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265 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrew Tridgell
0ab4c3de6f util1: handle out-of-range times in timestring 2026-05-15 12:01:21 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
d094c4723a main: reject hyphen-prefixed remote-shell hostnames 2026-05-15 12:01:21 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
36860669cc socket: reject over-long proxy response line
fixes a one byte stack overflow when using RSYNC_PROXY with a
malicious proxy.

Reach: only when RSYNC_PROXY is set and a malicious or MITM'd
proxy returns the pathological response.  The byte written is
always '\0' and the attacker doesn't choose the offset, so impact
is corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
misbehaviour or crash -- no information disclosure beyond the
existing rprintf of buffer contents.

Reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich
2026-05-15 12:01:21 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
0beceb95ac rsync.h: lower MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT to avoid signed-int overflow in read_del_stats
read_del_stats() in main.c accumulates 5 wire-supplied counts into
the int32 stats.deleted_files field:

    stats.deleted_files  = read_varint_bounded(..., MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, ...);
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs     = ...;
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = ...;
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices  = ...;
    stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = ...;

With the previous MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT = 2^30 (1.07 GB) the worst-case
sum is 5 * 2^30 = 5.37 GB; three maximal values already exceed
INT32_MAX = 2.15 GB on the third "+=", triggering signed integer
overflow (C99 6.5/5 -- undefined behaviour, the compiler may assume
it cannot happen and elide subsequent checks).

The bound was introduced in f0155902 ("defence-in-depth: bound
wire-supplied counts and lengths") with a commit message claiming
"per-summand cap so the total can't overflow", but 2^30 * 5 does
overflow.  Lower the per-summand cap to 2^28 (= 268M) so the worst
case is 5 * 2^28 = 1.34 GB < INT32_MAX with margin.  2^28 deletions
per category is still vastly above any plausible real transfer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 12:01:13 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
4370cb2ce1 testsuite: fixes for 3.2.7 backport 2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
f406c780ec popt: fix poptDupArgv strlcpy size argument
The bundled popt 1.18 (rsync 3.2.7) calls strlcpy(dst, argv[i], nb)
inside the per-arg loop in poptDupArgv(), where nb is the TOTAL
allocation size — not the remaining bytes after dst has advanced.
The actual write was always within the malloc'd buffer, so it was
silent on older glibcs, but glibc 2.39+ fortified strlcpy compares
the size argument against __bos(dst) and aborts with "*** buffer
overflow detected ***" once dst passes through any bytes.

That broke ~15 tests on Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 in CI (any test
spawning a child rsync via popt's argv duplication path). Pass the
remaining bytes (end_buf - dst) so the size argument matches reality.

Master fixed the same bug differently in popt 1.19 (4c8683c8 "update
to popt 1.19") by switching to stpcpy, but pulling that 1500-line
refresh into a security backport is heavier than warranted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
259e04f923 ci: update RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED for 3.2.7 backport baseline
The macOS / Cygwin expected-skipped lists in 3.4.x master assume
features that are present on master but not on 3.2.7 (e.g.
open-noatime semantics) and don't account for new tests added by
the May 2026 sec-patches that get skipped on these platforms
(daemon-chroot-acl, *-symlink-race, sender-flist-symlink-leak).
Realign each list with what the platform actually skips on this
backport branch so RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED matches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
189612f94a testsuite: use integer sleep in clean-fname-underflow.test
Solaris /usr/bin/sleep is POSIX and rejects fractional seconds, which
made the test abort silently under `set -eu` (empty log, FAIL). One
second is more than enough for the daemon to listen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Jiri Slaby
9354f27f9d exclude: fix crashes with fortified strlcpy()
Fortified (-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 for gcc) builds make strlcpy() crash when
its third parameter (size) is larger than the buffer:
  $ rsync -FFXHav '--filter=merge global-rsync-filter' Align-37-43/ xxx
  sending incremental file list
  *** buffer overflow detected ***: terminated

It's in the exclude code in setup_merge_file():
  strlcpy(y, save, MAXPATHLEN);

Note the 'y' pointer was incremented, so it no longer points to memory
with MAXPATHLEN "owned" bytes.

Fix it by remembering the number of copied bytes into the 'save' buffer
and use that instead of MAXPATHLEN which is clearly incorrect.

Fixes #511.
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
a335091e91 CI: added workflows from master for backport testing 2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
3ac8349e07 defence-in-depth: receiver block-index bounds + read_delay_line null check
Two assorted audit findings:

  - receive_data() never bounds-checked the block index returned
    by recv_token() against sum.count before computing offset2
    and feeding it to map_ptr(). An out-of-bounds index from a
    hostile sender produces invalid memory access. Add a
    sum.count bounds check.

  - read_delay_line()'s strchr() call could return NULL when no
    space was found, but the code unconditionally added 1 to the
    result before dereferencing. Low impact (just a disconnect on
    exit of the client-specific forked process) but the NULL
    deref is real. Guard the NULL.

Both reported by Joshua Rogers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
816aa32059 defence-in-depth: guard cumulative snprintf against length underflow
Two cumulative-snprintf patterns in log.c (rsyserr) and main.c
(output_itemized_counts) had the shape

    len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, ...);
    len += snprintf(buf+len, sizeof buf - len, ...);

with no guard between calls. snprintf returns the would-have-been
length on truncation, so a truncated first call leaves
"sizeof buf - len" as a negative-then-promoted-to-size_t value,
underflowing into a huge size_t and writing past buf.

Realistic exposure is small in both cases (log header well under
buffer, only ~5 itemized iterations writing ~25 chars each into a
1024-byte buffer) but the defect class matches bb0a8118 and the
fix is cheap. Guard before each subsequent call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
f50c1d59c4 defence-in-depth: bound wire-supplied counts and lengths
Multiple receiver-side fields read from the wire were trusted
without upper-bound checks. A hostile peer could either request
extreme allocations (DoS via --max-alloc) or, on platforms where
read_varint returned a negative value, push ~SIZE_MAX through the
size_t conversion to wrap downstream length checks.

Introduce read_int_bounded(), read_varint_bounded() and
read_varint_size() in io.c so wire-derived integer ranges are
checked at the read site rather than scattered across each
caller, with RERR_PROTOCOL on out-of-range input.

Apply the bounded primitives to:
  - sum->count (checksum count -- previously could overflow
    (size_t)count * xfer_sum_len on 32-bit with raised max-alloc)
  - xattrs: count, name_len, datum_len, plus rel_pos overflow
    detect to stop chain wrapping the num accumulator
  - acls: ida-entry count
  - flist: file mode S_IFMT validation, modtime_nsec range check
  - delete-stat counters in main: per-summand cap so the total
    can't overflow a signed 32-bit accumulator

Reporters include Joshua Rogers (checksum-count overflow finding).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
74ea276900 clientserver: fix hostname ACL bypass when using daemon chroot
On an rsync daemon configured with "daemon chroot", the reverse-DNS
lookup of the connecting client was performed *after* the chroot
had been entered. If the chroot did not contain the files glibc
needs for resolution (/etc/resolv.conf, /etc/nsswitch.conf,
/etc/hosts, NSS service modules), the lookup failed and
client_name() returned "UNKNOWN". Hostname-based deny rules
("hosts deny = *.evil.example") therefore could not match, and
an attacker controlling their PTR record could connect from a
hostname the administrator had intended to deny. IP-based ACLs
were unaffected.

Do the reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid; client_name()
caches its result, so the post-chroot call uses the cached value
and hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
post-chroot.

Adds testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test as end-to-end regression
coverage. The test sets up an empty chroot directory, configures
"hosts deny = <localhost-resolved-name>" with daemon chroot, and
asserts the connection is refused with @ERROR access denied.
Uses unshare --user --map-root-user for non-root CAP_SYS_CHROOT;
skips cleanly on non-Linux or when user namespaces aren't
available.

Reporter: Joshua Rogers (MegaManSec).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
0a5fa00fdc receiver: add parent_ndx<0 guard, mirroring 797e17f
Commit 797e17f ("fixed an invalid access to files array") added a
parent_ndx < 0 guard to send_files() in sender.c, but the visually-
identical block in recv_files() in receiver.c was not updated. A
malicious rsync:// server can therefore drive any connecting client
into the same out-of-bounds dir_flist->files[-1] read followed by a
file_struct dereference in f_name() one line later.

Reach: protocol-30+ default (inc_recurse) makes flist.c:2745 set
parent_ndx = -1 on the first received flist when the sender omits a
leading "." entry; rsync.c flist_for_ndx() does not reject ndx == 0
in that state because the range check evaluates 0 < 0 = false; and
read_ndx_and_attrs() only validates ndx with the ITEM_TRANSFER bit
set, so iflags=ITEM_IS_NEW (or any other non-transfer iflag word)
bypasses the check.

Apply the same guard receiver-side. Confirmed: the same PoC (a
minimal Python rsyncd that handshakes with CF_INC_RECURSE, sends a
no-leading-"." flist, and emits ndx=0 with ITEM_IS_NEW) crashes
unpatched 3.4.2 with SEGV_MAPERR si_addr=0x4101a-class in the
receiver child; with this guard it exits cleanly with code 2
(RERR_PROTOCOL).

The attack surface delta over the sender variant is large:
the original was malicious-client -> daemon, this is
malicious-server -> any rsync client doing a normal rsync://
or remote-shell pull.

Reported by Pratham Gupta (alchemy1729).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
4255413e0c testsuite: cover 'refuse options = compress' for the daemon
Add a daemon-refuse-compress test that builds a module configured with
'refuse options = compress' and asserts that:
  1. an attempted -z transfer to that module fails with an error
     mentioning --compress, and
  2. the same transfer without -z still succeeds.

This pins down the documented way to disable all compression on a
daemon, which previously had no automated coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
901041dddc token: harden compressed-token decoding against integer overflow
The receiver's three compressed-token decoders --
recv_deflated_token (zlib), recv_zstd_token, and
recv_compressed_token (lz4) -- accumulated rx_token (a 32-bit
signed counter) without overflow checking. A malicious sender
could craft a compressed-token stream that walked rx_token past
INT32_MAX, with careful manipulation leaking process memory
contents to the wire (environment variables, passwords, heap
pointers, library pointers -- significantly weakening ASLR
and facilitating further exploitation).

Cap rx_token at MAX_TOKEN_INDEX = 0x7ffffffe. Fold the
bookkeeping into recv_compressed_token_num() and
recv_compressed_token_run() shared by all three decoders. Reject
negative or out-of-range token values explicitly. Also cap the
simple_recv_token literal-block length at the source: any
wire-supplied length > CHUNK_SIZE is ill-formed (the matching
simple_send_token never writes a chunk larger than CHUNK_SIZE),
so reject before looping on attacker-controlled bytes.

Reach: an authenticated daemon connection with compression
enabled (the default for protocols >= 30 when both peers
advertise it). Disabling compression on the daemon
("refuse options = compress" in rsyncd.conf) is the available
workaround.

Reporter: Omar Elsayed (seks99x).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
7c8a647c2e testsuite: end-to-end regression test for chdir-symlink-race
testsuite/chdir-symlink-race.test runs an actual rsync daemon
(via RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG to avoid the network) configured with
"use chroot = no", plants a symlink at module/subdir -> ../outside,
and runs four flavours of attacker-shaped transfer (single-file
poc_chmod, -r push into the symlinked subdir with --size-only and
without, -r push into the module root). All four must leave the
outside-the-module sentinel file's mode AND content unchanged.

Portability:
  - file_mode() helper falls back to BSD stat -f %Lp when GNU
    stat -c %a is unavailable (macOS, FreeBSD).
  - Pre-saved pristine copy + cmp(1) replaces sha1sum, which
    differs across platforms (sha1sum / shasum / sha1).

Tests are kept running as root in the user-namespace re-exec
wrapper used by symlink-race tests so the daemon's setuid path
doesn't drop into the test user's identity (which on Linux
would mean the chmod-escape code path can't trigger because
the test user doesn't have CAP_FOWNER over the outside file).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
a277a06b10 util1+syscall: secure copy_file source/dest opens; bare-path defence-in-depth
Three related codex audit findings:

  Finding 3a: copy_file()'s source open in util1.c used
  do_open_nofollow(), which only rejects a final-component
  symlink. A parent-component symlink (e.g. --copy-dest=cd where
  cd -> /outside) follows freely and reads outside the module.
  Route through secure_relative_open() with O_NOFOLLOW.

  Finding 3b: generator.c's in-place backup-file create still
  used a bare do_open with O_CREAT, leaving a tiny but reachable
  parent-symlink window between the secure unlink (already
  through do_unlink_at) and the create. Add do_open_at() that
  goes through a secure parent dirfd, and route the call site
  through it.

  Finding 3c: copy_file()'s destination open in
  unlink_and_reopen() had the same bare-do_open pattern; route
  through do_open_at as well.

