
recv_compressed_token_run() shared by all three decoders. Reject
negative or out-of-range token values explicitly. Also cap the
simple_recv_token literal-block length at the source: any
wire-supplied length > CHUNK_SIZE is ill-formed (the matching
simple_send_token never writes a chunk larger than CHUNK_SIZE),
so reject before looping on attacker-controlled bytes.

Reach: an authenticated daemon connection with compression
enabled (the default for protocols >= 30 when both peers
advertise it). Disabling compression on the daemon
("refuse options = compress" in rsyncd.conf) is the available
workaround.

Reporter: Omar Elsayed (seks99x).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
fc592a8e25 ci(cygwin): mark all symlink-race regression tests as expected-skipped
Cygwin lacks RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support and the
per-component O_NOFOLLOW fallback also can't be exercised meaningfully
under the cygwin runner's filesystem semantics, so every test that
asserts the secure_relative_open / do_*_at machinery actually blocks
the attack would skip. Make those skips expected in the workflow's
RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED list:

  - chdir-symlink-race
  - chmod-symlink-race
  - bare-do-open-symlink-race
  - sender-flist-symlink-leak
  - daemon-chroot-acl

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
40a6e13071 testsuite: end-to-end regression test for chdir-symlink-race
testsuite/chdir-symlink-race.test runs an actual rsync daemon
(via RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG to avoid the network) configured with
"use chroot = no", plants a symlink at module/subdir -> ../outside,
and runs four flavours of attacker-shaped transfer (single-file
poc_chmod, -r push into the symlinked subdir with --size-only and
without, -r push into the module root). All four must leave the
outside-the-module sentinel file's mode AND content unchanged.

Portability:
  - file_mode() helper falls back to BSD stat -f %Lp when GNU
    stat -c %a is unavailable (macOS, FreeBSD).
  - Pre-saved pristine copy + cmp(1) replaces sha1sum, which
    differs across platforms (sha1sum / shasum / sha1).

Tests are kept running as root in the user-namespace re-exec
wrapper used by symlink-race tests so the daemon's setuid path
doesn't drop into the test user's identity (which on Linux
would mean the chmod-escape code path can't trigger because
the test user doesn't have CAP_FOWNER over the outside file).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
3cc6a9e8cd util1+syscall: secure copy_file source/dest opens; bare-path defence-in-depth
Three related codex audit findings:

  Finding 3a: copy_file()'s source open in util1.c used
  do_open_nofollow(), which only rejects a final-component
  symlink. A parent-component symlink (e.g. --copy-dest=cd where
  cd -> /outside) follows freely and reads outside the module.
  Route through secure_relative_open() with O_NOFOLLOW.

  Finding 3b: generator.c's in-place backup-file create still
  used a bare do_open with O_CREAT, leaving a tiny but reachable
  parent-symlink window between the secure unlink (already
  through do_unlink_at) and the create. Add do_open_at() that
  goes through a secure parent dirfd, and route the call site
  through it.

  Finding 3c: copy_file()'s destination open in
  unlink_and_reopen() had the same bare-do_open pattern; route
  through do_open_at as well.

Adds testsuite/copy-dest-source-symlink.test and
testsuite/bare-do-open-symlink-race.test as regression coverage
for both attack shapes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
30656c5e35 syscall: add symlink-race-safe do_*_at() wrappers and harden secure_relative_open
Add the rest of the path-based syscall wrappers and migrate every
receiver-side caller:
  - do_lchown_at, do_rename_at, do_mkdir_at, do_symlink_at,
    do_mknod_at, do_link_at, do_unlink_at, do_rmdir_at,
    do_utimensat_at, do_stat_at, do_lstat_at

Same shape as do_chmod_at: open each parent under
secure_relative_open(), call the *at() variant against the dirfd,
fall through to the bare path-based syscall in non-daemon /
chrooted / absolute-path / no-parent cases. macOS's
setattrlist-based set_times tier is also routed through the
utimensat_at path on daemon-no-chroot.

Hardenings to secure_relative_open() itself:
  - confine basedir resolution under the same kernel mechanism
    used for relpath (basedirs from --copy-dest / --link-dest are
    sender-controllable in daemon mode)
  - reject any '..' component (bare '..', 'foo/..', 'subdir/..')
    so the per-component O_NOFOLLOW fallback can't escape
  - return the dirfd we built up from the per-component fallback
    when the caller passed O_DIRECTORY (otherwise every do_*_at
    failed with EINVAL on platforms without RESOLVE_BENEATH)

Adds testsuite/alt-dest-symlink-race.test and
testsuite/secure-relpath-validation.test (with t_secure_relpath
helper) as regression coverage for the new hardenings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
15d2964256 util1: secure change_dir() against symlink-race chdir-escape
The receiver's chdir(2) into a destination subdirectory followed
attacker-planted symlinks at every path component. Once CWD
escaped the module, every subsequent path-relative syscall (open,
chmod, lchown, ...) inherited the escape -- defeating
secure_relative_open's RESOLVE_BENEATH anchor against AT_FDCWD,
since the anchor itself was now outside the module.

Route change_dir's relative target through secure_relative_open()
and fchdir() to the resulting dirfd in am_daemon && !am_chrooted
mode, so the chdir step itself can no longer follow a parent-
symlink. Same treatment applied to the CD_SKIP_CHDIR /
set_path_only path so it also can't follow attacker symlinks
during path tracking.

Adds testsuite/sender-flist-symlink-leak.test covering the
sender-side flist resolution variant of the same primitive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
862fe4eeaf syscall+receiver: secure receiver-side do_chmod against symlink-race TOCTOU
CVE-2026-29518's fix routed the receiver's open() through
secure_relative_open(), but every other path-based syscall the
receiver runs on sender-controllable paths is vulnerable to the
same TOCTOU primitive. This commit closes the chmod variant.

Add do_chmod_at() that opens the parent of fname under
secure_relative_open() and uses fchmodat() against the resulting
dirfd. Gate the secure path on am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the same
gate use_secure_symlinks already uses for the receiver basis-file
open), so non-daemon callers and chrooted daemons keep the original
do_chmod() fast path.

Migrate the receiver-side do_chmod() call sites in delete.c,
generator.c, rsync.c, and xattrs.c.

Adds testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test (with t_chmod_secure helper)
as regression coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
859d44fa4f sender: fix read-path TOCTOU by opening from module root (CVE-2026-29518)
The sender's file open was vulnerable to the same TOCTOU symlink
race as the receiver-side basis-file open. change_pathname() calls
chdir() into subdirectories, which follows symlinks; an attacker
could race to swap a directory for a symlink between the chdir and
the file open, allowing reads of privileged files through the
daemon.

Reconstruct the full relative path (F_PATHNAME + fname) and open
via secure_relative_open() from the trusted module_dir, which
walks each path component without following symlinks. This is
independent of CWD, so the chdir race is neutralised.

CVE-2026-29518.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
f1c24ab03b syscall+clientserver: am_chrooted and use_secure_symlinks for daemon-no-chroot (CVE-2026-29518)
CVE-2026-29518: an rsync daemon configured with "use chroot = no"
is exposed to a TOCTOU race on parent path components. A local
attacker with write access to a module can replace a parent
directory component with a symlink between the receiver's check
and its open(), redirecting reads (basis-file disclosure) and
writes (file overwrite) outside the module. Under elevated daemon
privilege this allows privilege escalation. Default
"use chroot = yes" is not exposed.

Add secure_relative_open() in syscall.c. It walks the parent
components under RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) /
O_RESOLVE_BENEATH (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) / per-component
O_NOFOLLOW elsewhere, anchored at a trusted dirfd, so a parent-
symlink swap is rejected by the kernel. Route the receiver's
basis-file open in receiver.c through it when use_secure_symlinks
is set in clientserver.c rsync_module().

Reporters: Nullx3D (Batuhan SANCAK); Damien Neil; Michael Stapelberg.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 10:01:22 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
b9cc0c6176 ci(almalinux-8): use python39 module for runtests.py
The default python3 on AlmaLinux 8 is 3.6, but runtests.py uses
subprocess.run(capture_output=...) and check_output(text=...) which
were introduced in 3.7. Install the python39 module stream and point
/usr/bin/python3 at it via alternatives so the existing shebang
resolves correctly.

Reproduced as: TypeError: __init__() got an unexpected keyword
argument 'capture_output' at runtests.py line 75.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 05:47:29 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
c60550bff9 ci: add Ubuntu 22.04 and AlmaLinux 8 workflows for backporting
The intent is to validate that future security fixes still build and
test cleanly on the oldest still-supported LTS releases of the two
mainstream Linux families, so backports can be developed against the
same CI surface as the trunk:

  - ubuntu-22.04: oldest GitHub Actions runner image still available
    (20.04 was retired in April 2025). Mirrors the existing
    ubuntu-build.yml step list.
  - almalinux-8: RHEL 8 rebuild, full support until 2029. Runs in an
    almalinux:8 container on ubuntu-latest because GHA has no native
    runner for the Fedora/RHEL family. Pulls libzstd/xxhash/lz4 dev
    headers from PowerTools + EPEL; commonmark via pip for the man
    page generator.

Both jobs follow the same paths-ignore convention as the other
workflows so a workflow-only change to one file won't fan out across
the whole CI matrix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 05:47:29 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
67f1dcf604 testsuite: run protected-regular test as non-root using unshare
Use unshare with user namespace UID mapping to run the
protected-regular test without real root privileges. Falls back
to skipping if unshare or uidmap is not available.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 09:27:12 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
79fd7d5885 Start 3.4.3dev going.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:43:14 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
dfdcd8f851 ci: add symlink-dirlink-basis to Cygwin's expected-skipped list
The test correctly skips on Cygwin (which lacks RESOLVE_BENEATH), but
the workflow's RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED list still treats any change in
the skipped set as a CI failure. Add the new test name so the
skipped/got comparison matches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:30:31 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
04e2fc2c76 testsuite: skip symlink-dirlink-basis on platforms without RESOLVE_BENEATH
secure_relative_open() has a kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path
on Linux 5.6+ (openat2 RESOLVE_BENEATH) and FreeBSD 13+ (openat
O_RESOLVE_BENEATH). On Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, and Cygwin the code
falls back to the per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk, which by design
rejects every directory symlink in the path -- the very case this
test exercises. Mark the test skipped there rather than have it
fail with a known regression that's tracked separately.

macOS is intentionally not in the skip list: although it does not
have O_RESOLVE_BENEATH either, the test passes there in practice;
investigation of the underlying reason is left as follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:30:31 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
7f60ec001a syscall: also use O_RESOLVE_BENEATH on FreeBSD and MacOS
FreeBSD and MacOS have O_RESOLVE_BENEATH as an openat() flag with the same
"must not escape dirfd" semantics as Linux's RESOLVE_BENEATH. The
kernel rejects ".." escapes, absolute symlinks, and symlinks whose
target lies outside dirfd, while still following symlinks that
resolve within it -- the same trade-off that fixes issue #715 on
Linux.

Add a parallel BSD path in secure_relative_open(), gated on
declared. Unlike Linux, BSD doesn't have the header/runtime split
where the symbol can exist without kernel support, so no runtime
fallback is needed: if the flag compiles in, the kernel honours it.

OpenBSD and NetBSD have no equivalent kernel primitive and continue
to use the existing per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk; issue #715
remains visible on those platforms (a userland resolver or
unveil(2)-based fence would be follow-up work).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:30:31 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
4fa7156ccd syscall: use openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux for secure_relative_open
The CVE fix in commit c35e283 made secure_relative_open() walk every
component of relpath with O_NOFOLLOW. That blocks every symlink in the
path, which is stricter than the threat model required: legitimate
directory symlinks within the destination tree (e.g. when using -K /
--copy-dirlinks) are also rejected, breaking delta transfers with
"failed verification -- update discarded".  See issue #715.

On Linux 5.6+, openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS) gives
us exactly what we want: the kernel rejects any resolution that would
escape the starting directory (via "..", absolute paths, or symlinks
pointing outside dirfd) while still following symlinks that resolve
within it. /proc magic-links are blocked too.

Use openat2 first; fall back to the existing per-component O_NOFOLLOW
walk on ENOSYS (kernel < 5.6). The lexical "../" checks at the head
of the function are kept as defense in depth. The Linux gate is
plain #ifdef __linux__: the runtime ENOSYS fallback covers the only
case that actually matters (header present + old kernel), and any
Linux build environment without linux/openat2.h will fail with a
clear "no such file" error rather than silently disabling the
protection.

Verified manually that openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) blocks all four
escape patterns (absolute symlink, ../ symlink, lexical .., absolute
path) while allowing direct and within-tree symlinks. The new
testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (taken from PR #864 by Samuel
Henrique) exercises the issue #715 regression and passes; full
make check passes 47/47.

Test: testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (8 scenarios)
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:30:31 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
dcf364dac5 testsuite/xattrs: ignore SUNWattr_* in the Solaris xls helper
The Solaris xls() function listed every entry in the file's xattr
directory, which on Solaris includes OS-managed SUNWattr_ro and
SUNWattr_rw pseudo-attributes. SUNWattr_rw embeds the file creation
time, so its bytes naturally differ between the source and destination
files, making the xattrs and xattrs-hlink tests fail with diffs that
have nothing to do with rsync.

Rsync's own listxattr wrapper already filters these out
(lib/sysxattrs.c), so the right fix is to filter them in the test
display too. Other platforms are unaffected because each has its own
xls() branch in the case statement.

With the test now actually passing on Solaris, drop the CI hack that
overwrote testsuite/xattrs.test with a skip stub.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:25:58 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
d1eff8f0dc ci: add OpenBSD and NetBSD build jobs, run 'make check' on the BSDs
Mirror the existing FreeBSD workflow for OpenBSD and NetBSD using
vmactions/openbsd-vm and vmactions/netbsd-vm so we get cross-BSD
coverage on push, PR, and the nightly schedule.

Also extend the FreeBSD and Solaris workflows to actually exercise the
test suite by running 'make check' after the build. The Linux, macOS,
and Cygwin jobs already did this.

The Solaris xattrs and xattrs-hlink tests are removed before 'make
check' because the Solaris SUNWattr_ro / SUNWattr_rw system attributes
leak into the test diff; that's a real rsync-on-Solaris issue to follow
up on, but skip the tests for now so the suite goes green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 08:15:37 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
8f727166d9 runtests.py: error early when test helper programs are missing
When invoked directly (rather than via 'make check'), runtests.py
previously left the user with a wall of confusing "not found" errors
from inside individual test scripts if the CHECK_PROGS helpers had not
been built. Detect this up front and point the user at the make
target that builds them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 17:00:55 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
5bcb3deb2f packaging: remove old release system 2026-04-28 15:08:25 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
de3cc03b03 Preparing for release of 3.4.2 [buildall] 2026-04-28 14:29:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
006ee327d6 packaging: new release script 2026-04-28 14:27:41 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
9b6363fa10 update NEWS.md ready for 3.4.2 2026-04-28 12:55:38 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
9e2f0fe9ae packaging: remove support for rsync-patches 2026-04-28 12:55:38 +10:00
Michal Ruprich
4f6e4ea64a Do not clean DISPLAY unconditionally 2026-04-22 13:05:35 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
567c40935f call tzset() before chroot to cache timezone data
localtime/localtime_r need /etc/localtime for timezone info.
After chroot this file is inaccessible, causing log timestamps
to fall back to UTC. Calling tzset() before chroot ensures the
timezone data is cached by glibc for subsequent calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 13:02:10 +10:00
Michal Ruprich
8e11f0c169 Using a correct time in log file 2026-04-22 13:02:10 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
e9dbc8d66d rsyncd.conf: document the temp dir parameter
The temp dir parameter was functional but undocumented in the man page.

Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/820

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 12:34:58 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
bd2dbd2f32 runtests.py: preserve test-execution order in skipped list
The sorted() call reordered skipped test names alphabetically,
causing CI expected-skipped mismatches (e.g. acls,acls-default
instead of acls-default,acls). Sort by original test order instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 12:34:39 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
350e295d1c runtests.py: add -j/--parallel option for parallel test execution
Add parallel test execution using concurrent.futures. With -j8 the
test suite completes in ~4s vs ~29s sequential (~7x speedup).

Also fix two issues that caused failures under parallel execution:
- rsync_ls_lR now prunes testtmp/ so parallel tests don't see each
  other's temp files when scanning the source tree
- clean-fname-underflow.test now uses $scratchdir instead of /tmp

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 12:34:39 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
066156fcd9 replace runtests.sh with runtests.py
Rewrite the test runner in Python with proper command-line options
including --valgrind which directs valgrind output to per-process
log files so it doesn't interfere with test output comparisons.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 12:34:39 +10:00
Holger Hoffstätte
a5bbe859db Fix glibc-2.43 constness warnings
Glibc 2.43 added C23 const-preserving overloads to various string functions,
which change the return type depending on the constness of the argument(s).
Currently this leads to warnings from calls to strtok() or strchr().
Fix this by properly declaring the respective variable types.

Signed-off-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
2026-04-22 12:10:08 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
d046525de3 zero all new memory from allocations
Change my_alloc() to use calloc instead of malloc so all fresh
allocations return zeroed memory. Also zero the expanded portion
in expand_item_list() after realloc, since it knows both old and
new sizes. This gives more predictable behaviour in case of bugs
where uninitialised or stale memory is accidentally accessed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 11:44:10 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
bb0a8118c2 xattrs: fixed count in qsort
this fixes the count passed to the sort of the xattr list. This issue
was reported here:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/16/2

the bug is not exploitable due to the fork-per-connection design of
rsync, the attack is the equivalent of the user closing the socket
themselves.
2026-04-22 10:38:14 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
d1df0aaf70 fix signed integer overflow in proxy protocol v2 header parsing
The len field in the proxy v2 header was declared as signed char,
allowing a negative size to bypass the validation check and cause
a stack buffer overflow when passed to read_buf() as size_t.

This bug was reported by John Walker from ZeroPath, many thanks for
the clear report!

With the current code this bug does not represent a security issue as
it only results in the exit of the forked process that is specific to
the attached client, so it is equivalent to the client closing the
socket, so no CVE for this, but it is good to fix it to prevent a
future issue.
2026-04-16 13:59:52 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
15d8e49a64 zlib: convert K&R function definitions to ANSI style
The bundled zlib 1.2.8 used K&R-style function definitions which are
rejected by clang 16+ as hard errors. Convert all 90 functions across
9 files to ANSI-style prototypes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 13:49:30 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
b905ab23af CI: add simd-checksum to expected-skipped on macOS and Cygwin
The new simd-checksum test is skipped on platforms where SIMD
instructions are unavailable (macOS ARM, Cygwin). Add it to the
RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED lists so CI doesn't fail on the mismatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 09:52:01 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
aa142f08ef fix uninitialized mul_one in AVX2 checksum and add SIMD checksum test
The AVX2 get_checksum1_avx2_64() read mul_one before initializing it,
which is undefined behavior. Replace the cmpeq/abs trick with
_mm256_set1_epi8(1) to match the SSSE3 and SSE2 versions.

Add a TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 test mode that verifies all SIMD paths
(SSE2, SSSE3, AVX2, and the full dispatch chain) produce identical
results to the C reference, across multiple buffer sizes with both
aligned and unaligned buffers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 09:52:01 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
236417cf35 acl: fixed ACL ID mapping for non-root
closes issue #618
2026-01-19 11:32:13 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
2a97d81e99 CI: fixed MacOS test
fixed multiple MacOS issues
2025-12-31 11:37:27 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
359e539a72 reject negative token values in compressed stream receivers
Validate that token numbers read from compressed streams are
non-negative. A negative token value would cause the return value
of recv_*_token() to become positive, which callers interpret as
literal data length, but no data pointer is set on this code path.

While this only causes the receiver to crash (which is process-isolated
and only affects the attacker's own connection), it's still undefined
behavior.

Reported-by: Will Sergeant <wlsergeant@gmail.com>
2025-12-31 09:31:52 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
9e0898460d util: fixed issue in clean_fname()
fixes buffer underflow (not exploitable) in clean_fname
2025-12-30 17:49:35 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
185520a141 testsuite: added clean-fname-underflow test 2025-12-30 17:49:35 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
c98f9d1f68 fix uninitialized buf1 in get_checksum2() MD4 path
The static buf1 pointer was only allocated when len > len1, but on
first call with len == 0, this condition is false (0 > 0), leaving
buf1 NULL when passed to memcpy().

Fixes #673
2025-12-30 16:51:43 +11:00
Nebojša Cvetković
1f9ce2fcbe rsync: Add missing dirs long option 2025-12-30 16:48:34 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
797e17fc4a fixed an invalid access to files array
this was found by Calum Hutton from Rapid7. It is a real bug, but
analysis shows it can't be leverged into an exploit. Worth fixing
though.

Many thanks to Calum and Rapid7 for finding and reporting this
2025-08-23 17:49:19 +10:00
Ronnie Sahlberg
c2db921890 options.c: Fix segv if poptGetContext returns NULL
If poptGetContext returns NULL, perhaps due to OOM,
a NULL pointer is passed into poptReadDefaultConfig()
which in turns SEGVs when trying to dereference it.

This was found using https://github.com/sahlberg/malloc-fail-tester.git
$ ./test_malloc_failure.sh rsync -Pav crash crosh

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
2025-08-23 17:49:03 +10:00
Silent
77be09aaed syscall: fix a Y2038 bug by replacing Int32x32To64 with multiplication
Int32x32To64 macro internally truncates the arguments to int32,
while time_t is 64-bit on most/all modern platforms.
Therefore, usage of this macro creates a Year 2038 bug.
2025-08-23 17:32:11 +10:00
Jeremy Norris
0d0f615240 Ignore directory has vanished errors. 2025-08-23 17:31:52 +10:00
Max Kellermann
b6457bbc83 make lots of global variables const
This way, they can live in `.rodata` and the compiler is allowed to do
certain optimizations.
2025-08-23 17:31:40 +10:00
Peter Eriksson
1807ce485a Fix handling of objects with many xattrs on FreeBSD 2025-08-23 17:31:28 +10:00
Rahul Mehta
9c175ac9ef chore: gitignore MacOS debug symbols 2025-08-23 17:31:12 +10:00
Emily
a84b79ea58 Allow ls(1) to fail in test setup
This can happen when the tests are unable to `stat(2)` some files in
`/etc`, `/bin`, or `/`, due to Unix permissions or other sandboxing. We
still guard against serious errors, which use exit code 2.
2025-08-23 17:30:59 +10:00
fbuescher
d4c4f6754e fixed remove multiple leading slashes 2025-08-23 17:14:43 +10:00
Michal Ruprich
a4b926dcdc bool is a keyword in C23 2025-08-23 17:14:26 +10:00
Eli Schwartz
0973d0e380 configure.ac: check for xattr support both in libc and in -lattr
In 2015, the attr/xattr.h header was fully removed from upstream attr.

In 2020, rsync started preferring the standard header, if it exists:
https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/pull/22

But the fix was incomplete. We still looked for the getxattr function in
-lattr, and used it if -lattr exists. This was the case even if the
system libc was sufficient to provide the needed functions. Result:
overlinking to -lattr, if it happened to be installed for any other
reason.

```
checking whether to support extended attributes... Using Linux xattrs
checking for getxattr in -lattr... yes
```

Instead, use a different autoconf macro that first checks if the
function is available for use without any libraries (e.g. it is in
libc).

Result:

```
checking whether to support extended attributes... Using Linux xattrs
checking for library containing getxattr... none required
```

Signed-off-by: Eli Schwartz <eschwartz@gentoo.org>
2025-08-23 17:14:06 +10:00
Ethan Halsall
e405cfc073 feat: add compress threads to man page 2025-08-23 17:13:49 +10:00
Ethan Halsall
b78a841bb0 feat: validate compress threads option 2025-08-23 17:13:49 +10:00
Ethan Halsall
f7a2b8a3fa feat: add threads to zstd compression 2025-08-23 17:13:49 +10:00
Arnaud Rebillout
d941807915 Fix flaky hardlinks test
The test was added in dc34990, it turns out that it's flaky. It failed
once on the Debian build infra, cf. [1].

The problem is that the command `rsync -aH '$fromdir/sym' '$todir'`
updates the mod time of `$todir`, so there might be a diff between the
output of `rsync_ls_lR $fromdir` and `rsync_ls_lR $todir`, if ever rsync
runs 1 second (or more) after the directories were created.

To clarify: it's easy to make the test fails 100% of the times with this
change:

```
 makepath "$fromdir/sym" "$todir"
+sleep 5
 checkit "$RSYNC -aH '$fromdir/sym' '$todir'" "$fromdir" "$todir"
```

With the fix proposed here, we don't use `checkit` anymore, instead we
just run the rsync command, then a simple `diff` to compare the two
directories. This is exactly what the other `-H` test just above does.

In case there's some doubts, `diff` fails if `sym` is missing:

```
$ mkdir -p foo/sym bar
$ diff foo bar || echo KO!
Only in foo: sym
KO!
```

I tested that, after this commit, the test still catches the `-H`
regression in rsync 3.4.0.

Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/735

[1]: https://buildd.debian.org/status/fetch.php?pkg=rsync&arch=ppc64el&ver=3.4.1%2Bds1-1&stamp=1741147156&raw=0
2025-08-23 17:13:28 +10:00
Krzysztof Płocharz
992e10efaf Fix --open-noatime option not working on files
atime of source files could sometimes be overwritten
even though --open-noatime option was used.

To fix that, optional O_NOATIME flag was added
to do_open_nofollow which is also used to open regular
files since fix:
  "fixed symlink race condition in sender"
Previously optional O_NOATIME flag was only in do_open.
2025-08-23 17:13:09 +10:00
Chris Lamb
1c5ebdc4e5 Make the build reproducible
From https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1093201:
Whilst working on the Reproducible Builds effort [0], we noticed that
rsync could not be built reproducibly.

This is because the date in the manual page can vary depending on
whether there is a .git directory and the modification time of version.h
and Mafile, which might get modified when patching via quilt.

A patch is attached that makes this use SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, which
will always be reliable.
2025-08-23 16:40:34 +10:00
Wayne Davison
9994933c8c Test on ubuntu-latest. 2025-02-11 13:37:12 -08:00
Alan Coopersmith
23d9ead5af popt: remove obsolete findme.c & findme.h
popt 1.14 merged these into popt.c but the import into rsync
missed removing them.

Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/710

Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
2025-01-17 08:31:36 +11:00
Wayne Davison
fcfdd36054 Update MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET on release.
This also fixes a string with \s that wasn't a r'...' string.
2025-01-15 23:27:27 -08:00
Wayne Davison
89b847393f Fix python deprecation warning. 2025-01-15 22:36:29 -08:00
Wayne Davison
788ecbe5ea Don't edit copyright year values anymore. 2025-01-15 22:30:32 -08:00
Wayne Davison
353506bc51 Improve interior dashes in long options.
Improve the backslash-adding code in md-convert to affect dashes in the
interior of long options.  Perhaps fixes #686.
2025-01-15 22:23:30 -08:00
Wayne Davison
7cff121ec8 Start 3.4.2dev going. 2025-01-15 22:01:42 -08:00
Andrew Tridgell
14f33837dc fixed build error on ia64 NonStop
it treats missing prototype as an error, not warning
2025-01-16 15:27:21 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
3305a7a063 Preparing for release of 3.4.1 [buildall] 2025-01-16 07:49:23 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
494879b819 update NEWS.md for 3.4.1 2025-01-16 07:47:07 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
8d6da040e5 popt: remove dependency on alloca 2025-01-16 07:27:46 +11:00
Natanael Copa
68e9add76a Fix build on ancient glibc without openat(AT_FDCWD
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/701
2025-01-16 06:43:57 +11:00
Rodrigo OSORIO
dc34990b2e Test send a single directory with -H enabled
Ensure this still working after 3.4.0 breakage

https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702
2025-01-16 06:32:17 +11:00
Natanael Copa
81ead9e70c Fix use-after-free in generator
full_fname() will free the return value in the next call so we need to
duplicate it before passing it to rsyserr.

Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/704
2025-01-16 06:27:26 +11:00
Natanael Copa
996af4a79f Fix FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST collission with FLAG_HLINKED
fixes commit 688f5c379a (Refuse a duplicate dirlist.)

Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/697
2025-01-16 06:21:54 +11:00
Andrew Tridgell
dacadd53a9 update maintainer address
use rsync.project@gmail.com
2025-01-15 12:13:41 +11:00
Wayne Davison
a6312e60c9 Force rsync group when uploading files. 2025-01-14 13:09:33 -08:00
100 changed files with 5581 additions and 1899 deletions

77
.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
name: Test rsync on AlmaLinux 8
# Older-LTS coverage on the Fedora/RHEL family to help with backporting
# security fixes. AlmaLinux 8 is the RHEL 8 rebuild and is the oldest
# active LTS in this family (RHEL 8 full support runs to 2029).
# GitHub Actions has no native runner for this family, so the job runs
# inside an almalinux:8 container hosted on ubuntu-latest.
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: almalinux:8
name: Test rsync on AlmaLinux 8
steps:
- name: install git
# actions/checkout needs git in the container before the checkout step.
run: dnf -y install git
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: prep
# PowerTools is needed for libzstd-devel etc; xxhash and lz4 dev
# headers live in EPEL on RHEL 8. The default python3 on RHEL 8
# is 3.6, which is too old for runtests.py (uses capture_output=
# / text= introduced in 3.7), so install python39 and point
# /usr/bin/python3 at it.
run: |
dnf -y install epel-release
dnf config-manager --set-enabled powertools
dnf -y install gcc gcc-c++ make autoconf automake m4 \
python39 python39-pip diffutils \
openssl openssl-devel \
attr libattr-devel acl libacl-devel \
zstd libzstd-devel \
lz4 lz4-devel \
xxhash xxhash-devel
alternatives --set python3 /usr/bin/python3.9
pip3 install commonmark
- name: configure
run: ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: info
run: ./rsync --version
- name: check
# In the container we already run as root, so no sudo. The
# crtimes-not-supported skip matches the other Linux jobs.
run: RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
- name: ssl file list
run: ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: almalinux-8-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ jobs:
- name: info
run: bash -c '/usr/local/bin/rsync --version'
- name: check
run: bash -c 'RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,acls,chown,devices,dir-sgid,protected-regular make check'
run: bash -c 'RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,acls,bare-do-open-symlink-race,chdir-symlink-race,chmod-symlink-race,chown,daemon-chroot-acl,devices,dir-sgid,open-noatime,protected-regular,sender-flist-symlink-leak,simd-checksum,symlink-dirlink-basis make check'
- name: ssl file list
run: bash -c 'PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true'
- name: save artifact

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ jobs:
./configure --with-rrsync -disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4

View File

@@ -25,10 +25,15 @@ jobs:
- name: prep
run: |
brew install automake openssl xxhash zstd lz4
sudo pip3 install commonmark
echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
pip3 install --user --break-system-packages commonmark
echo "$(brew --prefix)/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: CPPFLAGS=-I/usr/local/opt/openssl/include/ LDFLAGS=-L/usr/local/opt/openssl/lib/ ./configure --with-rrsync
run: |
BREW_PREFIX=$(brew --prefix)
OPENSSL_PREFIX=$(brew --prefix openssl)
CPPFLAGS="-I${BREW_PREFIX}/include -I${OPENSSL_PREFIX}/include" \
LDFLAGS="-L${BREW_PREFIX}/lib -L${OPENSSL_PREFIX}/lib" \
./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
@@ -36,11 +41,11 @@ jobs:
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,chmod-temp-dir,chown-fake,devices-fake,dir-sgid,protected-regular,xattrs-hlink,xattrs make check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,chmod-temp-dir,chown-fake,daemon-chroot-acl,devices-fake,dir-sgid,open-noatime,protected-regular,simd-checksum,xattrs-hlink,xattrs make check
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: macos-bin
path: |

51
.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
name: Test rsync on NetBSD
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on NetBSD
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Test in NetBSD VM
id: test
uses: vmactions/netbsd-vm@v1
with:
usesh: true
prepare: |
PATH=/usr/sbin:$PATH pkg_add autoconf automake python312
ln -sf /usr/pkg/bin/python3.12 /usr/pkg/bin/python3
run: |
uname -a
./configure --with-rrsync --disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: netbsd-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

52
.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
name: Test rsync on OpenBSD
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on OpenBSD
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Test in OpenBSD VM
id: test
uses: vmactions/openbsd-vm@v1
with:
usesh: true
prepare: |
pkg_add -I bash autoconf%2.71 automake%1.16
run: |
uname -a
export AUTOCONF_VERSION=2.71
export AUTOMAKE_VERSION=1.16
./configure --with-rrsync --disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: openbsd-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ jobs:
./configure --with-rrsync -disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu 22.04
# Older-LTS coverage to help with backporting security fixes. ubuntu-22.04
# is currently the oldest GitHub Actions runner image (20.04 was retired
# in April 2025).
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu 22.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: prep
run: |
sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl
echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
run: sudo make install
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
- name: check30
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
- name: check29
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ubuntu-22.04-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ on:
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -58,3 +58,4 @@ aclocal.m4
/auto-build-save
.deps
/*.exe
*.dSYM/

View File

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ OBJS2=options.o io.o compat.o hlink.o token.o uidlist.o socket.o hashtable.o \
usage.o fileio.o batch.o clientname.o chmod.o acls.o xattrs.o
OBJS3=progress.o pipe.o @MD5_ASM@ @ROLL_SIMD@ @ROLL_ASM@
DAEMON_OBJ = params.o loadparm.o clientserver.o access.o connection.o authenticate.o
popt_OBJS=popt/findme.o popt/popt.o popt/poptconfig.o \
popt_OBJS= popt/popt.o popt/poptconfig.o \
popt/popthelp.o popt/poptparse.o popt/poptint.o
OBJS=$(OBJS1) $(OBJS2) $(OBJS3) $(DAEMON_OBJ) $(LIBOBJ) @BUILD_ZLIB@ @BUILD_POPT@
@@ -57,12 +57,13 @@ TLS_OBJ = tls.o syscall.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/perms
# Programs we must have to run the test cases
CHECK_PROGS = rsync$(EXEEXT) tls$(EXEEXT) getgroups$(EXEEXT) getfsdev$(EXEEXT) \
testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT)
testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT) \
t_secure_relpath$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT) simdtest$(EXEEXT)
CHECK_SYMLINKS = testsuite/chown-fake.test testsuite/devices-fake.test testsuite/xattrs-hlink.test
# Objects for CHECK_PROGS to clean
CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o t_chmod_secure.o t_secure_relpath.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
# note that the -I. is needed to handle config.h when using VPATH
.c.o:
@@ -178,6 +179,14 @@ T_UNSAFE_OBJ = t_unsafe.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/sn
t_unsafe$(EXEEXT): $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ = t_chmod_secure.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT): $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ = t_secure_relpath.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
t_secure_relpath$(EXEEXT): $(T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ) $(LIBS)
.PHONY: conf
conf: configure.sh config.h.in
@@ -312,20 +321,28 @@ test: check
.PHONY: check
check: all $(CHECK_PROGS) $(CHECK_SYMLINKS)
rsync_bin=`pwd`/rsync$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/runtests.sh
$(srcdir)/runtests.py --rsync-bin=`pwd`/rsync$(EXEEXT)
.PHONY: check29
check29: all $(CHECK_PROGS) $(CHECK_SYMLINKS)
rsync_bin=`pwd`/rsync$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/runtests.sh --protocol=29
$(srcdir)/runtests.py --rsync-bin=`pwd`/rsync$(EXEEXT) --protocol=29
.PHONY: check30
check30: all $(CHECK_PROGS) $(CHECK_SYMLINKS)
rsync_bin=`pwd`/rsync$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/runtests.sh --protocol=30
$(srcdir)/runtests.py --rsync-bin=`pwd`/rsync$(EXEEXT) --protocol=30
wildtest.o: wildtest.c t_stub.o lib/wildmatch.c rsync.h config.h
wildtest$(EXEEXT): wildtest.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o @BUILD_POPT@
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ wildtest.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o @BUILD_POPT@ $(LIBS)
simdtest$(EXEEXT): simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp $(HEADERS)
@if test x"@ROLL_SIMD@" != x; then \
$(CXX) -I. $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -DTEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 \
-o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp @ROLL_ASM@ $(LIBS); \
else \
touch $@; \
fi
testsuite/chown-fake.test:
ln -s chown.test $(srcdir)/testsuite/chown-fake.test
@@ -341,7 +358,7 @@ testsuite/xattrs-hlink.test:
.PHONY: installcheck
installcheck: $(CHECK_PROGS) $(CHECK_SYMLINKS)
POSIXLY_CORRECT=1 TOOLDIR=`pwd` rsync_bin="$(bindir)/rsync$(EXEEXT)" srcdir="$(srcdir)" $(srcdir)/runtests.sh
$(srcdir)/runtests.py --rsync-bin="$(bindir)/rsync$(EXEEXT)" --srcdir="$(srcdir)" --tooldir=`pwd`
# TODO: Add 'dist' target; need to know which files will be included

