Files
flatpak/common
Sebastian Wick e07a5b5ac0 dir: Use fd-based traversal for marker files in deploy directories
The paths up to files/ are not attacker-controlled, and
g_file_replace_contents with G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION already
replaces symlinks rather than following them, so this is not a security
fix. The only reason why is that the file is in the root of the attacker
controlled directory.

This is a bit subtle, so lets do the right thing and concistently use
fd-relative operations when doing anything inside attacker/app
controlled directories.

Helps: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-w69g-9x8j-7p8f
2026-08-11 01:22:28 +02:00
..
2019-02-25 18:12:30 +00:00
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2018-05-24 11:59:52 +00:00
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