Adds testsuite/copy-dest-source-symlink.test and
testsuite/bare-do-open-symlink-race.test as regression coverage
for both attack shapes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
39b3074a1a syscall: add symlink-race-safe do_*_at() wrappers and harden secure_relative_open
Add the rest of the path-based syscall wrappers and migrate every
receiver-side caller:
  - do_lchown_at, do_rename_at, do_mkdir_at, do_symlink_at,
    do_mknod_at, do_link_at, do_unlink_at, do_rmdir_at,
    do_utimensat_at, do_stat_at, do_lstat_at

Same shape as do_chmod_at: open each parent under
secure_relative_open(), call the *at() variant against the dirfd,
fall through to the bare path-based syscall in non-daemon /
chrooted / absolute-path / no-parent cases. macOS's
setattrlist-based set_times tier is also routed through the
utimensat_at path on daemon-no-chroot.

Hardenings to secure_relative_open() itself:
  - confine basedir resolution under the same kernel mechanism
    used for relpath (basedirs from --copy-dest / --link-dest are
    sender-controllable in daemon mode)
  - reject any '..' component (bare '..', 'foo/..', 'subdir/..')
    so the per-component O_NOFOLLOW fallback can't escape
  - return the dirfd we built up from the per-component fallback
    when the caller passed O_DIRECTORY (otherwise every do_*_at
    failed with EINVAL on platforms without RESOLVE_BENEATH)

Adds testsuite/alt-dest-symlink-race.test and
testsuite/secure-relpath-validation.test (with t_secure_relpath
helper) as regression coverage for the new hardenings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
d22b6bc7d1 util1: secure change_dir() against symlink-race chdir-escape
The receiver's chdir(2) into a destination subdirectory followed
attacker-planted symlinks at every path component. Once CWD
escaped the module, every subsequent path-relative syscall (open,
chmod, lchown, ...) inherited the escape -- defeating
secure_relative_open's RESOLVE_BENEATH anchor against AT_FDCWD,
since the anchor itself was now outside the module.

Route change_dir's relative target through secure_relative_open()
and fchdir() to the resulting dirfd in am_daemon && !am_chrooted
mode, so the chdir step itself can no longer follow a parent-
symlink. Same treatment applied to the CD_SKIP_CHDIR /
set_path_only path so it also can't follow attacker symlinks
during path tracking.

Adds testsuite/sender-flist-symlink-leak.test covering the
sender-side flist resolution variant of the same primitive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
24852cda3d syscall+receiver: secure receiver-side do_chmod against symlink-race TOCTOU
CVE-2026-29518's fix routed the receiver's open() through
secure_relative_open(), but every other path-based syscall the
receiver runs on sender-controllable paths is vulnerable to the
same TOCTOU primitive. This commit closes the chmod variant.

Add do_chmod_at() that opens the parent of fname under
secure_relative_open() and uses fchmodat() against the resulting
dirfd. Gate the secure path on am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the same
gate use_secure_symlinks already uses for the receiver basis-file
open), so non-daemon callers and chrooted daemons keep the original
do_chmod() fast path.

Migrate the receiver-side do_chmod() call sites in delete.c,
generator.c, rsync.c, and xattrs.c.

Adds testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test (with t_chmod_secure helper)
as regression coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
99b36291d0 sender: fix read-path TOCTOU by opening from module root (CVE-2026-29518)
The sender's file open was vulnerable to the same TOCTOU symlink
race as the receiver-side basis-file open. change_pathname() calls
chdir() into subdirectories, which follows symlinks; an attacker
could race to swap a directory for a symlink between the chdir and
the file open, allowing reads of privileged files through the
daemon.

Reconstruct the full relative path (F_PATHNAME + fname) and open
via secure_relative_open() from the trusted module_dir, which
walks each path component without following symlinks. This is
independent of CWD, so the chdir race is neutralised.

CVE-2026-29518.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
1a5ad81add syscall+clientserver: am_chrooted and use_secure_symlinks for daemon-no-chroot (CVE-2026-29518)
CVE-2026-29518: an rsync daemon configured with "use chroot = no"
is exposed to a TOCTOU race on parent path components. A local
attacker with write access to a module can replace a parent
directory component with a symlink between the receiver's check
and its open(), redirecting reads (basis-file disclosure) and
writes (file overwrite) outside the module. Under elevated daemon
privilege this allows privilege escalation. Default
"use chroot = yes" is not exposed.

Add secure_relative_open() in syscall.c. It walks the parent
components under RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) /
O_RESOLVE_BENEATH (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) / per-component
O_NOFOLLOW elsewhere, anchored at a trusted dirfd, so a parent-
symlink swap is rejected by the kernel. Route the receiver's
basis-file open in receiver.c through it when use_secure_symlinks
is set in clientserver.c rsync_module().

Reporters: Nullx3D (Batuhan SANCAK); Damien Neil; Michael Stapelberg.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 08:20:48 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
2b3f8aacc7 testsuite: skip symlink-dirlink-basis on platforms without RESOLVE_BENEATH
secure_relative_open() has a kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path
on Linux 5.6+ (openat2 RESOLVE_BENEATH) and FreeBSD 13+ (openat
O_RESOLVE_BENEATH). On Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, and Cygwin the code
falls back to the per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk, which by design
rejects every directory symlink in the path -- the very case this
test exercises. Mark the test skipped there rather than have it
fail with a known regression that's tracked separately.

macOS is intentionally not in the skip list: although it does not
have O_RESOLVE_BENEATH either, the test passes there in practice;
investigation of the underlying reason is left as follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:25:14 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
61d987c54a syscall: also use O_RESOLVE_BENEATH on FreeBSD and MacOS
FreeBSD and MacOS have O_RESOLVE_BENEATH as an openat() flag with the same
"must not escape dirfd" semantics as Linux's RESOLVE_BENEATH. The
kernel rejects ".." escapes, absolute symlinks, and symlinks whose
target lies outside dirfd, while still following symlinks that
resolve within it -- the same trade-off that fixes issue #715 on
Linux.

Add a parallel BSD path in secure_relative_open(), gated on
declared. Unlike Linux, BSD doesn't have the header/runtime split
where the symbol can exist without kernel support, so no runtime
fallback is needed: if the flag compiles in, the kernel honours it.

OpenBSD and NetBSD have no equivalent kernel primitive and continue
to use the existing per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk; issue #715
remains visible on those platforms (a userland resolver or
unveil(2)-based fence would be follow-up work).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:25:14 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
72d1cf1c28 syscall: use openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux for secure_relative_open
The CVE fix in commit c35e283 made secure_relative_open() walk every
component of relpath with O_NOFOLLOW. That blocks every symlink in the
path, which is stricter than the threat model required: legitimate
directory symlinks within the destination tree (e.g. when using -K /
--copy-dirlinks) are also rejected, breaking delta transfers with
"failed verification -- update discarded".  See issue #715.

On Linux 5.6+, openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS) gives
us exactly what we want: the kernel rejects any resolution that would
escape the starting directory (via "..", absolute paths, or symlinks
pointing outside dirfd) while still following symlinks that resolve
within it. /proc magic-links are blocked too.

Use openat2 first; fall back to the existing per-component O_NOFOLLOW
walk on ENOSYS (kernel < 5.6). The lexical "../" checks at the head
of the function are kept as defense in depth. The Linux gate is
plain #ifdef __linux__: the runtime ENOSYS fallback covers the only
case that actually matters (header present + old kernel), and any
Linux build environment without linux/openat2.h will fail with a
clear "no such file" error rather than silently disabling the
protection.

Verified manually that openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) blocks all four
escape patterns (absolute symlink, ../ symlink, lexical .., absolute
path) while allowing direct and within-tree symlinks. The new
testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (taken from PR #864 by Samuel
Henrique) exercises the issue #715 regression and passes; full
make check passes 47/47.

Test: testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (8 scenarios)
Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:25:14 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
9ba21f638c testsuite/xattrs: ignore SUNWattr_* in the Solaris xls helper
The Solaris xls() function listed every entry in the file's xattr
directory, which on Solaris includes OS-managed SUNWattr_ro and
SUNWattr_rw pseudo-attributes. SUNWattr_rw embeds the file creation
time, so its bytes naturally differ between the source and destination
files, making the xattrs and xattrs-hlink tests fail with diffs that
have nothing to do with rsync.

Rsync's own listxattr wrapper already filters these out
(lib/sysxattrs.c), so the right fix is to filter them in the test
display too. Other platforms are unaffected because each has its own
xls() branch in the case statement.

With the test now actually passing on Solaris, drop the CI hack that
overwrote testsuite/xattrs.test with a skip stub.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:24:49 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
acf4b7b839 call tzset() before chroot to cache timezone data
localtime/localtime_r need /etc/localtime for timezone info.
After chroot this file is inaccessible, causing log timestamps
to fall back to UTC. Calling tzset() before chroot ensures the
timezone data is cached by glibc for subsequent calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:24:42 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
968d4c0cd0 xattrs: fixed count in qsort
this fixes the count passed to the sort of the xattr list. This issue
was reported here:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/16/2

the bug is not exploitable due to the fork-per-connection design of
rsync, the attack is the equivalent of the user closing the socket
themselves.
2026-05-07 07:24:42 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
d69162dbf4 zero all new memory from allocations
Change my_alloc() to use calloc instead of malloc so all fresh
allocations return zeroed memory. Also zero the expanded portion
in expand_item_list() after realloc, since it knows both old and
new sizes. This gives more predictable behaviour in case of bugs
where uninitialised or stale memory is accidentally accessed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:24:42 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
cad6aab534 fix signed integer overflow in proxy protocol v2 header parsing
The len field in the proxy v2 header was declared as signed char,
allowing a negative size to bypass the validation check and cause
a stack buffer overflow when passed to read_buf() as size_t.

This bug was reported by John Walker from ZeroPath, many thanks for
the clear report!

With the current code this bug does not represent a security issue as
it only results in the exit of the forked process that is specific to
the attached client, so it is equivalent to the client closing the
socket, so no CVE for this, but it is good to fix it to prevent a
future issue.
2026-05-07 07:23:37 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
7ab20b293f zlib: convert K&R function definitions to ANSI style
The bundled zlib 1.2.8 used K&R-style function definitions which are
rejected by clang 16+ as hard errors. Convert all 90 functions across
9 files to ANSI-style prototypes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:23:37 +10:00
Holger Hoffstätte
c822d0c404 Fix glibc-2.43 constness warnings
Glibc 2.43 added C23 const-preserving overloads to various string functions,
which change the return type depending on the constness of the argument(s).
Currently this leads to warnings from calls to strtok() or strchr().
Fix this by properly declaring the respective variable types.

Signed-off-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
2026-05-07 07:23:37 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
f8d8bba793 fix uninitialized mul_one in AVX2 checksum and add SIMD checksum test
The AVX2 get_checksum1_avx2_64() read mul_one before initializing it,
which is undefined behavior. Replace the cmpeq/abs trick with
_mm256_set1_epi8(1) to match the SSSE3 and SSE2 versions.

Add a TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 test mode that verifies all SIMD paths
(SSE2, SSSE3, AVX2, and the full dispatch chain) produce identical
results to the C reference, across multiple buffer sizes with both
aligned and unaligned buffers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 07:23:23 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
43e2af4dd3 acl: fixed ACL ID mapping for non-root
closes issue #618
2026-05-07 07:23:23 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
50f0add12a reject negative token values in compressed stream receivers
Validate that token numbers read from compressed streams are
non-negative. A negative token value would cause the return value
of recv_*_token() to become positive, which callers interpret as
literal data length, but no data pointer is set on this code path.

While this only causes the receiver to crash (which is process-isolated
and only affects the attacker's own connection), it's still undefined
behavior.

Reported-by: Will Sergeant <wlsergeant@gmail.com>
2026-05-07 07:22:46 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
ada7ba004f fix uninitialized buf1 in get_checksum2() MD4 path
The static buf1 pointer was only allocated when len > len1, but on
first call with len == 0, this condition is false (0 > 0), leaving
buf1 NULL when passed to memcpy().

Fixes #673
2026-05-07 07:22:46 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
41213d20d1 fixed an invalid access to files array
this was found by Calum Hutton from Rapid7. It is a real bug, but
analysis shows it can't be leverged into an exploit. Worth fixing
though.

Many thanks to Calum and Rapid7 for finding and reporting this
2026-05-07 07:22:46 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
03d0b41e64 testsuite: added clean-fname-underflow test 2026-05-07 07:22:39 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
934a6bec96 util: fixed issue in clean_fname()
fixes buffer underflow (not exploitable) in clean_fname
2026-05-07 07:22:39 +10:00
Eli Schwartz
841ab71c7c configure.ac: check for xattr support both in libc and in -lattr
In 2015, the attr/xattr.h header was fully removed from upstream attr.

In 2020, rsync started preferring the standard header, if it exists:
https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/pull/22

But the fix was incomplete. We still looked for the getxattr function in
-lattr, and used it if -lattr exists. This was the case even if the
system libc was sufficient to provide the needed functions. Result:
overlinking to -lattr, if it happened to be installed for any other
reason.

```
checking whether to support extended attributes... Using Linux xattrs
checking for getxattr in -lattr... yes
```

Instead, use a different autoconf macro that first checks if the
function is available for use without any libraries (e.g. it is in
libc).