358
NEWS.md
View File

@@ -1,3 +1,355 @@
# NEWS for rsync 3.4.3 (20 May 2026)
## Changes in this version:
### SECURITY FIXES:
Six CVEs are fixed in this release. All six are assigned by
VulnCheck as CNA. Affected versions are 3.4.2 and earlier in every
case. Three of the six (CVE-2026-29518, CVE-2026-43617,
CVE-2026-43619) require non-default daemon configuration to reach:
the first and third need `use chroot = no` for a module, the second
needs `daemon chroot = ...` set in rsyncd.conf. Two (CVE-2026-43618,
CVE-2026-43620) are reachable from a normal pull or a normal
authenticated daemon connection. The sixth (CVE-2026-45232) is
reachable only when `RSYNC_PROXY` is set and the proxy (or a MITM)
returns a pathological response. Many thanks to the external
researchers who reported these issues.
- CVE-2026-29518 (CVSS v4.0 7.3, HIGH): TOCTOU symlink race condition
allowing local privilege escalation in daemon mode without chroot.
An rsync daemon configured with "use chroot = no" was exposed to a
time-of-check / time-of-use race on parent path components: a local
attacker with write access to a module could replace a parent
directory component with a symlink between the receiver's check and
its open(), redirecting reads (basis-file disclosure) and writes
(file overwrite) outside the module. Default "use chroot = yes" is
not exposed. `secure_relative_open()` (added in 3.4.0 for
CVE-2024-12086) was previously unused in the daemon-no-chroot
case; the fix enables it there and reroutes the sender's
read-path opens through it. Reported by Nullx3D (Batuhan Sancak),
Damien Neil and Michael Stapelberg.
- CVE-2026-43617 (CVSS v3.1 4.8, MEDIUM): Hostname/ACL bypass on an
rsync daemon configured with `daemon chroot = /X` in rsyncd.conf
when the chroot tree lacks DNS resolution support. The
reverse-DNS lookup of the connecting client was performed *after*
the daemon chroot had been entered; if /X did not contain the
libc resolver fixtures (`/etc/resolv.conf`, `/etc/nsswitch.conf`,
`/etc/hosts`, NSS service modules) the lookup failed and the
connecting hostname was set to "UNKNOWN", causing hostname-based
deny rules to silently fail open. IP-based ACLs are unaffected.
The per-module `use chroot` setting is unrelated to this issue.
The fix performs the lookup before entering the daemon chroot.
Reported by MegaManSec.
- CVE-2026-43618 (CVSS v3.1 8.1, HIGH): Integer overflow in the
compressed-token decoder enabling remote memory disclosure to an
authenticated daemon peer. The receiver accumulated a 32-bit
signed counter without overflow checking; a malicious sender could
trigger an overflow that, with careful manipulation, leaked process
memory contents to the attacker -- environment variables,
passwords, heap and library pointers -- significantly weakening
ASLR. The fix bounds the counter and adds wire-input validation in
several adjacent places (defence-in-depth). Workaround for older
releases: `refuse options = compress` in rsyncd.conf. Reported by
Omar Elsayed.
- CVE-2026-43619 (CVSS v3.1 6.3, MEDIUM): Symlink races on path-based
system calls in "use chroot = no" daemon mode (generalisation of
CVE-2026-29518). Earlier fixes for symlink races on the receiver's
open() call missed the same race class on every other path-based
system call: chmod, lchown, utimes, rename, unlink, mkdir, symlink,
mknod, link, rmdir and lstat. The fix routes each affected
path-based syscall through a parent dirfd opened under
RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel-enforced confinement (openat2 on
Linux 5.6+, O_RESOLVE_BENEATH on FreeBSD 13+ and macOS 15+,
per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk elsewhere). Default "use chroot =
yes" is not exposed. Reported by Andrew Tridgell as a follow-on
audit of CVE-2026-29518.
- CVE-2026-43620 (CVSS v3.1 6.5, MEDIUM): Out-of-bounds read in the
receiver's recv_files() enabling remote denial-of-service of any
client pulling from a malicious server (incomplete fix of commit
797e17f). The earlier parent_ndx<0 guard added to send_files() was
not applied to the visually-identical block in recv_files(). A
malicious rsync server can drive any connecting client into a
deterministic SIGSEGV by setting CF_INC_RECURSE in the
compatibility flags and sending a crafted file list and transfer
record. inc_recurse is the protocol-30+ default, so no special
options are required on the victim. Workaround for older
releases: `--no-inc-recursive` on the client. Reported by Pratham
Gupta.
- CVE-2026-45232 (CVSS v3.1 3.1, LOW): Off-by-one out-of-bounds stack
write in the rsync client's HTTP CONNECT proxy handler
(`establish_proxy_connection()` in `socket.c`). After issuing the
CONNECT request, rsync read the proxy's first response line one
byte at a time into a 1024-byte stack buffer with the bound
`cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]`. If the proxy (or a MITM in
front of it) returned 1023+ bytes on that first line without a
newline terminator, `cp` exited the loop pointing at a buffer slot
the loop never wrote, leaving `*cp` holding stale stack data from
the earlier `snprintf()` of the outgoing CONNECT request. The
post-loop logic then wrote a single `\0` one byte past the end of
the buffer on the stack. Reach is client-side only, and only when
`RSYNC_PROXY` is set so rsync tunnels an `rsync://` connection
through an HTTP CONNECT proxy. The written byte is always `\0`
and the offset is fixed by the buffer size, not attacker-chosen,
so this is not an arbitrary-write primitive: practical impact is
corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
misbehaviour or crash. The fix detects the "buffer filled without
finding `\n`" case explicitly by position and refuses the response
with "proxy response line too long". Reported by Aisle Research
via Michal Ruprich (rsync-3.4.1-2.el10 QE).
In addition to the six CVE fixes, this release adds defence-in-depth
hardening on several adjacent paths: bounded wire-supplied counts and
lengths in flist/io/acls/xattrs, a guard against length underflow in
cumulative `snprintf()` callers, a parent block-index bounds check on
the receiver, a NULL check in `read_delay_line()`, a lower ceiling on
`MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT` to avoid signed-int overflow in the
`read_del_stats()` accumulator, rejection of hyphen-prefixed
remote-shell hostnames (defence-in-depth against argv-injection in
tooling that forwards untrusted input into the hostspec position;
reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich), and a NULL-check on
`localtime_r()` in `timestring()` to keep a malicious server from
crashing the client by advertising a file with an out-of-range
modtime.
### BUG FIXES:
- Fixed a regression introduced by the 3.4.0 secure_relative_open()
CVE fix where legitimate directory symlinks on the receiver side
(e.g. when using `-K` / `--copy-dirlinks`) caused "failed
verification -- update discarded" errors on delta transfers. The
old code rejected every symlink in the path with a per-component
`O_NOFOLLOW` walk; the receiver now uses kernel-enforced "stay
below dirfd" path resolution where available. Fixes #715.
### PORTABILITY / BUILD:
- secure_relative_open() now uses `openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH |
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS)` on Linux 5.6+, and `openat()` with
`O_RESOLVE_BENEATH` on FreeBSD 13+ and macOS 15+ (Sequoia) /
iOS 18+. The kernel rejects ".." escapes, absolute symlinks, and
symlinks whose target lies outside the starting directory, while
still following symlinks that resolve within it -- the same
trade-off that fixes the issue #715 regression without weakening
the original CVE protection. Other platforms (Solaris, OpenBSD,
NetBSD, Cygwin) retain the previous per-component `O_NOFOLLOW`
walk; on those platforms the issue #715 regression remains
visible.
- testsuite/xattrs: ignore `SUNWattr_*` in the Solaris `xls`
helper.
### DEVELOPER RELATED:
- Added testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (taken from PR #864
by Samuel Henrique) covering the issue #715 regression and
several edge cases (`--backup`, `--inplace`, `--partial-dir`
with protocol < 29, top-level files). The test skips on
platforms without a RESOLVE_BENEATH equivalent.
- Added regression tests for the new security fixes:
`chmod-symlink-race.test`, `chdir-symlink-race.test`,
`bare-do-open-symlink-race.test`, `alt-dest-symlink-race.test`,
`copy-dest-source-symlink.test`, `sender-flist-symlink-leak.test`,
`secure-relpath-validation.test`, `daemon-chroot-acl.test` and
`daemon-refuse-compress.test`. The symlink-race tests skip on
Cygwin, Solaris, OpenBSD and NetBSD (no RESOLVE_BENEATH
equivalent on those platforms).
- runtests.py now errors early with a clear message when any of
the test helper programs (`tls`, `trimslash`, `t_unsafe`,
`t_chmod_secure`, `t_secure_relpath`, `wildtest`, `getgroups`,
`getfsdev`) are missing, instead of letting many tests fail with
confusing "not found" errors.
- Added OpenBSD and NetBSD CI jobs that run `make check` on those
platforms.
- Added Ubuntu 22.04 and AlmaLinux 8 CI workflows so future
backports to the two mainstream LTS families build and test on
the same CI surface as trunk.
- testsuite/protected-regular.test now runs unprivileged via
`unshare` with user-namespace UID mapping, falling back to skip
if `unshare`/`uidmap` is not available; previously it required
real root.
- Added `symlink-dirlink-basis` to the Cygwin CI's expected-skipped
list.
- Removed the old release system (replaced by the new release
script in 3.4.2).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NEWS for rsync 3.4.2 (28 Apr 2026)
## Changes in this version:
### SECURITY RELATED:
Several security-relevant defects were reported and fixed since 3.4.1.
None were assigned a CVE — rsync's fork-per-connection design scopes
the impact of each of these to the attacker's own connection, which is
equivalent to the client closing the socket itself — but they are
fixed here as a matter of hygiene and to reduce the chances of a
future exploitable combination. Many thanks to the external
researchers who reported these issues.
- Fixed a signed integer overflow in the PROXY protocol v2 header
parser: a negative `len` field could bypass the size check and cause
a stack buffer overflow in `read_buf()`. Reported by John Walker of
ZeroPath.
- Fixed an invalid access to the files array. Reported by Calum
Hutton of Rapid7.
- Reject negative token values in the compressed-stream token
decoder; a negative value could cause callers to misinterpret a
missing data pointer as literal data. Reported by Will Sergeant.
- Fixed the element count passed to the xattr `qsort()` (see
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/16/2).
- Fixed a buffer underflow in `clean_fname()`, and added a regression
test.
- Fixed an uninitialized `mul_one` in the AVX2 get_checksum1 path
(undefined behaviour), and added a SIMD-checksum self-test that
cross-checks SSE2, SSSE3 and AVX2 against the C reference on both
aligned and unaligned buffers.
- Fixed an uninitialized `buf1` on the first call to
`get_checksum2()` in the MD4 path (fixes #673).
- Zero all new memory from internal allocations: `my_alloc()` now uses
`calloc`, and `expand_item_list()` zeros the expanded portion after
`realloc`. This gives more predictable behaviour if stale or
uninitialised memory is ever accidentally read.
### BUG FIXES:
- Call `tzset()` before chroot so that log timestamps continue to
reflect the configured local timezone after the daemon chroots
(glibc needs `/etc/localtime`, which is unreachable post-chroot).
- Use the correct time when writing to the log file.
- Do not clear `DISPLAY` unconditionally.
- Fixed a Y2038 bug in `syscall.c` by replacing the `Int32x32To64`
macro (which truncates its arguments to 32 bits) with a plain
64-bit multiplication.
- Fixed ACL ID mapping for non-root users (closes #618).
- Fixed handling of objects with many xattrs on FreeBSD.
- Fixed `--open-noatime` not taking effect when opening regular
files: `O_NOATIME` is now also passed to `do_open_nofollow()`, which
has been used for regular files since the CVE fix "fixed symlink
race condition in sender".
- Ignore "directory has vanished" errors.
- Fixed the removal of multiple leading slashes.
- Added the missing `--dirs` long option.
- Fixed a segfault if `poptGetContext()` returns NULL (e.g. under
OOM) by not passing NULL to `poptReadDefaultConfig()`. Reported by
Ronnie Sahlberg; found with `malloc-fail-tester`.
- Fixed a build error on ia64 NonStop (which treats missing
prototypes as an error, not a warning).
- Fixed a flaky hardlinks test (fixes #735).
### ENHANCEMENTS:
- Added multi-threaded `zstd` compression, gated by a new
`--compress-threads=N` option, with validation and man-page
coverage.
- Documented the `temp dir` parameter in the rsyncd.conf man page
(fixes #820).
- Improved rendering of interior dashes in long-option names in
`md-convert` (perhaps fixes #686).
### PORTABILITY / BUILD:
- Fixed glibc 2.43 const-preserving overloads of `strtok()`,
`strchr()` etc. by declaring the affected locals with the right
constness. Contributed by Holger Hoffstätte.
- Converted the bundled zlib 1.2.8 from K&R-style function
definitions to ANSI prototypes, so it builds with clang 16+.
- Avoid using `bool` as an identifier; it is a keyword in C23.
- `configure.ac`: check for xattr functions in libc first and only
fall back to `-lattr`, avoiding spurious overlinking when `-lattr`
happens to be installed. Contributed by Eli Schwartz.
- Made the build reproducible by honouring `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` for
the manpage date.
- Removed obsolete `popt/findme.c` and `popt/findme.h` that upstream
popt 1.14 folded into `popt.c` (fixes #710). Contributed by Alan
Coopersmith.
### INTERNAL:
- Made many module-global variables `const` so they can live in
`.rodata` and enable additional compiler optimization.
### DEVELOPER RELATED:
- Replaced `runtests.sh` with `runtests.py`, a Python test runner
that supports `--valgrind` (with per-process log files so valgrind
output no longer interferes with output comparisons) and
`-j/--parallel` execution for roughly a 7× speed-up on typical
hardware.
- Added a SIMD checksum self-test and a `clean-fname-underflow`
regression test.
- Various CI fixes for macOS and Cygwin (including adding
`simd-checksum` to the expected-skipped lists on platforms without
SIMD), and tests now run on `ubuntu-latest`.
- removed support for the unmaintained rsync-patches archive
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NEWS for rsync 3.4.1 (16 Jan 2025)
Release 3.4.1 is a fix for regressions introduced in 3.4.0
## Changes in this version:
### BUG FIXES:
- fixed handling of -H flag with conflict in internal flag values
- fixed a user after free in logging of failed rename
- fixed build on systems without openat()
- removed dependency on alloca() in bundled popt
### DEVELOPER RELATED:
- fix to permissions handling in the developer release script
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NEWS for rsync 3.4.0 (15 Jan 2025)
Release 3.4.0 is a security release that fixes a number of important vulnerabilities.
@@ -52,6 +404,7 @@ to develop and test fixes.
- added FreeBSD and Solaris CI builds
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NEWS for rsync 3.3.0 (6 Apr 2024)
## Changes in this version:
@@ -4816,7 +5169,10 @@ to develop and test fixes.
| RELEASE DATE | VER. | DATE OF COMMIT\* | PROTOCOL |
|--------------|--------|------------------|-------------|
| 15 Jan 2025 | 3.4.0 | | 32 |
| 20 May 2026 | 3.4.3 | | 32 |
| 28 Apr 2026 | 3.4.2 | | 32 |
| 16 Jan 2025 | 3.4.1 | | 32 |
| 15 Jan 2025 | 3.4.0 | 15 Jan 2025 | 32 |
| 06 Apr 2024 | 3.3.0 | | 31 |
| 20 Oct 2022 | 3.2.7 | | 31 |
| 09 Sep 2022 | 3.2.6 | | 31 |

View File

@@ -9,4 +9,5 @@ help backporting fixes into an older release, feel free to ask.
Email your vulnerability information to rsync's maintainer:
Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Rsync Project <rsync.project@gmail.com>

View File

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static void make_mask(char *mask, int plen, int addrlen)
return;
}
static int match_address(const char *addr, const char *tok)
static int match_address(const char *addr, char *tok)
{
char *p;
struct addrinfo hints, *resa, *rest;

4
acls.c
View File

@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ static uint32 recv_acl_access(int f, uchar *name_follows_ptr)
static uchar recv_ida_entries(int f, ida_entries *ent)
{
uchar computed_mask_bits = 0;
int i, count = read_varint(f);
int i, count = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_ACL_COUNT, "ACL count");
ent->idas = count ? new_array(id_access, count) : NULL;
ent->count = count;
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ static uchar recv_ida_entries(int f, ida_entries *ent)
else
id = recv_group_name(f, id, NULL);
} else if (access & NAME_IS_USER) {
if (inc_recurse && am_root && !numeric_ids)
if (inc_recurse && !numeric_ids)
id = match_uid(id);
} else {
if (inc_recurse && (!am_root || !numeric_ids))

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int validate_backup_dir(void)
{
STRUCT_STAT st;
if (do_lstat(backup_dir_buf, &st) < 0) {
if (do_lstat_at(backup_dir_buf, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "backup lstat %s failed", backup_dir_buf);
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static BOOL copy_valid_path(const char *fname)
for ( ; b; name = b + 1, b = strchr(name, '/')) {
*b = '\0';
while (do_mkdir(backup_dir_buf, ACCESSPERMS) < 0) {
while (do_mkdir_at(backup_dir_buf, ACCESSPERMS) < 0) {
if (errno == EEXIST) {
val = validate_backup_dir();
if (val > 0)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static inline int link_or_rename(const char *from, const char *to,
if (IS_SPECIAL(stp->st_mode) || IS_DEVICE(stp->st_mode))
return 0; /* Use copy code. */
#endif
if (do_link(from, to) == 0) {
if (do_link_at(from, to) == 0) {
if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: HLINK %s successful.\n", from);
return 2;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline int link_or_rename(const char *from, const char *to,
return 0;
}
#endif
if (do_rename(from, to) == 0) {
if (do_rename_at(from, to) == 0) {
if (stp->st_nlink > 1 && !S_ISDIR(stp->st_mode)) {
/* If someone has hard-linked the file into the backup
* dir, rename() might return success but do nothing! */
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
goto success;
if (errno == EEXIST || errno == EISDIR) {
STRUCT_STAT bakst;
if (do_lstat(buf, &bakst) == 0) {
if (do_lstat_at(buf, &bakst) == 0) {
int flags = get_del_for_flag(bakst.st_mode) | DEL_FOR_BACKUP | DEL_RECURSE;
if (delete_item(buf, bakst.st_mode, flags) != 0)
return 0;
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
/* Check to see if this is a device file, or link */
if ((am_root && preserve_devices && IS_DEVICE(file->mode))
|| (preserve_specials && IS_SPECIAL(file->mode))) {
if (do_mknod(buf, file->mode, sx.st.st_rdev) < 0)
if (do_mknod_at(buf, file->mode, sx.st.st_rdev) < 0)
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "mknod %s failed", full_fname(buf));
else if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: DEVICE %s successful.\n", fname);
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
}
ret = 2;
} else {
if (do_symlink(sl, buf) < 0)
if (do_symlink_at(sl, buf) < 0)
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "link %s -> \"%s\"", full_fname(buf), sl);
else if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: SYMLINK %s successful.\n", fname);

View File

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int *flag_ptr[] = {
NULL
};
static char *flag_name[] = {
static const char *const flag_name[] = {
"--recurse (-r)",
"--owner (-o)",
"--group (-g)",

View File

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void parse_checksum_choice(int final_call)
if (valid_checksums.negotiated_nni)
xfer_sum_nni = file_sum_nni = valid_checksums.negotiated_nni;
else {
char *cp = checksum_choice ? strchr(checksum_choice, ',') : NULL;
const char *cp = checksum_choice ? strchr(checksum_choice, ',') : NULL;
if (cp) {
xfer_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, cp - checksum_choice);
file_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(cp+1, -1);
@@ -366,9 +366,8 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
if (len > len1 || !buf1) {
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
}

View File

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ NORETURN void _exit_cleanup(int code, const char *file, int line)
switch_step++;
if (cleanup_fname)
do_unlink(cleanup_fname);
do_unlink_at(cleanup_fname);
if (exit_code)
kill_all(SIGUSR1);
if (cleanup_pid && cleanup_pid == getpid()) {

View File

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int read_proxy_protocol_header(int fd)
char sig[PROXY_V2_SIG_SIZE];
char ver_cmd;
char fam;
char len[2];
unsigned char len[2];
union {
struct {
char src_addr[4];

View File

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ extern int list_only;
extern int am_sender;
extern int am_server;
extern int am_daemon;
extern int am_chrooted;
extern int am_root;
extern int msgs2stderr;
extern int rsync_port;
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ extern int ignore_errors;
extern int preserve_xattrs;
extern int kluge_around_eof;
extern int munge_symlinks;
extern int use_secure_symlinks;
extern int open_noatime;
extern int sanitize_paths;
extern int numeric_ids;
@@ -976,11 +978,14 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
}
if (use_chroot) {
/* Cache timezone data before chroot makes /etc/localtime inaccessible */
tzset();
if (chroot(module_chdir)) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot(\"%s\") failed", module_chdir);
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: chroot failed\n");
return -1;
}
am_chrooted = 1;
module_chdir = module_dir;
}
@@ -1003,6 +1008,15 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
}
}
/* Enable secure symlink handling for any non-chrooted daemon module.
* This prevents TOCTOU race attacks where an attacker could switch a
* directory to a symlink between path validation and file open.
* Match the gate used by the do_*_at() wrappers in syscall.c
* (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) -- the protection has nothing to do
* with symlink munging, so a module configured with
* "munge symlinks = false" must still get the secure-open path. */
use_secure_symlinks = am_daemon && !am_chrooted;
if (gid_list.count) {
gid_t *gid_array = gid_list.items;
if (setgid(gid_array[0])) {
@@ -1298,13 +1312,49 @@ int start_daemon(int f_in, int f_out)
if (lp_proxy_protocol() && !read_proxy_protocol_header(f_in))
return -1;
/* Do reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid. The result is cached,
* so the later client_name() call will use this cached value. This
* ensures hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
* after chroot.
*
* "reverse lookup" can be set globally OR per-module, so we also
* scan each module: a deployment with "reverse lookup = no" in the
* global section but "reverse lookup = yes" in a specific module
* still triggers a post-chroot lookup at access-check time
* (rsync_module() in this file), which would also fail in the
* chroot and turn hostname-based deny rules into silent bypasses. */
{
int need_reverse = lp_reverse_lookup(-1);
int j, num_modules = lp_num_modules();
for (j = 0; !need_reverse && j < num_modules; j++) {
if (lp_reverse_lookup(j))
need_reverse = 1;
}
if (need_reverse)
(void)client_name(client_addr(f_in));
}
p = lp_daemon_chroot();
if (*p) {
log_init(0); /* Make use we've initialized syslog before chrooting. */
tzset();
if (chroot(p) < 0) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chroot(\"%s\") failed", p);
return -1;
}
/* Deliberately do NOT set am_chrooted here. am_chrooted
* gates the per-module symlink-race defenses
* (secure_relative_open() and the do_*_at() wrappers in
* syscall.c) and means "the kernel is enforcing path
* confinement at the module boundary". The daemon chroot
* confines path resolution to the daemon-chroot directory,
* not to any individual module path -- modules sharing the
* daemon chroot are still distinguishable filesystem
* subtrees and a sender-controlled symlink in module A
* could redirect a syscall to module B (or to other files
* inside the daemon chroot) without the per-module
* defenses. Leave am_chrooted=0 here so secure_relative_open()
* still fires for "use chroot = no" modules. */
if (chdir("/") < 0) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chdir(\"/\") failed");
return -1;

View File

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ extern int need_messages_from_generator;
extern int delete_mode, delete_before, delete_during, delete_after;
extern int do_compression;
extern int do_compression_level;
extern int do_compression_threads;
extern int saw_stderr_opt;
extern int msgs2stderr;
extern char *shell_cmd;
@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ static const char *client_info;
* of that protocol for it to be advertised as available. */
static void check_sub_protocol(void)
{
char *dot;
const char *dot;
int their_protocol, their_sub;
int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
@@ -414,7 +415,7 @@ static const char *getenv_nstr(int ntype)
env_str = ntype == NSTR_COMPRESS ? "zlib" : protocol_version >= 30 ? "md5" : "md4";
if (am_server && env_str) {
char *cp = strchr(env_str, '&');
const char *cp = strchr(env_str, '&');
if (cp)
env_str = cp + 1;
}

View File

@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ else
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LINUX_XATTRS, 1, [True if you have Linux xattrs (or equivalent)])
AC_DEFINE(SUPPORT_XATTRS, 1)
AC_DEFINE(NO_SYMLINK_USER_XATTRS, 1, [True if symlinks do not support user xattrs])
AC_CHECK_LIB(attr,getxattr)
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(getxattr,attr)
;;
darwin*)
AC_MSG_RESULT(Using OS X xattrs)

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
BEGIN {
heading = "/* DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE! It is auto-generated from a list of values in " ARGV[1] "! */\n\n"
sect = psect = defines = accessors = prior_ptype = ""
parms = "\nstatic struct parm_struct parm_table[] = {"
parms = "\nstatic const struct parm_struct parm_table[] = {"
comment_fmt = "\n/********** %s **********/\n"
tdstruct = "typedef struct {"
}

View File

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static enum delret delete_dir_contents(char *fname, uint16 flags)
strlcpy(p, fp->basename, remainder);
if (!(fp->mode & S_IWUSR) && !am_root && fp->flags & FLAG_OWNED_BY_US)
do_chmod(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
do_chmod_at(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
/* Save stack by recursing to ourself directly. */
if (S_ISDIR(fp->mode)) {
if (delete_dir_contents(fname, flags | DEL_RECURSE) != DR_SUCCESS)
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
}
if (flags & DEL_NO_UID_WRITE)
do_chmod(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
do_chmod_at(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
if (S_ISDIR(mode) && !(flags & DEL_DIR_IS_EMPTY)) {
/* This only happens on the first call to delete_item() since
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
what = "rmdir";
ok = do_rmdir(fbuf) == 0;
ok = do_rmdir_at(fbuf) == 0;
} else {
if (make_backups > 0 && !(flags & DEL_FOR_BACKUP) && (backup_dir || !is_backup_file(fbuf))) {
what = "make_backup";

View File

@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ static int rule_matches(const char *fname, filter_rule *ex, int name_flags)
{
int slash_handling, str_cnt = 0, anchored_match = 0;
int ret_match = ex->rflags & FILTRULE_NEGATE ? 0 : 1;
char *p, *pattern = ex->pattern;
const char *p, *pattern = ex->pattern;
const char *strings[16]; /* more than enough */
const char *name = fname + (*fname == '/');

21
flist.c
View File

@@ -840,9 +840,9 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
}
if (xflags & XMIT_MOD_NSEC)
#ifndef CAN_SET_NSEC
(void)read_varint(f);
(void)read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_NSEC, "modtime_nsec");
#else
modtime_nsec = read_varint(f);
modtime_nsec = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_NSEC, "modtime_nsec");
else
modtime_nsec = 0;
#endif
@@ -861,8 +861,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
#endif
}
#endif
if (!(xflags & XMIT_SAME_MODE))
if (!(xflags & XMIT_SAME_MODE)) {
mode = from_wire_mode(read_int(f));
/* Reject modes whose type bits are not one of the standard
* file types; otherwise garbage mode values propagate through
* the file-type checks below unpredictably. */
if (!S_ISREG(mode) && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !S_ISLNK(mode)
&& !S_ISCHR(mode) && !S_ISBLK(mode)
&& !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid file mode 0%o for %s [%s]\n",
(unsigned)mode, lastname, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
}
if (atimes_ndx && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !(xflags & XMIT_SAME_ATIME)) {
atime = read_varlong(f, 4);
#if SIZEOF_TIME_T < SIZEOF_INT64
@@ -3167,8 +3178,8 @@ static void output_flist(struct file_list *flist)
} else
*uidbuf = '\0';
if (gid_ndx) {
static char parens[] = "(\0)\0\0\0";
char *pp = parens + (file->flags & FLAG_SKIP_GROUP ? 0 : 3);
static const char parens[] = "(\0)\0\0\0";
const char *pp = parens + (file->flags & FLAG_SKIP_GROUP ? 0 : 3);
snprintf(gidbuf, sizeof gidbuf, " gid=%s%u%s",
pp, F_GROUP(file), pp + 2);
} else

View File

@@ -229,11 +229,13 @@ static int read_delay_line(char *buf, int *flags_p)
*flags_p = 0;
if (sscanf(bp, "%x ", &mode) != 1) {
invalid_data:
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: invalid data in delete-delay file.\n");
return -1;
goto invalid_data;
}
past_space = strchr(bp, ' ') + 1;
past_space = strchr(bp, ' ');
if (!past_space) {
goto invalid_data;
}
past_space++;
len = j - read_pos - (past_space - bp) + 1; /* count the '\0' */
read_pos = j + 1;
@@ -247,6 +249,10 @@ static int read_delay_line(char *buf, int *flags_p)
memcpy(buf, past_space, len);
return mode;
invalid_data:
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: invalid data in delete-delay file.\n");
return -1;
}
static void do_delayed_deletions(char *delbuf)
@@ -984,7 +990,7 @@ static int try_dests_reg(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, int ndx,
if (find_exact_for_existing) {
if (alt_dest_type == LINK_DEST && real_st.st_dev == sxp->st.st_dev && real_st.st_ino == sxp->st.st_ino)
return -1;
if (do_unlink(fname) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
if (do_unlink_at(fname) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
goto got_nothing_for_ya;
}
#ifdef SUPPORT_HARD_LINKS
@@ -1112,7 +1118,7 @@ static int try_dests_non(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, int ndx,
&& !IS_SPECIAL(file->mode) && !IS_DEVICE(file->mode)
#endif
&& !S_ISDIR(file->mode)) {
if (do_link(cmpbuf, fname) < 0) {
if (do_link_at(cmpbuf, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"failed to hard-link %s with %s",
cmpbuf, fname);
@@ -1315,7 +1321,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
}
}
if (relative_paths && !implied_dirs && file->mode != 0
&& do_stat(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
&& do_stat_at(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
if (dry_run)
goto parent_is_dry_missing;
if (make_path(fname, MKP_DROP_NAME | MKP_SKIP_SLASH) < 0) {
@@ -1427,7 +1433,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
&& (stype == FT_DIR
|| delete_item(fname, sx.st.st_mode, del_opts | DEL_FOR_DIR) != 0))
goto cleanup; /* Any errors get reported later. */
if (do_mkdir(fname, (file->mode|added_perms) & 0700) == 0)
if (do_mkdir_at(fname, (file->mode|added_perms) & 0700) == 0)
file->flags |= FLAG_DIR_CREATED;
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -1469,10 +1475,10 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
itemize(fnamecmp, file, ndx, statret, &sx,
statret ? ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE : 0, 0, NULL);
}
if (real_ret != 0 && do_mkdir(fname,file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
if (real_ret != 0 && do_mkdir_at(fname,file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
if (!relative_paths || errno != ENOENT
|| make_path(fname, MKP_DROP_NAME | MKP_SKIP_SLASH) < 0
|| (do_mkdir(fname, file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)) {
|| (do_mkdir_at(fname, file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"recv_generator: mkdir %s failed",
full_fname(fname));
@@ -1499,7 +1505,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
#ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
if (!am_root && (file->mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU && dir_tweaking) {
mode_t mode = file->mode | S_IRWXU;
if (do_chmod(fname, mode) < 0) {
if (do_chmod_at(fname, mode) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"failed to modify permissions on %s",
full_fname(fname));
@@ -1808,7 +1814,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
;
else if (quick_check_ok(FT_REG, fnamecmp, file, &sx.st)) {
if (partialptr) {
do_unlink(partialptr);
do_unlink_at(partialptr);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
set_file_attrs(fname, file, &sx, NULL, maybe_ATTRS_REPORT | maybe_ATTRS_ACCURATE_TIME);
@@ -1896,7 +1902,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
back_file = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((f_copy = do_open(backupptr, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
if ((f_copy = do_open_at(backupptr, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(backupptr));
unmake_file(back_file);
back_file = NULL;
@@ -2016,7 +2022,7 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
if (slnk) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
if (do_symlink(slnk, create_name) < 0) {
if (do_symlink_at(slnk, create_name) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "symlink %s -> \"%s\" failed",
full_fname(create_name), slnk);
return 0;
@@ -2032,7 +2038,7 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
return 0;
#endif
} else {
if (do_mknod(create_name, file->mode, rdev) < 0) {
if (do_mknod_at(create_name, file->mode, rdev) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "mknod %s failed",
full_fname(create_name));
return 0;
@@ -2040,10 +2046,14 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
}
if (!skip_atomic) {
if (do_rename(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
if (do_rename_at(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
char *full_tmpname = strdup(full_fname(tmpname));
if (full_tmpname == NULL)
out_of_memory("atomic_create");
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\" failed",
full_fname(tmpname), full_fname(fname));
do_unlink(tmpname);
full_tmpname, full_fname(fname));
free(full_tmpname);
do_unlink_at(tmpname);
return 0;
}
}
@@ -2107,7 +2117,7 @@ static void touch_up_dirs(struct file_list *flist, int ndx)
continue;
fname = f_name(file, NULL);
if (fix_dir_perms)
do_chmod(fname, file->mode);
do_chmod_at(fname, file->mode);
if (need_retouch_dir_times) {
STRUCT_STAT st;
if (link_stat(fname, &st, 0) == 0 && mtime_differs(&st, file)) {
@@ -2142,6 +2152,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
if (send_failed)
ndx = get_hlink_num();
flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.1");
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
assert(file->flags & FLAG_HLINKED);
if (send_failed)
@@ -2170,6 +2182,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
flist = cur_flist;
cur_flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.2");
if (ndx < cur_flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
if (solo_file)

View File

@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ int hard_link_check(struct file_struct *file, int ndx, char *fname,
int hard_link_one(struct file_struct *file, const char *fname,
const char *oldname, int terse)
{
if (do_link(oldname, fname) < 0) {
if (do_link_at(oldname, fname) < 0) {
enum logcode code;
if (terse) {
if (!INFO_GTE(NAME, 1))

