apply_extra_data() used GFile path-based operations that follow
symlinks: --ro-bind/--bind with resolved paths, chmod on the extra
directory path, and flatpak_cp_a for the extra/export merge.
These are not independently exploitable: apply_extra_data only runs
after extract_extra_data has already created files/extra as a real
directory, so there is no symlink left to follow. The apply_extra
script itself runs in a restricted sandbox with dropped caps and no
/proc. The extra/export merge only adds to the app's own export
directory, which is already app-controlled and whose desktop file
Exec keys are rewritten to flatpak run.
Replace with fd-relative operations as defense in depth:
glnx_chaseat with GLNX_CHASE_RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS and
GLNX_CHASE_RESOLVE_BENEATH for directory traversal,
--ro-bind-fd/--bind-fd for bwrap mounts, fchmod on the directory fd,
and flatpak_cp_a_at for the export merge.
Helps: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-fqx6-vh4p-42cg
[smcv: Use glnx_fd_reopen() to reopen O_PATH fd as readable]
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Sebastian Wick
0860bb1d70