Result:

```
checking whether to support extended attributes... Using Linux xattrs
checking for library containing getxattr... none required
```

Signed-off-by: Eli Schwartz <eschwartz@gentoo.org>
2026-05-07 07:22:39 +10:00
Michal Ruprich
ae1bc1b9e7 Using a correct time in log file 2026-05-07 07:22:39 +10:00
Ronnie Sahlberg
350d39a05d options.c: Fix segv if poptGetContext returns NULL
If poptGetContext returns NULL, perhaps due to OOM,
a NULL pointer is passed into poptReadDefaultConfig()
which in turns SEGVs when trying to dereference it.

This was found using https://github.com/sahlberg/malloc-fail-tester.git
$ ./test_malloc_failure.sh rsync -Pav crash crosh

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
2026-05-07 07:22:39 +10:00
Silent
9141bf1d83 syscall: fix a Y2038 bug by replacing Int32x32To64 with multiplication
Int32x32To64 macro internally truncates the arguments to int32,
while time_t is 64-bit on most/all modern platforms.
Therefore, usage of this macro creates a Year 2038 bug.
2026-05-07 07:22:39 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
ad7dc53795 fixed symlink race condition in sender
when we open a file that we don't expect to be a symlink use
O_NOFOLLOW to prevent a race condition where an attacker could change
a file between being a normal file and a symlink
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
5ddf470275 make --safe-links stricter
when --safe-links is used also reject links where a '../' component is
included in the destination as other than the leading part of the
filename
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
de7a95a775 range check dir_ndx before use 2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Wayne Davison
14026162dc Refuse a duplicate dirlist. 2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
16666c6e75 disallow ../ elements in relpath for secure_relative_open 2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
866dd7131e receiver: use secure_relative_open() for basis file
this prevents attacks where the basis file is manipulated by a
malicious sender to gain information about files outside the
destination tree
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
b31301abb7 added secure_relative_open()
this is an open that enforces no symlink following for all path
components in a relative path
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
769e5f0bcf refuse fuzzy options when fuzzy not selected
this prevents a malicious server providing a file to compare to when
the user has not given the fuzzy option
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Andrew Tridgell
ce06002ce8 prevent information leak off the stack
prevent leak of uninitialised stack data in hash_search
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Wayne Davison
9119310d01 Another cast when multiplying integers. 2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Wayne Davison
147c7a0d97 Some checksum buffer fixes.
- Put sum2_array into sum_struct to hold an array of sum2 checksums
  that are each xfer_sum_len bytes.
- Remove sum2 buf from sum_buf.
- Add macro sum2_at() to access each sum2 array element.
- Throw an error if a sums header has an s2length larger than
  xfer_sum_len.
2026-05-07 07:21:57 +10:00
Holger Hoffstätte
77b7f5e0aa Fix warning about missing bomb(..) prototype
Clang rightfully complains about invoking bomb(..) without a proper prototype:
  lib/pool_alloc.c:171:16: warning: passing arguments to a function without a prototype
  is deprecated in all versions of C and is not supported in C2x [-Wdeprecated-non-prototype]
                (*pool->bomb)(bomb_msg, __FILE__, __LINE__);
                             ^
1 warning generated.

Signed-off-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
2026-05-07 07:19:33 +10:00
Michal Ruprich
292d9de105 bool is a keyword in C23 2026-05-07 07:18:39 +10:00
Charalampos Mitrodimas
f1cf29cefa hlink: Fix function pointer cast in qsort()
Replace unsafe generic function pointer cast with proper type cast for
qsort() comparison function. This fixes a potential type mismatch
warning without changing the behavior.

Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charmitro@posteo.net>
2026-05-07 07:18:39 +10:00
Holger Hoffstätte
9585830e1e Fix warning about conflicting lseek/lseek64 prototypes
Clang rightfully complains about conflicting prototypes, as both lseek() variants
are redefined:

  syscall.c:394:10: warning: a function declaration without a prototype is deprecated
  in all versions of C and is treated as a zero-parameter prototype in C2x, conflicting
  with a previous declaration [-Wdeprecated-non-prototype]
        off64_t lseek64();
                ^
/usr/include/unistd.h:350:18: note: conflicting prototype is here
extern __off64_t lseek64 (int __fd, __off64_t __offset, int __whence)
                 ^
1 warning generated.

The point of the #ifdef is to build for the configured OFF_T; there is
no reason to redefine lseek/lseek64, which should have been found
via configure.

Signed-off-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
2026-05-07 07:18:39 +10:00
Wayne Davison
6b5ae825db Preparing for release of 3.2.7 [buildall] 2022-10-20 17:57:22 -07:00
Wayne Davison
3b719d1d6e Improve JSON output a bit more. 2022-10-20 17:50:06 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ebe1af749c Make use of -VV when checking rsync capabilities. 2022-10-20 09:09:26 -07:00
Wayne Davison
de6848ed97 Re-run the exclude test using lsh.sh pull.
The exclude.test file continues to run local copies (which are a special
kind of "push") while the exclude-lsh.test symlink runs a a "pull" using
the lsh.sh script as the "remote" shell.
2022-10-19 20:58:29 -07:00
Wayne Davison
42f8386823 Improve --mkpath a bit more. 2022-10-16 12:27:30 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ad6245f394 Include "buildall" flag in the release commit. 2022-10-16 12:14:46 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ca980b5863 Yet another manpage tweak. 2022-10-16 12:10:05 -07:00
Wayne Davison
677aa0dc91 Fix version verification when "\|" doesn't work in sed. 2022-10-16 11:14:15 -07:00
Wayne Davison
025596757c Silence autoconf warnings. 2022-10-16 10:28:58 -07:00
Wayne Davison
449d9bf950 Make the new manpage section better. 2022-10-16 10:26:39 -07:00
Wayne Davison
35ecec972a A few more manpage clarifications. 2022-10-15 17:02:18 -07:00
Alexponomarev7
d76cabe54f Fix autoconf help strings (#389) 2022-10-15 16:54:27 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b5544a95b1 Add info on single-file copying; tweak --mkpath. 2022-10-12 10:16:47 -07:00
Wayne Davison
11bd2a4fd6 Tweak NEWS. 2022-10-10 08:55:09 -07:00
Wayne Davison
6ba434de5c Change fgrep to grep. 2022-10-06 22:18:48 -07:00
Wayne Davison
3296351442 Fix validation of "preN" git tags for git-version.h. 2022-10-02 11:43:46 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0088a85aeb Mention smart-make in a comment. 2022-10-02 11:26:44 -07:00
Wayne Davison
4923c4dc0c Mention the --list-only output format. 2022-10-02 10:35:23 -07:00
Wayne Davison
76c4fa8b54 Mention latest changes. 2022-10-02 10:03:00 -07:00
Wayne Davison
25efa10802 Complain if the destination arg is empty. 2022-10-02 09:54:59 -07:00
Wayne Davison
fdf5e577f5 Read a 4-byte mtime as unsigned (old-protocol).
When conversing with a protocol 29 or earlier rsync, the modtime values
are arriving as 4-byte integers.  This change interprets these short
values as unsigned integers, allowing the time that can be conveyed to
range from 1-Jan-1970 to 7-Feb-2106 instead of the signed range of
13-Dec-1901 to 19-Jan-2038.  Given that we are fast approaching 2038,
any old-protocol transfers will be better served using the unsigned
range rather than the signed.

It is important to keep in mind that protocol 30 & 31 convey the full
8-byte mtime value (plus nanoseconds), allowing for a huge span of time
that is not affected by this change.
2022-10-02 09:54:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
19bd0dd340 Use newer protocol to avoid mtime corruption. 2022-10-01 08:04:00 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ed4b3448be Preparing for release of 3.2.7pre1 2022-09-30 12:36:21 -07:00
Wayne Davison
4d44bf122d A few more doc tweaks & comment tweaks. 2022-09-30 12:34:58 -07:00
Wayne Davison
6af27a538e Explicitly ignore snprintf() return value. 2022-09-30 11:50:20 -07:00
Wayne Davison
f9e29dfb09 More NEWS updates. 2022-09-25 13:20:06 -07:00
Wayne Davison
591de7ce5c Fix compile w/o openssl; disable sha256 & sha512 for --checksum. 2022-09-25 12:42:09 -07:00
Wayne Davison
c8c627756a Avoid test -e. 2022-09-20 21:50:07 -07:00
Wayne Davison
46884e4ff6 Fix a link. 2022-09-20 00:12:49 -07:00
Wayne Davison
97e02bf21a Some "use chroot" improvements.
- The sanitize_paths variable was set too often. It only needs to be set
  when the "inner" path is not "/".  This change avoids sanitizing &
  munging things for a path=/ module just because chroot is off.
- The default for "use chroot" is now "unset" instead of "true".  When
  unset it checks if chrooting works, and if not, it proceeds with a
  sanitized copy instead of totally failing to work.  This makes it
  easier to setup a non-root rsync daemon, for instance.  It will have
  no effect on a typical Linux root-run daemon where the default will
  continue to use chroot (because chrooting works).  A config file can
  explicitly set "use chroot = true | false" to force the choice.
- Try to improve the "use chroot" manpage.
2022-09-20 00:08:16 -07:00
Wayne Davison
77d762ced8 Stop importing "re". 2022-09-19 22:36:49 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5b27d2e6f3 Pre-compute FILE_SUM_EXTRA_CNT. 2022-09-15 10:25:32 -07:00
Wayne Davison
7e634f5355 We always add a slash now that path is cleaned. 2022-09-15 10:13:20 -07:00
Kenneth Finnegan
8fe8cfd60a Use string length diff heuristic to skip Levenshtein Algo (#369)
When using the --fuzzy option to try and find close matches locally,
the edit distance algorithm used is O(N^2), which can get painful on
CPU constrained systems when working in folders with tens of thousands
of files in it.

The lower bound on the calculated Levenshtein distance is the difference
of the two strings being compared, so if that difference is larger than
the current best match, the calculation of the exact edit distance between
the two strings can be skipped.

Testing on the OpenSUSE package repo has shown a 50% reduction in the CPU time
required to plan the rsync transaction.
2022-09-15 10:12:02 -07:00
Wayne Davison
7a2dbf7177 Make the implied-arg adding for --relative more efficient. 2022-09-14 08:20:41 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8449539a0f More NEWS updates. 2022-09-14 07:57:44 -07:00
Wayne Davison
71c2b5d0e3 Fix exclusion of /. with --relative. 2022-09-14 07:14:13 -07:00
Wayne Davison
f3f5d8420f Tweak a define. 2022-09-14 07:13:24 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8b1b81e054 Use UNSUPPORTED instead of PROTOCOL for various validation checks. 2022-09-13 23:38:01 -07:00
Wayne Davison
e8161304f7 Use hashlittle2() for xattr hashing
- The non-zero key code is now in hashtable.c
- The hashtable_create() code already checks for OOM
2022-09-13 22:43:01 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b012cde1ed Add hashlittle2() and ensure the hash is never 0
It's probably time for a faster hash algorithm, but this gives us
the free 64-bit hashing that things like the xattr code can use.
2022-09-13 22:37:39 -07:00
Wayne Davison
464555ea92 Fix really silly bug with --relative rules. 2022-09-13 20:56:32 -07:00
Wayne Davison
df904f590e Improve var ref. 2022-09-13 20:55:58 -07:00
Wayne Davison
208d6ad1cd NEWS tweak. 2022-09-13 20:54:35 -07:00
Wayne Davison
51dae12c92 Update NEWS. 2022-09-12 22:04:33 -07:00
Wayne Davison
950730313d Fix bug with validing remote filter rules. 2022-09-12 22:02:00 -07:00
Wayne Davison
81c5c81381 Mention the filename when unpack_smb_acl() returns an error. 2022-09-11 10:04:26 -07:00
Wayne Davison
a6a0d2f77c Require a newer protocol to specify the digest list. 2022-09-10 22:12:24 -07:00
Wayne Davison
418e38a878 Talk about the new daemon greeting line. 2022-09-10 22:12:23 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b2dcabdbb9 Improve output of "N-bit" items in json data. 2022-09-10 21:10:10 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ad53a9b5a0 Also change dashes in the dict var names to make jq use easier. 2022-09-10 17:30:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
1750288660 A few more tweaks. 2022-09-10 16:35:20 -07:00
Wayne Davison
087fffaa2b Unify older protect-args capability to secluded-args name. 2022-09-10 16:17:32 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5c1fa2a21d Use dict for capabilities & optimizations in json output. 2022-09-10 16:01:53 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0efa63f2e6 Use JSON output if --version (-V) is repeated (client side only). 2022-09-10 13:14:42 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ae16850dc5 Add support for various SHA checksum digests
The main purpose of the SHA checksums are to allow the daemon auth code
to pick a stonger digest method when negotiating the auth digest to use.
However, the SHA digests are also available for use in file checksums,
should someon really want to use one of them.

The new digests are listed from strongest to weakest at the start of the
daemon auth list, giving them the highest priority.