63
io.c
View File

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int active_filecnt = 0;
static OFF_T active_bytecnt = 0;
static int first_message = 1;
static char int_byte_extra[64] = {
static const char int_byte_extra[64] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* (00 - 3F)/4 */
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* (40 - 7F)/4 */
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, /* (80 - BF)/4 */
@@ -1090,6 +1090,9 @@ static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
{
struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "got_flist_entry_status");
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
if (remove_source_files) {
active_filecnt--;
active_bytecnt -= F_LENGTH(flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start]);
@@ -1158,8 +1161,8 @@ void set_io_timeout(int secs)
static void check_for_d_option_error(const char *msg)
{
static char rsync263_opts[] = "BCDHIKLPRSTWabceghlnopqrtuvxz";
char *colon;
static const char rsync263_opts[] = "BCDHIKLPRSTWabceghlnopqrtuvxz";
const char *colon;
int saw_d = 0;
if (*msg != 'r'
@@ -1865,6 +1868,45 @@ int64 read_varlong(int f, uchar min_bytes)
return u.x;
}
/* Read an int32 and verify lo <= v <= hi. On out-of-range, abort with a
* protocol error naming "what". The bound is co-located with the read so it
* cannot be forgotten by a downstream user. */
int32 read_int_bounded(int f, int32 lo, int32 hi, const char *what)
{
int32 v = read_int(f);
if (v < lo || v > hi) {
rprintf(FERROR, "wire value %s out of range: %ld not in [%ld,%ld] [%s]\n",
what, (long)v, (long)lo, (long)hi, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
return v;
}
/* As read_int_bounded but for varint-encoded values. */
int32 read_varint_bounded(int f, int32 lo, int32 hi, const char *what)
{
int32 v = read_varint(f);
if (v < lo || v > hi) {
rprintf(FERROR, "wire value %s out of range: %ld not in [%ld,%ld] [%s]\n",
what, (long)v, (long)lo, (long)hi, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
return v;
}
/* Read a varint that will be used as a size_t. Rejects negative values
* (which would wrap to ~SIZE_MAX) and values exceeding the supplied max. */
size_t read_varint_size(int f, size_t max, const char *what)
{
int32 v = read_varint(f);
if (v < 0 || (size_t)v > max) {
rprintf(FERROR, "wire size %s out of range: %ld > %lu [%s]\n",
what, (long)v, (unsigned long)max, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
return (size_t)v;
}
int64 read_longint(int f)
{
#if SIZEOF_INT64 >= 8
@@ -1971,6 +2013,21 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum)
(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
/* Guard against integer overflow in downstream allocations sized by
* count*element_size. my_alloc uses divide-not-multiply so it is
* already wraparound-safe, but checking here gives a clearer error
* and also covers the (size_t)count * xfer_sum_len arithmetic that
* is performed *before* reaching my_alloc. */
if (xfer_sum_len > 0 && (size_t)sum->count > SIZE_MAX / (size_t)xfer_sum_len) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum count %ld (too large) [%s]\n",
(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if ((size_t)sum->count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(struct sum_buf)) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum count %ld (sum_buf overflow) [%s]\n",
(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
sum->blength = read_int(f);
if (sum->blength < 0 || sum->blength > max_blength) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid block length %ld [%s]\n",

View File

@@ -1 +1 @@
#define LATEST_YEAR "2025"
#define LATEST_YEAR "2026"

View File

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ void md5_update(md_context *ctx, const uchar *input, uint32 length)
memcpy(ctx->buffer + left, input, length);
}
static uchar md5_padding[CSUM_CHUNK] = { 0x80 };
static const uchar md5_padding[CSUM_CHUNK] = { 0x80 };
void md5_result(md_context *ctx, uchar digest[MD5_DIGEST_LEN])
{

View File

@@ -126,9 +126,18 @@ ssize_t sys_llistxattr(const char *path, char *list, size_t size)
unsigned char keylen;
ssize_t off, len = extattr_list_link(path, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, list, size);
if (len <= 0 || (size_t)len > size)
if (len <= 0 || size == 0)
return len;
if ((size_t)len >= size) {
/* FreeBSD extattr_list_xx() returns 'size' as 'len' in case there are
more data available, truncating the output, we solve this by signalling
ERANGE in case len == size so that the code in xattrs.c will retry with
a bigger buffer */
errno = ERANGE;
return -1;
}
/* FreeBSD puts a single-byte length before each string, with no '\0'
* terminator. We need to change this into a series of null-terminted
* strings. Since the size is the same, we can simply transform the
@@ -136,7 +145,7 @@ ssize_t sys_llistxattr(const char *path, char *list, size_t size)
for (off = 0; off < len; off += keylen + 1) {
keylen = ((unsigned char*)list)[off];
if (off + keylen >= len) {
/* Should be impossible, but kernel bugs happen! */
/* Should be impossible, but bugs happen! */
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}

View File

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ typedef enum {
struct enum_list {
int value;
char *name;
const char *name;
};
struct parm_struct {
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct parm_struct {
parm_type type;
parm_class class;
void *ptr;
struct enum_list *enum_list;
const struct enum_list *enum_list;
unsigned flags;
};
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static item_list section_list = EMPTY_ITEM_LIST;
static int iSectionIndex = -1;
static BOOL bInGlobalSection = True;
static struct enum_list enum_syslog_facility[] = {
static const struct enum_list enum_syslog_facility[] = {
#ifdef LOG_AUTH
{ LOG_AUTH, "auth" },
#endif
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static char *expand_vars(const char *str)
for (t = buf, f = str; bufsize && *f; ) {
if (*f == '%' && isUpper(f+1)) {
char *percent = strchr(f+1, '%');
const char *percent = strchr(f+1, '%');
if (percent && percent - f < bufsize) {
char *val;
strlcpy(t, f+1, percent - f);

12
log.c
View File

@@ -456,11 +456,17 @@ void rsyserr(enum logcode code, int errcode, const char *format, ...)
char buf[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
size_t len;
/* snprintf returns the would-have-been length on truncation, so
* each cumulative call must be guarded; if not, sizeof buf - len
* can underflow when promoted to size_t and the next call writes
* past the buffer. */
len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, RSYNC_NAME ": [%s] ", who_am_i());
va_start(ap, format);
len += vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len, format, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (len < sizeof buf) {
va_start(ap, format);
len += vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len, format, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
if (len < sizeof buf) {
len += snprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len,

29
main.c
View File

@@ -239,11 +239,11 @@ void write_del_stats(int f)
void read_del_stats(int f)
{
stats.deleted_files = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_files");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_dirs");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_symlinks");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_devices");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_specials");
}
static void become_copy_as_user()
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static void handle_stats(int f)
static void output_itemized_counts(const char *prefix, int *counts)
{
static char *labels[] = { "reg", "dir", "link", "dev", "special" };
static char *const labels[] = { "reg", "dir", "link", "dev", "special" };
char buf[1024], *pre = " (";
int j, len = 0;
int total = counts[0];
@@ -394,9 +394,18 @@ static void output_itemized_counts(const char *prefix, int *counts)
counts[0] -= counts[1] + counts[2] + counts[3] + counts[4];
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
if (counts[j]) {
/* snprintf can return more than its size arg
* on truncation; keep len <= sizeof buf - 2 so
* the closing ')' and trailing NUL always
* have room and the next iteration's
* sizeof buf - len - 2 cannot underflow. */
if (len >= (int)sizeof buf - 2)
break;
len += snprintf(buf+len, sizeof buf - len - 2,
"%s%s: %s",
pre, labels[j], comma_num(counts[j]));
if (len > (int)sizeof buf - 2)
len = (int)sizeof buf - 2;
pre = ", ";
}
}
@@ -1559,6 +1568,10 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
shell_user = shell_machine;
shell_machine = p+1;
}
if (*shell_machine == '-') {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid remote host: hostnames may not start with '-'.\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
}
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(CMD, 2)) {
@@ -1743,7 +1756,9 @@ int main(int argc,char *argv[])
our_gid = MY_GID();
am_root = our_uid == ROOT_UID;
unset_env_var("DISPLAY");
// DISPLAY should not be emptied unconditionally
if (!getenv("SSH_ASKPASS"))
unset_env_var("DISPLAY");
#if defined USE_OPENSSL && defined SET_OPENSSL_CONF
#define TO_STR2(x) #x

View File

@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ TZ_RE = re.compile(r'^#define\s+MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET\s+(-?\d+(\.\d+)?)', re.M)
VAR_REF_RE = re.compile(r'\$\{(\w+)\}')
VERSION_RE = re.compile(r' (\d[.\d]+)[, ]')
BIN_CHARS_RE = re.compile(r'[\1-\7]+')
LONG_OPT_DASH_RE = re.compile(r'(--\w[-\w]+)')
SPACE_DOUBLE_DASH_RE = re.compile(r'\s--(\s)')
NON_SPACE_SINGLE_DASH_RE = re.compile(r'(^|\W)-')
WHITESPACE_RE = re.compile(r'\s')
@@ -247,6 +248,9 @@ def find_man_substitutions():
env_subs['date'] = time.strftime('%d %b %Y', time.gmtime(mtime + tz_offset)).lstrip('0')
if 'SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH' in os.environ:
env_subs['date'] = time.strftime('%d %b %Y', time.gmtime(int(os.environ.get('SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH', time.time()))))
def html_via_commonmark(txt):
return commonmark.HtmlRenderer().render(commonmark.Parser().parse(txt))
@@ -540,6 +544,7 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
if st.in_pre:
html = htmlify(txt)
else:
txt = LONG_OPT_DASH_RE.sub(lambda x: x.group(1).replace('-', NBR_DASH[0]), txt)
txt = SPACE_DOUBLE_DASH_RE.sub(NBR_SPACE[0] + r'--\1', txt).replace('--', NBR_DASH[0]*2)
txt = NON_SPACE_SINGLE_DASH_RE.sub(r'\1' + NBR_DASH[0], txt)
html = htmlify(txt)

View File

@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ int sparse_files = 0;
int preallocate_files = 0;
int do_compression = 0;
int do_compression_level = CLVL_NOT_SPECIFIED;
int do_compression_threads = 0; /*n = 0 use rsync thread, n >= 1 spawn n threads for compression */
int am_root = 0; /* 0 = normal, 1 = root, 2 = --super, -1 = --fake-super */
int am_server = 0;
int am_sender = 0;
@@ -113,11 +114,20 @@ int mkpath_dest_arg = 0;
int allow_inc_recurse = 1;
int xfer_dirs = -1;
int am_daemon = 0;
/* Set after a successful per-module chroot ("use chroot = yes") in
* clientserver.c. NOT set for the daemon-level "daemon chroot = /X"
* chroot: that confines path resolution to /X, but module paths
* /X/modA, /X/modB, etc. are not chroot boundaries, so the per-module
* symlink-race defenses (secure_relative_open() / do_*_at() in
* syscall.c, gated by `am_daemon && !am_chrooted`) must still fire
* even when the daemon is inside a daemon chroot. */
int am_chrooted = 0;
int connect_timeout = 0;
int keep_partial = 0;
int safe_symlinks = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
int munge_symlinks = 0;
int use_secure_symlinks = 0;
int size_only = 0;
int daemon_bwlimit = 0;
int bwlimit = 0;
@@ -225,7 +235,7 @@ char *iconv_opt =
struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes = NULL;
static const char *debug_verbosity[] = {
static const char *const debug_verbosity[] = {
/*0*/ NULL,
/*1*/ NULL,
/*2*/ "BIND,CMD,CONNECT,DEL,DELTASUM,DUP,FILTER,FLIST,ICONV",
@@ -236,7 +246,7 @@ static const char *debug_verbosity[] = {
#define MAX_VERBOSITY ((int)(sizeof debug_verbosity / sizeof debug_verbosity[0]) - 1)
static const char *info_verbosity[1+MAX_VERBOSITY] = {
static const char *const info_verbosity[1+MAX_VERBOSITY] = {
/*0*/ "NONREG",
/*1*/ "COPY,DEL,FLIST,MISC,NAME,STATS,SYMSAFE",
/*2*/ "BACKUP,MISC2,MOUNT,NAME2,REMOVE,SKIP",
@@ -474,7 +484,7 @@ static void parse_output_words(struct output_struct *words, short *levels, const
static void output_item_help(struct output_struct *words)
{
short *levels = words == info_words ? info_levels : debug_levels;
const char **verbosity = words == info_words ? info_verbosity : debug_verbosity;
const char *const*verbosity = words == info_words ? info_verbosity : debug_verbosity;
char buf[128], *opt, *fmt = "%-10s %s\n";
int j;
@@ -756,6 +766,8 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
{"skip-compress", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &skip_compress, 0, 0, 0 },
{"compress-level", 0, POPT_ARG_INT, &do_compression_level, 0, 0, 0 },
{"zl", 0, POPT_ARG_INT, &do_compression_level, 0, 0, 0 },
{"compress-threads", 0, POPT_ARG_INT, &do_compression_threads, 0, 0, 0 },
{"zt", 0, POPT_ARG_INT, &do_compression_threads, 0, 0, 0 },
{0, 'P', POPT_ARG_NONE, 0, 'P', 0, 0 },
{"progress", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &do_progress, 1, 0, 0 },
{"no-progress", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &do_progress, 0, 0, 0 },
@@ -844,7 +856,7 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
{0,0,0,0, 0, 0, 0}
};
static struct poptOption long_daemon_options[] = {
static const struct poptOption long_daemon_options[] = {
/* longName, shortName, argInfo, argPtr, value, descrip, argDesc */
{"address", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &bind_address, 0, 0, 0 },
{"bwlimit", 0, POPT_ARG_INT, &daemon_bwlimit, 0, 0, 0 },
@@ -1156,7 +1168,7 @@ static time_t parse_time(const char *arg)
{
const char *cp;
time_t val, now = time(NULL);
struct tm t, *today = localtime(&now);
struct tm t, tmp, *today = localtime_r(&now, &tmp);
int in_date, old_mday, n;
memset(&t, 0, sizeof t);
@@ -1369,6 +1381,10 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
/* TODO: Call poptReadDefaultConfig; handle errors. */
pc = poptGetContext(RSYNC_NAME, argc, argv, long_options, 0);
if (pc == NULL) {
strlcpy(err_buf, "poptGetContext returned NULL\n", sizeof err_buf);
return 0;
}
if (!am_server) {
poptReadDefaultConfig(pc, 0);
popt_unalias(pc, "--daemon");
@@ -2006,6 +2022,8 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
create_refuse_error(refused_compress);
goto cleanup;
}
if (do_compression_threads < 0)
do_compression_threads = 0;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETVBUF

View File

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env -S python3 -B
# This script turns one or more diff files in the patches dir (which is
# expected to be a checkout of the rsync-patches git repo) into a branch
# in the main rsync git checkout. This allows the applied patch to be
# merged with the latest rsync changes and tested. To update the diff
# with the resulting changes, see the patch-update script.
import os, sys, re, argparse, glob
sys.path = ['packaging'] + sys.path
from pkglib import *
def main():
global created, info, local_branch
cur_branch, args.base_branch = check_git_state(args.base_branch, not args.skip_check, args.patches_dir)
local_branch = get_patch_branches(args.base_branch)
if args.delete_local_branches:
for name in sorted(local_branch):
branch = f"patch/{args.base_branch}/{name}"
cmd_chk(['git', 'branch', '-D', branch])
local_branch = set()
if args.add_missing:
for fn in sorted(glob.glob(f"{args.patches_dir}/*.diff")):
name = re.sub(r'\.diff$', '', re.sub(r'.+/', '', fn))
if name not in local_branch and fn not in args.patch_files:
args.patch_files.append(fn)
if not args.patch_files:
return
for fn in args.patch_files:
if not fn.endswith('.diff'):
die(f"Filename is not a .diff file: {fn}")
if not os.path.isfile(fn):
die(f"File not found: {fn}")
scanned = set()
info = { }
patch_list = [ ]
for fn in args.patch_files:
m = re.match(r'^(?P<dir>.*?)(?P<name>[^/]+)\.diff$', fn)
patch = argparse.Namespace(**m.groupdict())
if patch.name in scanned:
continue
patch.fn = fn
lines = [ ]
commit_hash = None
with open(patch.fn, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
for line in fh:
m = re.match(r'^based-on: (\S+)', line)
if m:
commit_hash = m[1]
break
if (re.match(r'^index .*\.\..* \d', line)
or re.match(r'^diff --git ', line)
or re.match(r'^--- (old|a)/', line)):
break
lines.append(re.sub(r'\s*\Z', "\n", line, 1))
info_txt = ''.join(lines).strip() + "\n"
lines = None
parent = args.base_branch
patches = re.findall(r'patch -p1 <%s/(\S+)\.diff' % args.patches_dir, info_txt)
if patches:
last = patches.pop()
if last != patch.name:
warn(f"No identity patch line in {patch.fn}")
patches.append(last)
if patches:
parent = patches.pop()
if parent not in scanned:
diff_fn = patch.dir + parent + '.diff'
if not os.path.isfile(diff_fn):
die(f"Failed to find parent of {patch.fn}: {parent}")
# Add parent to args.patch_files so that we will look for the
# parent's parent. Any duplicates will be ignored.
args.patch_files.append(diff_fn)
else:
warn(f"No patch lines found in {patch.fn}")
info[patch.name] = [ parent, info_txt, commit_hash ]
patch_list.append(patch)
created = set()
for patch in patch_list:
create_branch(patch)
cmd_chk(['git', 'checkout', args.base_branch])
def create_branch(patch):
if patch.name in created:
return
created.add(patch.name)
parent, info_txt, commit_hash = info[patch.name]
parent = argparse.Namespace(dir=patch.dir, name=parent, fn=patch.dir + parent + '.diff')
if parent.name == args.base_branch:
parent_branch = commit_hash if commit_hash else args.base_branch
else:
create_branch(parent)
parent_branch = '/'.join(['patch', args.base_branch, parent.name])
branch = '/'.join(['patch', args.base_branch, patch.name])
print("\n" + '=' * 64)
print(f"Processing {branch} ({parent_branch})")
if patch.name in local_branch:
cmd_chk(['git', 'branch', '-D', branch])
cmd_chk(['git', 'checkout', '-b', branch, parent_branch])
info_fn = 'PATCH.' + patch.name
with open(info_fn, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(info_txt)
cmd_chk(['git', 'add', info_fn])
with open(patch.fn, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
patch_txt = fh.read()
cmd_run('patch -p1'.split(), input=patch_txt)
for fn in glob.glob('*.orig') + glob.glob('*/*.orig'):
os.unlink(fn)
pos = 0
new_file_re = re.compile(r'\nnew file mode (?P<mode>\d+)\s+--- /dev/null\s+\+\+\+ b/(?P<fn>.+)')
while True:
m = new_file_re.search(patch_txt, pos)
if not m:
break
os.chmod(m['fn'], int(m['mode'], 8))
cmd_chk(['git', 'add', m['fn']])
pos = m.end()
while True:
cmd_chk('git status'.split())
ans = input('Press Enter to commit, Ctrl-C to abort, or type a wild-name to add a new file: ')
if ans == '':
break
cmd_chk("git add " + ans, shell=True)
while True:
s = cmd_run(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f"Creating branch from {patch.name}.diff."])
if not s.returncode:
break
s = cmd_run([os.environ.get('SHELL', '/bin/sh')])
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting due to shell error code')
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Create a git patch branch from an rsync patch file.", add_help=False)
parser.add_argument('--branch', '-b', dest='base_branch', metavar='BASE_BRANCH', default='master', help="The branch the patch is based on. Default: master.")
parser.add_argument('--add-missing', '-a', action='store_true', help="Add a branch for every patches/*.diff that doesn't have a branch.")
parser.add_argument('--skip-check', action='store_true', help="Skip the check that ensures starting with a clean branch.")
parser.add_argument('--delete', dest='delete_local_branches', action='store_true', help="Delete all the local patch/BASE/* branches, not just the ones that are being recreated.")
parser.add_argument('--patches-dir', '-p', metavar='DIR', default='patches', help="Override the location of the rsync-patches dir. Default: patches.")
parser.add_argument('patch_files', metavar='patches/DIFF_FILE', nargs='*', help="Specify what patch diff files to process. Default: all of them.")
parser.add_argument("--help", "-h", action="help", help="Output this help message and exit.")
args = parser.parse_args()
main()
# vim: sw=4 et ft=python

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Summary: A fast, versatile, remote (and local) file-copying tool
Name: rsync
Version: 3.4.0
Version: 3.4.3
%define fullversion %{version}
Release: 1
%define srcdir src
@@ -79,9 +79,5 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%dir /etc/rsync-ssl/certs
%changelog
* Wed Jan 15 2025 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Released 3.4.0.
* Fri Mar 21 2008 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Added installation of /etc/xinetd.d/rsync file and some commented-out
lines that demonstrate how to use the rsync-patches tar file.
* Wed May 20 2026 Rsync Project <rsync.project@gmail.com>
Released 3.4.3.

View File

@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env -S python3 -B
# This script is used to turn one or more of the "patch/BASE/*" branches
# into one or more diffs in the "patches" directory. Pass the option
# --gen if you want generated files in the diffs. Pass the name of
# one or more diffs if you want to just update a subset of all the
# diffs.
import os, sys, re, argparse, time, shutil
sys.path = ['packaging'] + sys.path
from pkglib import *
MAKE_GEN_CMDS = [
'./prepare-source'.split(),
'cd build && if test -f config.status ; then ./config.status ; else ../configure ; fi',
'make -C build gen'.split(),
]
TMP_DIR = "patches.gen"
os.environ['GIT_MERGE_AUTOEDIT'] = 'no'
def main():
global master_commit, parent_patch, description, completed, last_touch
if not os.path.isdir(args.patches_dir):
die(f'No "{args.patches_dir}" directory was found.')
if not os.path.isdir('.git'):
die('No ".git" directory present in the current dir.')
starting_branch, args.base_branch = check_git_state(args.base_branch, not args.skip_check, args.patches_dir)
master_commit = latest_git_hash(args.base_branch)
if cmd_txt_chk(['packaging/prep-auto-dir']).out == '':
die('You must setup an auto-build-save dir to use this script.')
if args.gen:
if os.path.lexists(TMP_DIR):
die(f'"{TMP_DIR}" must not exist in the current directory.')
gen_files = get_gen_files()
os.mkdir(TMP_DIR, 0o700)
for cmd in MAKE_GEN_CMDS:
cmd_chk(cmd)
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *gen_files, f'{TMP_DIR}/master/'])
last_touch = int(time.time())
# Start by finding all patches so that we can load all possible parents.
patches = sorted(list(get_patch_branches(args.base_branch)))
parent_patch = { }
description = { }
for patch in patches:
branch = f"patch/{args.base_branch}/{patch}"
desc = ''
proc = cmd_pipe(['git', 'diff', '-U1000', f"{args.base_branch}...{branch}", '--', f"PATCH.{patch}"])
in_diff = False
for line in proc.stdout:
if in_diff:
if not re.match(r'^[ +]', line):
continue
line = line[1:]
m = re.search(r'patch -p1 <patches/(\S+)\.diff', line)
if m and m[1] != patch:
parpat = parent_patch[patch] = m[1]
if not parpat in patches:
die(f"Parent of {patch} is not a local branch: {parpat}")
desc += line
elif re.match(r'^@@ ', line):
in_diff = True
description[patch] = desc
proc.communicate()
if args.patch_files: # Limit the list of patches to actually process
valid_patches = patches
patches = [ ]
for fn in args.patch_files:
name = re.sub(r'\.diff$', '', re.sub(r'.+/', '', fn))
if name not in valid_patches:
die(f"Local branch not available for patch: {name}")
patches.append(name)
completed = set()
for patch in patches:
if patch in completed:
continue
if not update_patch(patch):
break
if args.gen:
shutil.rmtree(TMP_DIR)
while last_touch >= int(time.time()):
time.sleep(1)
cmd_chk(['git', 'checkout', starting_branch])
cmd_chk(['packaging/prep-auto-dir'], discard='output')
def update_patch(patch):
global last_touch
completed.add(patch) # Mark it as completed early to short-circuit any (bogus) dependency loops.
parent = parent_patch.get(patch, None)
if parent:
if parent not in completed:
if not update_patch(parent):
return 0
based_on = parent = f"patch/{args.base_branch}/{parent}"
else:
parent = args.base_branch
based_on = master_commit
print(f"======== {patch} ========")
while args.gen and last_touch >= int(time.time()):
time.sleep(1)
branch = f"patch/{args.base_branch}/{patch}"
s = cmd_run(['git', 'checkout', branch])
if s.returncode != 0:
return 0
s = cmd_run(['git', 'merge', based_on])
ok = s.returncode == 0
skip_shell = False
if not ok or args.cmd or args.make or args.shell:
cmd_chk(['packaging/prep-auto-dir'], discard='output')
if not ok:
print(f'"git merge {based_on}" incomplete -- please fix.')
if not run_a_shell(parent, patch):
return 0
if not args.make and not args.cmd:
skip_shell = True
if args.make:
if cmd_run(['packaging/smart-make']).returncode != 0:
if not run_a_shell(parent, patch):
return 0
if not args.cmd:
skip_shell = True
if args.cmd:
if cmd_run(args.cmd).returncode != 0:
if not run_a_shell(parent, patch):
return 0
skip_shell = True
if args.shell and not skip_shell:
if not run_a_shell(parent, patch):
return 0
with open(f"{args.patches_dir}/{patch}.diff", 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(description[patch])
fh.write(f"\nbased-on: {based_on}\n")
if args.gen:
gen_files = get_gen_files()
for cmd in MAKE_GEN_CMDS:
cmd_chk(cmd)
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *gen_files, f"{TMP_DIR}/{patch}/"])
else:
gen_files = [ ]
last_touch = int(time.time())
proc = cmd_pipe(['git', 'diff', based_on])
skipping = False
for line in proc.stdout:
if skipping:
if not re.match(r'^diff --git a/', line):
continue
skipping = False
elif re.match(r'^diff --git a/PATCH', line):
skipping = True
continue
if not re.match(r'^index ', line):
fh.write(line)
proc.communicate()
if args.gen:
e_tmp_dir = re.escape(TMP_DIR)
diff_re = re.compile(r'^(diff -Nurp) %s/[^/]+/(.*?) %s/[^/]+/(.*)' % (e_tmp_dir, e_tmp_dir))
minus_re = re.compile(r'^\-\-\- %s/[^/]+/([^\t]+)\t.*' % e_tmp_dir)
plus_re = re.compile(r'^\+\+\+ %s/[^/]+/([^\t]+)\t.*' % e_tmp_dir)
if parent == args.base_branch:
parent_dir = 'master'
else:
m = re.search(r'([^/]+)$', parent)
parent_dir = m[1]
proc = cmd_pipe(['diff', '-Nurp', f"{TMP_DIR}/{parent_dir}", f"{TMP_DIR}/{patch}"])
for line in proc.stdout:
line = diff_re.sub(r'\1 a/\2 b/\3', line)
line = minus_re.sub(r'--- a/\1', line)
line = plus_re.sub(r'+++ b/\1', line)
fh.write(line)
proc.communicate()
return 1
def run_a_shell(parent, patch):
m = re.search(r'([^/]+)$', parent)
parent_dir = m[1]
os.environ['PS1'] = f"[{parent_dir}] {patch}: "
while True:
s = cmd_run([os.environ.get('SHELL', '/bin/sh')])
if s.returncode != 0:
ans = input("Abort? [n/y] ")
if re.match(r'^y', ans, flags=re.I):
return False
continue
cur_branch, is_clean, status_txt = check_git_status(0)
if is_clean:
break
print(status_txt, end='')
cmd_run('rm -f build/*.o build/*/*.o')
return True
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Turn a git branch back into a diff files in the patches dir.", add_help=False)
parser.add_argument('--branch', '-b', dest='base_branch', metavar='BASE_BRANCH', default='master', help="The branch the patch is based on. Default: master.")
parser.add_argument('--skip-check', action='store_true', help="Skip the check that ensures starting with a clean branch.")
parser.add_argument('--make', '-m', action='store_true', help="Run the smart-make script in every patch branch.")
parser.add_argument('--cmd', '-c', help="Run a command in every patch branch.")
parser.add_argument('--shell', '-s', action='store_true', help="Launch a shell for every patch/BASE/* branch updated, not just when a conflict occurs.")
parser.add_argument('--gen', metavar='DIR', nargs='?', const='', help='Include generated files. Optional DIR value overrides the default of using the "patches" dir.')
parser.add_argument('--patches-dir', '-p', metavar='DIR', default='patches', help="Override the location of the rsync-patches dir. Default: patches.")
parser.add_argument('patch_files', metavar='patches/DIFF_FILE', nargs='*', help="Specify what patch diff files to process. Default: all of them.")
parser.add_argument("--help", "-h", action="help", help="Output this help message and exit.")
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.gen == '':
args.gen = args.patches_dir
elif args.gen is not None:
args.patches_dir = args.gen
main()
# vim: sw=4 et ft=python

