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docs: update SECURITY.md with trust model baseline
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32
SECURITY.md
32
SECURITY.md
@@ -41,3 +41,35 @@ When reporting, include as much of the following as you can:
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- If the report is declined, out of scope, or cannot be reproduced, we will explain why when possible.
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Please avoid public disclosure until a fix has been released and maintainers have had reasonable time to notify users.
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## Trust model baseline
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Zerobyte is a self-hosted operator tool. Treat any authenticated user as a trusted machine/operator user with intentional access to:
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- Browse/select host directories for volumes
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- Configure local, network, and cloud storage backends
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- Trigger mounts/unmounts, backups, restores, and Restic maintenance
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- Read/write files through intended backup/restore workflows
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- Access repository/volume metadata needed to operate backups
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Do **not** report these as vulnerabilities by themselves:
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- Authenticated host filesystem browsing
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- Local directory volume pointing to broad host paths
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- Backing up arbitrary readable host paths
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- Restoring snapshots to arbitrary writable host paths
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- Authenticated Restic/mount/rclone execution through intended UI flows
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- Information disclosure to authenticated operators about filesystem paths or backend errors
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Only report issues when they violate this trust model, for example:
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- Unauthenticated access to operator features
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- CSRF/cross-origin abuse causing a trusted operator’s browser to perform actions
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- Shell/command injection beyond intended argument-based execution
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- Path traversal that escapes a deliberately configured root/volume/repository boundary
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- Secret leakage to logs, unauthenticated users, or non-operator contexts
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- Cross-organization data access despite authenticated trust
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- Privilege bypass between global admin/org admin/member where the product explicitly distinguishes roles
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- Unsafe dev-only features enabled without the documented gate
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- Vulnerabilities in parsing untrusted external data from repositories/backends/notifications
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- Persistence corruption, data loss, or workflow bypass not intended by operator actions
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