The new digests are listed from weakest to strongest near the end of the
checksum list, giving them the lowest priority of use for file
checksums.
2022-09-10 11:48:44 -07:00
Wayne Davison
7e2711bb2b Improve various things in the checksum code
- Size flist checksum data to hold the active size, not the max.
- Add a negotiated hash method to the daemon auth code.
- Use EVP for all openssl digests. This makes it easy to add more
  openssl digest methods and avoids deprecation warnings.
- Support a way to re-enable deprecated digests via openssl conf
  file and allow a default file to be configured.
- Supply a simple openssl-rsync.cnf file to enable legacy digests.
2022-09-10 11:39:37 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b8c2fde3a5 Try freebsd-13-1 to fix weird wget issue. 2022-09-09 13:16:27 -07:00
Wayne Davison
1f12b196fd When deleting a tag, del in the patches dir too. 2022-09-09 12:59:22 -07:00
Wayne Davison
bafe73dd5c Start 3.2.7dev going. 2022-09-09 12:59:17 -07:00
Wayne Davison
db5bfe67a5 Preparing for release of 3.2.6 2022-09-09 12:23:37 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5447d038c6 Mention a potential bash security issue with openssh forced commands. 2022-09-09 10:48:52 -07:00
Wayne Davison
711773631b A few more minor tweaks. 2022-09-01 22:07:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
bf3e49b453 Improve the daemon info a bit. 2022-09-01 22:01:18 -07:00
Wayne Davison
034d5e8770 Tweak a couple links. 2022-08-23 21:12:26 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ad8917437a Mention that copying to a case-ignoring filesystem can be problematical. 2022-08-23 21:02:41 -07:00
Wayne Davison
1b664d30e4 Fix an unreleased bug handling a leading dot. 2022-08-23 19:38:41 -07:00
Wayne Davison
ea38f34d02 Another spelling fix. 2022-08-23 15:44:48 -07:00
Wayne Davison
44d4727664 Fix a link. 2022-08-23 15:30:37 -07:00
Wayne Davison
1f2f413167 Fix split limits. 2022-08-23 15:30:32 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0a09df2c5e Rename --protect-args to --secluded-args. 2022-08-23 14:56:23 -07:00
Wayne Davison
cc861cf8c0 More NEWS tweaks. 2022-08-22 08:15:35 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5183c0d6f0 Add safety check for local --remove-source-files.
A local_server copy now includes the dev+ino info from the destination
file so that the sender can make sure that it is not going to delete
the destination file.  Fixes mistakes such as:

  rsync -aiv --remove-source-files dir .
2022-08-21 10:19:23 -07:00
Wayne Davison
706bff9176 Mention the latest changes. 2022-08-20 08:30:22 -07:00
Wayne Davison
2c1204032b Make sure that the configure.sh script is up-to-date in a release. 2022-08-19 09:49:52 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8adc2240e0 Mention copy-devices. 2022-08-19 08:56:49 -07:00
Wayne Davison
84ad83525b Remove unneeded var. 2022-08-19 08:56:04 -07:00
Wayne Davison
9a3449a398 Stop enabling -pedantic-errors. 2022-08-18 17:33:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
3258534e99 Change name_num_obj struct to use a name_num_item pointer. 2022-08-18 17:33:25 -07:00
Samuel Henrique
b94bba4036 Fix typos on manpage (#358) 2022-08-17 21:50:43 -07:00
Wayne Davison
a182507bef Fix issue when the files-from list isn't nl terminated. 2022-08-17 16:57:39 -07:00
Wayne Davison
2895b65f53 Another mkgitver tweak & mention it in NEWS. 2022-08-16 08:56:36 -07:00
Wayne Davison
def595c559 Remove useless comment. 2022-08-15 21:56:37 -07:00
Wayne Davison
68b1ce1dc3 Only run git describe if .git exists in the $srcdir. 2022-08-15 21:52:13 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5a4116e553 Start 3.2.6dev going. 2022-08-15 19:01:56 -07:00
Wayne Davison
024bf1d831 Do more path cleaning in add_implied_include(); make u.slash_cnt more accurate. 2022-08-15 18:55:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
db4f919ebe Allow ~/remote/./path with -R if the path has /./ in it. 2022-08-15 18:55:05 -07:00
Wayne Davison
6ac2c7b682 We must use the CSUM_CHUNK size in the non-openssl MD4 code. 2022-08-14 14:03:02 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0e10163a9d Fix another dot-dir implied arg issue. 2022-08-14 12:27:25 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5fcf20ee9d Preparing for release of 3.2.5 2022-08-14 10:15:08 -07:00
Wayne Davison
fc72d2b771 Update the NEWS. 2022-08-14 10:12:06 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b7ea3fcd19 Ensure a dynamically linked xxhash lib is >= 0.8 for XX3. 2022-08-14 10:09:40 -07:00
Wayne Davison
9cb7529ba6 Remove some trailing whitespace. 2022-08-13 10:53:53 -07:00
Wayne Davison
55ad8757ec Make a --trust-sender a bit clearer. 2022-08-10 16:34:26 -07:00
Wayne Davison
3e4b01173a One more doc tweak. 2022-08-10 08:48:27 -07:00
Wayne Davison
2f1d1d5cac Add packaging note. 2022-08-10 08:42:22 -07:00
Wayne Davison
4c0a4067df Fix handling of a character class with an escaped closing bracket. 2022-08-09 17:55:03 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8550142804 Be a little paranoid. 2022-08-09 17:55:03 -07:00
Wayne Davison
97f40754ba A couple manpage tweaks. 2022-08-09 17:55:01 -07:00
Wayne Davison
cff8f04477 Add --trust-sender option. 2022-08-09 11:45:56 -07:00
Wayne Davison
db8034f12e Escape leading tilde char when "~" or with -R. 2022-08-09 11:42:32 -07:00
Wayne Davison
c86763dc38 Fix handling of daemon module names in file-list verification; convert some while loops to for loops. 2022-08-09 11:37:47 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5ce575b157 Preparing for release of 3.2.5pre2 2022-08-08 22:50:31 -07:00
Wayne Davison
fabef23bea Fix --relative when copying an absolute path. 2022-08-08 21:30:43 -07:00
Wayne Davison
685bf58046 Handle files-from args that span 2 buffers. 2022-08-08 21:18:10 -07:00
Wayne Davison
9e2921fce8 A fix for the zlib fix. 2022-08-08 20:05:10 -07:00
Wayne Davison
80d8f7c7cb Handle a "[foo]" arg matching the literal wildcards. 2022-08-08 19:57:28 -07:00
Wayne Davison
38e1b075b4 Fix some issues with backslashed wildcards in args. 2022-08-08 19:26:05 -07:00
Wayne Davison
d659610afc Handle a trailing "/." at the end of a source arg. 2022-08-08 17:36:36 -07:00
Wayne Davison
6cafc1f8bf Update the NEWS. 2022-08-07 09:59:43 -07:00
Wayne Davison
788f11ea6a Fix zlib bug with a large gzip header extra field
From zlib commit eff308af425b67093bab25f80f1ae950166bece1.
Fixes CVE-2022-37434.
2022-08-07 09:34:26 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b7fdc9ef0e Make sure that --read-batch doesn't try to check args. 2022-08-07 08:56:39 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0d8cc26044 Some md-convert doc tweaks. 2022-08-03 09:55:51 -07:00
Jakub Wilk
2955888468 Fix typos in NEWS (#339) 2022-08-02 11:31:04 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0773cecc1f Preparing for release of 3.2.5pre1 2022-08-01 18:51:07 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8e33586359 Tweaks to allow for a release. 2022-08-01 18:50:28 -07:00
Wayne Davison
da5c72da4b More NEWS. 2022-08-01 18:36:22 -07:00
Wayne Davison
2f7c583143 A few more minor tweaks. 2022-08-01 18:36:21 -07:00
Wayne Davison
51fd4993ba Avoid the getgroups program when cross-compiliing. 2022-08-01 09:00:34 -07:00
Wayne Davison
e37bfdb445 Make sure sign is consistend in 2 gid comparisons. 2022-08-01 08:29:15 -07:00
Wayne Davison
3d7015afa2 A few more minor changes. 2022-08-01 07:45:57 -07:00
Wayne Davison
7e5424b806 More improvements to file-list checking
- Avoid implied rules on generator and (with extra certainty) on server
- Add -R implied-directory path elements as directory includes
- Log about extra file-list checking using a new --debug=FILTER3 level
2022-08-01 07:00:51 -07:00
Wayne Davison
43f70b961e The latest NEWS. 2022-07-31 17:47:45 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b7231c7d02 Some extra file-list safety checks. 2022-07-31 17:46:34 -07:00
Wayne Davison
15c34f0a8c A few more minor doc tweaks. 2022-07-11 13:54:59 -07:00
Wayne Davison
d1e42ffa16 A few minor fixes. 2022-06-19 17:35:18 -07:00
Wayne Davison
36f489c211 Link to rsyncd.conf page server-setup details. 2022-06-19 16:55:18 -07:00
Wayne Davison
defe2287aa Improve the filter intro. 2022-06-19 16:45:43 -07:00
Wayne Davison
112bef11ad Improve filter discussion. 2022-06-19 16:28:45 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b38780f3fd Some proxy improvements (mainly). 2022-06-19 11:42:25 -07:00
Wayne Davison
5f33238f06 Some clarifications about transfer rules. 2022-06-19 11:42:24 -07:00
Wayne Davison
3592ac3c02 Include bsd/strings.h if it exists
Some systems apparently put strlcpy() into a separate bsd/strings.h file
without putting the function into a separate library. Thus, configure
finds that the function exists for linking but the build does not have
the declaration (which rsync only supplies if it is also supplying its
own version of the function).
2022-06-19 10:11:28 -07:00
Yuri Chornoivan
c897b16f32 Fix minor typos (#327) 2022-06-19 09:14:36 -07:00
Wayne Davison
4f741addbd Fix configure's "signed char" check
When pedantic errors are enabled, SIGNED_CHAR_OK was no longer
being set correctly. This would cause the checksum code to use
"char" instead of "signed char", and if the default for a "char"
was unsigned, the checksum code would fail to compute the right
hash values.  Fixes bug #317.
2022-06-18 10:23:32 -07:00
Wayne Davison
355b81d8bc Avoid -pedantic-errors on non-x86 for the moment. 2022-06-18 09:42:16 -07:00
Wayne Davison
6f35553372 Fix grabbing version value in configure. 2022-06-01 17:41:28 -07:00
Wayne Davison
71090b7e2c Improve discussion of old-args in advanced usage. 2022-05-14 16:41:44 -07:00
Wayne Davison
2ab2ee166e Make md-convert --test work again. 2022-05-06 19:37:40 -07:00
Wayne Davison
1e858e39e6 Manpage improvements. 2022-05-06 17:42:55 -07:00
Wayne Davison
664639e349 Use the maintainer's timezone for translating the manpage date. 2022-05-06 17:42:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
517b9d91fc Setup for 3.2.5dev. 2022-05-06 17:24:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
0ac7ebceef Preparing for release of 3.2.4 2022-04-15 13:31:16 -07:00
Wayne Davison
85c56b2603 The latest news. 2022-04-11 09:50:58 -07:00
Wayne Davison
10aeb75cea Add debugging comment about read_buf_(). 2022-04-11 09:50:31 -07:00
Simon Deziel
d41bb98c09 systemd: restart daemon on-failure (#302)
man 5 systemd.service:
> Setting this to on-failure is the recommended choice for long-running services

Partial fix for https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13463

Signed-off-by: Simon Deziel <simon@sdeziel.info>
2022-04-11 09:08:11 -07:00
Yoichi NAKAYAMA
2fda51692b Specify log format to avoid malfunctions and unexpected errors. (#305)
Solve the following problems:
* mishandling of commit message lines similar to committer lines
* UnicodeDecodeError with commit messages that cannot be interpreted
  as utf-8
2022-04-11 08:57:19 -07:00
Michal Ruprich
1de71e8a78 Fix for CVE-2018-25032 in zlib (#306) 2022-04-11 08:50:50 -07:00
Wayne Davison
60dd42be60 Handle linking with a zlib with external read_buf. 2022-04-11 08:29:54 -07:00
Wayne Davison
d821e4cbfb Preparing for release of 3.2.4pre4 2022-03-27 14:59:57 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8aa465117f Add new & improved --copy-devices option. 2022-03-27 14:04:59 -07:00
Wayne Davison
8977815f5d Some --write-device fixes. 2022-03-27 12:52:26 -07:00
Wayne Davison
a48c20c97c Combine some alt-dest tests. 2022-03-26 10:01:12 -07:00
Wayne Davison
601f47436f Rename compare-dest test. 2022-03-26 10:01:10 -07:00
Sam Mikes
ef76d6cfa5 Extract unlink_and_reopen from copy_file (#294)
* add tests to exercise copy_file

* Extract new function unlink_and_reopen from copy_file

The argument `ofd` to copy_file is always set to -1 unless
`open_tmpfile()` is called at generator.c:909