View File

@@ -1,414 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env -S python3 -B
# This script expects the directory ~/samba-rsync-ftp to exist and to be a
# copy of the /home/ftp/pub/rsync dir on samba.org. When the script is done,
# the git repository in the current directory will be updated, and the local
# ~/samba-rsync-ftp dir will be ready to be rsynced to samba.org. See the
# script samba-rsync for an easy way to initialize the local ftp copy and to
# thereafter update the remote files from your local copy.
# This script also expects to be able to gpg sign the resulting tar files
# using your default gpg key. Make sure that the html download.html file
# has a link to the relevant keys that are authorized to sign the tar files
# and also make sure that the following commands work as expected:
#
# touch TeMp
# gpg --sign TeMp
# gpg --verify TeMp.gpg
# gpg --sign TeMp
# rm TeMp*
#
# The second time you sign the file it should NOT prompt you for your password
# (unless the timeout period has passed). It will prompt about overriding the
# existing TeMp.gpg file, though.
import os, sys, re, argparse, glob, shutil, signal
from datetime import datetime
from getpass import getpass
sys.path = ['packaging'] + sys.path
from pkglib import *
os.environ['LESS'] = 'mqeiXR'; # Make sure that -F is turned off and -R is turned on.
dest = os.environ['HOME'] + '/samba-rsync-ftp'
ORIGINAL_PATH = os.environ['PATH']
def main():
if not os.path.isfile('packaging/release-rsync'):
die('You must run this script from the top of your rsync checkout.')
now = datetime.now()
cl_today = now.strftime('* %a %b %d %Y')
year = now.strftime('%Y')
ztoday = now.strftime('%d %b %Y')
today = ztoday.lstrip('0')
curdir = os.getcwd()
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_handler)
if cmd_txt_chk(['packaging/prep-auto-dir']).out == '':
die('You must setup an auto-build-save dir to use this script.');
auto_dir, gen_files = get_gen_files(True)
gen_pathnames = [ os.path.join(auto_dir, fn) for fn in gen_files ]
dash_line = '=' * 74
print(f"""\
{dash_line}
== This will release a new version of rsync onto an unsuspecting world. ==
{dash_line}
""")
with open('build/rsync.1') as fh:
for line in fh:
if line.startswith(r'.\" prefix='):
doc_prefix = line.split('=')[1].strip()
if doc_prefix != '/usr':
warn(f"*** The documentation was built with prefix {doc_prefix} instead of /usr ***")
die("*** Read the md2man script for a way to override this. ***")
break
if line.startswith('.P'):
die("Failed to find the prefix comment at the start of the rsync.1 manpage.")
if not os.path.isdir(dest):
die(dest, "dest does not exist")
if not os.path.isdir('.git'):
die("There is no .git dir in the current directory.")
if os.path.lexists('a'):
die('"a" must not exist in the current directory.')
if os.path.lexists('b'):
die('"b" must not exist in the current directory.')
if os.path.lexists('patches.gen'):
die('"patches.gen" must not exist in the current directory.')
check_git_state(args.master_branch, True, 'patches')
curversion = get_rsync_version()
# All version values are strings!
lastversion, last_protocol_version, pdate = get_NEWS_version_info()
protocol_version, subprotocol_version = get_protocol_versions()
version = curversion
m = re.search(r'pre(\d+)', version)
if m:
version = re.sub(r'pre\d+', 'pre' + str(int(m[1]) + 1), version)
else:
version = version.replace('dev', 'pre1')
ans = input(f"Please enter the version number of this release: [{version}] ")
if ans == '.':
version = re.sub(r'pre\d+', '', version)
elif ans != '':
version = ans
if not re.match(r'^[\d.]+(pre\d+)?$', version):
die(f'Invalid version: "{version}"')
v_ver = 'v' + version
rsync_ver = 'rsync-' + version
if os.path.lexists(rsync_ver):
die(f'"{rsync_ver}" must not exist in the current directory.')
out = cmd_txt_chk(['git', 'tag', '-l', v_ver]).out
if out != '':
print(f"Tag {v_ver} already exists.")
ans = input("\nDelete tag or quit? [Q/del] ")
if not re.match(r'^del', ans, flags=re.I):
die("Aborted")
cmd_chk(['git', 'tag', '-d', v_ver])
if os.path.isdir('patches/.git'):
cmd_chk(f"cd patches && git tag -d '{v_ver}'")
version = re.sub(r'[-.]*pre[-.]*', 'pre', version)
if 'pre' in version and not curversion.endswith('dev'):
lastversion = curversion
ans = input(f"Enter the previous version to produce a patch against: [{lastversion}] ")
if ans != '':
lastversion = ans
lastversion = re.sub(r'[-.]*pre[-.]*', 'pre', lastversion)
rsync_lastver = 'rsync-' + lastversion
if os.path.lexists(rsync_lastver):
die(f'"{rsync_lastver}" must not exist in the current directory.')
m = re.search(r'(pre\d+)', version)
pre = m[1] if m else ''
release = '0.1' if pre else '1'
ans = input(f"Please enter the RPM release number of this release: [{release}] ")
if ans != '':
release = ans
if pre:
release += '.' + pre
finalversion = re.sub(r'pre\d+', '', version)
proto_changed = protocol_version != last_protocol_version
if proto_changed:
if finalversion in pdate:
proto_change_date = pdate[finalversion]
else:
while True:
ans = input("On what date did the protocol change to {protocol_version} get checked in? (dd Mmm yyyy) ")
if re.match(r'^\d\d \w\w\w \d\d\d\d$', ans):
break
proto_change_date = ans
else:
proto_change_date = ' ' * 11
if 'pre' in lastversion:
if not pre:
die("You should not diff a release version against a pre-release version.")
srcdir = srcdiffdir = lastsrcdir = 'src-previews'
skipping = ' ** SKIPPING **'
elif pre:
srcdir = srcdiffdir = 'src-previews'
lastsrcdir = 'src'
skipping = ' ** SKIPPING **'
else:
srcdir = lastsrcdir = 'src'
srcdiffdir = 'src-diffs'
skipping = ''
print(f"""
{dash_line}
version is "{version}"
lastversion is "{lastversion}"
dest is "{dest}"
curdir is "{curdir}"
srcdir is "{srcdir}"
srcdiffdir is "{srcdiffdir}"
lastsrcdir is "{lastsrcdir}"
release is "{release}"
About to:
- tweak SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION in rsync.h, if needed
- tweak the version in version.h and the spec files
- tweak NEWS.md to ensure header values are correct
- generate configure.sh, config.h.in, and proto.h
- page through the differences
""")
ans = input("<Press Enter to continue> ")
specvars = {
'Version:': finalversion,
'Release:': release,
'%define fullversion': f'%{{version}}{pre}',
'Released': version + '.',
'%define srcdir': srcdir,
}
tweak_files = 'version.h rsync.h'.split()
tweak_files += glob.glob('packaging/*.spec')
tweak_files += glob.glob('packaging/*/*.spec')
for fn in tweak_files:
with open(fn, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
old_txt = txt = fh.read()
if fn == 'version.h':
x_re = re.compile(r'^(#define RSYNC_VERSION).*', re.M)
msg = f"Unable to update RSYNC_VERSION in {fn}"
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, r'\1 "%s"' % version, txt, msg)
elif '.spec' in fn:
for var, val in specvars.items():
x_re = re.compile(r'^%s .*' % re.escape(var), re.M)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, var + ' ' + val, txt, f"Unable to update {var} in {fn}")
x_re = re.compile(r'^\* \w\w\w \w\w\w \d\d \d\d\d\d (.*)', re.M)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, r'%s \1' % cl_today, txt, f"Unable to update ChangeLog header in {fn}")
elif fn == 'rsync.h':
x_re = re.compile('(#define\s+SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION)\s+(\d+)')
repl = lambda m: m[1] + ' ' + ('0' if not pre or not proto_changed else '1' if m[2] == '0' else m[2])
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt, f"Unable to find SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION define in {fn}")
elif fn == 'NEWS.md':
efv = re.escape(finalversion)
x_re = re.compile(r'^# NEWS for rsync %s \(UNRELEASED\)\s+## Changes in this version:\n' % efv
+ r'(\n### PROTOCOL NUMBER:\s+- The protocol number was changed to \d+\.\n)?')
rel_day = 'UNRELEASED' if pre else today
repl = (f'# NEWS for rsync {finalversion} ({rel_day})\n\n'
+ '## Changes in this version:\n')
if proto_changed:
repl += f'\n### PROTOCOL NUMBER:\n\n - The protocol number was changed to {protocol_version}.\n'
good_top = re.sub(r'\(.*?\)', '(UNRELEASED)', repl, 1)
msg = f"The top lines of {fn} are not in the right format. It should be:\n" + good_top
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt, msg)
x_re = re.compile(r'^(\| )(\S{2} \S{3} \d{4})(\s+\|\s+%s\s+\| ).{11}(\s+\| )\S{2}(\s+\|+)$' % efv, re.M)
repl = lambda m: m[1] + (m[2] if pre else ztoday) + m[3] + proto_change_date + m[4] + protocol_version + m[5]
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt, f'Unable to find "| ?? ??? {year} | {finalversion} | ... |" line in {fn}')
else:
die(f"Unrecognized file in tweak_files: {fn}")
if txt != old_txt:
print(f"Updating {fn}")
with open(fn, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(txt)
cmd_chk(['packaging/year-tweak'])
print(dash_line)
cmd_run("git diff".split())
srctar_name = f"{rsync_ver}.tar.gz"
pattar_name = f"rsync-patches-{version}.tar.gz"
diff_name = f"{rsync_lastver}-{version}.diffs.gz"
srctar_file = os.path.join(dest, srcdir, srctar_name)
pattar_file = os.path.join(dest, srcdir, pattar_name)
diff_file = os.path.join(dest, srcdiffdir, diff_name)
lasttar_file = os.path.join(dest, lastsrcdir, rsync_lastver + '.tar.gz')
print(f"""\
{dash_line}
About to:
- git commit all changes
- run a full build, ensuring that the manpages & configure.sh are up-to-date
- merge the {args.master_branch} branch into the patch/{args.master_branch}/* branches
- update the files in the "patches" dir and OPTIONALLY (if you type 'y') to
run patch-update with the --make option (which opens a shell on error)
""")
ans = input("<Press Enter OR 'y' to continue> ")
s = cmd_run(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f'Preparing for release of {version} [buildall]'])
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting')
cmd_chk('touch configure.ac && packaging/smart-make && make gen')
print('Creating any missing patch branches.')
s = cmd_run(f'packaging/branch-from-patch --branch={args.master_branch} --add-missing')
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting')
print('Updating files in "patches" dir ...')
s = cmd_run(f'packaging/patch-update --branch={args.master_branch}')
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting')
if re.match(r'^y', ans, re.I):
print(f'\nRunning smart-make on all "patch/{args.master_branch}/*" branches ...')
cmd_run(f"packaging/patch-update --branch={args.master_branch} --skip-check --make")
if os.path.isdir('patches/.git'):
s = cmd_run(f"cd patches && git commit -a -m 'The patches for {version}.'")
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting')
print(f"""\
{dash_line}
About to:
- create signed tag for this release: {v_ver}
- create release diffs, "{diff_name}"
- create release tar, "{srctar_name}"
- generate {rsync_ver}/patches/* files
- create patches tar, "{pattar_name}"
- update top-level README.md, NEWS.md, TODO, and ChangeLog
- update top-level rsync*.html manpages
- gpg-sign the release files
- update hard-linked top-level release files{skipping}
""")
ans = input("<Press Enter to continue> ")
# TODO: is there a better way to ensure that our passphrase is in the agent?
cmd_run("touch TeMp; gpg --sign TeMp; rm TeMp*")
out = cmd_txt(f"git tag -s -m 'Version {version}.' {v_ver}", capture='combined').out
print(out, end='')
if 'bad passphrase' in out or 'failed' in out:
die('Aborting')
if os.path.isdir('patches/.git'):
out = cmd_txt(f"cd patches && git tag -s -m 'Version {version}.' {v_ver}", capture='combined').out
print(out, end='')
if 'bad passphrase' in out or 'failed' in out:
die('Aborting')
os.environ['PATH'] = ORIGINAL_PATH
# Extract the generated files from the old tar.
tweaked_gen_files = [ os.path.join(rsync_lastver, fn) for fn in gen_files ]
cmd_run(['tar', 'xzf', lasttar_file, *tweaked_gen_files])
os.rename(rsync_lastver, 'a')
print(f"Creating {diff_file} ...")
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *gen_pathnames, 'b/'])
sed_script = r's:^((---|\+\+\+) [ab]/[^\t]+)\t.*:\1:' # CAUTION: must not contain any single quotes!
cmd_chk(f"(git diff v{lastversion} {v_ver} -- ':!.github'; diff -upN a b | sed -r '{sed_script}') | gzip -9 >{diff_file}")
shutil.rmtree('a')
os.rename('b', rsync_ver)
print(f"Creating {srctar_file} ...")
cmd_chk(f"git archive --format=tar --prefix={rsync_ver}/ {v_ver} | tar xf -")
cmd_chk(f"support/git-set-file-times --quiet --prefix={rsync_ver}/")
cmd_chk(['fakeroot', 'tar', 'czf', srctar_file, '--exclude=.github', rsync_ver])
shutil.rmtree(rsync_ver)
print(f'Updating files in "{rsync_ver}/patches" dir ...')
os.mkdir(rsync_ver, 0o755)
os.mkdir(f"{rsync_ver}/patches", 0o755)
cmd_chk(f"packaging/patch-update --skip-check --branch={args.master_branch} --gen={rsync_ver}/patches".split())
print(f"Creating {pattar_file} ...")
cmd_chk(['fakeroot', 'tar', 'chzf', pattar_file, rsync_ver + '/patches'])
shutil.rmtree(rsync_ver)
print(f"Updating the other files in {dest} ...")
md_files = 'README.md NEWS.md INSTALL.md'.split()
html_files = [ fn for fn in gen_pathnames if fn.endswith('.html') ]
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *md_files, *html_files, dest])
cmd_chk(["./md-convert", "--dest", dest, *md_files])
cmd_chk(f"git log --name-status | gzip -9 >{dest}/ChangeLog.gz")
for fn in (srctar_file, pattar_file, diff_file):
asc_fn = fn + '.asc'
if os.path.lexists(asc_fn):
os.unlink(asc_fn)
res = cmd_run(['gpg', '--batch', '-ba', fn])
if res.returncode != 0 and res.returncode != 2:
die("gpg signing failed")
if not pre:
for find in f'{dest}/rsync-*.gz {dest}/rsync-*.asc {dest}/src-previews/rsync-*diffs.gz*'.split():
for fn in glob.glob(find):
os.unlink(fn)
top_link = [
srctar_file, f"{srctar_file}.asc",
pattar_file, f"{pattar_file}.asc",
diff_file, f"{diff_file}.asc",
]
for fn in top_link:
os.link(fn, re.sub(r'/src(-\w+)?/', '/', fn))
print(f"""\
{dash_line}
Local changes are done. When you're satisfied, push the git repository
and rsync the release files. Remember to announce the release on *BOTH*
rsync-announce@lists.samba.org and rsync@lists.samba.org (and the web)!
""")
def replace_or_die(regex, repl, txt, die_msg):
m = regex.search(txt)
if not m:
die(die_msg)
return regex.sub(repl, txt, 1)
def signal_handler(sig, frame):
die("\nAborting due to SIGINT.")
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Prepare a new release of rsync in the git repo & ftp dir.", add_help=False)
parser.add_argument('--branch', '-b', dest='master_branch', default='master', help="The branch to release. Default: master.")
parser.add_argument("--help", "-h", action="help", help="Output this help message and exit.")
args = parser.parse_args()
main()
# vim: sw=4 et ft=python

703
packaging/release.py Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Step-based release script for rsync. Each step is a separate invocation
# selected by a --step-N-XX option, so the maintainer drives the release
# manually one piece at a time.
#
# All persistent state and working files live in ../release/ (a sibling of
# the rsync git checkout):
#
# ../release/rsync-ftp/ mirror of samba.org:/home/ftp/pub/rsync
# ../release/rsync-html/ git checkout of rsync-web (the html site)
# ../release/work/ scratch space for tarball / diff staging
# ../release/release-state.json info shared between steps
#
# The rsync-patches archive is no longer maintained and has been dropped.
#
# Run "packaging/release.py --list" to see the step list.
import os, sys, re, argparse, glob, shutil, json, signal, subprocess
from datetime import datetime
sys.path = ['packaging'] + sys.path
from pkglib import (
warn, die, cmd_run, cmd_chk, cmd_txt, cmd_txt_chk, cmd_pipe,
check_git_state, get_rsync_version,
get_NEWS_version_info, get_protocol_versions,
)
# ---------- Paths ----------
RELEASE_DIR = os.path.realpath('../release')
FTP_DIR = os.path.join(RELEASE_DIR, 'rsync-ftp')
HTML_DIR = os.path.join(RELEASE_DIR, 'rsync-html')
WORK_DIR = os.path.join(RELEASE_DIR, 'work')
STATE_FILE = os.path.join(RELEASE_DIR, 'release-state.json')
# Local rsync-web checkout (sibling of rsync-git) is the source-of-truth for
# the git-tracked html content. The maintainer pulls/commits/pushes there;
# step-1-fetch just snapshots it into HTML_DIR for the release flow.
HTML_SRC = os.path.realpath('../rsync-web')
FTP_REMOTE_PATH = '/home/ftp/pub/rsync'
HTML_REMOTE_PATH = '/home/httpd/html/rsync'
# Files that ./configure + make produce and that the release tarball / diff
# need to bundle alongside the git-tracked source. Mirrors the GENFILES
# definition in Makefile.in (with rrsync.1{,.html} since we always configure
# --with-rrsync in --step-4-build).
GEN_FILES = [
'configure.sh',
'aclocal.m4',
'config.h.in',
'rsync.1', 'rsync.1.html',
'rsync-ssl.1', 'rsync-ssl.1.html',
'rsyncd.conf.5', 'rsyncd.conf.5.html',
'rrsync.1', 'rrsync.1.html',
]
# ---------- Step registry ----------
STEPS = [
('step-1-fetch', 'mirror ../release/rsync-ftp from samba.org and snapshot ../release/rsync-html from ../rsync-web'),
('step-2-prepare', 'gather release info interactively and write release-state.json'),
('step-3-tweak', 'update version.h, rsync.h, NEWS.md, and packaging/*.spec'),
('step-4-build', 'run smart-make + make gen'),
('step-5-commit', 'git commit -a (commit the prepared release changes)'),
('step-6-tag', 'create the gpg-signed git tag'),
('step-7-tarball', 'build the source tarball and diffs.gz against the previous release'),
('step-8-update-ftp', 'refresh README/NEWS/INSTALL/html in the ftp dir, regen ChangeLog.gz, gpg-sign tarballs'),
('step-9-toplinks', 'hard-link top-level release files (final releases only)'),
('step-10-push-ftp', 'rsync ../release/rsync-ftp/ to samba.org'),
('step-11-push-html', 'rsync ../release/rsync-html/ to samba.org (after any manual edits)'),
('step-12-push-git', 'print the git push commands for you to run'),
]
STEP_FLAGS = [s[0] for s in STEPS]
DASH_LINE = '=' * 74
# ---------- State helpers ----------
def load_state():
if not os.path.isfile(STATE_FILE):
die(f"{STATE_FILE} not found. Run --step-2-prepare first.")
with open(STATE_FILE, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
return json.load(fh)
def save_state(state):
os.makedirs(RELEASE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
with open(STATE_FILE, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
json.dump(state, fh, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
fh.write('\n')
def require_samba_host():
host = os.environ.get('RSYNC_SAMBA_HOST', '')
if not host.endswith('.samba.org'):
die("Set RSYNC_SAMBA_HOST in your environment to the samba hostname (e.g. hr3.samba.org).")
return host
def require_top_of_checkout():
if not os.path.isfile('packaging/release.py'):
die("Run this script from the top of your rsync checkout.")
if not os.path.isdir('.git'):
die("There is no .git dir in the current directory.")
def replace_or_die(regex, repl, txt, die_msg):
m = regex.search(txt)
if not m:
die(die_msg)
return regex.sub(repl, txt, 1)
def section(title):
print(f"\n{DASH_LINE}\n== {title}\n{DASH_LINE}")
def confirm(prompt, default_no=True):
suffix = '[n] ' if default_no else '[y] '
ans = input(f"{prompt} {suffix}").strip().lower()
if default_no:
return ans.startswith('y')
return ans == '' or ans.startswith('y')
# ---------- Step 1: fetch ftp + html ----------
def step_1_fetch(args):
host = require_samba_host()
os.makedirs(RELEASE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
os.makedirs(WORK_DIR, exist_ok=True)
section(f"Fetching ftp dir into {FTP_DIR}")
if not os.path.isdir(FTP_DIR):
os.makedirs(FTP_DIR)
# The .filt file lives in the ftp dir on the server; mirror down using the
# transmitted filter, falling back to no filter on the very first pull.
filt = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, '.filt')
if os.path.exists(filt):
opts = ['-aivOHP', f'-f:_{filt}']
else:
opts = ['-aivOHP']
cmd_chk(['rsync', *opts, f'{host}:{FTP_REMOTE_PATH}/', f'{FTP_DIR}/'])
section(f"Snapshotting html dir from {HTML_SRC} into {HTML_DIR}")
if not os.path.isdir(HTML_SRC):
die(f"{HTML_SRC} not found. Clone the rsync-web repo there first.")
if not os.path.isdir(os.path.join(HTML_SRC, '.git')):
die(f"{HTML_SRC} exists but is not a git checkout.")
print(f"(Make sure {HTML_SRC} is up to date — this script does not 'git pull' for you.)")
os.makedirs(HTML_DIR, exist_ok=True)
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-aiv', '--exclude=/.git',
f'{HTML_SRC}/', f'{HTML_DIR}/'])
# Then mirror non-git html content from the server (mirroring samba-rsync's
# behavior: skip files that the html git already provides).
filt = os.path.join(HTML_DIR, 'filt')
if os.path.exists(filt):
tmp_filt = os.path.join(HTML_DIR, 'tmp-filt')
cmd_chk(f"sed -n -e 's/[-P]/H/p' '{filt}' >'{tmp_filt}'")
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-aivOHP', f'-f._{tmp_filt}',
f'{host}:{HTML_REMOTE_PATH}/', f'{HTML_DIR}/'])
os.unlink(tmp_filt)
print(f"\nFetch complete. Local dirs are now in {RELEASE_DIR}.")
# ---------- Step 2: prepare ----------
def step_2_prepare(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
os.makedirs(RELEASE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
if not os.path.isdir(FTP_DIR):
die(f"{FTP_DIR} does not exist. Run --step-1-fetch first.")
now = datetime.now().astimezone()
cl_today = now.strftime('* %a %b %d %Y')
year = now.strftime('%Y')
ztoday = now.strftime('%d %b %Y')
today = ztoday.lstrip('0')
tz_now = now.strftime('%z')
tz_num = tz_now[0:1].replace('+', '') + str(float(tz_now[1:3]) + float(tz_now[3:]) / 60)
curversion = get_rsync_version()
lastversion, last_protocol_version, pdate = get_NEWS_version_info()
protocol_version, subprotocol_version = get_protocol_versions()
# Default next version: bump preN, or move dev -> pre1.
version = curversion
m = re.search(r'pre(\d+)', version)
if m:
version = re.sub(r'pre\d+', 'pre' + str(int(m[1]) + 1), version)
else:
version = version.replace('dev', 'pre1')
print(f"\nCurrent version (version.h): {curversion}")
print(f"Last released version (NEWS.md): {lastversion}")
print(f"Current protocol version: {protocol_version} (last released: {last_protocol_version})")
ans = input(f"\nVersion to release [{version}, '.' to drop the preN suffix]: ").strip()
if ans == '.':
version = re.sub(r'pre\d+', '', version)
elif ans:
version = ans
if not re.match(r'^[\d.]+(pre\d+)?$', version):
die(f'Invalid version: "{version}"')
version = re.sub(r'[-.]*pre[-.]*', 'pre', version)
if 'pre' in version and not curversion.endswith('dev'):
lastversion = curversion
ans = input(f"Previous version to diff against [{lastversion}]: ").strip()
if ans:
lastversion = ans
lastversion = re.sub(r'[-.]*pre[-.]*', 'pre', lastversion)
m = re.search(r'(pre\d+)', version)
pre = m[1] if m else ''
finalversion = re.sub(r'pre\d+', '', version)
release = '0.1' if pre else '1'
ans = input(f"RPM release number [{release}]: ").strip()
if ans:
release = ans
if pre:
release += '.' + pre
proto_changed = protocol_version != last_protocol_version
if proto_changed:
if finalversion in pdate:
proto_change_date = pdate[finalversion]
else:
while True:
ans = input(f"Date the protocol changed to {protocol_version} (dd Mmm yyyy): ").strip()
if re.match(r'^\d\d \w\w\w \d\d\d\d$', ans):
break
proto_change_date = ans
else:
proto_change_date = ' ' * 11
if 'pre' in lastversion:
if not pre:
die("Refusing to diff a release version against a pre-release version.")
srcdir = srcdiffdir = lastsrcdir = 'src-previews'
elif pre:
srcdir = srcdiffdir = 'src-previews'
lastsrcdir = 'src'
else:
srcdir = lastsrcdir = 'src'
srcdiffdir = 'src-diffs'
state = {
'version': version,
'lastversion': lastversion,
'finalversion': finalversion,
'pre': pre,
'release': release,
'protocol_version': protocol_version,
'subprotocol_version': subprotocol_version,
'proto_changed': proto_changed,
'proto_change_date': proto_change_date,
'srcdir': srcdir,
'srcdiffdir': srcdiffdir,
'lastsrcdir': lastsrcdir,
'today': today,
'ztoday': ztoday,
'cl_today': cl_today,
'year': year,
'tz_num': tz_num,
'master_branch': args.master_branch,
}
save_state(state)
section("Release info")
for k in ('version', 'lastversion', 'release', 'srcdir', 'srcdiffdir', 'lastsrcdir',
'protocol_version', 'proto_changed', 'proto_change_date'):
print(f" {k}: {state[k]}")
print(f"\nWrote {STATE_FILE}. Re-run --step-2-prepare to change anything.")
# ---------- Step 3: tweak version files ----------
def step_3_tweak(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
state = load_state()
version = state['version']
finalversion = state['finalversion']
pre = state['pre']
release = state['release']
today = state['today']
ztoday = state['ztoday']
cl_today = state['cl_today']
year = state['year']
tz_num = state['tz_num']
proto_changed = state['proto_changed']
proto_change_date = state['proto_change_date']
protocol_version = state['protocol_version']
srcdir = state['srcdir']
specvars = {
'Version:': finalversion,
'Release:': release,
'%define fullversion': f'%{{version}}{pre}',
'Released': version + '.',
'%define srcdir': srcdir,
}
tweak_files = ['version.h', 'rsync.h', 'NEWS.md']
tweak_files += glob.glob('packaging/*.spec')
tweak_files += glob.glob('packaging/*/*.spec')
for fn in tweak_files:
with open(fn, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
old_txt = txt = fh.read()
if fn == 'version.h':
x_re = re.compile(r'^(#define RSYNC_VERSION).*', re.M)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, r'\1 "%s"' % version, txt,
f"Unable to update RSYNC_VERSION in {fn}")
x_re = re.compile(r'^(#define MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET).*', re.M)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, r'\1 ' + tz_num, txt,
f"Unable to update MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET in {fn}")
elif fn == 'rsync.h':
x_re = re.compile(r'(#define\s+SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION)\s+(\d+)')
repl = lambda m: m[1] + ' ' + (
'0' if not pre or not proto_changed
else '1' if m[2] == '0'
else m[2])
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt,
f"Unable to find SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION in {fn}")
elif fn == 'NEWS.md':
efv = re.escape(finalversion)
x_re = re.compile(
r'^# NEWS for rsync %s \(UNRELEASED\)\s+## Changes in this version:\n' % efv
+ r'(\n### PROTOCOL NUMBER:\s+- The protocol number was changed to \d+\.\n)?')
rel_day = 'UNRELEASED' if pre else today
repl = (f'# NEWS for rsync {finalversion} ({rel_day})\n\n'
+ '## Changes in this version:\n')
if proto_changed:
repl += f'\n### PROTOCOL NUMBER:\n\n - The protocol number was changed to {protocol_version}.\n'
good_top = re.sub(r'\(.*?\)', '(UNRELEASED)', repl, 1)
msg = (f"The top of {fn} is not in the right format. It should be:\n" + good_top)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt, msg)
x_re = re.compile(
r'^(\| )(\S{2} \S{3} \d{4})(\s+\|\s+%s\s+\| ).{11}(\s+\| )\S{2}(\s+\|+)$' % efv,
re.M)
repl = lambda m: (m[1] + (m[2] if pre else ztoday) + m[3]
+ proto_change_date + m[4] + protocol_version + m[5])
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt,
f'Unable to find "| ?? ??? {year} | {finalversion} | ... |" line in {fn}')
elif '.spec' in fn:
for var, val in specvars.items():
x_re = re.compile(r'^%s .*' % re.escape(var), re.M)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, var + ' ' + val, txt,
f"Unable to update {var} in {fn}")
x_re = re.compile(r'^\* \w\w\w \w\w\w \d\d \d\d\d\d (.*)', re.M)
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, r'%s \1' % cl_today, txt,
f"Unable to update ChangeLog header in {fn}")
else:
die(f"Unrecognized file in tweak_files: {fn}")
if txt != old_txt:
print(f"Updating {fn}")
with open(fn, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(txt)
cmd_chk(['packaging/year-tweak'])
section("git diff after tweaks")
cmd_run(['git', '--no-pager', 'diff'])
# ---------- Step 4: build ----------
def step_4_build(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
load_state() # just to ensure we've prepared
section("Running prepare-source + configure --prefix=/usr --with-rrsync + make + make gen")
# Always re-prepare so configure.sh is current; we run configure ourselves
# with the release-required flags rather than relying on the cached
# config.status (which may have been produced with different options).
if os.path.isfile('.fetch'):
cmd_chk(['./prepare-source', 'fetch'])
else:
cmd_chk(['./prepare-source'])
cmd_chk(['./configure', '--prefix=/usr', '--with-rrsync'])
cmd_chk(['make'])
cmd_chk(['make', 'gen'])
# ---------- Step 5: commit ----------
def step_5_commit(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
state = load_state()
version = state['version']
section("git status")
cmd_run(['git', 'status'])
if not confirm("Commit all current changes with the release message?"):
die("Aborted.")
cmd_chk(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f'Preparing for release of {version} [buildall]'])
# ---------- Step 6: tag ----------
def step_6_tag(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
state = load_state()
version = state['version']
v_ver = 'v' + version
out = cmd_txt_chk(['git', 'tag', '-l', v_ver]).out
if out.strip():
if not confirm(f"Tag {v_ver} already exists. Delete and recreate?"):
die("Aborted.")
cmd_chk(['git', 'tag', '-d', v_ver])
# Prime the gpg agent so the actual tag signing won't prompt.
section("Priming gpg agent")
cmd_run("touch TeMp; gpg --sign TeMp; rm -f TeMp TeMp.gpg")
section(f"Creating signed tag {v_ver}")
out = cmd_txt(['git', 'tag', '-s', '-m', f'Version {version}.', v_ver],
capture='combined').out
print(out, end='')
if 'bad passphrase' in out.lower() or 'failed' in out.lower():
die("Tag creation failed.")
# ---------- Step 7: tarball + diff ----------
def step_7_tarball(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
state = load_state()
version = state['version']
lastversion = state['lastversion']
pre = state['pre']
srcdir = state['srcdir']
srcdiffdir = state['srcdiffdir']
lastsrcdir = state['lastsrcdir']
rsync_ver = 'rsync-' + version
rsync_lastver = 'rsync-' + lastversion
v_ver = 'v' + version
srctar_name = f"{rsync_ver}.tar.gz"
diff_name = f"{rsync_lastver}-{version}.diffs.gz"
srctar_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, srcdir, srctar_name)
diff_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, srcdiffdir, diff_name)
lasttar_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, lastsrcdir, rsync_lastver + '.tar.gz')
for d in (os.path.dirname(srctar_file), os.path.dirname(diff_file)):
os.makedirs(d, exist_ok=True)
if not os.path.isfile(lasttar_file):
die(f"Previous tarball not found: {lasttar_file}")
# Stage in ../release/work to keep the source checkout clean.
if os.path.isdir(WORK_DIR):
shutil.rmtree(WORK_DIR)
os.makedirs(WORK_DIR)
a_dir = os.path.join(WORK_DIR, 'a')
b_dir = os.path.join(WORK_DIR, 'b')
# Extract gen files from the previous tarball into work/a/.
tweaked_gen_files = [os.path.join(rsync_lastver, fn) for fn in GEN_FILES]
cmd_chk(['tar', '-C', WORK_DIR, '-xzf', lasttar_file, *tweaked_gen_files])
os.rename(os.path.join(WORK_DIR, rsync_lastver), a_dir)
# Copy current gen files (built in the top-level checkout) into work/b/.
os.makedirs(b_dir)
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *GEN_FILES, b_dir + '/'])
section(f"Creating {diff_file}")
sed_script = r's:^((---|\+\+\+) [ab]/[^\t]+)\t.*:\1:' # no single quotes!
cmd_chk(
f"(git diff v{lastversion} {v_ver} -- ':!.github'; "
f"diff -upN {a_dir} {b_dir} | sed -r '{sed_script}') | gzip -9 >{diff_file}")
section(f"Creating {srctar_file}")
# Reuse work/b/ (which already holds the fresh gen files) as the release
# staging dir, then let "git archive" overlay the git-tracked source files
# on top. That way the tarball ends up with both gen files and source.
rsync_ver_dir = os.path.join(WORK_DIR, rsync_ver)
shutil.rmtree(a_dir)
os.rename(b_dir, rsync_ver_dir)
cmd_chk(f"git archive --format=tar --prefix={rsync_ver}/ {v_ver} | "
f"tar -C {WORK_DIR} -xf -")
cmd_chk(f"support/git-set-file-times --quiet --prefix={rsync_ver_dir}/")
cmd_chk(['fakeroot', 'tar', '-C', WORK_DIR, '-czf', srctar_file,
'--exclude=.github', rsync_ver])
# Leave staging in place; --step-8-update-ftp does its own thing.
print(f"\nCreated:\n {srctar_file}\n {diff_file}")
# ---------- Step 8: update ftp ----------
def step_8_update_ftp(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
state = load_state()
version = state['version']
lastversion = state['lastversion']
srcdir = state['srcdir']
srcdiffdir = state['srcdiffdir']
rsync_ver = 'rsync-' + version
rsync_lastver = 'rsync-' + lastversion
srctar_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, srcdir, f"{rsync_ver}.tar.gz")
diff_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, srcdiffdir,
f"{rsync_lastver}-{version}.diffs.gz")
section(f"Refreshing top-of-tree files in {FTP_DIR}")
md_files = ['README.md', 'NEWS.md', 'INSTALL.md']
html_files = [fn for fn in GEN_FILES if fn.endswith('.html')]
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *md_files, *html_files, FTP_DIR + '/'])
cmd_chk(['./md-convert', '--dest', FTP_DIR, *md_files])
section(f"Regenerating {FTP_DIR}/ChangeLog.gz")
cmd_chk(f"git log --name-status | gzip -9 >{FTP_DIR}/ChangeLog.gz")
# Prime gpg agent and then sign the tar + diff.
section("Priming gpg agent")
cmd_run("touch TeMp; gpg --sign TeMp; rm -f TeMp TeMp.gpg")
for fn in (srctar_file, diff_file):
if not os.path.isfile(fn):
die(f"Missing file to sign: {fn}. Did --step-7-tarball run successfully?")
asc_fn = fn + '.asc'
if os.path.lexists(asc_fn):
os.unlink(asc_fn)
section(f"GPG-signing {fn}")
res = cmd_run(['gpg', '--batch', '-ba', fn])
if res.returncode not in (0, 2):
die("gpg signing failed.")
# ---------- Step 9: top-level hard links ----------
def step_9_toplinks(args):
require_top_of_checkout()
state = load_state()
pre = state['pre']
if pre:
print("Skipping: pre-releases do not get top-level hard links.")
return
version = state['version']
lastversion = state['lastversion']
srcdir = state['srcdir']
srcdiffdir = state['srcdiffdir']
rsync_ver = 'rsync-' + version
rsync_lastver = 'rsync-' + lastversion
srctar_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, srcdir, f"{rsync_ver}.tar.gz")
diff_file = os.path.join(FTP_DIR, srcdiffdir,
f"{rsync_lastver}-{version}.diffs.gz")
section("Removing stale top-level rsync-* files")
for find in [f'{FTP_DIR}/rsync-*.gz',
f'{FTP_DIR}/rsync-*.asc',
f'{FTP_DIR}/src-previews/rsync-*diffs.gz*']:
for fn in glob.glob(find):
os.unlink(fn)
top_link = [
srctar_file, srctar_file + '.asc',
diff_file, diff_file + '.asc',
]
for fn in top_link:
target = re.sub(r'/src(-\w+)?/', '/', fn)
if os.path.lexists(target):
os.unlink(target)
os.link(fn, target)
print(f" linked {target}")
# ---------- Step 10: push ftp ----------
def step_10_push_ftp(args):
host = require_samba_host()
if not os.path.isdir(FTP_DIR):
die(f"{FTP_DIR} does not exist. Run --step-1-fetch first.")
section(f"rsync ftp dir to {host}")
rsync_with_confirm(['-aivOHP', '--chown=:rsync', '--del',
f'-f._{os.path.join(FTP_DIR, ".filt")}',
f'{FTP_DIR}/', f'{host}:{FTP_REMOTE_PATH}/'])
# ---------- Step 11: push html ----------
def step_11_push_html(args):
host = require_samba_host()
if not os.path.isdir(HTML_DIR):
die(f"{HTML_DIR} does not exist. Run --step-1-fetch first.")
section(f"rsync html dir to {host}")
filt = os.path.join(HTML_DIR, 'filt')
rsync_with_confirm(['-aivOHP', '--chown=:rsync', '--del',
f'-f._{filt}',
f'{HTML_DIR}/', f'{host}:{HTML_REMOTE_PATH}/'])
# ---------- Step 12: print push-git instructions ----------
def step_12_push_git(args):
state = load_state()
version = state['version']
master_branch = state['master_branch']
v_ver = 'v' + version
print(f"""\
{DASH_LINE}
Run these from the rsync-git checkout (this script does not push for you):
git push origin {master_branch}
git push origin {v_ver}
If you have a 'samba' remote configured (git.samba.org:/data/git/rsync.git):
git push samba {master_branch}
git push samba {v_ver}
Then upload the tarball + .asc to the GitHub release for {v_ver}, run
packaging/send-news (when convenient), and announce on rsync-announce@,
rsync@, and Discord.
""")
# ---------- shared rsync-with-confirm ----------
def rsync_with_confirm(rsync_args):
"""Run an rsync command in dry-run mode, then ask before running for real."""
cmd_run(['rsync', '--dry-run', *rsync_args])
if confirm("Run without --dry-run?"):
cmd_run(['rsync', *rsync_args])
# ---------- dispatch ----------
STEP_FUNCS = {
'step-1-fetch': step_1_fetch,
'step-2-prepare': step_2_prepare,
'step-3-tweak': step_3_tweak,
'step-4-build': step_4_build,
'step-5-commit': step_5_commit,
'step-6-tag': step_6_tag,
'step-7-tarball': step_7_tarball,
'step-8-update-ftp': step_8_update_ftp,
'step-9-toplinks': step_9_toplinks,
'step-10-push-ftp': step_10_push_ftp,
'step-11-push-html': step_11_push_html,
'step-12-push-git': step_12_push_git,
}
def signal_handler(sig, frame):
die("\nAborting due to SIGINT.")
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Step-based release script for rsync.",
formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
epilog="Run --list to see the steps. Each invocation runs exactly one --step-* option.")
parser.add_argument('--branch', '-b', dest='master_branch', default='master',
help="The branch to release (default: master).")
parser.add_argument('--list', action='store_true',
help="List all release steps and exit.")
grp = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
for flag, descr in STEPS:
grp.add_argument('--' + flag, dest='step', action='store_const',
const=flag, help=descr)
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.list:
print("Release steps:")
for flag, descr in STEPS:
print(f" --{flag:18s} {descr}")
return
if not args.step:
parser.error("pick one --step-N-XX option (or --list to see them).")
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_handler)
os.environ['LESS'] = 'mqeiXR'
STEP_FUNCS[args.step](args)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
# vim: sw=4 et ft=python

View File

@@ -121,4 +121,4 @@ fi
cd "$SRC_DIR" || exit 1
echo "Copying files from $SRC_DIR to $RSYNC_SAMBA_HOST ..."
do_rsync -aivOHP --del -f._$FILT . "$RSYNC_SAMBA_HOST:$DEST_DIR/"
do_rsync -aivOHP --chown=:rsync --del -f._$FILT . "$RSYNC_SAMBA_HOST:$DEST_DIR/"

View File

@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@
import sys, os, re, argparse, subprocess
from datetime import datetime
MAINTAINER_NAME = 'Wayne Davison'
MAINTAINER_SUF = ' ' + MAINTAINER_NAME + "\n"
def main():
latest_year = '2000'
@@ -22,10 +19,6 @@ def main():
m = argparse.Namespace(**m.groupdict())
if m.year > latest_year:
latest_year = m.year
if m.fn.startswith('zlib/') or m.fn.startswith('popt/'):
continue
if re.search(r'\.(c|h|sh|test)$', m.fn):
maybe_edit_copyright_year(m.fn, m.year)
proc.communicate()
fn = 'latest-year.h'
@@ -39,55 +32,8 @@ def main():
fh.write(txt)
def maybe_edit_copyright_year(fn, year):
opening_lines = [ ]
copyright_line = None
with open(fn, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
for lineno, line in enumerate(fh):
opening_lines.append(line)
if lineno > 3 and not re.search(r'\S', line):
break
m = re.match(r'^(?P<pre>.*Copyright\s+\S+\s+)(?P<year>\d\d\d\d(?:-\d\d\d\d)?(,\s+\d\d\d\d)*)(?P<suf>.+)', line)
if not m:
continue
copyright_line = argparse.Namespace(**m.groupdict())
copyright_line.lineno = len(opening_lines)
copyright_line.is_maintainer_line = MAINTAINER_NAME in copyright_line.suf
copyright_line.txt = line
if copyright_line.is_maintainer_line:
break
if not copyright_line:
return
if copyright_line.is_maintainer_line:
cyears = copyright_line.year.split('-')
if year == cyears[0]:
cyears = [ year ]
else:
cyears = [ cyears[0], year ]
txt = copyright_line.pre + '-'.join(cyears) + MAINTAINER_SUF
if txt == copyright_line.txt:
return
opening_lines[copyright_line.lineno - 1] = txt
else:
if fn.startswith('lib/') or fn.startswith('testsuite/'):
return
txt = copyright_line.pre + year + MAINTAINER_SUF
opening_lines[copyright_line.lineno - 1] += txt
remaining_txt = fh.read()
print(f"Updating {fn} with year {year}")
with open(fn, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(''.join(opening_lines))
fh.write(remaining_txt)
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Grab the year of last mod for our c & h files and make sure the Copyright comment is up-to-date.")
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Grab the year of the last mod for our c & h files and make sure the LATEST_YEAR value is accurate.")
args = parser.parse_args()
main()

View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
/** \ingroup popt
* \file popt/findme.c
*/
/* (C) 1998-2002 Red Hat, Inc. -- Licensing details are in the COPYING
file accompanying popt source distributions, available from
ftp://ftp.rpm.org/pub/rpm/dist. */
#include "system.h"
#include "findme.h"
const char * findProgramPath(const char * argv0)
{
char * path = getenv("PATH");
char * pathbuf;
char * start, * chptr;
char * buf;
size_t bufsize;
if (argv0 == NULL) return NULL; /* XXX can't happen */
/* If there is a / in the argv[0], it has to be an absolute path */
if (strchr(argv0, '/'))
return xstrdup(argv0);
if (path == NULL) return NULL;
bufsize = strlen(path) + 1;
start = pathbuf = alloca(bufsize);
if (pathbuf == NULL) return NULL; /* XXX can't happen */
strlcpy(pathbuf, path, bufsize);
bufsize += sizeof "/" - 1 + strlen(argv0);
buf = malloc(bufsize);
if (buf == NULL) return NULL; /* XXX can't happen */
chptr = NULL;
/*@-branchstate@*/
do {
if ((chptr = strchr(start, ':')))
*chptr = '\0';
snprintf(buf, bufsize, "%s/%s", start, argv0);
if (!access(buf, X_OK))
return buf;
if (chptr)
start = chptr + 1;
else
start = NULL;
} while (start && *start);
/*@=branchstate@*/
free(buf);
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/** \ingroup popt
* \file popt/findme.h
*/
/* (C) 1998-2000 Red Hat, Inc. -- Licensing details are in the COPYING
file accompanying popt source distributions, available from
ftp://ftp.rpm.org/pub/rpm/dist. */
#ifndef H_FINDME
#define H_FINDME
/**
* Return absolute path to executable by searching PATH.
* @param argv0 name of executable
* @return (malloc'd) absolute path to executable (or NULL)
*/
/*@null@*/ const char * findProgramPath(/*@null@*/ const char * argv0)
/*@*/;
#endif

View File

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern int fuzzy_basis;
extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
extern int xfer_sum_len;
extern int use_secure_symlinks;
static struct bitbag *delayed_bits = NULL;
static int phase = 0, redoing = 0;
@@ -214,7 +215,12 @@ int open_tmpfile(char *fnametmp, const char *fname, struct file_struct *file)
* access to ensure that there is no race condition. They will be
* correctly updated after the right owner and group info is set.
* (Thanks to snabb@epipe.fi for pointing this out.) */
fd = do_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
/* When use_secure_symlinks is on (non-chroot daemon with munge_symlinks),
* use secure_mkstemp to prevent symlink race attacks on parent directories. */
if (use_secure_symlinks)
fd = secure_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
else
fd = do_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
#if 0
/* In most cases parent directories will already exist because their
@@ -312,7 +318,12 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
}
}
while ((i = recv_token(f_in, &data)) != 0) {
while (1) {
data = NULL;
i = recv_token(f_in, &data);
if (i == 0)
break;
if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
show_progress(offset, total_size);
@@ -320,6 +331,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
maybe_send_keepalive(time(NULL), MSK_ALLOW_FLUSH | MSK_ACTIVE_RECEIVER);
if (i > 0) {
if (!data) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid literal token with no data [%s]\n", who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
rprintf(FINFO,"data recv %d at %s\n",
i, big_num(offset));
@@ -337,6 +352,11 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
}
i = -(i+1);
if (i < 0 || i >= sum.count) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid block index %d (count=%ld) [%s]\n",
i, (long)sum.count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
offset2 = i * (OFF_T)sum.blength;
len = sum.blength;
if (i == (int)sum.count-1 && sum.remainder != 0)
@@ -436,7 +456,7 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
}
/* We don't use robust_rename() here because the
* partial-dir must be on the same drive. */
if (do_rename(partialptr, fname) < 0) {
if (do_rename_at(partialptr, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"rename failed for %s (from %s)",
full_fname(fname), partialptr);
@@ -452,7 +472,10 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
{
struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
struct file_struct *file;
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
@@ -589,6 +612,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
else
file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
@@ -854,11 +879,21 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
/* We now check to see if we are writing the file "inplace" */
if (inplace || one_inplace) {
fnametmp = one_inplace ? partialptr : fname;
fd2 = do_open(fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
/* When use_secure_symlinks is on (non-chroot daemon),
* use secure open to prevent symlink race attacks where an
* attacker could switch a directory to a symlink between
* path validation and file open. */
if (use_secure_symlinks)
fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
else
fd2 = do_open(fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
#ifdef linux
if (fd2 == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
/* Maybe the error was due to protected_regular setting? */
fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
if (use_secure_symlinks)
fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
else
fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
}
#endif
if (fd2 == -1) {
@@ -910,7 +945,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
recv_ok = -1;
else if (fnamecmp == partialptr) {
if (!one_inplace)
do_unlink(partialptr);
do_unlink_at(partialptr);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
} else if (keep_partial && partialptr && (!one_inplace || delay_updates)) {
@@ -919,7 +954,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
"Unable to create partial-dir for %s -- discarding %s.\n",
local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, NULL),
recv_ok ? "completed file" : "partial file");
do_unlink(fnametmp);
do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
recv_ok = -1;
} else if (!finish_transfer(partialptr, fnametmp, fnamecmp, NULL,
file, recv_ok, !partial_dir))
@@ -930,7 +965,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
} else
partialptr = NULL;
} else if (!one_inplace)
do_unlink(fnametmp);
do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
cleanup_disable();

View File

@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ has its own detailed description later in this manpage.
--compress, -z compress file data during the transfer
--compress-choice=STR choose the compression algorithm (aka --zc)
--compress-level=NUM explicitly set compression level (aka --zl)
--compress-threads=NUM explicitly set compression threads (aka --zt)
--skip-compress=LIST skip compressing files with suffix in LIST
--cvs-exclude, -C auto-ignore files in the same way CVS does
--filter=RULE, -f add a file-filtering RULE
@@ -2817,6 +2818,22 @@ expand it.
report something like "`Client compress: zstd (level 3)`" (along with the
checksum choice in effect).
0. `--compress-threads=NUM`, `--zt=NUM`
Set the number of threads to spawn when compressing data. Setting this
option to 1 or more will instruct the compression library to spawn 1 or
more threads for compression. Ideally, increasing the number of threads
will increase transfer speed if the transfer is CPU bound on the sender.
This option does not affect decompression.
Compression algorithms that allow threading:
- `zstd` (only when libzstd is compiled with threading support)
This option is ignored if one of the above alogithms is not selected as the
`--compression-choice` or if compression not enabled.
0. `--skip-compress=LIST`
**NOTE:** no compression method currently supports per-file compression

View File

@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
if (am_root >= 0) {
uid_t uid = change_uid ? (uid_t)F_OWNER(file) : sxp->st.st_uid;
gid_t gid = change_gid ? (gid_t)F_GROUP(file) : sxp->st.st_gid;
if (do_lchown(fname, uid, gid) != 0) {
if (do_lchown_at(fname, uid, gid) != 0) {
/* We shouldn't have attempted to change uid
* or gid unless have the privilege. */
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "%s %s failed",
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
#ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
if (!BITS_EQUAL(sxp->st.st_mode, new_mode, CHMOD_BITS)) {
int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod(fname, new_mode);
int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod_at(fname, new_mode);
if (ret < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"failed to set permissions on %s",
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
if (!partialptr || (ret == -2 && temp_copy_name)
|| robust_rename(fnametmp, partialptr, NULL, file->mode) < 0)
do_unlink(fnametmp);
do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
return 0;
}
if (ret == 0) {
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
ok_to_set_time ? ATTRS_ACCURATE_TIME : ATTRS_SKIP_MTIME | ATTRS_SKIP_ATIME | ATTRS_SKIP_CRTIME);
if (temp_copy_name) {
if (do_rename(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
if (do_rename_at(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\"",
full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
return 0;

25
rsync.h
View File

@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@
#define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */
#define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */
#define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
#define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
#define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
#define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */
@@ -93,6 +92,7 @@
#define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10) /* receiver/generator */
#define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */
#define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12) /* sender/receiver/generator */
#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<13)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
/* These flags are passed to functions but not stored. */
@@ -163,6 +163,29 @@
/* For compatibility with older rsyncs */
#define OLD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ((int32)1 << 29)
/* Policy ceilings on attacker-controlled wire values. Picked well above any
* legitimate filesystem / protocol traffic but well below sizes that could
* cause integer overflow or DoS-grade allocations. See input_checking.txt.
*
* Note on MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN: xattr datum size is bounded only by the
* wire-format maximum (signed int32 varint, ~2GB). macOS resource forks
* are transferred as the com.apple.ResourceFork xattr and can legitimately
* be many GB; --max-alloc (default 1GB, configurable) is the real
* allocation cap. read_varint_size() still rejects negative values so a
* hostile peer cannot wrap to ~SIZE_MAX. */
#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_COUNT 65536
#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_NAMELEN 4096
#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN ((int32)0x7fffffff)
#define MAX_WIRE_ACL_COUNT 65536
#define MAX_WIRE_NSEC 999999999
/* MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT is the per-category cap for read_del_stats() in main.c,
* which accumulates 5 wire-supplied counts into the int32 stats.deleted_files
* accumulator. Capped at 2^28 so 5 * 2^28 = 1.34 GB stays under INT32_MAX
* (2.15 GB) with margin -- a higher cap (e.g. 2^30) would let a hostile peer
* supplying 3+ max-sized counts overflow the accumulator, which is signed-int
* UB. 2^28 is still well above any plausible real transfer's deletion count. */
#define MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT ((int32)1 << 28)
#define ROUND_UP_1024(siz) ((siz) & (1024-1) ? ((siz) | (1024-1)) + 1 : (siz))
#define IOERR_GENERAL (1<<0) /* For backward compatibility, this must == 1 */

View File

@@ -1073,6 +1073,16 @@ in the values of parameters. See that section for details.
**system()** call's default shell), and use RSYNC_NO_XFER_EXEC to disable
both options completely.
0. `temp dir`
Specifies a directory that rsync should use for temporary files created
during the transfer of updated files. If that directory is on a different
partition, after transfer file is being copied instead of unlinked.
This parameter equals with `--temp-dir` option, so please consult rsync
manpage for further information.
## CONFIG DIRECTIVES
There are currently two config directives available that allow a config file to

485
runtests.py Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 by Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
# Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
# Copyright (C) 2026 Andrew Tridgell
#
# Rewrite of runtests.sh in Python (runtests.sh is now deprecated).
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version
# 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
"""rsync test runner.
Invokes test scripts from testsuite/ and reports results.
Can be called by 'make check' or directly.
Usage:
./runtests.py [options] [TEST ...]
Each TEST is a test name (e.g. 'delete') or glob pattern (e.g. 'xattr*').
If no tests are specified, all tests are run.
"""
import argparse
import concurrent.futures
import glob
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
def parse_args():
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Run rsync test suite')
p.add_argument('tests', nargs='*', metavar='TEST',
help='Test names or patterns to run (default: all)')
p.add_argument('-j', '--parallel', type=int, default=1, metavar='N',
help='Run up to N tests in parallel (default: 1)')
p.add_argument('--valgrind', action='store_true',
help='Run rsync under valgrind (logs to per-process files)')
p.add_argument('--valgrind-opts', default='', metavar='OPTS',
help='Extra valgrind options (e.g. "--leak-check=full")')
p.add_argument('--preserve-scratch', action='store_true',
help='Keep scratch directories after tests complete')
p.add_argument('--log-level', type=int, default=1, metavar='N',
help='Verbosity level 1-10 (default: 1)')
p.add_argument('--always-log', action='store_true',
help='Show test logs even for passing tests')
p.add_argument('--stop-on-fail', action='store_true',
help='Stop after first test failure')
p.add_argument('--timeout', type=int, default=300, metavar='SECS',
help='Per-test timeout in seconds (default: 300)')
p.add_argument('--rsync-bin', default=None, metavar='PATH',
help='Path to rsync binary (default: ./rsync)')
p.add_argument('--tooldir', default=None, metavar='DIR',
help='Tool/build directory (default: cwd)')
p.add_argument('--srcdir', default=None, metavar='DIR',
help='Source directory (default: script directory)')
p.add_argument('--protocol', type=int, default=None, metavar='VER',
help='Force protocol version (adds --protocol=VER to rsync)')
p.add_argument('--expect-skipped', default=None, metavar='LIST',
help='Comma-separated list of expected-skipped tests')
return p.parse_args()
def find_setfacl_nodef(scratchbase):
"""Determine the setfacl command to remove default ACLs."""
for cmd in [
['setacl', '-k', 'u::7,g::5,o:5', scratchbase],
['setfacl', '-k', scratchbase],
['setfacl', '-s', 'u::7,g::5,o:5', scratchbase],
]:
try:
subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=5)
return cmd[:2] if cmd[0] == 'setacl' else cmd[:2]
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
continue
try:
r = subprocess.run(['setfacl', '--help'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
if '-k,' in r.stdout or '-k,' in r.stderr:
return ['setfacl', '-k']
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
return None
def get_tls_args(config_h):
"""Determine TLS_ARGS from config.h."""
args = ''
try:
with open(config_h) as f:
text = f.read()
if '#define HAVE_LUTIMES 1' in text:
args += ' -l'
if '#undef CHOWN_MODIFIES_SYMLINK' in text:
args += ' -L'
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
return args.strip()
def read_shconfig(path):
"""Read shell config variables from shconfig."""
env = {}
try:
with open(path) as f:
for line in f:
line = line.strip()
if line.startswith('#') or line.startswith('export') or not line:
continue
if '=' in line:
k, _, v = line.partition('=')
env[k.strip()] = v.strip().strip('"')
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
return env
def get_testuser():
"""Determine the current test user."""
for cmd in ['/usr/bin/whoami', '/usr/ucb/whoami', '/bin/whoami']:
if os.path.isfile(cmd):
try:
return subprocess.check_output([cmd], text=True).strip()
except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
pass
try:
return subprocess.check_output(['id', '-un'], text=True).strip()
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
return os.environ.get('LOGNAME', os.environ.get('USER', 'UNKNOWN'))
def prep_scratch(scratchdir, srcdir, tooldir, setfacl_nodef):
"""Prepare a scratch directory for a test."""
if os.path.isdir(scratchdir):
subprocess.run(['chmod', '-R', 'u+rwX', scratchdir], capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(['rm', '-rf', scratchdir], capture_output=True)
os.makedirs(scratchdir, exist_ok=True)
if setfacl_nodef:
subprocess.run(setfacl_nodef + [scratchdir], capture_output=True)
try:
os.chmod(scratchdir, os.stat(scratchdir).st_mode & ~0o2000) # clear setgid
except OSError:
pass
src_link = os.path.join(scratchdir, 'src')
if not os.path.exists(src_link):
if os.path.isabs(srcdir):
os.symlink(srcdir, src_link)
else:
os.symlink(os.path.join(tooldir, srcdir), src_link)
def collect_tests(suitedir, patterns):
"""Collect test scripts matching the given patterns."""
if not patterns:
tests = sorted(glob.glob(os.path.join(suitedir, '*.test')))
else:
tests = []
for pat in patterns:
if not pat.endswith('.test'):
pat = pat + '.test'
matches = sorted(glob.glob(os.path.join(suitedir, pat)))
tests.extend(matches)
return tests
def build_rsync_cmd(rsync_bin, args, scratchbase):
"""Build the RSYNC command string for tests."""
parts = []
if args.valgrind:
vlog = os.path.join(scratchbase, 'valgrind.%p.log')
vopts = f'--log-file={vlog}'
if args.valgrind_opts:
vopts += ' ' + args.valgrind_opts
parts.append(f'valgrind {vopts}')
parts.append(rsync_bin)
if args.protocol is not None:
parts.append(f'--protocol={args.protocol}')
return ' '.join(parts)
class TestResult:
"""Result of a single test execution."""
__slots__ = ('testbase', 'result', 'output', 'skipped_reason')
def __init__(self, testbase, result, output='', skipped_reason=''):
self.testbase = testbase
self.result = result
self.output = output
self.skipped_reason = skipped_reason
def run_one_test(testscript, testbase, scratchdir, base_env, timeout,
srcdir, tooldir, setfacl_nodef, always_log):
"""Run a single test. Returns a TestResult.
This function is safe to call from multiple threads — it uses only
per-test state (unique scratchdir, copy of env).
"""
prep_scratch(scratchdir, srcdir, tooldir, setfacl_nodef)
env = base_env.copy()
env['scratchdir'] = scratchdir
logfile = os.path.join(scratchdir, 'test.log')
try:
with open(logfile, 'w') as log:
proc = subprocess.run(
['sh', '-e', testscript],
stdout=log, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
env=env, timeout=timeout,
cwd=env.get('TOOLDIR', '.')
)
result = proc.returncode
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
result = 1
with open(logfile, 'a') as log:
log.write(f"\nTIMEOUT: test took over {timeout} seconds\n")
# Build output text
output_parts = []
show_log = always_log or (result not in (0, 77, 78))
if show_log:
output_parts.append(f'----- {testbase} log follows')
try:
with open(logfile) as f:
output_parts.append(f.read().rstrip())
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
output_parts.append(f'----- {testbase} log ends')
rsyncd_log = os.path.join(scratchdir, 'rsyncd.log')
if os.path.isfile(rsyncd_log):
output_parts.append(f'----- {testbase} rsyncd.log follows')
with open(rsyncd_log) as f:
output_parts.append(f.read().rstrip())
output_parts.append(f'----- {testbase} rsyncd.log ends')
skipped_reason = ''
if result == 0:
output_parts.append(f'PASS {testbase}')
elif result == 77:
whyfile = os.path.join(scratchdir, 'whyskipped')
try:
with open(whyfile) as f:
skipped_reason = f.read().strip()
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
output_parts.append(f'SKIP {testbase} ({skipped_reason})')
elif result == 78:
output_parts.append(f'XFAIL {testbase}')
else:
output_parts.append(f'FAIL {testbase}')
return TestResult(testbase, result, '\n'.join(output_parts), skipped_reason)
# Lock for serializing output in parallel mode
_print_lock = threading.Lock()
def main():
args = parse_args()
# Also accept legacy environment variables
if args.preserve_scratch or os.environ.get('preserve_scratch') == 'yes':
args.preserve_scratch = True
if args.log_level == 1:
args.log_level = int(os.environ.get('loglevel', '1'))
if args.expect_skipped is None:
args.expect_skipped = os.environ.get('RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED', 'IGNORE')
if os.environ.get('whichtests'):
args.tests = [os.environ['whichtests']]
# Determine directories
tooldir = args.tooldir or os.environ.get('TOOLDIR') or os.getcwd()
script_path = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
srcdir = args.srcdir or script_path
if not srcdir or srcdir == '.':
srcdir = tooldir
rsync_bin = args.rsync_bin or os.environ.get('rsync_bin') or os.path.join(tooldir, 'rsync')
suitedir = os.path.join(srcdir, 'testsuite')
scratchbase = os.path.join(os.environ.get('scratchbase', tooldir), 'testtmp')
os.makedirs(scratchbase, exist_ok=True)
shconfig = read_shconfig(os.path.join(tooldir, 'shconfig'))
tls_args = get_tls_args(os.path.join(tooldir, 'config.h'))
setfacl_nodef = find_setfacl_nodef(scratchbase)
rsync_cmd = build_rsync_cmd(rsync_bin, args, scratchbase)
if not os.path.isfile(rsync_bin):
sys.stderr.write(f"rsync_bin {rsync_bin} is not a file\n")
sys.exit(2)
if not os.path.isdir(srcdir):
sys.stderr.write(f"srcdir {srcdir} is not a directory\n")
sys.exit(2)
# Helper programs the test scripts invoke directly. Missing any of these
# would cause many tests to fail with confusing "not found" errors, so
# check up front and point the user at the make target that builds them.
required_helpers = ['tls', 'trimslash', 't_unsafe', 't_chmod_secure',
't_secure_relpath',
'wildtest', 'getgroups', 'getfsdev']
missing = [h for h in required_helpers
if not os.path.isfile(os.path.join(tooldir, h))]
if missing:
sys.stderr.write(
f"runtests.py: missing test helper program(s) in {tooldir}: "
f"{', '.join(missing)}\n"
f"Build them with: make {' '.join(missing)}\n"
f"or run the full test target: make check\n"
)
sys.exit(2)
testuser = get_testuser()
# Print header
print('=' * 60)
print(f'{sys.argv[0]} running in {tooldir}')
print(f' rsync_bin={rsync_cmd}')
print(f' srcdir={srcdir}')
print(f' TLS_ARGS={tls_args}')
print(f' testuser={testuser}')
print(f' os={subprocess.check_output(["uname", "-a"], text=True).strip()}')
print(f' preserve_scratch={"yes" if args.preserve_scratch else "no"}')
if args.valgrind:
print(f' valgrind=enabled (logs in valgrind.*.log)')
if args.parallel > 1:
print(f' parallel={args.parallel}')
print(f' scratchbase={scratchbase}')
# Build base environment for test scripts
path = os.environ.get('PATH', '')
if os.path.isdir('/usr/xpg4/bin'):
path = '/usr/xpg4/bin:' + path
base_env = os.environ.copy()
base_env.update({
'PATH': path,
'POSIXLY_CORRECT': '1',
'TOOLDIR': tooldir,
'srcdir': srcdir,
'RSYNC': rsync_cmd,
'TLS_ARGS': tls_args,
'RUNSHFLAGS': '-e',
'scratchbase': scratchbase,
'suitedir': suitedir,
'TESTRUN_TIMEOUT': str(args.timeout),
'HOME': scratchbase,
})
for k, v in shconfig.items():
if v:
base_env[k] = v
if setfacl_nodef:
base_env['setfacl_nodef'] = ' '.join(setfacl_nodef)
else:
base_env['setfacl_nodef'] = 'true'
if args.log_level > 8:
base_env['RUNSHFLAGS'] = '-e -x'
# Collect tests
tests = collect_tests(suitedir, args.tests)
full_run = len(args.tests) == 0
# Record test order for consistent skipped-list output
test_order = {os.path.basename(t).replace('.test', ''): i for i, t in enumerate(tests)}
passed = 0
failed = 0
skipped = 0
skipped_list = []
def process_result(tr):
"""Process a TestResult and update counters. Returns True if test failed."""
nonlocal passed, failed, skipped
with _print_lock:
if tr.output:
print(tr.output)
scratchdir = os.path.join(scratchbase, tr.testbase)
if tr.result == 0:
passed += 1
if not args.preserve_scratch and os.path.isdir(scratchdir):
subprocess.run(['rm', '-rf', scratchdir], capture_output=True)
return False
elif tr.result == 77:
skipped_list.append(tr.testbase)
skipped += 1
if not args.preserve_scratch and os.path.isdir(scratchdir):
subprocess.run(['rm', '-rf', scratchdir], capture_output=True)
return False
elif tr.result == 78:
failed += 1
return True
else:
failed += 1
return True
if args.parallel > 1:
# Parallel execution
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=args.parallel) as executor:
futures = {}
for testscript in tests:
testbase = os.path.basename(testscript).replace('.test', '')
scratchdir = os.path.join(scratchbase, testbase)
timeout = 600 if 'hardlinks' in testbase else args.timeout
f = executor.submit(
run_one_test, testscript, testbase, scratchdir,
base_env, timeout, srcdir, tooldir, setfacl_nodef,
args.always_log
)
futures[f] = testbase
for f in concurrent.futures.as_completed(futures):
tr = f.result()
is_fail = process_result(tr)
if is_fail and args.stop_on_fail:
# Cancel pending futures
for pending in futures:
pending.cancel()
break
else:
# Sequential execution
for testscript in tests:
testbase = os.path.basename(testscript).replace('.test', '')
scratchdir = os.path.join(scratchbase, testbase)
timeout = 600 if 'hardlinks' in testbase else args.timeout
tr = run_one_test(
testscript, testbase, scratchdir,
base_env, timeout, srcdir, tooldir, setfacl_nodef,
args.always_log
)
is_fail = process_result(tr)
if is_fail and args.stop_on_fail:
break
# Check valgrind logs for errors
vg_errors = 0
if args.valgrind:
for vlog in sorted(glob.glob(os.path.join(scratchbase, 'valgrind.*.log'))):
try:
with open(vlog) as f:
content = f.read()
for line in content.splitlines():
if 'ERROR SUMMARY:' in line and 'ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors' not in line:
vg_errors += 1
print(f'----- valgrind errors in {os.path.basename(vlog)}:')
print(content)
break
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
# Summary
print('-' * 60)
print('----- overall results:')
print(f' {passed} passed')
if failed > 0:
print(f' {failed} failed')
if skipped > 0:
print(f' {skipped} skipped')
if vg_errors > 0:
print(f' {vg_errors} valgrind error(s) found (see logs in {scratchbase})')
skipped_str = ','.join(sorted(skipped_list, key=lambda x: test_order.get(x, 0)))
if full_run and args.expect_skipped != 'IGNORE':
print('----- skipped results:')
print(f' expected: {args.expect_skipped}')
print(f' got: {skipped_str}')
else:
skipped_str = ''
args.expect_skipped = ''
print('-' * 60)
exit_code = failed + vg_errors
if exit_code == 0 and skipped_str != args.expect_skipped:
exit_code = 1
print(f'overall result is {exit_code}')
sys.exit(exit_code)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()

View File

@@ -1,360 +0,0 @@
#! /bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 by Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
# Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version
# 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# Lesser General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# rsync top-level test script -- this invokes all the other more
# detailed tests in order. This script can either be called by `make
# check' or `make installcheck'. `check' runs against the copies of
# the program and other files in the build directory, and
# `installcheck' against the installed copy of the program.
# It can also be called on a single test file using a run like this:
#
# preserve_scratch=yes whichtests=itemize.test ./runtests.sh
# In either case we need to also be able to find the source directory,
# since we read test scripts and possibly other information from
# there.
# Whenever possible, informational messages are written to stdout and
# error messages to stderr. They're separated out by the build farm
# display scripts.
# According to the GNU autoconf manual, the only valid place to set up
# directory locations is through Make, since users are allowed to (try
# to) change their mind on the Make command line. So, Make has to
# pass in all the values we need.
# For other configured settings we read ./config.sh, which tells us
# about shell commands on this machine and similar things.
# rsync_bin gives the location of the rsync binary. This is either
# builddir/rsync if we're testing an uninstalled copy, or
# install_prefix/bin/rsync if we're testing an installed copy. On the
# build farm rsync will be installed, but into a scratch /usr.
# srcdir gives the location of the source tree, which lets us find the
# build scripts. At the moment we assume we are invoked from the
# source directory.
# This script must be invoked from the build directory.
# A scratch directory, 'testtmp', is used in the build directory to
# hold per-test subdirectories.
# This script also uses the $loglevel environment variable. 1 is the
# default value, and 10 the most verbose. You can set this from the
# Make command line. It's also set by the build farm to give more
# detail for failing builds.
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NOTES FOR TEST CASES:
# Each test case runs in its own shell.
# Exit codes from tests:
# 1 tests failed
# 2 error in starting tests
# 77 this test skipped (random value unlikely to happen by chance, same as
# automake)
# HOWEVER, the overall exit code to the farm is different: we return
# the *number of tests that failed*, so that it will show up nicely in
# the overall summary.
# rsync.fns contains some general setup functions and definitions.
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NOTES ON PORTABILITY:
# Both this script and the Makefile have to be pretty conservative
# about which Unix features they use.
# We cannot count on Make exporting variables to commands, unless
# they're explicitly given on the command line.
# Also, we can't count on 'cp -a' or 'mkdir -p', although they're
# pretty handy (see function makepath for the latter).
# I think some of the GNU documentation suggests that we shouldn't
# rely on shell functions. However, the Bash manual seems to say that
# they're in POSIX 1003.2, and since the build farm relies on them
# they're probably working on most machines we really care about.
# You cannot use "function foo {" syntax, but must instead say "foo()
# {", or it breaks on FreeBSD.
# BSD machines tend not to have "head" or "seq".
# You cannot do "export VAR=VALUE" all on one line; the export must be
# separate from the assignment. (SCO SysV)
# Don't rely on grep -q, as that doesn't work everywhere -- just redirect
# stdout to /dev/null to keep it quiet.
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# STILL TO DO:
# We need a good protection against tests that hang indefinitely.
# Perhaps some combination of starting them in the background, wait,
# and kill?
# Perhaps we need a common way to cleanup tests. At the moment just
# clobbering the directory when we're done should be enough.
# If any of the targets fail, then (GNU?) Make returns 2, instead of
# the return code from the failing command. This is fine, but it
# means that the build farm just shows "2" for failed tests, not the
# number of tests that actually failed. For more details we might
# need to grovel through the log files to find a line saying how many
# failed.
set -e
. "./shconfig"
RUNSHFLAGS='-e'
export RUNSHFLAGS
# for Solaris
if [ -d /usr/xpg4/bin ]; then
PATH="/usr/xpg4/bin/:$PATH"
export PATH
fi
if [ "x$loglevel" != x ] && [ "$loglevel" -gt 8 ]; then
if set -x; then
# If it doesn't work the first time, don't keep trying.
RUNSHFLAGS="$RUNSHFLAGS -x"
fi
fi
POSIXLY_CORRECT=1
if test x"$TOOLDIR" = x; then
TOOLDIR=`pwd`
fi
srcdir=`dirname $0`
if test x"$srcdir" = x || test x"$srcdir" = x.; then
srcdir="$TOOLDIR"
fi
if test x"$rsync_bin" = x; then
rsync_bin="$TOOLDIR/rsync"
fi
# This allows the user to specify extra rsync options -- use carefully!
RSYNC="$rsync_bin $*"
#RSYNC="valgrind $rsync_bin $*"
TLS_ARGS=''
if grep -E '^#define HAVE_LUTIMES 1' config.h >/dev/null; then
TLS_ARGS="$TLS_ARGS -l"
fi
if grep -E '#undef CHOWN_MODIFIES_SYMLINK' config.h >/dev/null; then
TLS_ARGS="$TLS_ARGS -L"
fi
export POSIXLY_CORRECT TOOLDIR srcdir RSYNC TLS_ARGS
echo "============================================================"
echo "$0 running in $TOOLDIR"
echo " rsync_bin=$RSYNC"
echo " srcdir=$srcdir"
echo " TLS_ARGS=$TLS_ARGS"
if [ -f /usr/bin/whoami ]; then
testuser=`/usr/bin/whoami`
elif [ -f /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
testuser=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
elif [ -f /bin/whoami ]; then
testuser=`/bin/whoami`
else
testuser=`id -un 2>/dev/null || echo ${LOGNAME:-${USERNAME:-${USER:-'UNKNOWN'}}}`
fi
echo " testuser=$testuser"
echo " os=`uname -a`"
# It must be "yes", not just nonnull
if [ "x$preserve_scratch" = xyes ]; then
echo " preserve_scratch=yes"
else
echo " preserve_scratch=no"
fi
# Check if setacl/setfacl is around and if it supports the -k or -s option.
if setacl -k u::7,g::5,o:5 testsuite 2>/dev/null; then
setfacl_nodef='setacl -k'
elif setfacl --help 2>&1 | grep ' -k,\|\[-[a-z]*k' >/dev/null; then
setfacl_nodef='setfacl -k'
elif setfacl -s u::7,g::5,o:5 testsuite 2>/dev/null; then
setfacl_nodef='setfacl -s u::7,g::5,o:5'
else
# The "true" command runs successfully, but does nothing.
setfacl_nodef=true
fi
export setfacl_nodef
if [ ! -f "$rsync_bin" ]; then
echo "rsync_bin $rsync_bin is not a file" >&2
exit 2
fi
if [ ! -d "$srcdir" ]; then
echo "srcdir $srcdir is not a directory" >&2
exit 2
fi
expect_skipped="${RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED-IGNORE}"
skipped_list=''
skipped=0
missing=0
passed=0
failed=0
# Directory that holds the other test subdirs. We create separate dirs
# inside for each test case, so that they can be left behind in case of
# failure to aid investigation. We don't remove the testtmp subdir at
# the end so that it can be configured as a symlink to a filesystem that
# has ACLs and xattr support enabled (if desired).
scratchbase="${scratchbase:-$TOOLDIR}"/testtmp
echo " scratchbase=$scratchbase"
[ -d "$scratchbase" ] || mkdir "$scratchbase"
suitedir="$srcdir/testsuite"
TESTRUN_TIMEOUT=300
export scratchdir suitedir TESTRUN_TIMEOUT
prep_scratch() {
[ -d "$scratchdir" ] && chmod -R u+rwX "$scratchdir" && rm -rf "$scratchdir"
mkdir "$scratchdir"
# Get rid of default ACLs and dir-setgid to avoid confusing some tests.
$setfacl_nodef "$scratchdir" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod g-s "$scratchdir"
case "$srcdir" in
/*) ln -s "$srcdir" "$scratchdir/src" ;;
*) ln -s "$TOOLDIR/$srcdir" "$scratchdir/src" ;;
esac
return 0
}
maybe_discard_scratch() {
[ x"$preserve_scratch" != xyes ] && [ -d "$scratchdir" ] && rm -rf "$scratchdir"
return 0
}
if [ "x$whichtests" = x ]; then
whichtests="*.test"
full_run=yes
else
full_run=no
fi
for testscript in $suitedir/$whichtests; do
testbase=`echo $testscript | sed -e 's!.*/!!' -e 's/.test\$//'`
scratchdir="$scratchbase/$testbase"
prep_scratch
case "$testscript" in
*hardlinks*) TESTRUN_TIMEOUT=600 ;;
*) TESTRUN_TIMEOUT=300 ;;
esac
set +e
"$TOOLDIR/"testrun $RUNSHFLAGS "$testscript" >"$scratchdir/test.log" 2>&1
result=$?
set -e
if [ "x$always_log" = xyes ] || ( [ $result != 0 ] && [ $result != 77 ] && [ $result != 78 ] )
then
echo "----- $testbase log follows"
cat "$scratchdir/test.log"
echo "----- $testbase log ends"
if [ -f "$scratchdir/rsyncd.log" ]; then
echo "----- $testbase rsyncd.log follows"
cat "$scratchdir/rsyncd.log"
echo "----- $testbase rsyncd.log ends"
fi
fi
case $result in
0)
echo "PASS $testbase"
passed=`expr $passed + 1`
maybe_discard_scratch
;;
77)
# backticks will fill the whole file onto one line, which is a feature
whyskipped=`cat "$scratchdir/whyskipped"`
echo "SKIP $testbase ($whyskipped)"
skipped_list="$skipped_list,$testbase"
skipped=`expr $skipped + 1`
maybe_discard_scratch
;;
78)
# It failed, but we expected that. don't dump out error logs,
# because most users won't want to see them. But do leave
# the working directory around.
echo "XFAIL $testbase"
failed=`expr $failed + 1`
;;
*)
echo "FAIL $testbase"
failed=`expr $failed + 1`
if [ "x$nopersist" = xyes ]; then
exit 1
fi
esac
done
echo '------------------------------------------------------------'
echo "----- overall results:"
echo " $passed passed"
[ "$failed" -gt 0 ] && echo " $failed failed"
[ "$skipped" -gt 0 ] && echo " $skipped skipped"
[ "$missing" -gt 0 ] && echo " $missing missing"
if [ "$full_run" = yes ] && [ "$expect_skipped" != IGNORE ]; then
skipped_list=`echo "$skipped_list" | sed 's/^,//'`
echo "----- skipped results:"
echo " expected: $expect_skipped"
echo " got: $skipped_list"
else
skipped_list=''
expect_skipped=''
fi
echo '------------------------------------------------------------'
# OK, so expr exits with 0 if the result is neither null nor zero; and
# 1 if the expression is null or zero. This is the opposite of what
# we want, and if we just call expr then this script will always fail,
# because -e is set.
result=`expr $failed + $missing || true`
if [ "$result" = 0 ] && [ "$skipped_list" != "$expect_skipped" ]; then
result=1
fi
echo "overall result is $result"
exit $result