This change
 * removes assignment to a function argument
 * renames argument `ofd` to `tmpfilefd` in line with existing uses
 * extracts a new function `unlink_and_reopen` which is static to util1.c
 * rewrites header comments for copy_file
2022-03-26 09:14:10 -07:00
Wayne Davison
96ed4b47b9 Some word fixes. 2022-03-26 08:58:51 -07:00
Wayne Davison
13c4019e94 Also ignore a root-level rrsync file. 2022-03-13 10:45:09 -07:00
Wayne Davison
b7b387b1f7 Add FALLTHROUGH comment. 2022-03-13 09:31:44 -07:00
Wayne Davison
7569edfaef Use ac_includes_default in largefile support test. 2022-03-09 18:38:03 -08:00
Wayne Davison
55b2a06812 Test newer FreeBSD. 2022-03-03 17:26:47 -08:00
Wayne Davison
b81a509556 Make asm use more selectable
- Make the SIMD ASM code off by default. Use configure --enable-simd-asm
  to enable.
- Allow MD5 ASM code to be requested even when OpenSSL is handling MD4
  checksums. Use configure --enable-md5-asm to enable.
2022-03-03 17:00:57 -08:00
Wayne Davison
26f4dbe12c Change usage (--version) output to note when ASM isn't really being used. 2022-02-21 16:41:50 -08:00
Sam Mikes
b3f1970f18 Fix wording in RSYNC_PORT section (#293)
Fix wording from 'does is not read' -> 'is not read'
2022-02-21 14:00:45 -08:00
Wayne Davison
c51da9174f Build Cygwin on windows-2022 with newer python. [buildall] 2022-02-09 14:00:13 -08:00
Wayne Davison
81f71f6f29 Add a CAUTION message to --debug=FILTER for trailing whitespace. 2022-01-27 08:53:41 -08:00
Wayne Davison
48e7005554 Add a couple more --rsync-path opts to the test. [buildall] 2022-01-20 10:51:13 -08:00
Wayne Davison
2b3e68814b Specify the rsync that lsh.sh should run. [buildall] 2022-01-20 09:02:02 -08:00
Wayne Davison
cc83294316 Preparing for release of 3.2.4pre3 2022-01-18 23:47:45 -08:00
Wayne Davison
08c8375acb Tweak rrsync rules in the Makefile. 2022-01-18 23:13:22 -08:00
Wayne Davison
824a057935 Add some arg-escaping tests. 2022-01-18 22:47:05 -08:00
Wayne Davison
d91ddb97d1 Don't backslash-escape args for a local transfer. 2022-01-18 22:47:05 -08:00
Wayne Davison
5bb637ca04 Add missing ">". 2022-01-18 22:47:03 -08:00
Wayne Davison
142aba00d5 Silence some symlink mode-change failures. 2022-01-17 22:23:31 -08:00
Wayne Davison
8687e44d10 Fix a broken link & make a tweak. 2022-01-17 20:44:16 -08:00
Wayne Davison
0bd8e85185 Facilitate the next release. 2022-01-17 19:43:43 -08:00
Wayne Davison
00a5ab2364 Tweak some rrsync rules for cleanup & release. 2022-01-17 18:52:49 -08:00
Wayne Davison
f44e76b65c Handle html link targets in a better way. 2022-01-17 18:11:45 -08:00
Wayne Davison
1174d97072 Fix --old-args interaction with a daemon
Ensure that a remote rsync daemon will not split a filename arg unless
the user asked for `--old-args`.
2022-01-17 18:11:03 -08:00
Wayne Davison
d9eaffe564 Complain about --old-args with --protect-args. 2022-01-17 18:09:36 -08:00
Wayne Davison
6197385d1f More man & NEWS enhancements, including linking to env vars. 2022-01-17 18:09:34 -08:00
Wayne Davison
d07272d631 More man page and NEWS improvements.
- Add link targets for all option choices, not just the first one.
- Tweak cross-link arg format.
- Add more links, including some in the latest NEWS.
- Split out a few numbered lists.
2022-01-16 10:47:36 -08:00
Wayne Davison
e2a011d9d0 Fix some typos mentioned in the fossies report. 2022-01-16 10:33:22 -08:00
Wayne Davison
76dc7d0a76 It's OK to capitalize rsync at the start of a sentence. 2022-01-15 21:44:26 -08:00
Wayne Davison
7e94e52144 Some NEWS.html improvements.
- Improve NEWS heading's link targets using version info.
- Optimize regex compilation.
- Make sure every link target is unique.
- Allow link targets to start with a number.
2022-01-15 21:07:34 -08:00
Wayne Davison
5ef7e3c9c5 Remove <a name=...> tags. 2022-01-15 20:55:54 -08:00
Wayne Davison
d2cc1149b3 Get md-convert to output the release html files in the right dir. 2022-01-15 19:12:03 -08:00
Wayne Davison
c3b553a93f Preparing for release of 3.2.4pre2 2022-01-15 17:21:01 -08:00
Wayne Davison
eb0b41587c Use standard "git diff" for full diff highlighting support. 2022-01-15 17:20:11 -08:00
Wayne Davison
3c0bb7ff51 Even more man page improvements. 2022-01-15 17:13:31 -08:00
Wayne Davison
995ce7198b Man page improvments, including html cross-links. 2022-01-15 16:31:54 -08:00
Wayne Davison
38ffa522f6 A few more man page format tweaks. 2022-01-14 14:27:31 -08:00
Wayne Davison
8898aecb21 Make it easier to get section links. 2022-01-14 13:55:22 -08:00
Wayne Davison
f08505e92b Add more link targets to html man pages. 2022-01-13 23:44:30 -08:00
Wayne Davison
c1e8809a8f Tweak a caveat. 2022-01-13 23:31:43 -08:00
Wayne Davison
6130c4fa3c Display ??:??:?? when a time estimate gets too big. 2022-01-13 08:22:25 -08:00
Wayne Davison
8c4ceb3b86 Avoid a -8 in the progress output's remaining time
If the double "remain" value is so large that it overflows an int, make
the estimated seconds output as :00 instead of :-8.  Similar for the
estimated remaining minutes.  Support larger hours values.
2022-01-12 20:04:32 -08:00
Wayne Davison
30a5909544 Some symlink improvements to the man page. 2022-01-12 16:43:40 -08:00
Wayne Davison
e841944b47 Change manpage headings in html to use h2 tags with an id target. 2022-01-12 16:43:22 -08:00
Wayne Davison
635d8c0632 A repeated --old-args does more escape disabling. 2022-01-09 18:20:23 -08:00
Wayne Davison
6b8db0f644 Add an arg-protection idiom using backslash-escapes
The new default is to protect args and options from unintended shell
interpretation using backslash escapes.  See the new `--old-args` option
for a way to get the old-style splitting.  This idiom was chosen over
making `--protect-args` enabled by default because it is more backward
compatible (e.g. it works with rrsync). Fixes #272.
2022-01-09 17:47:24 -08:00
Wayne Davison
3b2804c815 Tweak a comment. 2022-01-09 14:03:31 -08:00
Wayne Davison
ff1792edf1 Improve --copy-links description. 2022-01-09 12:38:36 -08:00
Wayne Davison
b985123d2e Allow someone to specify scratchbase=FOO for runtests.sh. 2022-01-09 11:40:41 -08:00
Wayne Davison
c983279020 Improve rrsync usage and some more NEWS tweaks. 2022-01-03 00:47:19 -08:00
Wayne Davison
ee9199b542 More NEWS improvements. 2022-01-03 00:18:59 -08:00
Wayne Davison
f1a6998df2 Only send the --no-W kluge to a receiver. 2022-01-02 23:51:35 -08:00
142 changed files with 9632 additions and 3184 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
freebsd_task:
name: FreeBSD
freebsd_instance:
image_family: freebsd-12-2
image_family: freebsd-13-1
env:
PATH: /usr/local/bin:$PATH
prep_script:

76
.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
name: Test rsync on AlmaLinux 8
# Older-LTS coverage on the Fedora/RHEL family to help with backporting
# security fixes. AlmaLinux 8 is the RHEL 8 rebuild and is the oldest
# active LTS in this family (RHEL 8 full support runs to 2029).
# GitHub Actions has no native runner for this family, so the job runs
# inside an almalinux:8 container hosted on ubuntu-latest.
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: almalinux:8
name: Test rsync on AlmaLinux 8
steps:
- name: install git
# actions/checkout needs git in the container before the checkout step.
run: dnf -y install git
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: prep
# PowerTools is needed for libzstd-devel etc; xxhash and lz4 dev
# headers live in EPEL on RHEL 8. The default python3 on RHEL 8
# is 3.6, which is too old for runtests.py (uses capture_output=
# / text= introduced in 3.7), so install python39 and point
# /usr/bin/python3 at it.
run: |
dnf -y install epel-release
dnf config-manager --set-enabled powertools
dnf -y install gcc gcc-c++ make autoconf automake m4 \
python39 python39-pip diffutils \
openssl openssl-devel \
attr libattr-devel acl libacl-devel \
zstd libzstd-devel \
lz4 lz4-devel \
xxhash xxhash-devel
alternatives --set python3 /usr/bin/python3.9
pip3 install commonmark
- name: configure
run: ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: info
run: ./rsync --version
- name: check
# In the container we already run as root, so no sudo. The
# crtimes-not-supported skip matches the other Linux jobs.
run: RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
- name: ssl file list
run: ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: almalinux-8-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

View File

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
name: build
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore: [ .cirrus.yml ]
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore: [ .cirrus.yml ]
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
ubuntu-build:
runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: prep
run: |
sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl wget
wget -O git-version.h https://gist.githubusercontent.com/WayneD/c11243fa374fc64d4e42f2855c8e3827/raw/rsync-git-version.h
echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
run: sudo make install
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
- name: check30
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
- name: check29
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: ubuntu-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync
macos-build:
runs-on: macos-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: prep
run: |
brew install automake openssl xxhash zstd lz4 wget
sudo pip3 install commonmark
wget -O git-version.h https://gist.githubusercontent.com/WayneD/c11243fa374fc64d4e42f2855c8e3827/raw/rsync-git-version.h
echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: CPPFLAGS=-I/usr/local/opt/openssl/include/ LDFLAGS=-L/usr/local/opt/openssl/lib/ ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
run: sudo make install
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,chmod-temp-dir,chown-fake,devices-fake,dir-sgid,protected-regular,xattrs-hlink,xattrs make check
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: macos-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync
cygwin-build:
runs-on: windows-latest
if: (github.event_name == 'schedule' || contains(github.event.head_commit.message, '[buildall]'))
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- uses: crazy-max/ghaction-chocolatey@v1.2.2
with:
args: install -y --no-progress cygwin cyg-get
- name: prep
run: |
cyg-get make autoconf automake gcc-core attr libattr-devel python38 python38-pip libzstd-devel liblz4-devel libssl-devel libxxhash0 libxxhash-devel
curl.exe -o git-version.h https://gist.githubusercontent.com/WayneD/c11243fa374fc64d4e42f2855c8e3827/raw/rsync-git-version.h
echo "C:/tools/cygwin/bin" >>$Env:GITHUB_PATH
- name: commonmark
run: bash -c 'python3 -mpip install --user commonmark'
- name: configure
run: bash -c './configure --with-rrsync'
- name: make
run: bash -c 'make'
- name: install
run: bash -c 'make install'
- name: info
run: bash -c '/usr/local/bin/rsync --version'
- name: check
run: bash -c 'RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,acls,chown,devices,dir-sgid,protected-regular make check'
- name: ssl file list
run: bash -c 'PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true'
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
with:
name: cygwin-bin
path: |
rsync.exe
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

55
.github/workflows/cygwin-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
name: Test rsync on Cygwin
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/cygwin-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/cygwin-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: windows-2022
name: Test rsync on Cygwin
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: cygwin
run: choco install -y --no-progress cygwin cyg-get
- name: prep
run: |
cyg-get make autoconf automake gcc-core attr libattr-devel python39 python39-pip libzstd-devel liblz4-devel libssl-devel libxxhash0 libxxhash-devel
echo "C:/tools/cygwin/bin" >>$Env:GITHUB_PATH
- name: commonmark
run: bash -c 'python3 -mpip install --user commonmark'
- name: configure
run: bash -c './configure --with-rrsync'
- name: make
run: bash -c 'make'
- name: install
run: bash -c 'make install'
- name: info
run: bash -c '/usr/local/bin/rsync --version'
- name: check
run: bash -c 'RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,acls,bare-do-open-symlink-race,chdir-symlink-race,chmod-symlink-race,chown,clean-fname-underflow,daemon-chroot-acl,devices,dir-sgid,protected-regular,sender-flist-symlink-leak,simd-checksum,symlink-dirlink-basis make check'
- name: ssl file list
run: bash -c 'PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true'
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: cygwin-bin
path: |
rsync.exe
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

49
.github/workflows/freebsd-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
name: Test rsync on FreeBSD
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/freebsd-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/freebsd-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on FreeBSD
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Test in FreeBSD VM
id: test
uses: vmactions/freebsd-vm@v1
with:
usesh: true
prepare: |
pkg install -y bash autotools m4 devel/xxhash zstd liblz4 python3 archivers/liblz4 git
run: |
freebsd-version
./configure --with-rrsync -disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: freebsd-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

57
.github/workflows/macos-build.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
name: Test rsync on macOS
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/macos-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/macos-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: macos-latest
name: Test rsync on macOS
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: prep
run: |
brew install automake openssl xxhash zstd lz4
pip3 install --user --break-system-packages commonmark
echo "$(brew --prefix)/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: |
BREW_PREFIX=$(brew --prefix)
OPENSSL_PREFIX=$(brew --prefix openssl)
CPPFLAGS="-I${BREW_PREFIX}/include -I${OPENSSL_PREFIX}/include" \
LDFLAGS="-L${BREW_PREFIX}/lib -L${OPENSSL_PREFIX}/lib" \
./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
run: sudo make install
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,chmod-temp-dir,chown-fake,clean-fname-underflow,daemon-chroot-acl,devices-fake,dir-sgid,protected-regular,simd-checksum,xattrs-hlink,xattrs make check
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: macos-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

51
.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
name: Test rsync on NetBSD
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on NetBSD
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Test in NetBSD VM
id: test
uses: vmactions/netbsd-vm@v1
with:
usesh: true
prepare: |
PATH=/usr/sbin:$PATH pkg_add autoconf automake python312
ln -sf /usr/pkg/bin/python3.12 /usr/pkg/bin/python3
run: |
uname -a
./configure --with-rrsync --disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: netbsd-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

52
.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
name: Test rsync on OpenBSD
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on OpenBSD
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Test in OpenBSD VM
id: test
uses: vmactions/openbsd-vm@v1
with:
usesh: true
prepare: |
pkg_add -I bash autoconf%2.71 automake%1.16
run: |
uname -a
export AUTOCONF_VERSION=2.71
export AUTOMAKE_VERSION=1.16
./configure --with-rrsync --disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: openbsd-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

49
.github/workflows/solaris-build.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
name: Test rsync on Solaris
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/solaris-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/solaris-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on Solaris
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Test in Solaris VM
id: test
uses: vmactions/solaris-vm@v1
with:
usesh: true
prepare: |
pkg install bash automake gnu-m4 pkg://solaris/runtime/python-35 autoconf gcc git
run: |
uname -a
./configure --with-rrsync -disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
make
./rsync --version
make check
./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: solaris-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu 22.04
# Older-LTS coverage to help with backporting security fixes. ubuntu-22.04
# is currently the oldest GitHub Actions runner image (20.04 was retired
# in April 2025).
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu 22.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: prep
run: |
sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl
echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
run: sudo make install
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
- name: check30
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
- name: check29
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ubuntu-22.04-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

55
.github/workflows/ubuntu-build.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-build.yml'
pull_request:
paths-ignore:
- '.github/workflows/*.yml'
- '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-build.yml'
schedule:
- cron: '42 8 * * *'
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Test rsync on Ubuntu
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: prep
run: |
sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl
echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
- name: configure
run: ./configure --with-rrsync
- name: make
run: make
- name: install
run: sudo make install
- name: info
run: rsync --version
- name: check
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
- name: check30
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
- name: check29
run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
- name: ssl file list
run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
- name: save artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ubuntu-bin
path: |
rsync
rsync-ssl
rsync.1
rsync-ssl.1
rsyncd.conf.5
rrsync.1
rrsync

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ aclocal.m4
/proto.h
/proto.h-tstamp
/rsync*.[15]
/rrsync
/rrsync*.1
/rsync*.html
/rrsync*.html

View File

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ You need to have a C compiler installed and optionally a C++ compiler in order
to try to build some hardware-accelerated checksum routines. Rsync also needs
a modern awk, which might be provided via gawk or nawk on some OSes.
## Autoconf & man pages
## Autoconf & manpages
If you're installing from the git repo (instead of a release tar file) you'll
also need the GNU autotools (autoconf & automake) and your choice of 2 python3
markdown libraries: cmarkgfm or commonmark (needed to generate the man pages).
markdown libraries: cmarkgfm or commonmark (needed to generate the manpages).
If your OS doesn't provide a python3-cmarkgfm or python3-commonmark package,
you can run the following to install the commonmark python library for your
build user (after installing python3's pip package):
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ build user (after installing python3's pip package):
You can test if you've got it fixed by running (from the rsync checkout):
> ./md2man --test rsync-ssl.1.md
> ./md-convert --test rsync-ssl.1.md
Alternately, you can avoid generating the man pages by fetching the very latest
Alternately, you can avoid generating the manpages by fetching the very latest
versions (that match the latest git source) from the [generated-files][6] dir.
One way to do that is to run:

View File

@@ -30,11 +30,13 @@ SHELL=/bin/sh
.SUFFIXES:
.SUFFIXES: .c .o
SIMD_x86_64=simd-checksum-x86_64.o simd-checksum-avx2.o
ASM_x86_64=lib/md5-asm-x86_64.o
ROLL_SIMD_x86_64=simd-checksum-x86_64.o
ROLL_ASM_x86_64=simd-checksum-avx2.o
MD5_ASM_x86_64=lib/md5-asm-x86_64.o
GENFILES=configure.sh aclocal.m4 config.h.in rsync.1 rsync.1.html \
rsync-ssl.1 rsync-ssl.1.html rsyncd.conf.5 rsyncd.conf.5.html
rsync-ssl.1 rsync-ssl.1.html rsyncd.conf.5 rsyncd.conf.5.html \
@GEN_RRSYNC@
HEADERS=byteorder.h config.h errcode.h proto.h rsync.h ifuncs.h itypes.h inums.h \
lib/pool_alloc.h lib/mdigest.h lib/md-defines.h
LIBOBJ=lib/wildmatch.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/mdfour.o lib/md5.o \
@@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ OBJS1=flist.o rsync.o generator.o receiver.o cleanup.o sender.o exclude.o \
util1.o util2.o main.o checksum.o match.o syscall.o log.o backup.o delete.o
OBJS2=options.o io.o compat.o hlink.o token.o uidlist.o socket.o hashtable.o \
usage.o fileio.o batch.o clientname.o chmod.o acls.o xattrs.o
OBJS3=progress.o pipe.o @ASM@ @SIMD@
OBJS3=progress.o pipe.o @MD5_ASM@ @ROLL_SIMD@ @ROLL_ASM@
DAEMON_OBJ = params.o loadparm.o clientserver.o access.o connection.o authenticate.o
popt_OBJS=popt/findme.o popt/popt.o popt/poptconfig.o \
popt/popthelp.o popt/poptparse.o
@@ -55,12 +57,13 @@ TLS_OBJ = tls.o syscall.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/perms
# Programs we must have to run the test cases
CHECK_PROGS = rsync$(EXEEXT) tls$(EXEEXT) getgroups$(EXEEXT) getfsdev$(EXEEXT) \
testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT)
testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT) \
t_secure_relpath$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT) simdtest$(EXEEXT)
CHECK_SYMLINKS = testsuite/chown-fake.test testsuite/devices-fake.test testsuite/xattrs-hlink.test
# Objects for CHECK_PROGS to clean
CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o t_chmod_secure.o t_secure_relpath.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
# note that the -I. is needed to handle config.h when using VPATH
.c.o:
@@ -68,6 +71,8 @@ CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.
$(CC) -I. -I$(srcdir) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< @CC_SHOBJ_FLAG@
@OBJ_RESTORE@
# NOTE: consider running "packaging/smart-make" instead of "make" to auto-handle
# any changes to configure.sh and the main Makefile prior to a "make all".
all: Makefile rsync$(EXEEXT) stunnel-rsyncd.conf @MAKE_RRSYNC@ @MAKE_MAN@
.PHONY: all
@@ -146,13 +151,13 @@ git-version.h: ALWAYS_RUN
ALWAYS_RUN:
simd-checksum-x86_64.o: simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp
@$(srcdir)/cmd-or-msg disable-simd $(CXX) -I. $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c -o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp
@$(srcdir)/cmd-or-msg disable-roll-simd $(CXX) -I. $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c -o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp
simd-checksum-avx2.o: simd-checksum-avx2.S
@$(srcdir)/cmd-or-msg disable-asm $(CC) $(CFLAGS) --include=$(srcdir)/rsync.h -DAVX2_ASM -I. @NOEXECSTACK@ -c -o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-avx2.S
@$(srcdir)/cmd-or-msg disable-roll-asm $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -I. @NOEXECSTACK@ -c -o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-avx2.S
lib/md5-asm-x86_64.o: lib/md5-asm-x86_64.S config.h lib/md-defines.h
@$(srcdir)/cmd-or-msg disable-asm $(CC) -I. @NOEXECSTACK@ -c -o $@ $(srcdir)/lib/md5-asm-x86_64.S
lib/md5-asm-x86_64.o: lib/md5-asm-x86_64.S lib/md-defines.h
@$(srcdir)/cmd-or-msg disable-md5-asm $(CC) -I. @NOEXECSTACK@ -c -o $@ $(srcdir)/lib/md5-asm-x86_64.S
tls$(EXEEXT): $(TLS_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(TLS_OBJ) $(LIBS)
@@ -174,6 +179,14 @@ T_UNSAFE_OBJ = t_unsafe.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/sn
t_unsafe$(EXEEXT): $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ = t_chmod_secure.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT): $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ = t_secure_relpath.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
t_secure_relpath$(EXEEXT): $(T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ) $(LIBS)
.PHONY: conf
conf: configure.sh config.h.in
@@ -271,9 +284,9 @@ rrsync.1: support/rrsync.1.md md-convert Makefile
.PHONY: clean
clean: cleantests
rm -f *~ $(OBJS) $(CHECK_PROGS) $(CHECK_OBJS) $(CHECK_SYMLINKS) \
git-version.h rounding rounding.h *.old rsync*.1 rsync*.5 rsync*.html \
daemon-parm.h help-*.h default-*.h proto.h proto.h-tstamp
rm -f *~ $(OBJS) $(CHECK_PROGS) $(CHECK_OBJS) $(CHECK_SYMLINKS) @MAKE_RRSYNC@ \
git-version.h rounding rounding.h *.old rsync*.1 rsync*.5 @MAKE_RRSYNC_1@ \
*.html daemon-parm.h help-*.h default-*.h proto.h proto.h-tstamp
.PHONY: cleantests
cleantests:
@@ -330,6 +343,14 @@ wildtest.o: wildtest.c t_stub.o lib/wildmatch.c rsync.h config.h
wildtest$(EXEEXT): wildtest.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o @BUILD_POPT@
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ wildtest.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o @BUILD_POPT@ $(LIBS)
simdtest$(EXEEXT): simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp $(HEADERS)
@if test x"@ROLL_SIMD@" != x; then \
$(CXX) -I. $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -DTEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 \
-o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp @ROLL_ASM@ $(LIBS); \
else \
touch $@; \
fi
testsuite/chown-fake.test:
ln -s chown.test $(srcdir)/testsuite/chown-fake.test

620
NEWS.md
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ RSYNC DAEMONS
-------------
Rsync can also talk to "rsync daemons" which can provide anonymous or
authenticated rsync. See the rsyncd.conf(5) man page for details on how
to setup an rsync daemon. See the rsync(1) man page for info on how to
authenticated rsync. See the rsyncd.conf(5) manpage for details on how
to setup an rsync daemon. See the rsync(1) manpage for info on how to
connect to an rsync daemon.