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ extern int make_backups;
extern int inplace;
extern int inplace_partial;
extern int batch_fd;
extern int use_secure_symlinks;
extern char *module_dir;
extern int write_batch;
extern int file_old_total;
extern BOOL want_progress_now;
@@ -138,6 +140,8 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
return;
flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "successful_send");
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
if (!change_pathname(file, NULL, 0))
return;
@@ -262,6 +266,8 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
else
file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
if (F_PATHNAME(file)) {
@@ -350,7 +356,25 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
if (use_secure_symlinks) {
/* Open from module root to prevent TOCTOU race where
* change_pathname's chdir follows a directory symlink.
* Reconstruct the full path relative to module_dir
* from F_PATHNAME (path) and f_name (fname). */
char secure_path[MAXPATHLEN];
int slen = snprintf(secure_path, sizeof secure_path, "%s%s%s", path, slash, fname);
if (slen >= (int)sizeof secure_path) {
io_error |= IOERR_GENERAL;
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "path too long: %s%s%s\n", path, slash, fname);
free_sums(s);
if (protocol_version >= 30)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
fd = secure_relative_open(module_dir, secure_path, O_RDONLY, 0);
} else {
fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
}
if (fd == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING;

View File

@@ -347,8 +347,7 @@ __attribute__ ((target("avx2"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_avx2_64(schar* buf
__m128i tmp = _mm_load_si128((__m128i*) mul_t1_buf);
__m256i mul_t1 = _mm256_cvtepu8_epi16(tmp);
__m256i mul_const = _mm256_broadcastd_epi32(_mm_cvtsi32_si128(4 | (3 << 8) | (2 << 16) | (1 << 24)));
__m256i mul_one;
mul_one = _mm256_abs_epi8(_mm256_cmpeq_epi16(mul_one,mul_one)); // set all vector elements to 1
__m256i mul_one = _mm256_set1_epi8(1);
for (; i < (len-64); i+=64) {
// Load ... 4*[int8*16]
@@ -548,6 +547,118 @@ int main() {
#pragma clang optimize on
#endif /* BENCHMARK_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 */
#ifdef TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1
static uint32 checksum_via_default(char *buf, int32 len)
{
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
static uint32 checksum_via_sse2(char *buf, int32 len)
{
int32 i;
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
i = get_checksum1_sse2_32((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
static uint32 checksum_via_ssse3(char *buf, int32 len)
{
int32 i;
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
i = get_checksum1_ssse3_32((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
static uint32 checksum_via_avx2(char *buf, int32 len)
{
int32 i;
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM
i = get_checksum1_avx2_asm((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
#else
i = get_checksum1_avx2_64((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
#endif
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
int main()
{
static const int sizes[] = {1, 4, 31, 32, 33, 63, 64, 65, 128, 129, 256, 700, 1024, 4096, 65536};
int num_sizes = sizeof(sizes) / sizeof(sizes[0]);
int max_size = sizes[num_sizes - 1];
int failures = 0;
/* Allocate with extra bytes for unaligned test */
unsigned char *raw = (unsigned char *)malloc(max_size + 64 + 1);
if (!raw) {
fprintf(stderr, "malloc failed\n");
return 1;
}
/* Fill with deterministic data */
for (int i = 0; i < max_size + 64 + 1; i++)
raw[i] = (i + (i % 3) + (i % 11)) % 256;
/* Test with aligned buffer (64-byte aligned) */
unsigned char *aligned = raw + (64 - ((uintptr_t)raw % 64));
/* Test with unaligned buffer (+1 byte offset) */
unsigned char *unaligned = aligned + 1;
struct { const char *name; unsigned char *buf; } buffers[] = {
{"aligned", aligned},
{"unaligned", unaligned},
};
for (int b = 0; b < 2; b++) {
char *buf = (char *)buffers[b].buf;
const char *bname = buffers[b].name;
for (int s = 0; s < num_sizes; s++) {
int32 len = sizes[s];
uint32 ref = checksum_via_default(buf, len);
uint32 cs_sse2 = checksum_via_sse2(buf, len);
uint32 cs_ssse3 = checksum_via_ssse3(buf, len);
uint32 cs_avx2 = checksum_via_avx2(buf, len);
uint32 cs_auto = get_checksum1(buf, len);
if (cs_sse2 != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: SSE2=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_sse2, ref);
failures++;
}
if (cs_ssse3 != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: SSSE3=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_ssse3, ref);
failures++;
}
if (cs_avx2 != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: AVX2=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_avx2, ref);
failures++;
}
if (cs_auto != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: auto=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_auto, ref);
failures++;
}
}
}
free(raw);
if (failures) {
printf("%d checksum mismatches!\n", failures);
return 1;
}
printf("All SIMD checksum tests passed.\n");
return 0;
}
#endif /* TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 */
#endif /* } USE_ROLL_SIMD */
#endif /* } __cplusplus */
#endif /* } __x86_64__ */

View File

@@ -47,21 +47,23 @@ static struct sigaction sigact;
static int sock_exec(const char *prog);
#define PROXY_BUF_SIZE 1024
/* Establish a proxy connection on an open socket to a web proxy by using the
* CONNECT method. If proxy_user and proxy_pass are not NULL, they are used to
* authenticate to the proxy using the "Basic" proxy-authorization protocol. */
static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_user, char *proxy_pass)
{
char *cp, buffer[1024];
char *authhdr, authbuf[1024];
char *cp, buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
char *authhdr, authbuf[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
int len;
if (proxy_user && proxy_pass) {
stringjoin(buffer, sizeof buffer,
stringjoin(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE,
proxy_user, ":", proxy_pass, NULL);
len = strlen(buffer);
if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= (int)sizeof authbuf - 3) {
if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 3) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"authentication information is too long\n");
return -1;
@@ -74,14 +76,14 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
authhdr = "";
}
len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
assert(len > 0 && len < (int)sizeof buffer);
len = snprintf(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
assert(len > 0 && len < PROXY_BUF_SIZE);
if (write(fd, buffer, len) != len) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to write to proxy");
return -1;
}
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]; cp++) {
if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to read from proxy");
return -1;
@@ -90,11 +92,13 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
break;
}
if (*cp != '\n')
cp++;
*cp-- = '\0';
if (*cp == '\r')
*cp = '\0';
if (cp == &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]) {
rprintf(FERROR, "proxy response line too long\n");
return -1;
}
*cp = '\0';
if (cp > buffer && cp[-1] == '\r')
cp[-1] = '\0';
if (strncmp(buffer, "HTTP/", 5) != 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "bad response from proxy -- %s\n",
buffer);
@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
}
/* throw away the rest of the HTTP header */
while (1) {
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE]; cp++) {
if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno,
"failed to read from proxy");

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os, re, argparse, subprocess
from datetime import datetime
from datetime import datetime, UTC
NULL_COMMIT_RE = re.compile(r'\0\0commit [a-f0-9]{40}$|\0$')
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def print_line(fn, mtime, commit_time):
if args.list > 1:
ts = str(commit_time).rjust(10)
else:
ts = datetime.utcfromtimestamp(commit_time).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
ts = datetime.fromtimestamp(commit_time, UTC).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
chg = '.' if mtime == commit_time else '*'
print(chg, ts, fn)

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ long_opts = {
'compare-dest': 2,
'compress-choice': 1,
'compress-level': 1,
'compress-threads': 1,
'copy-dest': 2,
'copy-devices': -1,
'copy-unsafe-links': 0,
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ long_opts = {
'delete-during': 0,
'delete-excluded': 0,
'delete-missing-args': 0,
'dirs': 0,
'existing': 0,
'fake-super': 0,
'files-from': 3,
@@ -300,6 +302,7 @@ def validated_arg(opt, arg, typ=3, wild=False):
if arg.startswith('./'):
arg = arg[1:]
arg = arg.replace('//', '/')
arg = arg.lstrip('/')
if args.dir != '/':
if HAS_DOT_DOT_RE.search(arg):
die("do not use .. in", opt, "(anchor the path at the root of your restricted dir)")

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
REAL_RSYNC=/usr/bin/rsync
IGNOREEXIT=24
IGNOREOUT='^(file has vanished: |rsync warning: some files vanished before they could be transferred)'
IGNOREOUT='^((file|directory) has vanished: |rsync warning: some files vanished before they could be transferred)'
# If someone installs this as "rsync", make sure we don't affect a server run.
for arg in "${@}"; do

1275
syscall.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

117
t_chmod_secure.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
/*
* Test harness for do_chmod_at(). Confirms the symlink-TOCTOU
* primitive used by CVE-2026-29518 (and its incomplete-fix follow-up
* for chmod) is closed by do_chmod_at(): a parent directory component
* being a symlink that escapes the receiver's confinement must be
* rejected, while a parent symlink that resolves *within* the tree
* must still work (so legitimate dir-symlinks are not regressed).
*
* Not linked into rsync itself.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include "rsync.h"
#include <sys/stat.h>
int dry_run = 0;
int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 0;
int read_only = 0;
int list_only = 0;
int copy_links = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
static int errs = 0;
static void check(const char *label, int actual_rc, int expect_ok,
const char *path, mode_t expected_mode)
{
struct stat st;
int got_ok = (actual_rc == 0);
if (got_ok != expect_ok) {
fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: rc=%d errno=%d (%s), expected %s\n",
label, actual_rc, errno, strerror(errno),
expect_ok ? "success" : "rejection");
errs++;
return;
}
if (path && stat(path, &st) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: stat(%s) failed: %s\n",
label, path, strerror(errno));
errs++;
return;
}
if (path && (st.st_mode & 07777) != expected_mode) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [%s]: %s mode is 0%o, expected 0%o\n",
label, path, st.st_mode & 07777, expected_mode);
errs++;
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "OK [%s]\n", label);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <module-dir>\n", argv[0]);
return 2;
}
if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
perror("chdir");
return 2;
}
/* Simulate the daemon-without-chroot deployment that do_chmod_at()
* defends. With am_daemon=0 or am_chrooted=1 the wrapper falls
* through to plain do_chmod() and the symlink-race test would be
* meaningless. */
am_daemon = 1;
am_chrooted = 0;
/* Test layout (all inside the directory we just chdir'd to):
*
* ./realdir/sentinel -- regular target file
* ./inside_link -> realdir -- legitimate dir-symlink within the tree
* ./escape_link -> ../trap -- attacker swap, target outside tree
* ../trap/sentinel -- the file the attacker wants to alter
*
* The shell wrapper that calls this helper has set both sentinel
* files to mode 0600 so we have a clean baseline to compare.
*/
/* Scenario A: legitimate parent dir-symlink, chmod must succeed. */
int rc = do_chmod_at("inside_link/sentinel", 0640);
check("A: legit dir-symlink within tree",
rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0640);
/* Scenario B: parent symlink escapes the tree -- chmod must be
* rejected and the outside file's mode must be unchanged. */
rc = do_chmod_at("escape_link/sentinel", 0666);
check("B: parent symlink escapes tree (the attack)",
rc, 0, "../trap/sentinel", 0600);
/* Scenario C: plain relative path with no symlink components,
* regression check that the safe wrapper doesn't break the
* normal case. */
rc = do_chmod_at("realdir/sentinel", 0644);
check("C: plain relative path (regression check)",
rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0644);
/* Scenario D: top-level file, no parent directory component.
* Falls back to do_chmod(); should succeed. */
rc = do_chmod_at("topfile", 0640);
check("D: top-level file, no parent component",
rc, 1, "topfile", 0640);
if (errs)
fprintf(stderr, "%d failure(s)\n", errs);
return errs ? 1 : 0;
}

151
t_secure_relpath.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
/*
* Test harness for secure_relative_open()'s front-door input
* validation. Codex audit Finding 5 noted that the existing check
*
* if (strncmp(relpath, "../", 3) == 0 || strstr(relpath, "/../"))
*
* catches "../foo" and "foo/../bar" but misses bare ".." (an actual
* one-level escape on platforms that fall back to the per-component
* walk), as well as "a/..", "foo/..", and any other form that
* decomposes to a ".." component when split on "/". The kernel-
* enforced RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) and O_RESOLVE_BENEATH
* (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) reject these in-kernel; the per-
* component fallback used on NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, Cygwin and
* pre-5.6 Linux does not, so the validation must happen at the
* front door.
*
* This helper invokes secure_relative_open() with each suspect
* input and checks both the failure (rc < 0) and the errno
* (EINVAL means "rejected at the front door"). Pre-fix, the kernel
* may reject with a different errno (EXDEV from RESOLVE_BENEATH);
* post-fix, the front-door check catches every variant up front
* with a consistent EINVAL across platforms.
*
* Not linked into rsync itself.
*/
#include "rsync.h"
#include <sys/stat.h>
int dry_run = 0;
int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 0;
int read_only = 0;
int list_only = 0;
int copy_links = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
static int errs = 0;
static void check_relpath(const char *relpath)
{
int fd;
int saved_errno;
errno = 0;
fd = secure_relative_open(NULL, relpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
if (fd >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [relpath=%-12s]: returned valid fd %d (escape) -- expected -1 EINVAL\n",
relpath, fd);
close(fd);
errs++;
return;
}
if (saved_errno != EINVAL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [relpath=%-12s]: rejected but errno=%d (%s), expected EINVAL\n",
relpath, saved_errno, strerror(saved_errno));
errs++;
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "OK [relpath=%-12s]: rejected with EINVAL\n", relpath);
}
static void check_basedir(const char *basedir)
{
int fd;
int saved_errno;
errno = 0;
fd = secure_relative_open(basedir, "ok", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
if (fd >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [basedir=%-12s]: returned valid fd %d -- expected -1 EINVAL\n",
basedir, fd);
close(fd);
errs++;
return;
}
if (saved_errno != EINVAL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [basedir=%-12s]: rejected but errno=%d (%s), expected EINVAL\n",
basedir, saved_errno, strerror(saved_errno));
errs++;
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "OK [basedir=%-12s]: rejected with EINVAL\n", basedir);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <test-dir>\n", argv[0]);
return 2;
}
if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
perror("chdir");
return 2;
}
/* secure_relative_open's daemon-only confinement protections only
* fire when am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the threat model is the
* daemon-no-chroot deployment), but the front-door input
* validation runs unconditionally. We set am_daemon anyway so the
* helper exercises the same code shape the receiver does. */
am_daemon = 1;
am_chrooted = 0;
mkdir("subdir", 0755);
/* Each of these relpaths must be rejected with EINVAL at the
* secure_relative_open() front door. ".." is the actual one-level
* escape; the others ("subdir/..", "subdir/../subdir") resolve
* back to the start dir on systems that allow them, but we still
* reject them as defence-in-depth: a path containing a ".." token
* is suspicious and the caller should normalise before passing
* it in. The "../foo" / "foo/../bar" / "/foo" / "/" cases are
* regression checks for the existing checks. */
check_relpath("..");
check_relpath("../foo");
check_relpath("subdir/..");
check_relpath("subdir/../subdir");
check_relpath("foo/../bar");
check_relpath("/foo");
check_relpath("/");
/* Same checks against basedir (which the codex Finding 2 fix
* routes through the same RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent). Absolute
* basedirs are operator-trusted and intentionally not validated
* here. */
check_basedir("..");
check_basedir("../subdir");
check_basedir("subdir/..");
check_basedir("foo/../bar");
if (errs)
fprintf(stderr, "\n%d failure(s)\n", errs);
return errs ? 1 : 0;
}

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
int do_fsync = 0;
int inplace = 0;
int am_daemon = 0;
int am_chrooted = 0;
int modify_window = 0;
int preallocate_files = 0;
int protect_args = 0;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the basedir-confinement gap in
# secure_relative_open(). The function opens basedir with a plain
# openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY), without
# RESOLVE_BENEATH or a per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk, so a parent
# symlink ON basedir is followed unrestrictedly. RESOLVE_BENEATH is
# then applied only to relpath, anchored at the wrong directory.
#
# The receiver's basis-file lookup at receiver.c passes
# basis_dir[fnamecmp_type] (from --copy-dest / --link-dest /
# --compare-dest -- all sender-controllable in daemon mode) as
# basedir. A daemon-module attacker with write access can plant a
# symlink at module/cd -> /outside, then run --link-dest=cd to
# make the daemon's basis-file lookup resolve into /outside,
# leaking the contents of daemon-readable files via the rsync
# delta-rolling read-disclosure primitive.
#
# We detect the escape by leveraging --link-dest: when basis
# matches source exactly (content + mtime + mode), --link-dest
# hard-links the destination to the basis file. With the bug, the
# destination ends up as a hard link to the outside-the-module
# file (same inode). With the fix, no basis is found and the
# destination is a fresh copy (different inode).
#
# The vulnerable code path is the same on every platform
# (including the per-component fallback on systems without
# RESOLVE_BENEATH), so this test is not platform-gated.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
# Portable inode-number helper (GNU coreutils stat -c, BSD stat -f).
file_inode() {
stat -c %i "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %i "$1"
}
# Outside-the-module file an attacker would like the daemon to
# treat as a basis.
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
# The symlink trap planted in the module by the local attacker.
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
# Source file matches outside/target.txt exactly (content + mtime
# + mode) so --link-dest will hard-link the destination to the
# basis file iff the daemon's basedir lookup reaches outside/.
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$src/target.txt"
touch -r "$outside/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by
# default, which can't write into the test scratch dir. Force the
# daemon to keep our uid/gid in that case so the basis-link
# transfer can actually create the destination file. (Non-root
# can't specify uid/gid in rsyncd.conf -- comment them out then.)
my_uid=`get_testuid`
root_uid=`get_rootuid`
root_gid=`get_rootgid`
uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
fi
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
# Recursive --link-dest push directly into the module root. We
# avoid pushing into a destination subdir because the receiver
# would chdir into it before resolving --link-dest, making the
# relative basedir "cd" resolve in the wrong CWD and masking the
# bug. The realistic attack pushes into the module root (or the
# attacker uses a basedir path that resolves correctly from
# whichever subdir the receiver chdirs into).
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rtp --link-dest=cd "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/ \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ ! -f "$mod/target.txt" ]; then
test_fail "destination file was not created -- daemon transfer failed before the test could observe the basedir behaviour"
fi
outside_inode=$(file_inode "$outside/target.txt")
dst_inode=$(file_inode "$mod/target.txt")
if [ "$outside_inode" = "$dst_inode" ]; then
test_fail "basedir-escape: --link-dest hard-linked module/target.txt to outside/target.txt (inode $outside_inode); daemon's basis-file lookup followed the parent symlink on the basedir"
fi
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for codex audit Findings 3b and 3c:
#
# 3b: generator.c:1905 -- the in-place backup creation opens
# backupptr via bare do_open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_EXCL).
# With --backup-dir set to an attacker-planted parent symlink,
# the backup file is written outside the module under the
# daemon's authority.
#
# 3c-symlink: syscall.c:207 -- do_symlink_at falls through to bare
# do_symlink for am_root < 0 (fake-super), which then opens
# the destination path with bare open() (final-component
# fake-super file). A parent symlink on the destination path
# redirects the file creation outside the module.
#
# 3c-mknod: syscall.c:506 -- do_mknod_at falls through to bare
# do_mknod for am_root < 0, same path-based open(). For
# FIFOs/sockets/devices the bare path is also used.
#
# Each scenario plants a "secret" file outside the module at a
# location the symlink trap points to. The check is that the
# outside file's content and mode are unchanged after the attack
# attempt.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
# All three scenarios depend on receiver-side daemon code paths
# that are only secured on platforms with a working
# secure_relative_open. The chdir/chmod tests already skip the
# same set; mirror that.
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "secure_relative_open relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
# Portable inode-and-mode helpers.
file_mode() {
stat -c %a "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp "$1"
}
setup() {
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
echo "OUTSIDE_PROTECTED_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
outside_pristine="$scratchdir/outside-pristine.txt"
cp -p "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
}
verify_outside_unchanged() {
label="$1"
mode=$(file_mode "$outside/target.txt")
case "$mode" in
644|0644) ;;
*) test_fail "$label: outside/target.txt mode changed from 644 to $mode" ;;
esac
if ! cmp -s "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"; then
test_fail "$label: outside/target.txt content changed -- daemon followed the cd symlink"
fi
}
verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent() {
label="$1"
target="$2" # specific file under outside/ to check absence of
if [ -e "$outside/$target" ]; then
test_fail "$label: outside/$target was created -- daemon followed the cd symlink"
fi
}
# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by default
# and fail to write into the test scratch dir. Force it to keep our
# uid/gid in that case so the receiver actually runs the code paths
# we want to test.
my_uid=`get_testuid`
root_uid=`get_rootuid`
root_gid=`get_rootgid`
uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
fi
############################################################
# Scenario 3b: --inplace --backup --backup-dir=cd
#
# Pre-create module/target.txt so the receiver enters the in-place
# update path; a backup of the existing content must be made
# before the update. With --backup-dir=cd, backupptr resolves to
# "cd/target.txt"; with the bug, robust_unlink and the bare
# do_open at generator.c:1905 both follow the cd symlink, the
# unlink deletes outside/target.txt and the create writes the
# pre-existing module/target.txt content there.
############################################################
setup
echo "EXISTING_MODULE_DATA" > "$mod/target.txt"
chmod 0666 "$mod/target.txt"
echo "NEW_DATA_FROM_SENDER" > "$src/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC --inplace --backup --backup-dir=cd "$src/target.txt" \
rsync://localhost/upload/target.txt >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_outside_unchanged "3b inplace+backup-dir=cd"
############################################################
# Scenario 3c-symlink: fake-super symlink push to a path with a
# symlinked parent
#
# With "fake super = yes" set on the module, the receiver
# represents symlinks as fake-super files (regular files with the
# link target written to them). The path-based open() in
# do_symlink's fake-super branch follows parent symlinks. We push
# a single symlink to the destination path "cd/sym" so the
# receiver's create-file call lands at "cd/sym" relative to the
# module root, where cd is the symlink trap.
############################################################
setup
mkdir -p "$src/cd"
ln -s /etc/passwd "$src/cd/sym"
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload_fake]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
fake super = yes
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rl "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload_fake/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent "3c-symlink fake-super symlink push" "sym"
############################################################
# Scenario 3c-mknod: fake-super FIFO push to a path with a
# symlinked parent
#
# Similar to 3c-symlink but for special files. mkfifo works
# without root; we push a FIFO and verify the receiver doesn't
# create a fake-super file at outside/fifo.
############################################################
setup
mkdir -p "$src/cd"
mkfifo "$src/cd/fifo" 2>/dev/null
if [ ! -p "$src/cd/fifo" ]; then
test_skipped "mkfifo unavailable; cannot exercise 3c-mknod"
fi
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload_fake]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
fake super = yes
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rD "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload_fake/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent "3c-mknod fake-super FIFO push" "fifo"
exit 0

135
testsuite/chdir-symlink-race.test Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug at the receiver's
# chdir(). After the CVE-2026-29518 fix to secure_relative_open(), an
# attack remained where the receiver's chdir() into a destination
# subdirectory followed an attacker-planted symlink, escaping the
# module. Every subsequent path-relative syscall (open, chmod, lchown,
# utimes, etc.) inherited the escape -- secure_relative_open's
# RESOLVE_BENEATH anchor itself was outside the module by then, so it
# stopped protecting against anything.
#
# This test runs an actual rsync daemon (via RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG to
# avoid the network) configured with "use chroot = no", plants a
# symlink at module/subdir -> ../outside, and runs four flavours of
# rsync transfer that previously all reached files in ../outside:
#
# 1. single-file dest = subdir/target.txt (the original poc_chmod)
# 2. -r src/subdir/ to upload/subdir/ (the chdir-escape case)
# 3. -r src/subdir/ to upload/subdir/ (no --size-only: forces basis read+write)
# 4. -r src/ to upload/ (was already protected by the
# original CVE-2026-29518 fix;
# regression-checked here)
#
# All four must leave the outside-the-module sentinel file's mode AND
# content unchanged.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "secure chdir relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src" "$src/subdir"
# Portable octal-mode helper -- macOS and FreeBSD's stat use -f, GNU
# coreutils stat uses -c.
file_mode() {
stat -c %a "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp "$1"
}
# The "secret" file outside the module the attacker is trying to alter.
# Save a pristine copy alongside it so we can compare with cmp(1) rather
# than depending on sha1sum/shasum/sha1, which differ across platforms.
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0600 "$outside/target.txt"
outside_pristine="$scratchdir/outside-pristine.txt"
cp -p "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"
# Symlink trap planted in the module by the local attacker.
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/subdir"
# Source files the sender will push: same size as the outside target,
# different content, mode 0666 (the perms the attacker tries to push).
SIZE=$(stat -c %s "$outside/target.txt" 2>/dev/null \
|| stat -f %z "$outside/target.txt")
head -c "$SIZE" /dev/urandom > "$src/target.txt"
head -c "$SIZE" /dev/urandom > "$src/subdir/target.txt"
chmod 0666 "$src/target.txt" "$src/subdir/target.txt"
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
reset_outside() {
chmod 0600 "$outside/target.txt"
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
}
verify_unchanged() {
label="$1"
mode=$(file_mode "$outside/target.txt")
case "$mode" in
600|0600) ;;
*) test_fail "$label: outside file mode changed from 600 to $mode (chmod escape)" ;;
esac
if ! cmp -s "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"; then
test_fail "$label: outside file content changed (write escape)"
fi
}
run_attack() {
label="$1"; shift
reset_outside
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_unchanged "$label"
}
# 1. The original poc_chmod scenario: single file, dest path with
# the symlinked subdir as a path component. With --size-only the
# receiver normally skips the basis open and goes straight to chmod
# -- only the chdir-escape blocks the chmod from reaching outside.
run_attack "single-file --size-only" \
-tp --size-only \
"$src/target.txt" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/target.txt
# 2. -r push into the symlinked subdir: receiver chdir's into "subdir",
# follows the symlink, ends up in outside.
run_attack "-r --size-only into subdir/" \
-rtp --size-only \
"$src/subdir/" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/
# 3. Same but no --size-only -- forces the basis-file open and a real
# rename, so this exercises the read-disclosure and write-escape
# paths together.
run_attack "-r without --size-only into subdir/" \
-rtp \
"$src/subdir/" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/
# 4. -r src/ to upload/ -- this case was already covered by the
# original CVE-2026-29518 fix because the receiver stays at module
# root and operates on slashed paths. Regression check.
run_attack "-r --size-only into upload/ root" \
-rtp --size-only \
"$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/
exit 0

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@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug applied to
# chmod() on the receiver side. The CVE-2026-29518 fix used
# secure_relative_open() for the basis-file open, but every other
# path-based syscall the receiver runs on sender-controllable paths
# is vulnerable to the same primitive: a local attacker swaps a
# symlink into one of the parent directory components between the
# receiver's check and its act, and the syscall escapes the module.
#
# This test exercises the new do_chmod_at() wrapper via the
# t_chmod_secure helper. The helper sets up two scenarios:
# - a parent dir-symlink that resolves WITHIN the module tree
# (legitimate -K-style use, must continue to work)
# - a parent dir-symlink that escapes the module tree (the
# attack, must be rejected)
# plus two regression scenarios (plain relative path, top-level
# file) that just confirm the safe wrapper doesn't break the
# normal case.
#
# The kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path resolution is
# only available on Linux 5.6+, FreeBSD 13+, and macOS 15+.
# Skip on platforms that fall back to per-component O_NOFOLLOW
# (Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Cygwin); the per-component fallback
# would also reject the attack but the legitimate dir-symlink
# scenario would fail there.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "do_chmod_at relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
trap_outside="$scratchdir/trap"
rm -rf "$mod" "$trap_outside"
mkdir -p "$mod/realdir" "$trap_outside"
# Set up the four file-system objects the helper expects:
echo bystander > "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
chmod 0600 "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
echo target > "$trap_outside/sentinel"
chmod 0600 "$trap_outside/sentinel"
ln -s realdir "$mod/inside_link"
ln -s ../trap "$mod/escape_link"
echo top > "$mod/topfile"
chmod 0600 "$mod/topfile"
"$TOOLDIR/t_chmod_secure" "$mod" || \
test_fail "t_chmod_secure reported failures (see stderr above)"
# Sanity-check from the shell side too: the outside file's mode must
# still be 0600 -- the helper checked this, but a second look from
# the shell guards against a helper-internal stat() bug.
mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null \
|| stat -f '%Lp' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then
test_fail "outside sentinel mode changed from 600 to $mode -- chmod escaped the module"
fi
exit 0