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Routines to authenticate access to a daemon (hosts allow/deny).
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 2004-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static void make_mask(char *mask, int plen, int addrlen)
return;
}
static int match_address(const char *addr, const char *tok)
static int match_address(const char *addr, char *tok)
{
char *p;
struct addrinfo hints, *resa, *rest;

7
acls.c
View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2006-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2006-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ static int get_rsync_acl(const char *fname, rsync_acl *racl,
sys_acl_free_acl(sacl);
if (!ok) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "get_acl: unpack_smb_acl(%s)", fname);
return -1;
}
} else if (no_acl_syscall_error(errno)) {
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ static uint32 recv_acl_access(int f, uchar *name_follows_ptr)
static uchar recv_ida_entries(int f, ida_entries *ent)
{
uchar computed_mask_bits = 0;
int i, count = read_varint(f);
int i, count = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_ACL_COUNT, "ACL count");
ent->idas = count ? new_array(id_access, count) : NULL;
ent->count = count;
@@ -712,7 +713,7 @@ static uchar recv_ida_entries(int f, ida_entries *ent)
else
id = recv_group_name(f, id, NULL);
} else if (access & NAME_IS_USER) {
if (inc_recurse && am_root && !numeric_ids)
if (inc_recurse && !numeric_ids)
id = match_uid(id);
} else {
if (inc_recurse && (!am_root || !numeric_ids))

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Support rsync daemon authentication.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2000 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 2002-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2002-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
extern int read_only;
extern char *password_file;
extern struct name_num_obj valid_auth_checksums;
/***************************************************************************
encode a buffer using base64 - simple and slow algorithm. null terminates
@@ -72,9 +73,9 @@ static void gen_challenge(const char *addr, char *challenge)
SIVAL(input, 20, tv.tv_usec);
SIVAL(input, 24, getpid());
sum_init(-1, 0);
len = sum_init(valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni, 0);
sum_update(input, sizeof input);
len = sum_end(digest);
sum_end(digest);
base64_encode(digest, len, challenge, 0);
}
@@ -86,10 +87,10 @@ static void generate_hash(const char *in, const char *challenge, char *out)
char buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
sum_init(-1, 0);
len = sum_init(valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni, 0);
sum_update(in, strlen(in));
sum_update(challenge, strlen(challenge));
len = sum_end(buf);
sum_end(buf);
base64_encode(buf, len, out, 0);
}
@@ -238,6 +239,7 @@ char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
negotiate_daemon_auth(f_out, 0);
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
@@ -350,6 +352,7 @@ void auth_client(int fd, const char *user, const char *challenge)
if (!user || !*user)
user = "nobody";
negotiate_daemon_auth(-1, 1);
if (!(pass = getpassf(password_file))
&& !(pass = getenv("RSYNC_PASSWORD"))) {

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Backup handling code.
*
* Copyright (C) 1999 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int validate_backup_dir(void)
{
STRUCT_STAT st;
if (do_lstat(backup_dir_buf, &st) < 0) {
if (do_lstat_at(backup_dir_buf, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "backup lstat %s failed", backup_dir_buf);
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static BOOL copy_valid_path(const char *fname)
for ( ; b; name = b + 1, b = strchr(name, '/')) {
*b = '\0';
while (do_mkdir(backup_dir_buf, ACCESSPERMS) < 0) {
while (do_mkdir_at(backup_dir_buf, ACCESSPERMS) < 0) {
if (errno == EEXIST) {
val = validate_backup_dir();
if (val > 0)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static inline int link_or_rename(const char *from, const char *to,
if (IS_SPECIAL(stp->st_mode) || IS_DEVICE(stp->st_mode))
return 0; /* Use copy code. */
#endif
if (do_link(from, to) == 0) {
if (do_link_at(from, to) == 0) {
if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: HLINK %s successful.\n", from);
return 2;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline int link_or_rename(const char *from, const char *to,
return 0;
}
#endif
if (do_rename(from, to) == 0) {
if (do_rename_at(from, to) == 0) {
if (stp->st_nlink > 1 && !S_ISDIR(stp->st_mode)) {
/* If someone has hard-linked the file into the backup
* dir, rename() might return success but do nothing! */
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
goto success;
if (errno == EEXIST || errno == EISDIR) {
STRUCT_STAT bakst;
if (do_lstat(buf, &bakst) == 0) {
if (do_lstat_at(buf, &bakst) == 0) {
int flags = get_del_for_flag(bakst.st_mode) | DEL_FOR_BACKUP | DEL_RECURSE;
if (delete_item(buf, bakst.st_mode, flags) != 0)
return 0;
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
/* Check to see if this is a device file, or link */
if ((am_root && preserve_devices && IS_DEVICE(file->mode))
|| (preserve_specials && IS_SPECIAL(file->mode))) {
if (do_mknod(buf, file->mode, sx.st.st_rdev) < 0)
if (do_mknod_at(buf, file->mode, sx.st.st_rdev) < 0)
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "mknod %s failed", full_fname(buf));
else if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: DEVICE %s successful.\n", fname);
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
}
ret = 2;
} else {
if (do_symlink(sl, buf) < 0)
if (do_symlink_at(sl, buf) < 0)
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "link %s -> \"%s\"", full_fname(buf), sl);
else if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: SYMLINK %s successful.\n", fname);

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1999 Weiss
* Copyright (C) 2004 Chris Shoemaker
* Copyright (C) 2004-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int write_opt(const char *opt, const char *arg)
{
int len = strlen(opt);
int err = write(batch_sh_fd, " ", 1) != 1;
err = write(batch_sh_fd, opt, len) != len ? 1 : 0;
err = write(batch_sh_fd, opt, len) != len ? 1 : 0;
if (arg) {
err |= write(batch_sh_fd, "=", 1) != 1;
err |= write_arg(arg);