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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
#!/bin/sh
# clean-fname-underflow.test
# Ensure clean_fname() does not read-before-buffer when collapsing "..".
# This exercises the --server path where a crafted merge filename hits clean_fname().
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
workdir="$scratchdir/workdir"
mkdir -p "$workdir/mod"
cd "$workdir"
rsync_bin=`echo $RSYNC | sed 's/ .*//'`
# Invoke the server-side path. We don't need a real transfer; we just want to
# ensure clean_fname() doesn't crash when given "a/../test" via --filter=merge.
if $rsync_bin --server --sender -vlr --filter='merge a/../test' . mod/ >/dev/null 2>&1; then
: # success
else
status=$?
# Non-zero exit is expected for bogus input; ensure it wasn't a signal/crash.
if [ $status -ge 128 ]; then
test_fail "rsync exited due to a signal (status=$status)"
fi
fi
echo "OK: clean_fname() handled 'a/../test' without crashing"
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for codex audit Finding 3a: copy_file()'s source
# open in copy_altdest_file() is via do_open_nofollow(), which only
# refuses a final-component symlink. Parent components are still
# resolved with normal symlink-following. A daemon module attacker
# who plants a parent symlink at module/cd -> /outside, then runs
# --copy-dest=cd against a source file matching the size+mtime of
# /outside/target.txt, drives the receiver to:
#
# 1. Find a match-level >= 2 basis at "cd/target.txt"
# 2. Call copy_altdest_file -> copy_file(src="cd/target.txt", ...)
# 3. do_open_nofollow follows the "cd" parent symlink and reads
# the contents of /outside/target.txt under the daemon's
# authority
# 4. Copy that content into the module destination
#
# Result: outside/target.txt content lands at module/target.txt,
# accessible to the attacker on a subsequent pull.
#
# We detect by content: src/target.txt and outside/target.txt have
# identical metadata (size + mtime + mode) but different content.
# After the transfer, module/target.txt should match src (no
# basedir escape) -- if it matches outside, the bug copied across
# the symlink boundary.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
# Outside-the-module file the daemon should not read on the
# attacker's behalf.
echo "OUTSIDE_LEAKED_DATA!" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
# The symlink trap.
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
# Source: same size, same mtime, same mode as outside -- so the
# generator's link_stat + quick_check_ok finds a match-level >= 2
# basis and calls copy_altdest_file.
echo "ATTACKER_KNOWN_DATA!" > "$src/target.txt"
touch -r "$outside/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by
# default and fail to mkstemp in the scratch dir; force it to
# keep our uid/gid in that case.
my_uid=`get_testuid`
root_uid=`get_rootuid`
root_gid=`get_rootgid`
uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
fi
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
# --copy-dest push to module root.
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rtp --copy-dest=cd "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/ \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ ! -f "$mod/target.txt" ]; then
test_fail "destination file was not created -- daemon transfer failed before the test could observe the basedir behaviour"
fi
if cmp -s "$mod/target.txt" "$outside/target.txt"; then
test_fail "basedir-escape via copy_file source: module/target.txt now contains the contents of outside/target.txt -- daemon read /outside via the cd symlink and copied it into the module"
fi
if ! cmp -s "$mod/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"; then
test_fail "destination doesn't match source content (and isn't outside content either): unexpected state"
fi
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for GHSA-rjfm-3w2m-jf4f: a hostname-based "hosts deny"
# rule must still match when the daemon performs a 'daemon chroot' and
# the chroot does not contain the NSS files glibc needs for reverse DNS.
#
# Pre-fix, reverse DNS happened *after* the daemon chroot. With an empty
# chroot the NSS lookup failed, client_name() returned "UNKNOWN", and a
# deny rule referring to the connecting hostname silently failed to
# match.
#
# Two scenarios are exercised so we can distinguish the case the fix
# definitely covers from the per-module path that may still be
# vulnerable:
# A. global "reverse lookup = yes" (covered by b6abdb4c)
# B. only module "reverse lookup = yes" (gap to verify)
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
case `uname -s` in
Linux*) ;;
*) test_skipped "test is Linux-specific (uses chroot+unshare)" ;;
esac
# We need CAP_SYS_CHROOT. Re-exec under a user namespace if not root.
if ! chroot / /bin/true 2>/dev/null; then
if [ -z "$RSYNC_UNSHARED" ] && unshare --user --map-root-user true 2>/dev/null; then
echo "Re-running under unshare --user --map-root-user..."
RSYNC_UNSHARED=1 exec unshare --user --map-root-user "$SHELL_PATH" $RUNSHFLAGS "$0"
fi
test_skipped "need CAP_SYS_CHROOT (root or unshare --user --map-root-user)"
fi
# We need 127.0.0.1 to reverse-resolve to a real hostname while NSS is
# still working (i.e. before the daemon's chroot). The daemon will
# look that name up itself as part of its hostname-based ACL check;
# we then deny that name and assert the connection is rejected.
client_hostname=`getent hosts 127.0.0.1 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $2}'`
if [ -z "$client_hostname" ] || [ "$client_hostname" = "127.0.0.1" ]; then
test_skipped "no reverse DNS for 127.0.0.1"
fi
chrootdir="$scratchdir/chroot"
rm -rf "$chrootdir"
mkdir -p "$chrootdir/modroot"
echo "from chroot" > "$chrootdir/modroot/file1"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
logfile="$scratchdir/rsyncd.log"
write_conf() {
cat >"$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
log file = $logfile
daemon chroot = $chrootdir
reverse lookup = $1
hosts deny = $client_hostname
max verbosity = 4
[chrootmod]
path = /modroot
read only = yes
reverse lookup = $2
EOF
}
# Run a transfer and return 0 if the daemon refused with @ERROR access
# denied (the expected outcome when the deny rule matches).
run_check() {
label="$1"
rm -f "$logfile"
rm -rf "$todir"
mkdir -p "$todir"
out="$scratchdir/run.out"
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -av localhost::chrootmod/ "$todir/" >"$out" 2>&1
rc=$?
echo "----- $label (rsync exit $rc):"
cat "$out"
echo "----- daemon log:"
[ -f "$logfile" ] && cat "$logfile"
echo "-----"
grep -q '@ERROR.*access denied' "$out"
}
# Scenario A: global reverse lookup. Covered by b6abdb4c.
write_conf yes yes
if ! run_check "Scenario A (global reverse lookup = yes)"; then
test_fail "Scenario A: hostname deny rule was bypassed"
fi
# Scenario B: only the per-module reverse-lookup setting is enabled.
# The b6abdb4c fix only pre-warms client_name()'s cache when the
# global setting is on, so the post-chroot lookup in this path may
# still produce "UNKNOWN" and bypass the deny rule.
write_conf no yes
if ! run_check "Scenario B (per-module reverse lookup only)"; then
test_fail "Scenario B: hostname deny rule was bypassed (per-module reverse lookup with daemon chroot still has the bypass)"
fi
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Test that a daemon module configured with "refuse options = compress"
# rejects clients that ask for compression and still serves the same
# transfer when the client does not.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
build_rsyncd_conf
# Append a module that refuses --compress (-z).
cat >>"$conf" <<EOF
[no-compress]
path = $fromdir
read only = yes
refuse options = compress
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon"
export RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG
hands_setup
# Build a reference tree mirroring the daemon's global exclude rule.
$RSYNC -av --exclude=foobar.baz "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
# A compressed transfer must be refused.
errlog="$scratchdir/refuse.err"
if $RSYNC -avz localhost::no-compress/ "$todir/" >/dev/null 2>"$errlog"; then
cat "$errlog" >&2
test_fail "compressed transfer was not refused"
fi
grep -- '--compress' "$errlog" >/dev/null || {
cat "$errlog" >&2
test_fail "expected refuse error mentioning --compress"
}
# The same transfer without -z must succeed.
rm -rf "$todir"
mkdir "$todir"
checkit "$RSYNC -av localhost::no-compress/ '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -77,5 +77,12 @@ rm -rf "$todir"
$RSYNC -aHivv --debug=HLINK5 "$name1" "$todir/"
diff $diffopt "$name1" "$todir" || test_fail "solo copy of name1 failed"
# Make sure there's nothing wrong with sending a single directory with -H
# enabled (this has broken in 3.4.0 so far, so we need this test).
rm -rf "$fromdir" "$todir"
makepath "$fromdir/sym" "$todir"
$RSYNC -aH "$fromdir/sym" "$todir"
diff $diffopt "$fromdir" "$todir" || test_fail "solo copy of sym failed"
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ makepath "$longdir" || test_skipped "unable to create long directory"
touch "$longdir/1" || test_skipped "unable to create files in long directory"
date > "$longdir/1"
if [ -r /etc ]; then
ls -la /etc >"$longdir/2"
ls -la /etc >"$longdir/2" || [ $? -eq 1 ]
else
ls -la / >"$longdir/2"
ls -la / >"$longdir/2" || [ $? -eq 1 ]
fi
checkit "$RSYNC --delete -avH '$fromdir/' '$todir'" "$fromdir/" "$todir"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Test rsync --open-noatime option keeps source atimes intact
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
$RSYNC -VV | grep '"atimes": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without atimes support"
# O_NOATIME is Linux-specific; skip on other platforms
case `uname` in
Linux) ;;
*) test_skipped "O_NOATIME is only supported on Linux" ;;
esac
mkdir "$fromdir"
# --open-noatime did not work properly on files with size > 0
echo content > "$fromdir/foo"
touch -a -t 200102031717.42 "$fromdir/foo"
TLS_ARGS=--atimes
"$TOOLDIR/tls" $TLS_ARGS "$fromdir/foo" > "$tmpdir/atime-from-before"
# Do not use checkit because it uses "diff" which breaks atimes
$RSYNC --open-noatime --archive --recursive --times --atimes -vvv "$fromdir/" "$todir/"
"$TOOLDIR/tls" $TLS_ARGS "$fromdir/foo" > "$tmpdir/atime-from-after"
diff "$tmpdir/atime-from-before" "$tmpdir/atime-from-after"
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -10,22 +10,28 @@
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
test -f /proc/sys/fs/protected_regular || test_skipped "Can't find protected_regular setting (only available on Linux)"
pr_lvl=`cat /proc/sys/fs/protected_regular 2>/dev/null` || test_skipped "Can't check if fs.protected_regular is enabled (probably need root)"
pr_lvl=`cat /proc/sys/fs/protected_regular 2>/dev/null` || test_skipped "Can't check if fs.protected_regular is enabled"
test "$pr_lvl" != 0 || test_skipped "fs.protected_regular is not enabled"
workdir="$tmpdir/files"
mkdir "$workdir"
mkdir -p "$workdir"
chmod 1777 "$workdir"
echo "Source" > "$workdir/src"
echo "" > "$workdir/dst"
chown 5001 "$workdir/dst" || test_skipped "Can't chown (probably need root)"
# Output is only shown in case of an error
if ! chown 5001 "$workdir/dst" 2>/dev/null; then
# Not root - try re-running under unshare with UID mapping
if [ -z "$RSYNC_UNSHARED" ] && unshare --user --map-root-user --map-users 5001:100000:1 true 2>/dev/null; then
echo "Re-running under unshare with UID mapping..."
RSYNC_UNSHARED=1 exec unshare --user --map-root-user --map-users 5001:100000:1 "$SHELL_PATH" $RUNSHFLAGS "$0"
fi
test_skipped "Can't chown (need root or unshare with uidmap)"
fi
echo "Contents of $workdir:"
ls -al "$workdir"
$RSYNC --inplace "$workdir/src" "$workdir/dst" || test_fail
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the off-by-one stack OOB write in
# establish_proxy_connection() in socket.c when a malicious or
# man-in-the-middle HTTP proxy returns a first response line of
# 1023+ bytes without a '\n' terminator.
#
# Pre-fix: the read loop walked buffer[0..sizeof-2] one byte at a
# time, then post-loop logic did "if (*cp != '\n') cp++; *cp-- =
# '\0';". If no newline arrived before the loop filled the buffer,
# cp was left at &buffer[sizeof-1] (never written by the loop),
# *cp held stale stack bytes, and cp++ pushed cp one past the array.
# The null-termination then wrote one byte out of bounds on the
# stack. AddressSanitizer reports stack-buffer-overflow at the
# null-termination site.
#
# Post-fix: the bound-exhaustion case is detected by position and
# rejected with an "proxy response line too long" message, so no
# OOB write occurs and rsync exits with a non-signal status.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || test_skipped "python3 not available"
workdir="$scratchdir/workdir"
mkdir -p "$workdir"
cd "$workdir"
port_file="$workdir/port"
proxy_log="$workdir/proxy.log"
# A minimal TCP listener: binds to an ephemeral port on 127.0.0.1,
# writes the chosen port to $port_file *before* accept() so the test
# can synchronise without a sleep, accepts one connection, reads
# until end-of-headers or 64 KiB, sends exactly 1023 bytes of 'X'
# with no '\n', then closes.
python3 - "$port_file" >"$proxy_log" 2>&1 <<'PYEOF' &
import socket, sys, os
port_file = sys.argv[1]
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
port = s.getsockname()[1]
tmp = port_file + ".tmp"
with open(tmp, "w") as fp:
fp.write("%d\n" % port)
os.rename(tmp, port_file) # atomic visibility to the shell side
s.listen(1)
conn, _ = s.accept()
conn.settimeout(5)
try:
data = b""
while b"\r\n\r\n" not in data and len(data) < 65536:
chunk = conn.recv(8192)
if not chunk:
break
data += chunk
except socket.timeout:
pass
conn.sendall(b"X" * 1023) # exactly the buffer-1 trigger size
try:
conn.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
except OSError:
pass
conn.close()
s.close()
PYEOF
proxy_pid=$!
# Wait up to ~10s for the listener to publish its port.
i=0
while [ ! -s "$port_file" ] && [ $i -lt 10 ]; do
sleep 1
i=$((i + 1))
done
if [ ! -s "$port_file" ]; then
kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null
cat "$proxy_log" >&2 2>/dev/null
test_fail "proxy listener never published a port"
fi
port=`cat "$port_file"`
case "$port" in
*[!0-9]*|"") kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null; test_fail "bogus port from listener: '$port'" ;;
esac
# Run rsync through the malicious proxy. Any rsync:// URL works:
# the proxy intercepts the CONNECT and never forwards anywhere.
rsync_err="$workdir/rsync.err"
# rsync MUST exit non-zero here (the proxy is misbehaving).
# Use `|| status=$?` so we capture the real exit code under `sh -e`;
# `if ! cmd; then status=$?` would only ever see 0 because the `!`
# is the last command before `$?`.
status=0
RSYNC_PROXY="127.0.0.1:$port" \
$RSYNC rsync://example.invalid:873/whatever/ "$workdir/out/" \
>/dev/null 2>"$rsync_err" || status=$?
# Reap the listener.
wait "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
# 1. rsync must not have crashed (SIGSEGV/SIGABRT report >= 128).
if [ "$status" -ge 128 ]; then
cat "$rsync_err" >&2
test_fail "rsync killed by signal (status=$status) -- possible stack OOB regression"
fi
# 2. rsync must have actually exited non-zero (i.e. saw the bad proxy).
if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then
cat "$rsync_err" >&2
test_fail "rsync returned success despite malformed proxy response"
fi
# 3. The new error message must appear.
if ! grep -q "proxy response line too long" "$rsync_err"; then
cat "$rsync_err" >&2
test_fail "expected 'proxy response line too long' in rsync stderr"
fi
echo "OK: over-long proxy response line rejected cleanly without crashing"
exit 0

View File

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ printmsg() {
}
rsync_ls_lR() {
find "$@" -name .git -prune -o -name auto-build-save -prune -o -print | \
find "$@" -name .git -prune -o -name auto-build-save -prune -o -name testtmp -prune -o -print | \
sort | sed 's/ /\\ /g' | xargs "$TOOLDIR/tls" $TLS_ARGS
}
@@ -195,15 +195,15 @@ hands_setup() {
echo some data > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/foobar.baz"
mkdir "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir"
if [ -r /etc ]; then
ls -ltr /etc > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir/etc-ltr-list"
ls -ltr /etc > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir/etc-ltr-list" || [ $? -eq 1 ]
else
ls -ltr / > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir/etc-ltr-list"
ls -ltr / > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir/etc-ltr-list" || [ $? -eq 1 ]
fi
mkdir "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir2"
if [ -r /bin ]; then
ls -lt /bin > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir2/bin-lt-list"
ls -lt /bin > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir2/bin-lt-list" || [ $? -eq 1 ]
else
ls -lt / > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir2/bin-lt-list"
ls -lt / > "$fromdir/dir/subdir/subsubdir2/bin-lt-list" || [ $? -eq 1 ]
fi
# echo testing head:

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for codex audit Finding 5: secure_relative_open()'s
# front-door input check rejects "../foo" and "foo/../bar" but
# misses bare "..", "subdir/..", and other variants whose "/"-split
# components contain a literal "..". The kernel-enforced
# RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) and O_RESOLVE_BENEATH
# (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) reject these in-kernel; the per-component
# walk fallback used on NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, Cygwin and pre-5.6
# Linux does not -- so the validation must happen at the front door.
#
# This test invokes the t_secure_relpath helper, which calls
# secure_relative_open() with each suspect input and verifies the
# return value is -1 with errno == EINVAL. EINVAL is the marker
# that the front-door rejected the input, not the kernel; pre-fix
# the kernel returns -1 with EXDEV (or, on the per-component
# fallback, may return a valid fd at all -- "escape").
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
testdir="$scratchdir/relpath-test"
rm -rf "$testdir"
mkdir -p "$testdir"
if ! "$TOOLDIR/t_secure_relpath" "$testdir"; then
test_fail "t_secure_relpath rejected one or more inputs incorrectly (see stderr above for the specific case)"
fi
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for codex re-check finding: the sender-side file-
# list generator can still follow an attacker-planted symlink out of
# the module via change_pathname() -> change_dir(...,CD_SKIP_CHDIR)
# followed by change_dir(...,CD_NORMAL). The CD_SKIP_CHDIR sets
# skipped_chdir=1, and the next CD_NORMAL call's secure-branch in
# util1.c is gated on `!skipped_chdir`, so the secure path is
# bypassed and a raw chdir(curr_dir) follows attacker-controlled
# symlinks during flist generation.
#
# Reach: rsync daemon module with `use chroot = no`. A local
# attacker plants module/cd -> /outside. A client (innocent or
# malicious) pulls rsync://<daemon>/<module>/cd/. The daemon, as
# sender, enumerates files in /outside and ships their metadata
# (names, sizes, modes, mtimes) to the client. The actual content
# transfer fails later at the secure_relative_open step with EXDEV,
# but by then the metadata has already leaked.
#
# We detect by running a dry-run pull of the symlinked subdir and
# checking whether the client's --list-only output mentions any
# file from /outside. With the bug, /outside/secret.txt appears in
# the list with its size; with the fix, the daemon's chdir into
# the symlinked subdir is rejected and no /outside file is listed.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "secure change_dir relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
listfile="$scratchdir/listed.txt"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside"
# Outside-the-module file the daemon should NOT enumerate to clients.
# A distinctive name + non-trivial size makes the leak easy to spot.
echo "OUTSIDE_PROTECTED_FILE_USED_AS_LEAK_DETECTOR" > "$outside/leak_marker.txt"
chmod 0644 "$outside/leak_marker.txt"
# The symlink trap planted by the local attacker.
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
my_uid=`get_testuid`
root_uid=`get_rootuid`
root_gid=`get_rootgid`
uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
fi
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
# Pull recursively into the symlinked subdir with dry-run + verbose,
# capturing the daemon's flist (file list) on stdout. If the daemon
# enumerates /outside, leak_marker.txt will appear in the listing.
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -nrv rsync://localhost/upload/cd/ "$scratchdir/dst/" \
> "$listfile" 2>&1 || true
if grep -q "leak_marker\.txt" "$listfile"; then
echo "----- leaked listing follows" >&2
sed 's/^/ /' "$listfile" >&2
echo "----- leaked listing ends" >&2
test_fail "sender flist leak: outside/leak_marker.txt was enumerated to the client (daemon's chdir followed the cd symlink during flist generation)"
fi
exit 0

11
testsuite/simd-checksum.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Test SIMD checksum implementations against the C reference
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
if ! test -x "$TOOLDIR/simdtest"; then
test_skipped "simdtest not built (SIMD not available)"
fi
"$TOOLDIR/simdtest"

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING)
# This script tests ssh, if possible. It's called by runtests.sh
# This script tests ssh, if possible. It's called by runtests.py
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Test that updating a file through a directory symlink works when using
# -K (--copy-dirlinks). This is a regression test for:
# https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715
#
# The CVE fix in commit c35e283 introduced secure_relative_open() which
# uses O_NOFOLLOW on all path components, breaking legitimate directory
# symlinks on the receiver side. The fix splits the path into basedir
# (dirname, symlinks followed) and basename (O_NOFOLLOW) so that
# directory symlinks are traversed while the final file component is
# still protected.
#
# The regression only manifests when delta matching is triggered (i.e.,
# the sender finds matching blocks in the old file). Small files with
# completely different content are transferred in full and don't trigger
# the bug. We use a large file with a small modification to ensure
# delta transfer is used.
#
# In addition to the original regression, this test covers edge cases
# in the fix itself:
# - --backup with directory symlinks (finish_transfer pointer identity)
# - --partial-dir with protocol < 29 (fnamecmp != partialptr guard)
# - --inplace with directory symlinks (updating_basis_or_equiv check)
# - Files without a dirname (top-level files, no split needed)
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
# secure_relative_open() uses kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" via
# openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux 5.6+ and openat(O_RESOLVE_BENEATH)
# on FreeBSD 13+. Other platforms fall back to a per-component
# O_NOFOLLOW walk that rejects every symlink including legitimate
# directory symlinks -- the very case this test exercises. Skip on
# those rather than report a known failure.
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "secure_relative_open lacks RESOLVE_BENEATH equivalent on $(uname -s); issue #715 still affects this platform"
;;
esac
RSYNC_RSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
export RSYNC_RSH
# $HOME is set to $scratchdir by rsync.fns
# localhost: destination will cd to $HOME (i.e., $scratchdir)
# Helper: create a large file suitable for delta transfers.
# ~32KB is large enough for rsync's block matching to find matches.
make_testfile() {
dd if=/dev/urandom of="$1" bs=1024 count=32 2>/dev/null \
|| test_fail "failed to create test file $1"
}
# Set up source tree
srcbase="$tmpdir/src"
######################################################################
# Test 1: Basic directory symlink update (the original issue #715)
######################################################################
mkdir -p "$HOME/real-dir"
ln -s real-dir "$HOME/dir"
mkdir -p "$srcbase/dir"
make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
# First transfer (initial): should create the file through the symlink
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 1: initial transfer failed"
if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" ]; then
test_fail "test 1: initial transfer did not create file through symlink"
fi
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 1: initial transfer content mismatch"
# Small modification to trigger delta transfer
echo "appended update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
# Second transfer (update): was failing with "failed verification"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 1: update through directory symlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 1: update transfer content mismatch"
######################################################################
# Test 2: Compression (-z) as in the original reproducer
######################################################################
echo "another line" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptzv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 2: compressed update through directory symlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 2: compressed update content mismatch"
######################################################################
# Test 3: Nested directory symlinks (nested/sub/data.txt where
# "nested" is a symlink to "nested_real")
######################################################################
mkdir -p "$HOME/nested_real/sub"
ln -s nested_real "$HOME/nested"
mkdir -p "$srcbase/nested/sub"
make_testfile "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 3: initial nested transfer failed"
echo "appended nested" >> "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 3: update through nested directory symlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt" "$HOME/nested_real/sub/data.txt" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 3: nested update content mismatch"
######################################################################
# Test 4: --backup with directory symlinks
#
# Exercises the finish_transfer() "fnamecmp == fname" pointer
# comparison that determines whether to update fnamecmp to the
# backup name. If broken, --backup would reference a renamed file
# for xattr handling.
######################################################################
# Reset destination
rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 4: initial transfer for backup test failed"
echo "backup update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --backup --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 4: update with --backup through directory symlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 4: backup update content mismatch"
if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file~" ]; then
test_fail "test 4: backup file was not created"
fi
######################################################################
# Test 5: --inplace with directory symlinks
#
# Exercises the updating_basis_or_equiv check which uses
# "fnamecmp == fname". With --inplace, rsync writes directly to
# the destination file instead of a temp file.
######################################################################
rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 5: initial inplace transfer failed"
echo "inplace update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 5: inplace update through directory symlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 5: inplace update content mismatch"
######################################################################
# Test 6: Top-level file (no dirname, no split needed)
#
# Ensures the dirname/basename split is not attempted for files
# at the top level (file->dirname is NULL).
######################################################################
make_testfile "$srcbase/topfile"
mkdir -p "$HOME"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 6: initial top-level transfer failed"
echo "toplevel update" >> "$srcbase/topfile"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/topfile"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 6: top-level update failed"
diff "$srcbase/topfile" "$HOME/topfile" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 6: top-level update content mismatch"
######################################################################
# Test 7: --partial-dir with protocol < 29
#
# For protocol < 29, fnamecmp_type stays FNAMECMP_FNAME even when
# fnamecmp is set to partialptr. The dirname/basename split must
# NOT trigger in this case (guarded by "fnamecmp == fname").
######################################################################
rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
--rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 7: initial proto28 partial-dir transfer failed"
echo "partial-dir update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
--rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update through dirlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update content mismatch"
######################################################################
# Test 8: Protocol < 29 basic directory symlink update
#
# Exercises the protocol < 29 code path and its fallback logic
# (clearing basedir on retry).
######################################################################
rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
--rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 8: initial proto28 transfer failed"
echo "proto28 update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
sleep 1
touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
--rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
|| test_fail "test 8: proto28 update through directory symlink failed"
diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
|| test_fail "test 8: proto28 update content mismatch"
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ EOF
xls() {
for fn in "${@}"; do
runat "$fn" "$SHELL_PATH" <<EOF
for x in *; do echo "\$x=\`cat \$x\`"; done
for x in *; do
case "\$x" in SUNWattr_*) continue;; esac
echo "\$x=\`cat \$x\`"
done
EOF
done
}

4
tls.c
View File

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void storetime(char *dest, size_t destsize, time_t t, int nsecs)
{
if (t) {
int len;
struct tm *mt = gmtime(&t);
struct tm tmp, *mt = gmtime_r(&t, &tmp);
len = snprintf(dest, destsize,
" %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void list_file(const char *fname)
mtimebuf, atimebuf, crtimebuf, fname, linkbuf);
}
static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
static const struct poptOption long_options[] = {
/* longName, shortName, argInfo, argPtr, value, descrip, argDesc */
{"atimes", 'U', POPT_ARG_NONE, &display_atimes, 0, 0, 0},
#ifdef SUPPORT_CRTIMES

123
token.c
View File

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern int do_compression;
extern int protocol_version;
extern int module_id;
extern int do_compression_level;
extern int do_compression_threads;
extern char *skip_compress;
#ifndef Z_INSERT_ONLY
@@ -291,6 +292,14 @@ static int32 simple_recv_token(int f, char **data)
int32 i = read_int(f);
if (i <= 0)
return i;
/* simple_send_token caps each literal chunk at CHUNK_SIZE;
* reject anything larger so a hostile peer cannot drive the
* read_buf below past our static CHUNK_SIZE buffer. */
if (i > CHUNK_SIZE) {
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid uncompressed token length %ld [%s]\n",
(long)i, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
residue = i;
}
@@ -493,9 +502,52 @@ static char *cbuf;
static char *dbuf;
/* for decoding runs of tokens */
#define MAX_TOKEN_INDEX ((int32)0x7ffffffe)
static int32 rx_token;
static int32 rx_run;
static NORETURN void invalid_compressed_token(void)
{
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid token number in compressed stream\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
static int32 recv_compressed_token_num(int f, int32 flag)
{
if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
int32 incr = flag & 0x3f;
if (rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - incr)
invalid_compressed_token();
rx_token += incr;
flag >>= 6;
} else {
rx_token = read_int(f);
if (rx_token < 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
invalid_compressed_token();
}
if (flag & 1) {
rx_run = read_byte(f);
rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - rx_run)
invalid_compressed_token();
recv_state = r_running;
}
return -1 - rx_token;
}
static int32 recv_compressed_token_run(void)
{
if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token >= MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
invalid_compressed_token();
++rx_token;
if (--rx_run == 0)
recv_state = r_idle;
return -1 - rx_token;
}
/* Receive a deflated token and inflate it */
static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
{
@@ -586,17 +638,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
}
/* here we have a token of some kind */
if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
flag >>= 6;
} else
rx_token = read_int(f);
if (flag & 1) {
rx_run = read_byte(f);
rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
recv_state = r_running;
}
return -1 - rx_token;
return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
case r_inflating:
rx_strm.next_out = (Bytef *)dbuf;
@@ -616,10 +658,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
break;
case r_running:
++rx_token;
if (--rx_run == 0)
recv_state = r_idle;
return -1 - rx_token;
return recv_compressed_token_run();
}
}
}
@@ -692,6 +731,8 @@ static void send_zstd_token(int f, int32 token, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T of
obuf = new_array(char, OBUF_SIZE);
ZSTD_CCtx_setParameter(zstd_cctx, ZSTD_c_compressionLevel, do_compression_level);
ZSTD_CCtx_setParameter(zstd_cctx, ZSTD_c_nbWorkers, do_compression_threads);
zstd_out_buff.dst = obuf + 2;
comp_init_done = 1;
@@ -729,12 +770,11 @@ static void send_zstd_token(int f, int32 token, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T of
zstd_in_buff.src = map_ptr(buf, offset, nb);
zstd_in_buff.size = nb;
zstd_in_buff.pos = 0;
int finished;
do {
if (zstd_out_buff.size == 0) {
zstd_out_buff.size = MAX_DATA_COUNT;
zstd_out_buff.pos = 0;
}
zstd_out_buff.size = MAX_DATA_COUNT;
zstd_out_buff.pos = 0;
/* File ended, flush */
if (token != -2)
@@ -752,20 +792,21 @@ static void send_zstd_token(int f, int32 token, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T of
* state and send a smaller buffer so that the remote side can
* finish the file.
*/
if (zstd_out_buff.pos == zstd_out_buff.size || flush == ZSTD_e_flush) {
finished = (flush == ZSTD_e_flush) ? (r == 0) : (zstd_in_buff.pos == zstd_in_buff.size);
if (zstd_out_buff.pos != 0) {
n = zstd_out_buff.pos;
obuf[0] = DEFLATED_DATA + (n >> 8);
obuf[1] = n;
write_buf(f, obuf, n+2);
zstd_out_buff.size = 0;
}
/*
* Loop while the input buffer isn't full consumed or the
* internal state isn't fully flushed.
*/
} while (zstd_in_buff.pos < zstd_in_buff.size || r > 0);
} while (!finished);
flush_pending = token == -2;
}
@@ -828,17 +869,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
return 0;
}
/* here we have a token of some kind */
if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
flag >>= 6;
} else
rx_token = read_int(f);
if (flag & 1) {
rx_run = read_byte(f);
rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
recv_state = r_running;
}
return -1 - rx_token;
return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
case r_inflated: /* zstd doesn't get into this state */
break;
@@ -869,10 +900,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
break;
case r_running:
++rx_token;
if (--rx_run == 0)
recv_state = r_idle;
return -1 - rx_token;
return recv_compressed_token_run();
}
}
}
@@ -992,17 +1020,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
}
/* here we have a token of some kind */
if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
flag >>= 6;
} else
rx_token = read_int(f);
if (flag & 1) {
rx_run = read_byte(f);
rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
recv_state = r_running;
}
return -1 - rx_token;
return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
case r_inflating:
avail_out = LZ4_decompress_safe(next_in, dbuf, avail_in, size);
@@ -1018,10 +1036,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
break;
case r_running:
++rx_token;
if (--rx_run == 0)
recv_state = r_idle;
return -1 - rx_token;
return recv_compressed_token_run();
}
}
}

120
util1.c
View File

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int set_times(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *stp)
#ifdef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
#include "case_N.h"
if (do_utimensat(fname, stp) == 0)
if (do_utimensat_at(fname, stp) == 0)
break;
if (errno != ENOSYS)
return -1;
@@ -336,7 +336,13 @@ static int unlink_and_reopen(const char *dest, mode_t mode)
mode |= S_IWUSR;
#endif
mode &= INITACCESSPERMS;
if ((ofd = do_open(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, mode)) < 0) {
/* Use do_open_at so the create/truncate goes through a secure
* parent dirfd in the daemon-no-chroot deployment. Otherwise
* an attacker could swap a parent component with a symlink in
* the window between robust_unlink (which uses do_unlink_at,
* already secure) and the create here, and redirect the new
* file outside the module. */
if ((ofd = do_open_at(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, mode)) < 0) {
int save_errno = errno;
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, save_errno, "open %s", full_fname(dest));
errno = save_errno;
@@ -360,12 +366,23 @@ static int unlink_and_reopen(const char *dest, mode_t mode)
* --copy-dest options. */
int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
{
extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
int ifd, ofd;
char buf[1024 * 8];
int len; /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0;
if ((ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
/* On a daemon without chroot, route the source open through
* secure_relative_open so a parent-symlink on the source path
* (e.g. --copy-dest=cd where cd is a symlink to an outside
* directory) cannot redirect the read to a file the daemon can
* see but the attacker should not. Plain do_open_nofollow only
* refuses a final-component symlink; parents are still followed. */
if (am_daemon && !am_chrooted && source && *source && source[0] != '/')
ifd = secure_relative_open(NULL, source, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
else
ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY);
if (ifd < 0) {
int save_errno = errno;
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source));
errno = save_errno;
@@ -479,13 +496,13 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
int robust_unlink(const char *fname)
{
#ifndef ETXTBSY
return do_unlink(fname);
return do_unlink_at(fname);
#else
static int counter = 1;
int rc, pos, start;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
rc = do_unlink(fname);
rc = do_unlink_at(fname);
if (rc == 0 || errno != ETXTBSY)
return rc;
@@ -515,7 +532,7 @@ int robust_unlink(const char *fname)
}
/* maybe we should return rename()'s exit status? Nah. */
if (do_rename(fname, path) != 0) {
if (do_rename_at(fname, path) != 0) {
errno = ETXTBSY;
return -1;
}
@@ -538,7 +555,7 @@ int robust_rename(const char *from, const char *to, const char *partialptr,
return 0;
while (tries--) {
if (do_rename(from, to) == 0)
if (do_rename_at(from, to) == 0)
return 0;
switch (errno) {
@@ -559,7 +576,7 @@ int robust_rename(const char *from, const char *to, const char *partialptr,
}
if (copy_file(from, to, -1, mode) != 0)
return -2;
do_unlink(from);
do_unlink_at(from);
return 1;
default:
return -1;
@@ -942,7 +959,7 @@ int count_dir_elements(const char *p)
* resulting name would be empty, returns ".". */
int clean_fname(char *name, int flags)
{
char *limit = name - 1, *t = name, *f = name;
char *limit = name, *t = name, *f = name;
int anchored;
if (!name)
@@ -987,9 +1004,13 @@ int clean_fname(char *name, int flags)
f += 2;
continue;
}
while (s > limit && *--s != '/') {}
if (s != t - 1 && (s < name || *s == '/')) {
t = s + 1;
/* backing up for ".." — avoid reading before 'name' */
while (s > limit && s[-1] != '/')
s--;
/* If found prior '/', or we reached the start, adjust t. */
if (s != t - 1 && (s <= name || *s == '/')) {
t = (s == name) ? name : s + 1;
f += 2;
continue;
}
@@ -1112,6 +1133,7 @@ char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth, i
* Also cleans the path using the clean_fname() function. */
int change_dir(const char *dir, int set_path_only)
{
extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
static int initialised, skipped_chdir;
unsigned int len;
@@ -1150,10 +1172,57 @@ int change_dir(const char *dir, int set_path_only)
curr_dir[curr_dir_len++] = '/';
memcpy(curr_dir + curr_dir_len, dir, len + 1);
if (!set_path_only && chdir(curr_dir)) {
curr_dir_len = save_dir_len;
curr_dir[curr_dir_len] = '\0';
return 0;
if (!set_path_only) {
int chdir_failed;
/* In the daemon-without-chroot deployment we must not
* follow a symlink in any component of the chdir
* target -- otherwise CWD escapes the module and
* every subsequent path-relative syscall (open,
* chmod, lchown, ...) inherits the escape, which
* defeats secure_relative_open's RESOLVE_BENEATH
* anchor and re-opens the CVE-2026-29518 class of
* symlink TOCTOU attacks. Use the secure resolver
* to get a confined dirfd, then fchdir() to it.
*
* If skipped_chdir is set, a previous CD_SKIP_CHDIR
* call buffered an absolute prefix in curr_dir
* (e.g. change_pathname's CD_SKIP_CHDIR to orig_dir)
* without syncing the kernel's CWD. Resolve `dir`
* relative to that prefix as basedir so the secure
* branch still anchors at the operator-trusted
* directory rather than wherever the kernel CWD
* happens to be. */
if (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) {
const char *basedir = NULL;
char prefix[MAXPATHLEN];
int dfd;
if (skipped_chdir) {
if (save_dir_len >= sizeof prefix) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
chdir_failed = 1;
goto chdir_cleanup;
}
memcpy(prefix, curr_dir, save_dir_len);
prefix[save_dir_len] = '\0';
basedir = prefix;
}
dfd = secure_relative_open(basedir, dir,
O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
if (dfd < 0) {
chdir_failed = 1;
} else {
chdir_failed = fchdir(dfd) != 0;
close(dfd);
}
} else {
chdir_failed = chdir(curr_dir) != 0;
}
chdir_cleanup:
if (chdir_failed) {
curr_dir_len = save_dir_len;
curr_dir[curr_dir_len] = '\0';
return 0;
}
}
skipped_chdir = set_path_only;
}
@@ -1281,20 +1350,20 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create)
dir = partial_fname;
if (create) {
STRUCT_STAT st;
int statret = do_lstat(dir, &st);
int statret = do_lstat_at(dir, &st);
if (statret == 0 && !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
if (do_unlink(dir) < 0) {
if (do_unlink_at(dir) < 0) {
*fn = '/';
return 0;
}
statret = -1;
}
if (statret < 0 && do_mkdir(dir, 0700) < 0) {
if (statret < 0 && do_mkdir_at(dir, 0700) < 0) {
*fn = '/';
return 0;
}
} else
do_rmdir(dir);
do_rmdir_at(dir);
*fn = '/';
return 1;
@@ -1389,8 +1458,13 @@ char *timestring(time_t t)
static int ndx = 0;
static char buffers[4][20]; /* We support 4 simultaneous timestring results. */
char *TimeBuf = buffers[ndx = (ndx + 1) % 4];
struct tm *tm = localtime(&t);
int len = snprintf(TimeBuf, sizeof buffers[0], "%4d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
struct tm tmp, *tm = localtime_r(&t, &tmp);
int len;
if (!tm) {
strlcpy(TimeBuf, "(time out of range)", sizeof buffers[0]);
return TimeBuf;
}
len = snprintf(TimeBuf, sizeof buffers[0], "%4d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
(int)tm->tm_year + 1900, (int)tm->tm_mon + 1, (int)tm->tm_mday,
(int)tm->tm_hour, (int)tm->tm_min, (int)tm->tm_sec);
assert(len > 0); /* Silence gcc warning */
@@ -1714,6 +1788,8 @@ void *expand_item_list(item_list *lp, size_t item_size, const char *desc, int in
new_ptr == lp->items ? " not" : "");
}
memset((char *)new_ptr + lp->malloced * item_size, 0,
(expand_size - lp->malloced) * item_size);
lp->items = new_ptr;
lp->malloced = expand_size;
}

View File

@@ -79,9 +79,7 @@ void *my_alloc(void *ptr, size_t num, size_t size, const char *file, int line)
who_am_i(), do_big_num(max_alloc, 0, NULL), src_file(file), line);
exit_cleanup(RERR_MALLOC);
}
if (!ptr)
ptr = malloc(num * size);
else if (ptr == do_calloc)
if (!ptr || ptr == do_calloc)
ptr = calloc(num, size);
else
ptr = realloc(ptr, num * size);

View File

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
#define RSYNC_VERSION "3.4.0"
#define MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET -7.0
#define RSYNC_VERSION "3.4.3"
#define MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET 10.0

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ int fnmatch_errors = 0;
int wildmatch_errors = 0;
#if !defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || __STDC_VERSION__ < 202311L
typedef char bool;
#endif
int output_iterations = 0;
int explode_mod = 0;
@@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ int empties_mod = 0;
int empty_at_start = 0;
int empty_at_end = 0;
static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
static const struct poptOption long_options[] = {
/* longName, shortName, argInfo, argPtr, value, descrip, argDesc */
{"iterations", 'i', POPT_ARG_NONE, &output_iterations, 0, 0, 0},
{"empties", 'e', POPT_ARG_STRING, 0, 'e', 0, 0},

View File

@@ -697,6 +697,13 @@ int recv_xattr_request(struct file_struct *file, int f_in)
rxa = lst->items;
num = 0;
while ((rel_pos = read_varint(f_in)) != 0) {
/* Detect signed overflow before the accumulating add. A hostile
* peer could otherwise wrap 'num' to land on an arbitrary value. */
if ((rel_pos > 0 && num > INT_MAX - rel_pos)
|| (rel_pos < 0 && num < INT_MIN - rel_pos)) {
rprintf(FERROR, "xattr rel_pos accumulation overflow [%s]\n", who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
num += rel_pos;
if (am_sender) {
/* The sender-related num values are only in order on the sender.
@@ -742,7 +749,7 @@ int recv_xattr_request(struct file_struct *file, int f_in)
}
old_datum = rxa->datum;
rxa->datum_len = read_varint(f_in);
rxa->datum_len = read_varint_size(f_in, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN, "xattr datum_len");
if (SIZE_MAX - rxa->name_len < rxa->datum_len)
overflow_exit("recv_xattr_request");
@@ -783,7 +790,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
return;
}
if ((count = read_varint(f)) != 0) {
count = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_COUNT, "xattr count");
if (count != 0) {
(void)EXPAND_ITEM_LIST(&temp_xattr, rsync_xa, count);
temp_xattr.count = 0;
}
@@ -791,8 +799,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
for (num = 1; num <= count; num++) {
char *ptr, *name;
rsync_xa *rxa;
size_t name_len = read_varint(f);
size_t datum_len = read_varint(f);
size_t name_len = read_varint_size(f, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_NAMELEN, "xattr name_len");
size_t datum_len = read_varint_size(f, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN, "xattr datum_len");
size_t dget_len = datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM ? 1 + (size_t)xattr_sum_len : datum_len;
size_t extra_len = MIGHT_NEED_RPRE ? RPRE_LEN : 0;
if (SIZE_MAX - dget_len < extra_len || SIZE_MAX - dget_len - extra_len < name_len)
@@ -860,8 +868,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
rxa->num = num;
}
if (need_sort && count > 1)
qsort(temp_xattr.items, count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
if (need_sort && temp_xattr.count > 1)
qsort(temp_xattr.items, temp_xattr.count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
ndx = rsync_xal_store(&temp_xattr); /* adds item to rsync_xal_l */
@@ -1086,7 +1094,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
&& !S_ISLNK(sxp->st.st_mode)
#endif
&& access(fname, W_OK) < 0
&& do_chmod(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
&& do_chmod_at(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
added_write_perm = 1;
ndx = F_XATTR(file);
@@ -1094,7 +1102,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
lst = &glst->xa_items;
int return_value = rsync_xal_set(fname, lst, fnamecmp, sxp);
if (added_write_perm) /* remove the temporary write permission */
do_chmod(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
do_chmod_at(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
return return_value;
}
@@ -1211,7 +1219,7 @@ int set_stat_xattr(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, mode_t new_mode)
mode = (fst.st_mode & _S_IFMT) | (fmode & ACCESSPERMS)
| (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode) ? 0700 : 0600);
if (fst.st_mode != mode)
do_chmod(fname, mode);
do_chmod_at(fname, mode);
if (!IS_DEVICE(fst.st_mode))
fst.st_rdev = 0; /* just in case */
@@ -1249,7 +1257,12 @@ int set_stat_xattr(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, mode_t new_mode)
int x_stat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *fst, STRUCT_STAT *xst)
{
int ret = do_stat(fname, fst);
/* Use the *_at variants so that on a daemon-no-chroot deployment
* the metadata read goes through a secure parent dirfd instead
* of bare path resolution. The *_at wrappers fall through to
* plain do_stat outside the daemon-no-chroot context, so this
* change is transparent for non-daemon use. */
int ret = do_stat_at(fname, fst);
if ((ret < 0 || get_stat_xattr(fname, -1, fst, xst) < 0) && xst)
xst->st_mode = 0;
return ret;
@@ -1257,7 +1270,7 @@ int x_stat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *fst, STRUCT_STAT *xst)
int x_lstat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *fst, STRUCT_STAT *xst)
{
int ret = do_lstat(fname, fst);
int ret = do_lstat_at(fname, fst);
if ((ret < 0 || get_stat_xattr(fname, -1, fst, xst) < 0) && xst)
xst->st_mode = 0;
return ret;

View File

@@ -62,10 +62,7 @@ local uLong adler32_combine_ OF((uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off64_t len2));
#endif
/* ========================================================================= */
uLong ZEXPORT adler32(adler, buf, len)
uLong adler;
const Bytef *buf;
uInt len;
uLong ZEXPORT adler32(uLong adler, const Bytef *buf, uInt len)
{
unsigned long sum2;
unsigned n;
@@ -133,10 +130,7 @@ uLong ZEXPORT adler32(adler, buf, len)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
local uLong adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2)
uLong adler1;
uLong adler2;
z_off64_t len2;
local uLong adler32_combine_(uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off64_t len2)
{
unsigned long sum1;
unsigned long sum2;
@@ -162,18 +156,12 @@ local uLong adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine(adler1, adler2, len2)
uLong adler1;
uLong adler2;
z_off_t len2;
uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine(uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off_t len2)
{
return adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2);
}
uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine64(adler1, adler2, len2)
uLong adler1;
uLong adler2;
z_off64_t len2;
uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine64(uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off64_t len2)
{
return adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2);
}

View File

@@ -19,12 +19,7 @@
memory, Z_BUF_ERROR if there was not enough room in the output buffer,
Z_STREAM_ERROR if the level parameter is invalid.
*/
int ZEXPORT compress2 (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen, level)
Bytef *dest;
uLongf *destLen;
const Bytef *source;
uLong sourceLen;
int level;
int ZEXPORT compress2 (Bytef *dest, uLongf *destLen, const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen, int level)
{
z_stream stream;
int err;
@@ -59,11 +54,7 @@ int ZEXPORT compress2 (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen, level)
/* ===========================================================================
*/
int ZEXPORT compress (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen)
Bytef *dest;
uLongf *destLen;
const Bytef *source;
uLong sourceLen;
int ZEXPORT compress (Bytef *dest, uLongf *destLen, const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen)
{
return compress2(dest, destLen, source, sourceLen, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION);
}
@@ -72,8 +63,7 @@ int ZEXPORT compress (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen)
If the default memLevel or windowBits for deflateInit() is changed, then
this function needs to be updated.
*/
uLong ZEXPORT compressBound (sourceLen)
uLong sourceLen;
uLong ZEXPORT compressBound (uLong sourceLen)
{
return sourceLen + (sourceLen >> 12) + (sourceLen >> 14) +
(sourceLen >> 25) + 13;

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ local void make_crc_table OF((void));
allow for word-at-a-time CRC calculation for both big-endian and little-
endian machines, where a word is four bytes.
*/
local void make_crc_table()
local void make_crc_table(void)
{
z_crc_t c;
int n, k;
@@ -164,9 +164,7 @@ local void make_crc_table()
}
#ifdef MAKECRCH
local void write_table(out, table)
FILE *out;
const z_crc_t FAR *table;
local void write_table(FILE *out, const z_crc_t FAR *table)
{
int n;
@@ -187,7 +185,7 @@ local void write_table(out, table)
/* =========================================================================
* This function can be used by asm versions of crc32()
*/
const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table()
const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table(void)
{
#ifdef DYNAMIC_CRC_TABLE
if (crc_table_empty)
@@ -201,10 +199,7 @@ const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table()
#define DO8 DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1
/* ========================================================================= */
unsigned long ZEXPORT crc32(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
uInt len;
unsigned long ZEXPORT crc32(unsigned long crc, const unsigned char FAR *buf, uInt len)
{
if (buf == Z_NULL) return 0UL;
@@ -244,10 +239,7 @@ unsigned long ZEXPORT crc32(crc, buf, len)
#define DOLIT32 DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4
/* ========================================================================= */
local unsigned long crc32_little(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
local unsigned long crc32_little(unsigned long crc, const unsigned char FAR *buf, unsigned len)
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
@@ -284,10 +276,7 @@ local unsigned long crc32_little(crc, buf, len)
#define DOBIG32 DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4
/* ========================================================================= */
local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
unsigned long crc;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
local unsigned long crc32_big(unsigned long crc, const unsigned char FAR *buf, unsigned len)
{
register z_crc_t c;
register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
@@ -322,9 +311,7 @@ local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
#define GF2_DIM 32 /* dimension of GF(2) vectors (length of CRC) */
/* ========================================================================= */
local unsigned long gf2_matrix_times(mat, vec)
unsigned long *mat;
unsigned long vec;
local unsigned long gf2_matrix_times(unsigned long *mat, unsigned long vec)
{
unsigned long sum;
@@ -339,9 +326,7 @@ local unsigned long gf2_matrix_times(mat, vec)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
local void gf2_matrix_square(square, mat)
unsigned long *square;
unsigned long *mat;
local void gf2_matrix_square(unsigned long *square, unsigned long *mat)
{
int n;
@@ -350,10 +335,7 @@ local void gf2_matrix_square(square, mat)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
local uLong crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2)
uLong crc1;
uLong crc2;
z_off64_t len2;
local uLong crc32_combine_(uLong crc1, uLong crc2, z_off64_t len2)
{
int n;
unsigned long row;
@@ -406,18 +388,12 @@ local uLong crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine(crc1, crc2, len2)
uLong crc1;
uLong crc2;
z_off_t len2;
uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine(uLong crc1, uLong crc2, z_off_t len2)
{
return crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2);
}
uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine64(crc1, crc2, len2)
uLong crc1;
uLong crc2;
z_off64_t len2;
uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine64(uLong crc1, uLong crc2, z_off64_t len2)
{
return crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2);
}

View File

@@ -200,11 +200,8 @@ struct static_tree_desc_s {int dummy;}; /* for buggy compilers */
zmemzero((Bytef *)s->head, (unsigned)(s->hash_size-1)*sizeof(*s->head));
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateInit_(strm, level, version, stream_size)
z_streamp strm;
int level;
const char *version;
int stream_size;
int ZEXPORT deflateInit_(z_streamp strm, int level, const char *version,
int stream_size)
{
return deflateInit2_(strm, level, Z_DEFLATED, MAX_WBITS, DEF_MEM_LEVEL,
Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY, version, stream_size);
@@ -212,16 +209,8 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit_(strm, level, version, stream_size)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
version, stream_size)
z_streamp strm;
int level;
int method;
int windowBits;
int memLevel;
int strategy;
const char *version;
int stream_size;
int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(z_streamp strm, int level, int method, int windowBits,
int memLevel, int strategy, const char *version, int stream_size)
{
deflate_state *s;
int wrap = 1;
@@ -359,10 +348,8 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateSetDictionary (strm, dictionary, dictLength)
z_streamp strm;
const Bytef *dictionary;
uInt dictLength;
int ZEXPORT deflateSetDictionary (z_streamp strm, const Bytef *dictionary,
uInt dictLength)
{
deflate_state *s;
uInt str, n;
@@ -428,8 +415,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateSetDictionary (strm, dictionary, dictLength)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateResetKeep (strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT deflateResetKeep (z_streamp strm)
{
deflate_state *s;
@@ -463,8 +449,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateResetKeep (strm)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateReset (strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT deflateReset (z_streamp strm)
{
int ret;
@@ -475,9 +460,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateReset (strm)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateSetHeader (strm, head)
z_streamp strm;
gz_headerp head;
int ZEXPORT deflateSetHeader (z_streamp strm, gz_headerp head)
{
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
if (strm->state->wrap != 2) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
@@ -486,10 +469,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateSetHeader (strm, head)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflatePending (strm, pending, bits)
unsigned *pending;
int *bits;
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT deflatePending (z_streamp strm, unsigned *pending, int *bits)
{
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
if (pending != Z_NULL)
@@ -500,10 +480,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflatePending (strm, pending, bits)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflatePrime (strm, bits, value)
z_streamp strm;
int bits;
int value;
int ZEXPORT deflatePrime (z_streamp strm, int bits, int value)
{
deflate_state *s;
int put;
@@ -526,10 +503,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflatePrime (strm, bits, value)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateParams(strm, level, strategy)
z_streamp strm;
int level;
int strategy;
int ZEXPORT deflateParams(z_streamp strm, int level, int strategy)
{
deflate_state *s;
compress_func func;
@@ -567,12 +541,8 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateParams(strm, level, strategy)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateTune(strm, good_length, max_lazy, nice_length, max_chain)
z_streamp strm;
int good_length;
int max_lazy;
int nice_length;
int max_chain;
int ZEXPORT deflateTune(z_streamp strm, int good_length, int max_lazy,
int nice_length, int max_chain)
{
deflate_state *s;
@@ -602,9 +572,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateTune(strm, good_length, max_lazy, nice_length, max_chain)
* upper bound of about 14% expansion does not seem onerous for output buffer
* allocation.
*/
uLong ZEXPORT deflateBound(strm, sourceLen)
z_streamp strm;
uLong sourceLen;
uLong ZEXPORT deflateBound(z_streamp strm, uLong sourceLen)
{
deflate_state *s;
uLong complen, wraplen;
@@ -664,9 +632,7 @@ uLong ZEXPORT deflateBound(strm, sourceLen)
* IN assertion: the stream state is correct and there is enough room in
* pending_buf.
*/
local void putShortMSB (s, b)
deflate_state *s;
uInt b;
local void putShortMSB (deflate_state *s, uInt b)
{
put_byte(s, (Byte)(b >> 8));
put_byte(s, (Byte)(b & 0xff));
@@ -678,8 +644,7 @@ local void putShortMSB (s, b)
* to avoid allocating a large strm->next_out buffer and copying into it.
* (See also read_buf()).
*/
local void flush_pending(strm)
z_streamp strm;
local void flush_pending(z_streamp strm)
{
unsigned len;
deflate_state *s = strm->state;
@@ -701,9 +666,7 @@ local void flush_pending(strm)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflate (strm, flush)
z_streamp strm;
int flush;
int ZEXPORT deflate (z_streamp strm, int flush)
{
int old_flush; /* value of flush param for previous deflate call */
deflate_state *s;
@@ -1015,8 +978,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflate (strm, flush)
}
/* ========================================================================= */
int ZEXPORT deflateEnd (strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT deflateEnd (z_streamp strm)
{
int status;
@@ -1050,9 +1012,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateEnd (strm)
* To simplify the source, this is not supported for 16-bit MSDOS (which
* doesn't have enough memory anyway to duplicate compression states).
*/
int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
z_streamp dest;
z_streamp source;
int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (z_streamp dest, z_streamp source)
{
#ifdef MAXSEG_64K
return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
@@ -1109,10 +1069,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
* allocating a large strm->next_in buffer and copying from it.
* (See also flush_pending()).
*/
local int read_buf(strm, buf, size)
z_streamp strm;
Bytef *buf;
unsigned size;
local int read_buf(z_streamp strm, Bytef *buf, unsigned size)
{
unsigned len = strm->avail_in;
@@ -1139,8 +1096,7 @@ local int read_buf(strm, buf, size)
/* ===========================================================================
* Initialize the "longest match" routines for a new zlib stream
*/
local void lm_init (s)
deflate_state *s;
local void lm_init (deflate_state *s)
{
s->window_size = (ulg)2L*s->w_size;
@@ -1181,9 +1137,7 @@ local void lm_init (s)
/* For 80x86 and 680x0, an optimized version will be provided in match.asm or
* match.S. The code will be functionally equivalent.
*/
local uInt longest_match(s, cur_match)
deflate_state *s;
IPos cur_match; /* current match */
local uInt longest_match(deflate_state *s, IPos cur_match)
{
unsigned chain_length = s->max_chain_length;/* max hash chain length */
register Bytef *scan = s->window + s->strstart; /* current string */
@@ -1330,9 +1284,7 @@ local uInt longest_match(s, cur_match)
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Optimized version for FASTEST only
*/
local uInt longest_match(s, cur_match)
deflate_state *s;
IPos cur_match; /* current match */
local uInt longest_match(deflate_state *s, IPos cur_match)
{
register Bytef *scan = s->window + s->strstart; /* current string */
register Bytef *match; /* matched string */
@@ -1389,10 +1341,7 @@ local uInt longest_match(s, cur_match)
/* ===========================================================================
* Check that the match at match_start is indeed a match.
*/
local void check_match(s, start, match, length)
deflate_state *s;
IPos start, match;
int length;
local void check_match(deflate_state *s, IPos start, IPos match, int length)
{
/* check that the match is indeed a match */
if (zmemcmp(s->window + match,
@@ -1423,8 +1372,7 @@ local void check_match(s, start, match, length)
* performed for at least two bytes (required for the zip translate_eol
* option -- not supported here).
*/
local void fill_window(s)
deflate_state *s;
local void fill_window(deflate_state *s)
{
register unsigned n, m;
register Posf *p;
@@ -1597,9 +1545,7 @@ local void fill_window(s)
* NOTE: this function should be optimized to avoid extra copying from
* window to pending_buf.
*/
local block_state deflate_stored(s, flush)
deflate_state *s;
int flush;
local block_state deflate_stored(deflate_state *s, int flush)
{
/* Stored blocks are limited to 0xffff bytes, pending_buf is limited
* to pending_buf_size, and each stored block has a 5 byte header:
@@ -1670,9 +1616,7 @@ local block_state deflate_stored(s, flush)
* new strings in the dictionary only for unmatched strings or for short
* matches. It is used only for the fast compression options.
*/
local block_state deflate_fast(s, flush)
deflate_state *s;
int flush;
local block_state deflate_fast(deflate_state *s, int flush)
{
IPos hash_head; /* head of the hash chain */
int bflush; /* set if current block must be flushed */
@@ -1782,9 +1726,7 @@ local block_state deflate_fast(s, flush)
* evaluation for matches: a match is finally adopted only if there is
* no better match at the next window position.
*/
local block_state deflate_slow(s, flush)
deflate_state *s;
int flush;
local block_state deflate_slow(deflate_state *s, int flush)
{
IPos hash_head; /* head of hash chain */
int bflush; /* set if current block must be flushed */
@@ -1923,9 +1865,7 @@ local block_state deflate_slow(s, flush)
* one. Do not maintain a hash table. (It will be regenerated if this run of
* deflate switches away from Z_RLE.)
*/
local block_state deflate_rle(s, flush)
deflate_state *s;
int flush;
local block_state deflate_rle(deflate_state *s, int flush)
{
int bflush; /* set if current block must be flushed */
uInt prev; /* byte at distance one to match */
@@ -1996,9 +1936,7 @@ local block_state deflate_rle(s, flush)
* For Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY, do not look for matches. Do not maintain a hash table.
* (It will be regenerated if this run of deflate switches away from Huffman.)
*/
local block_state deflate_huff(s, flush)
deflate_state *s;
int flush;
local block_state deflate_huff(deflate_state *s, int flush)
{
int bflush; /* set if current block must be flushed */

View File

@@ -45,9 +45,7 @@
requires strm->avail_out >= 258 for each loop to avoid checking for
output space.
*/
void ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_fast(strm, start)
z_streamp strm;
unsigned start; /* inflate()'s starting value for strm->avail_out */
void ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_fast(z_streamp strm, unsigned start)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
z_const unsigned char FAR *in; /* local strm->next_in */

View File

@@ -101,8 +101,7 @@ local int updatewindow OF((z_streamp strm, const unsigned char FAR *end,
local unsigned syncsearch OF((unsigned FAR *have, const unsigned char FAR *buf,
unsigned len));
int ZEXPORT inflateResetKeep(strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT inflateResetKeep(z_streamp strm)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -126,8 +125,7 @@ z_streamp strm;
return Z_OK;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateReset(strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT inflateReset(z_streamp strm)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -139,9 +137,7 @@ z_streamp strm;
return inflateResetKeep(strm);
}
int ZEXPORT inflateReset2(strm, windowBits)
z_streamp strm;
int windowBits;
int ZEXPORT inflateReset2(z_streamp strm, int windowBits)
{
int wrap;
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -177,11 +173,7 @@ int windowBits;
return inflateReset(strm);
}
int ZEXPORT inflateInit2_(strm, windowBits, version, stream_size)
z_streamp strm;
int windowBits;
const char *version;
int stream_size;
int ZEXPORT inflateInit2_(z_streamp strm, int windowBits, const char *version, int stream_size)
{
int ret;
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -219,18 +211,12 @@ int stream_size;
return ret;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateInit_(strm, version, stream_size)
z_streamp strm;
const char *version;
int stream_size;
int ZEXPORT inflateInit_(z_streamp strm, const char *version, int stream_size)
{
return inflateInit2_(strm, DEF_WBITS, version, stream_size);
}
int ZEXPORT inflatePrime(strm, bits, value)
z_streamp strm;
int bits;
int value;
int ZEXPORT inflatePrime(z_streamp strm, int bits, int value)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -258,8 +244,7 @@ int value;
used for threaded applications, since the rewriting of the tables and virgin
may not be thread-safe.
*/
local void fixedtables(state)
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
local void fixedtables(struct inflate_state FAR *state)
{
#ifdef BUILDFIXED
static int virgin = 1;
@@ -376,10 +361,7 @@ void makefixed()
output will fall in the output data, making match copies simpler and faster.
The advantage may be dependent on the size of the processor's data caches.
*/
local int updatewindow(strm, end, copy)
z_streamp strm;
const Bytef *end;
unsigned copy;
local int updatewindow(z_streamp strm, const Bytef *end, unsigned copy)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
unsigned dist;
@@ -602,9 +584,7 @@ unsigned copy;
will return Z_BUF_ERROR if it has not reached the end of the stream.
*/
int ZEXPORT inflate(strm, flush)
z_streamp strm;
int flush;
int ZEXPORT inflate(z_streamp strm, int flush)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
z_const unsigned char FAR *next; /* next input */
@@ -1274,8 +1254,7 @@ int flush;
return ret;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateEnd(strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT inflateEnd(z_streamp strm)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL || strm->zfree == (free_func)0)
@@ -1288,10 +1267,7 @@ z_streamp strm;
return Z_OK;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateGetDictionary(strm, dictionary, dictLength)
z_streamp strm;
Bytef *dictionary;
uInt *dictLength;
int ZEXPORT inflateGetDictionary(z_streamp strm, Bytef *dictionary, uInt *dictLength)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -1311,10 +1287,7 @@ uInt *dictLength;
return Z_OK;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateSetDictionary(strm, dictionary, dictLength)
z_streamp strm;
const Bytef *dictionary;
uInt dictLength;
int ZEXPORT inflateSetDictionary(z_streamp strm, const Bytef *dictionary, uInt dictLength)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
unsigned long dictid;
@@ -1346,9 +1319,7 @@ uInt dictLength;
return Z_OK;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateGetHeader(strm, head)
z_streamp strm;
gz_headerp head;
int ZEXPORT inflateGetHeader(z_streamp strm, gz_headerp head)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -1374,10 +1345,7 @@ gz_headerp head;
called again with more data and the *have state. *have is initialized to
zero for the first call.
*/
local unsigned syncsearch(have, buf, len)
unsigned FAR *have;
const unsigned char FAR *buf;
unsigned len;
local unsigned syncsearch(unsigned FAR *have, const unsigned char FAR *buf, unsigned len)
{
unsigned got;
unsigned next;
@@ -1397,8 +1365,7 @@ unsigned len;
return next;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateSync(strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT inflateSync(z_streamp strm)
{
unsigned len; /* number of bytes to look at or looked at */
unsigned long in, out; /* temporary to save total_in and total_out */
@@ -1448,8 +1415,7 @@ z_streamp strm;
block. When decompressing, PPP checks that at the end of input packet,
inflate is waiting for these length bytes.
*/
int ZEXPORT inflateSyncPoint(strm)
z_streamp strm;
int ZEXPORT inflateSyncPoint(z_streamp strm)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -1458,9 +1424,7 @@ z_streamp strm;
return state->mode == STORED && state->bits == 0;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateCopy(dest, source)
z_streamp dest;
z_streamp source;
int ZEXPORT inflateCopy(z_streamp dest, z_streamp source)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
struct inflate_state FAR *copy;
@@ -1505,9 +1469,7 @@ z_streamp source;
return Z_OK;
}
int ZEXPORT inflateUndermine(strm, subvert)
z_streamp strm;
int subvert;
int ZEXPORT inflateUndermine(z_streamp strm, int subvert)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
@@ -1522,8 +1484,7 @@ int subvert;
#endif
}
long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
long ZEXPORT inflateMark(z_streamp strm)
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;

View File

@@ -29,13 +29,9 @@ const char inflate_copyright[] =
table index bits. It will differ if the request is greater than the
longest code or if it is less than the shortest code.
*/
int ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_table(type, lens, codes, table, bits, work)
codetype type;
unsigned short FAR *lens;
unsigned codes;
code FAR * FAR *table;
unsigned FAR *bits;
unsigned short FAR *work;
int ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_table(codetype type, unsigned short FAR *lens,
unsigned codes, code FAR * FAR *table, unsigned FAR *bits,
unsigned short FAR *work)
{
unsigned len; /* a code's length in bits */
unsigned sym; /* index of code symbols */

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@@ -185,10 +185,7 @@ local void gen_trees_header OF((void));
#ifdef DEBUG
local void send_bits OF((deflate_state *s, int value, int length));
local void send_bits(s, value, length)
deflate_state *s;
int value; /* value to send */
int length; /* number of bits */
local void send_bits(deflate_state *s, int value, int length)
{
Tracevv((stderr," l %2d v %4x ", length, value));
Assert(length > 0 && length <= 15, "invalid length");
@@ -231,7 +228,7 @@ local void send_bits(s, value, length)
/* ===========================================================================
* Initialize the various 'constant' tables.
*/
local void tr_static_init()
local void tr_static_init(void)
{
#if defined(GEN_TREES_H) || !defined(STDC)
static int static_init_done = 0;
@@ -325,7 +322,7 @@ local void tr_static_init()
((i) == (last)? "\n};\n\n" : \
((i) % (width) == (width)-1 ? ",\n" : ", "))
void gen_trees_header()
void gen_trees_header(void)
{
FILE *header = fopen("trees.h", "w");
int i;
@@ -378,8 +375,7 @@ void gen_trees_header()
/* ===========================================================================
* Initialize the tree data structures for a new zlib stream.
*/
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_init(s)
deflate_state *s;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_init(deflate_state *s)
{
tr_static_init();
@@ -406,8 +402,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_init(s)
/* ===========================================================================
* Initialize a new block.
*/
local void init_block(s)
deflate_state *s;
local void init_block(deflate_state *s)
{
int n; /* iterates over tree elements */
@@ -450,10 +445,7 @@ local void init_block(s)
* when the heap property is re-established (each father smaller than its
* two sons).
*/
local void pqdownheap(s, tree, k)
deflate_state *s;
ct_data *tree; /* the tree to restore */
int k; /* node to move down */
local void pqdownheap(deflate_state *s, ct_data *tree, int k)
{
int v = s->heap[k];
int j = k << 1; /* left son of k */
@@ -485,9 +477,7 @@ local void pqdownheap(s, tree, k)
* The length opt_len is updated; static_len is also updated if stree is
* not null.
*/
local void gen_bitlen(s, desc)
deflate_state *s;
tree_desc *desc; /* the tree descriptor */
local void gen_bitlen(deflate_state *s, tree_desc *desc)
{
ct_data *tree = desc->dyn_tree;
int max_code = desc->max_code;
@@ -572,10 +562,7 @@ local void gen_bitlen(s, desc)
* OUT assertion: the field code is set for all tree elements of non
* zero code length.
*/
local void gen_codes (tree, max_code, bl_count)
ct_data *tree; /* the tree to decorate */
int max_code; /* largest code with non zero frequency */
ushf *bl_count; /* number of codes at each bit length */
local void gen_codes(ct_data *tree, int max_code, ushf *bl_count)
{
ush next_code[MAX_BITS+1]; /* next code value for each bit length */
ush code = 0; /* running code value */
@@ -614,9 +601,7 @@ local void gen_codes (tree, max_code, bl_count)
* and corresponding code. The length opt_len is updated; static_len is
* also updated if stree is not null. The field max_code is set.
*/
local void build_tree(s, desc)
deflate_state *s;
tree_desc *desc; /* the tree descriptor */
local void build_tree(deflate_state *s, tree_desc *desc)
{
ct_data *tree = desc->dyn_tree;
const ct_data *stree = desc->stat_desc->static_tree;
@@ -702,10 +687,7 @@ local void build_tree(s, desc)
* Scan a literal or distance tree to determine the frequencies of the codes
* in the bit length tree.
*/
local void scan_tree (s, tree, max_code)
deflate_state *s;
ct_data *tree; /* the tree to be scanned */
int max_code; /* and its largest code of non zero frequency */
local void scan_tree(deflate_state *s, ct_data *tree, int max_code)
{
int n; /* iterates over all tree elements */
int prevlen = -1; /* last emitted length */
@@ -747,10 +729,7 @@ local void scan_tree (s, tree, max_code)
* Send a literal or distance tree in compressed form, using the codes in
* bl_tree.
*/
local void send_tree (s, tree, max_code)
deflate_state *s;
ct_data *tree; /* the tree to be scanned */
int max_code; /* and its largest code of non zero frequency */
local void send_tree(deflate_state *s, ct_data *tree, int max_code)
{
int n; /* iterates over all tree elements */
int prevlen = -1; /* last emitted length */
@@ -798,8 +777,7 @@ local void send_tree (s, tree, max_code)
* Construct the Huffman tree for the bit lengths and return the index in
* bl_order of the last bit length code to send.
*/
local int build_bl_tree(s)
deflate_state *s;
local int build_bl_tree(deflate_state *s)
{
int max_blindex; /* index of last bit length code of non zero freq */
@@ -833,9 +811,7 @@ local int build_bl_tree(s)
* lengths of the bit length codes, the literal tree and the distance tree.
* IN assertion: lcodes >= 257, dcodes >= 1, blcodes >= 4.
*/
local void send_all_trees(s, lcodes, dcodes, blcodes)
deflate_state *s;
int lcodes, dcodes, blcodes; /* number of codes for each tree */
local void send_all_trees(deflate_state *s, int lcodes, int dcodes, int blcodes)
{
int rank; /* index in bl_order */
@@ -862,11 +838,7 @@ local void send_all_trees(s, lcodes, dcodes, blcodes)
/* ===========================================================================
* Send a stored block
*/
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_stored_block(s, buf, stored_len, last)
deflate_state *s;
charf *buf; /* input block */
ulg stored_len; /* length of input block */
int last; /* one if this is the last block for a file */
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_stored_block(deflate_state *s, charf *buf, ulg stored_len, int last)
{
send_bits(s, (STORED_BLOCK<<1)+last, 3); /* send block type */
#ifdef DEBUG
@@ -879,8 +851,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_stored_block(s, buf, stored_len, last)
/* ===========================================================================
* Flush the bits in the bit buffer to pending output (leaves at most 7 bits)
*/
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_bits(s)
deflate_state *s;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_bits(deflate_state *s)
{
bi_flush(s);
}
@@ -889,8 +860,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_bits(s)
* Send one empty static block to give enough lookahead for inflate.
* This takes 10 bits, of which 7 may remain in the bit buffer.
*/
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_align(s)
deflate_state *s;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_align(deflate_state *s)
{
send_bits(s, STATIC_TREES<<1, 3);
send_code(s, END_BLOCK, static_ltree);
@@ -904,11 +874,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_align(s)
* Determine the best encoding for the current block: dynamic trees, static
* trees or store, and output the encoded block to the zip file.
*/
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_block(s, buf, stored_len, last)
deflate_state *s;
charf *buf; /* input block, or NULL if too old */
ulg stored_len; /* length of input block */
int last; /* one if this is the last block for a file */
void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_block(deflate_state *s, charf *buf, ulg stored_len, int last)
{
ulg opt_lenb, static_lenb; /* opt_len and static_len in bytes */
int max_blindex = 0; /* index of last bit length code of non zero freq */
@@ -1007,10 +973,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_block(s, buf, stored_len, last)
* Save the match info and tally the frequency counts. Return true if
* the current block must be flushed.
*/
int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally (s, dist, lc)
deflate_state *s;
unsigned dist; /* distance of matched string */
unsigned lc; /* match length-MIN_MATCH or unmatched char (if dist==0) */
int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally(deflate_state *s, unsigned dist, unsigned lc)
{
s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist;
s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist >> 8;
@@ -1035,10 +998,7 @@ int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally (s, dist, lc)
/* ===========================================================================
* Send the block data compressed using the given Huffman trees
*/
local void compress_block(s, ltree, dtree)
deflate_state *s;
const ct_data *ltree; /* literal tree */
const ct_data *dtree; /* distance tree */
local void compress_block(deflate_state *s, const ct_data *ltree, const ct_data *dtree)
{
unsigned dist; /* distance of matched string */
int lc; /* match length or unmatched char (if dist == 0) */
@@ -1095,8 +1055,7 @@ local void compress_block(s, ltree, dtree)
* (7 {BEL}, 8 {BS}, 11 {VT}, 12 {FF}, 26 {SUB}, 27 {ESC}).
* IN assertion: the fields Freq of dyn_ltree are set.
*/
local int detect_data_type(s)
deflate_state *s;
local int detect_data_type(deflate_state *s)
{
/* black_mask is the bit mask of black-listed bytes
* set bits 0..6, 14..25, and 28..31
@@ -1129,9 +1088,7 @@ local int detect_data_type(s)
* method would use a table)
* IN assertion: 1 <= len <= 15
*/
local unsigned bi_reverse(code, len)
unsigned code; /* the value to invert */
int len; /* its bit length */
local unsigned bi_reverse(unsigned code, int len)
{
register unsigned res = 0;
do {
@@ -1144,8 +1101,7 @@ local unsigned bi_reverse(code, len)
/* ===========================================================================
* Flush the bit buffer, keeping at most 7 bits in it.
*/
local void bi_flush(s)
deflate_state *s;
local void bi_flush(deflate_state *s)
{
if (s->bi_valid == 16) {
put_short(s, s->bi_buf);
@@ -1161,8 +1117,7 @@ local void bi_flush(s)
/* ===========================================================================
* Flush the bit buffer and align the output on a byte boundary
*/
local void bi_windup(s)
deflate_state *s;
local void bi_windup(deflate_state *s)
{
if (s->bi_valid > 8) {
put_short(s, s->bi_buf);
@@ -1180,11 +1135,7 @@ local void bi_windup(s)
* Copy a stored block, storing first the length and its
* one's complement if requested.
*/
local void copy_block(s, buf, len, header)
deflate_state *s;
charf *buf; /* the input data */
unsigned len; /* its length */
int header; /* true if block header must be written */
local void copy_block(deflate_state *s, charf *buf, unsigned len, int header)
{
bi_windup(s); /* align on byte boundary */

View File

@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ z_const char * const z_errmsg[10] = {
""};
const char * ZEXPORT zlibVersion()
const char * ZEXPORT zlibVersion(void)
{
return ZLIB_VERSION;
}
uLong ZEXPORT zlibCompileFlags()
uLong ZEXPORT zlibCompileFlags(void)
{
uLong flags;
@@ -122,8 +122,7 @@ uLong ZEXPORT zlibCompileFlags()
# endif
int ZLIB_INTERNAL z_verbose = verbose;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL z_error (m)
char *m;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL z_error (char *m)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
exit(1);
@@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL z_error (m)
/* exported to allow conversion of error code to string for compress() and
* uncompress()
*/
const char * ZEXPORT zError(err)
int err;
const char * ZEXPORT zError(int err)
{
return ERR_MSG(err);
}
@@ -149,10 +147,7 @@ const char * ZEXPORT zError(err)
#ifndef HAVE_MEMCPY
void ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemcpy(dest, source, len)
Bytef* dest;
const Bytef* source;
uInt len;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemcpy(Bytef* dest, const Bytef* source, uInt len)
{
if (len == 0) return;
do {
@@ -160,10 +155,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemcpy(dest, source, len)
} while (--len != 0);
}
int ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemcmp(s1, s2, len)
const Bytef* s1;
const Bytef* s2;
uInt len;
int ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemcmp(const Bytef* s1, const Bytef* s2, uInt len)
{
uInt j;
@@ -173,9 +165,7 @@ int ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemcmp(s1, s2, len)
return 0;
}
void ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemzero(dest, len)
Bytef* dest;
uInt len;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL zmemzero(Bytef* dest, uInt len)
{
if (len == 0) return;
do {
@@ -301,19 +291,14 @@ extern voidp calloc OF((uInt items, uInt size));
extern void free OF((voidpf ptr));
#endif
voidpf ZLIB_INTERNAL zcalloc (opaque, items, size)
voidpf opaque;
unsigned items;
unsigned size;
voidpf ZLIB_INTERNAL zcalloc (voidpf opaque, unsigned items, unsigned size)
{
if (opaque) items += size - size; /* make compiler happy */
return sizeof(uInt) > 2 ? (voidpf)malloc(items * size) :
(voidpf)calloc(items, size);
}
void ZLIB_INTERNAL zcfree (opaque, ptr)
voidpf opaque;
voidpf ptr;
void ZLIB_INTERNAL zcfree (voidpf opaque, voidpf ptr)
{
free(ptr);
if (opaque) return; /* make compiler happy */