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Simple byteorder handling.
*
* Copyright (C) 1992-1995 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 2007-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -129,4 +129,3 @@ SIVAL(char *buf, int pos, uint32 val)
{
SIVALu((uchar*)buf, pos, val);
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2004-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -42,41 +42,94 @@ extern int protocol_version;
extern int proper_seed_order;
extern const char *checksum_choice;
struct name_num_obj valid_checksums = {
"checksum", NULL, NULL, 0, 0, {
#define NNI_BUILTIN (1<<0)
#define NNI_EVP (1<<1)
#define NNI_EVP_OK (1<<2)
struct name_num_item valid_checksums_items[] = {
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
{ CSUM_XXH3_128, "xxh128", NULL },
{ CSUM_XXH3_64, "xxh3", NULL },
{ CSUM_XXH3_128, 0, "xxh128", NULL },
{ CSUM_XXH3_64, 0, "xxh3", NULL },
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
{ CSUM_XXH64, "xxh64", NULL },
{ CSUM_XXH64, "xxhash", NULL },
{ CSUM_XXH64, 0, "xxh64", NULL },
{ CSUM_XXH64, 0, "xxhash", NULL },
#endif
{ CSUM_MD5, "md5", NULL },
{ CSUM_MD4, "md4", NULL },
{ CSUM_NONE, "none", NULL },
{ 0, NULL, NULL }
}
{ CSUM_MD5, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md5", NULL },
{ CSUM_MD4, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md4", NULL },
#ifdef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
{ CSUM_SHA1, NNI_EVP, "sha1", NULL },
#endif
{ CSUM_NONE, 0, "none", NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
};
int xfersum_type = 0; /* used for the file transfer checksums */
int checksum_type = 0; /* used for the pre-transfer (--checksum) checksums */
struct name_num_obj valid_checksums = {
"checksum", NULL, 0, 0, valid_checksums_items
};
int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
struct name_num_item valid_auth_checksums_items[] = {
#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
{ CSUM_SHA512, NNI_EVP, "sha512", NULL },
#endif
#ifdef SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
{ CSUM_SHA256, NNI_EVP, "sha256", NULL },
#endif
#ifdef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
{ CSUM_SHA1, NNI_EVP, "sha1", NULL },
#endif
{ CSUM_MD5, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md5", NULL },
{ CSUM_MD4, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md4", NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
};
struct name_num_obj valid_auth_checksums = {
"daemon auth checksum", NULL, 0, 0, valid_auth_checksums_items
};
/* These cannot make use of openssl, so they're marked just as built-in */
struct name_num_item implied_checksum_md4 =
{ CSUM_MD4, NNI_BUILTIN, "md4", NULL };
struct name_num_item implied_checksum_md5 =
{ CSUM_MD5, NNI_BUILTIN, "md5", NULL };
struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni; /* used for the transfer checksum2 computations */
int xfer_sum_len;
struct name_num_item *file_sum_nni; /* used for the pre-transfer --checksum computations */
int file_sum_len, file_sum_extra_cnt;
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
const EVP_MD *xfer_sum_evp_md;
const EVP_MD *file_sum_evp_md;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx_evp = NULL;
#endif
static int initialized_choices = 0;
struct name_num_item *parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
{
struct name_num_item *nni;
if (len < 0 && name)
len = strlen(name);
init_checksum_choices();
if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
if (protocol_version >= 30)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (protocol_version >= 27)
return CSUM_MD4_OLD;
if (protocol_version >= 21)
return CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
return CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC;
if (protocol_version >= 30) {
if (!proper_seed_order)
return &implied_checksum_md5;
name = "md5";
len = 3;
} else {
if (protocol_version >= 27)
implied_checksum_md4.num = CSUM_MD4_OLD;
else if (protocol_version >= 21)
implied_checksum_md4.num = CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
else
implied_checksum_md4.num = CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC;
return &implied_checksum_md4;
}
}
nni = get_nni_by_name(&valid_checksums, name, len);
@@ -86,44 +139,74 @@ int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return nni->num;
return nni;
}
static const char *checksum_name(int num)
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static const EVP_MD *csum_evp_md(struct name_num_item *nni)
{
struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_num(&valid_checksums, num);
const EVP_MD *emd;
if (!(nni->flags & NNI_EVP))
return NULL;
return nni ? nni->name : num < CSUM_MD4 ? "md4" : "UNKNOWN";
#ifdef USE_MD5_ASM
if (nni->num == CSUM_MD5)
emd = NULL;
else
#endif
emd = EVP_get_digestbyname(nni->name);
if (emd && !(nni->flags & NNI_EVP_OK)) { /* Make sure it works before we advertise it */
if (!ctx_evp && !(ctx_evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
out_of_memory("csum_evp_md");
/* Some routines are marked as legacy and are not enabled in the openssl.cnf file.
* If we can't init the emd, we'll fall back to our built-in code. */
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx_evp, emd, NULL) == 0)
emd = NULL;
else
nni->flags = (nni->flags & ~NNI_BUILTIN) | NNI_EVP_OK;
}
if (!emd)
nni->flags &= ~NNI_EVP;
return emd;
}
#endif
void parse_checksum_choice(int final_call)
{
if (valid_checksums.negotiated_name)
xfersum_type = checksum_type = valid_checksums.negotiated_num;
if (valid_checksums.negotiated_nni)
xfer_sum_nni = file_sum_nni = valid_checksums.negotiated_nni;
else {
char *cp = checksum_choice ? strchr(checksum_choice, ',') : NULL;
const char *cp = checksum_choice ? strchr(checksum_choice, ',') : NULL;
if (cp) {
xfersum_type = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, cp - checksum_choice);
checksum_type = parse_csum_name(cp+1, -1);
xfer_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, cp - checksum_choice);
file_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(cp+1, -1);
} else
xfersum_type = checksum_type = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, -1);
xfer_sum_nni = file_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, -1);
if (am_server && checksum_choice)
validate_choice_vs_env(NSTR_CHECKSUM, xfersum_type, checksum_type);
validate_choice_vs_env(NSTR_CHECKSUM, xfer_sum_nni->num, file_sum_nni->num);
}
xfer_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(xfer_sum_nni->num, 0);
file_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(file_sum_nni->num, 0);
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
xfer_sum_evp_md = csum_evp_md(xfer_sum_nni);
file_sum_evp_md = csum_evp_md(file_sum_nni);
#endif
if (xfersum_type == CSUM_NONE)
file_sum_extra_cnt = (file_sum_len + EXTRA_LEN - 1) / EXTRA_LEN;
if (xfer_sum_nni->num == CSUM_NONE)
whole_file = 1;
/* Snag the checksum name for both write_batch's option output & the following debug output. */
if (valid_checksums.negotiated_name)
checksum_choice = valid_checksums.negotiated_name;
if (valid_checksums.negotiated_nni)
checksum_choice = valid_checksums.negotiated_nni->name;
else if (checksum_choice == NULL)
checksum_choice = checksum_name(xfersum_type);
checksum_choice = xfer_sum_nni->name;
if (final_call && DEBUG_GTE(NSTR, am_server ? 3 : 1)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "%s%s checksum: %s\n",
am_server ? "Server" : "Client",
valid_checksums.negotiated_name ? " negotiated" : "",
valid_checksums.negotiated_nni ? " negotiated" : "",
checksum_choice);
}
}
@@ -143,6 +226,18 @@ int csum_len_for_type(int cst, BOOL flist_csum)
return MD4_DIGEST_LEN;
case CSUM_MD5:
return MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
#ifdef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
case CSUM_SHA1:
return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
#endif
#ifdef SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
case CSUM_SHA256:
return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
#endif
#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
case CSUM_SHA512:
return SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
#endif
case CSUM_XXH64:
case CSUM_XXH3_64:
return 64/8;
@@ -168,6 +263,9 @@ int canonical_checksum(int csum_type)
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD5:
case CSUM_SHA1:
case CSUM_SHA256:
case CSUM_SHA512:
return -1;
case CSUM_XXH64:
case CSUM_XXH3_64:
@@ -179,7 +277,7 @@ int canonical_checksum(int csum_type)
return 0;
}
#ifndef HAVE_SIMD /* See simd-checksum-*.cpp. */
#ifndef USE_ROLL_SIMD /* See simd-checksum-*.cpp. */
/*
a simple 32 bit checksum that can be updated from either end
(inspired by Mark Adler's Adler-32 checksum)
@@ -204,7 +302,22 @@ uint32 get_checksum1(char *buf1, int32 len)
void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
{
switch (xfersum_type) {
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (xfer_sum_evp_md) {
static EVP_MD_CTX *evp = NULL;
uchar seedbuf[4];
if (!evp && !(evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, xfer_sum_evp_md, NULL);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, seedbuf, 4);
}
EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, (uchar *)buf, len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, (uchar *)sum, NULL);
} else
#endif
switch (xfer_sum_nni->num) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
case CSUM_XXH64:
SIVAL64(sum, 0, XXH64(buf, len, checksum_seed));
@@ -222,40 +335,26 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
}
#endif
case CSUM_MD5: {
MD5_CTX m5;
md_context m5;
uchar seedbuf[4];
MD5_Init(&m5);
md5_begin(&m5);
if (proper_seed_order) {
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
MD5_Update(&m5, seedbuf, 4);
md5_update(&m5, seedbuf, 4);
}
MD5_Update(&m5, (uchar *)buf, len);
md5_update(&m5, (uchar *)buf, len);
} else {
MD5_Update(&m5, (uchar *)buf, len);
md5_update(&m5, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
MD5_Update(&m5, seedbuf, 4);
md5_update(&m5, seedbuf, 4);
}
}
MD5_Final((uchar *)sum, &m5);
md5_result(&m5, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
{
MD4_CTX m4;
MD4_Init(&m4);
MD4_Update(&m4, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
uchar seedbuf[4];
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
MD4_Update(&m4, seedbuf, 4);
}
MD4_Final((uchar *)sum, &m4);
break;
}
#endif
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: {
@@ -266,9 +365,8 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
if (len > len1 || !buf1) {
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
}
@@ -288,7 +386,7 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes.
*/
if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
if (len - i > 0 || xfer_sum_nni->num > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
@@ -306,15 +404,33 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
int32 remainder;
int fd;
memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
if (fd == -1) {
memset(sum, 0, file_sum_len);
return;
}
buf = map_file(fd, len, MAX_MAP_SIZE, CHUNK_SIZE);
switch (checksum_type) {
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (file_sum_evp_md) {
static EVP_MD_CTX *evp = NULL;
if (!evp && !(evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
out_of_memory("file_checksum");
EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, file_sum_evp_md, NULL);
for (i = 0; i + CHUNK_SIZE <= len; i += CHUNK_SIZE)
EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, (uchar *)sum, NULL);
} else
#endif
switch (file_sum_nni->num) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
case CSUM_XXH64: {
static XXH64_state_t* state = NULL;
@@ -374,38 +490,21 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
}
#endif
case CSUM_MD5: {
MD5_CTX m5;
md_context m5;
MD5_Init(&m5);
md5_begin(&m5);
for (i = 0; i + CHUNK_SIZE <= len; i += CHUNK_SIZE)
MD5_Update(&m5, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
md5_update(&m5, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
MD5_Update(&m5, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
md5_update(&m5, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
MD5_Final((uchar *)sum, &m5);
md5_result(&m5, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
{
MD4_CTX m4;
MD4_Init(&m4);
for (i = 0; i + CHUNK_SIZE <= len; i += CHUNK_SIZE)
MD4_Update(&m4, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
MD4_Update(&m4, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
MD4_Final((uchar *)sum, &m4);
break;
}
#endif
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: {
@@ -413,15 +512,15 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
mdfour_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CHUNK_SIZE <= len; i += CHUNK_SIZE)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CSUM_CHUNK), CSUM_CHUNK);
/* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0 || checksum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
if (remainder > 0 || file_sum_nni->num > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
@@ -429,7 +528,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
}
default:
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum-choice for --checksum: %s (%d)\n",
checksum_name(checksum_type), checksum_type);
file_sum_nni->name, file_sum_nni->num);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
@@ -438,30 +537,43 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
}
static int32 sumresidue;
static union {
md_context md;
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
MD4_CTX m4;
#endif
MD5_CTX m5;
} ctx;
static md_context ctx_md;
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
static XXH64_state_t* xxh64_state;
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
static XXH3_state_t* xxh3_state;
#endif
static int cursum_type;
static struct name_num_item *cur_sum_nni;
int cur_sum_len;
void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static const EVP_MD *cur_sum_evp_md;
#endif
/* Initialize a hash digest accumulator. Data is supplied via
* sum_update() and the resulting binary digest is retrieved via
* sum_end(). This only supports one active sum at a time. */
int sum_init(struct name_num_item *nni, int seed)
{
char s[4];
if (csum_type < 0)
csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cursum_type = csum_type;
if (!nni)
nni = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cur_sum_nni = nni;
cur_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(nni->num, 0);
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
cur_sum_evp_md = csum_evp_md(nni);
#endif
switch (csum_type) {
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (cur_sum_evp_md) {
if (!ctx_evp && !(ctx_evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
out_of_memory("file_checksum");
EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx_evp, cur_sum_evp_md, NULL);
} else
#endif
switch (cur_sum_nni->num) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
case CSUM_XXH64:
if (!xxh64_state && !(xxh64_state = XXH64_createState()))
@@ -482,20 +594,16 @@ void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
break;
#endif
case CSUM_MD5:
MD5_Init(&ctx.m5);
md5_begin(&ctx_md);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
MD4_Init(&ctx.m4);
#else
mdfour_begin(&ctx.md);
mdfour_begin(&ctx_md);
sumresidue = 0;
#endif
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
mdfour_begin(&ctx.md);
mdfour_begin(&ctx_md);
sumresidue = 0;
SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
sum_update(s, 4);
@@ -505,19 +613,19 @@ void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
default: /* paranoia to prevent missing case values */
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return cur_sum_len;
}
/**
* Feed data into an MD4 accumulator, md. The results may be
* retrieved using sum_end(). md is used for different purposes at
* different points during execution.
*
* @todo Perhaps get rid of md and just pass in the address each time.
* Very slightly clearer and slower.
**/
/* Feed data into a hash digest accumulator. */
void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (cur_sum_evp_md) {
EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx_evp, (uchar *)p, len);
} else
#endif
switch (cur_sum_nni->num) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
case CSUM_XXH64:
XXH64_update(xxh64_state, p, len);
@@ -532,39 +640,35 @@ void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
break;
#endif
case CSUM_MD5:
MD5_Update(&ctx.m5, (uchar *)p, len);
md5_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
MD4_Update(&ctx.m4, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
#endif
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
memcpy(ctx.md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
memcpy(ctx_md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
sumresidue += len;
break;
}
if (sumresidue) {
int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
memcpy(ctx.md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)ctx.md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
memcpy(ctx_md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)ctx_md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= i;
p += i;
}
while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
p += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
sumresidue = len;
if (sumresidue)
memcpy(ctx.md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
memcpy(ctx_md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
@@ -573,13 +677,18 @@ void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
}
}
/* NOTE: all the callers of sum_end() pass in a pointer to a buffer that is
* MAX_DIGEST_LEN in size, so even if the csum-len is shorter that that (i.e.
* CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC), we don't have to worry about limiting the data we write
* into the "sum" buffer. */
int sum_end(char *sum)
/* The sum buffer only needs to be as long as the current checksum's digest
* len, not MAX_DIGEST_LEN. Note that for CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC that is the full
* MD4_DIGEST_LEN even if the file-list code is going to ignore all but the
* first 2 bytes of it. */
void sum_end(char *sum)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (cur_sum_evp_md) {
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx_evp, (uchar *)sum, NULL);
} else
#endif
switch (cur_sum_nni->num) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
case CSUM_XXH64:
SIVAL64(sum, 0, XXH64_digest(xxh64_state));
@@ -597,22 +706,18 @@ int sum_end(char *sum)
}
#endif
case CSUM_MD5:
MD5_Final((uchar *)sum, &ctx.m5);
md5_result(&ctx_md, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
MD4_Final((uchar *)sum, &ctx.m4);
break;
#endif
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)ctx.md.buffer, sumresidue);
mdfour_result(&ctx.md, (uchar *)sum);
mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)ctx_md.buffer, sumresidue);
mdfour_result(&ctx_md, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
if (sumresidue)
mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)ctx.md.buffer, sumresidue);
mdfour_result(&ctx.md, (uchar *)sum);
mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)ctx_md.buffer, sumresidue);
mdfour_result(&ctx_md, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
*sum = '\0';
@@ -620,6 +725,74 @@ int sum_end(char *sum)
default: /* paranoia to prevent missing case values */
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return csum_len_for_type(cursum_type, 0);
}
#if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL
static void verify_digest(struct name_num_item *nni, BOOL check_auth_list)
{
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
static int xxh3_result = 0;
#endif
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static int prior_num = 0, prior_flags = 0, prior_result = 0;
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
if (nni->num == CSUM_XXH3_64 || nni->num == CSUM_XXH3_128) {
if (!xxh3_result) {
char buf[32816];
int j;
for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof buf; j++)
buf[j] = ' ' + (j % 96);
sum_init(nni, 0);
sum_update(buf, 32816);
sum_update(buf, 31152);
sum_update(buf, 32474);
sum_update(buf, 9322);
xxh3_result = XXH3_64bits_digest(xxh3_state) != 0xadbcf16d4678d1de ? -1 : 1;
}
if (xxh3_result < 0)
nni->num = CSUM_gone;
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (BITS_SETnUNSET(nni->flags, NNI_EVP, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP_OK)) {
if (nni->num == prior_num && nni->flags == prior_flags) {
nni->flags = prior_result;
if (!(nni->flags & NNI_EVP))
nni->num = CSUM_gone;
} else {
prior_num = nni->num;
prior_flags = nni->flags;
if (!csum_evp_md(nni))
nni->num = CSUM_gone;
prior_result = nni->flags;
if (check_auth_list && (nni = get_nni_by_num(&valid_auth_checksums, prior_num)) != NULL)
verify_digest(nni, False);
}
}
#endif
}
#endif
void init_checksum_choices()
{
#if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL
struct name_num_item *nni;
#endif
if (initialized_choices)
return;
#if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL
for (nni = valid_checksums.list; nni->name; nni++)
verify_digest(nni, True);
for (nni = valid_auth_checksums.list; nni->name; nni++)
verify_digest(nni, False);
#endif
initialized_choices = 1;
}

View File

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ NORETURN void _exit_cleanup(int code, const char *file, int line)
switch_step++;
if (cleanup_fname)
do_unlink(cleanup_fname);
do_unlink_at(cleanup_fname);
if (exit_code)
kill_all(SIGUSR1);
if (cleanup_pid && cleanup_pid == getpid()) {

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1992-2001 Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2002-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2002-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int read_proxy_protocol_header(int fd)
char sig[PROXY_V2_SIG_SIZE];
char ver_cmd;
char fam;
char len[2];
unsigned char len[2];
union {
struct {
char src_addr[4];

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2001 Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2002-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2002-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ extern int list_only;
extern int am_sender;
extern int am_server;
extern int am_daemon;
extern int am_chrooted;
extern int am_root;
extern int msgs2stderr;
extern int rsync_port;
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ extern int ignore_errors;
extern int preserve_xattrs;
extern int kluge_around_eof;
extern int munge_symlinks;
extern int use_secure_symlinks;
extern int open_noatime;
extern int sanitize_paths;
extern int numeric_ids;
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ extern int protocol_version;
extern int io_timeout;
extern int no_detach;
extern int write_batch;
extern int old_style_args;
extern int default_af_hint;
extern int logfile_format_has_i;
extern int logfile_format_has_o_or_i;
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ extern uid_t our_uid;
extern gid_t our_gid;
char *auth_user;
char *daemon_auth_choices;
int read_only = 0;
int module_id = -1;
int pid_file_fd = -1;
@@ -148,13 +152,9 @@ int start_socket_client(char *host, int remote_argc, char *remote_argv[],
static int exchange_protocols(int f_in, int f_out, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int am_client)
{
int remote_sub = -1;
#if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
int our_sub = protocol_version < PROTOCOL_VERSION ? 0 : SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION;
#else
int our_sub = 0;
#endif
int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
io_printf(f_out, "@RSYNCD: %d.%d\n", protocol_version, our_sub);
output_daemon_greeting(f_out, am_client);
if (!am_client) {
char *motd = lp_motd_file();
if (motd && *motd) {
@@ -186,16 +186,30 @@ static int exchange_protocols(int f_in, int f_out, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int
}
if (remote_sub < 0) {
if (remote_protocol == 30) {
if (remote_protocol >= 30) {
if (am_client)
rprintf(FERROR, "rsync: server is speaking an incompatible beta of protocol 30\n");
rprintf(FERROR, "rsync: the server omitted the subprotocol value: %s\n", buf);
else
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client is speaking an incompatible beta of protocol 30\n");
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client omitted the subprotocol value: %s\n", buf);
return -1;
}
remote_sub = 0;
}
daemon_auth_choices = strchr(buf + 9, ' ');
if (daemon_auth_choices) {
char *cp;
daemon_auth_choices = strdup(daemon_auth_choices + 1);
if ((cp = strchr(daemon_auth_choices, '\n')) != NULL)
*cp = '\0';
} else if (remote_protocol > 31) {
if (am_client)
rprintf(FERROR, "rsync: the server omitted the digest name list: %s\n", buf);
else
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client omitted the digest name list: %s\n", buf);
return -1;
}
if (protocol_version > remote_protocol) {
protocol_version = remote_protocol;
if (remote_sub)
@@ -288,20 +302,45 @@ int start_inband_exchange(int f_in, int f_out, const char *user, int argc, char
sargs[sargc++] = ".";
if (!old_style_args)
snprintf(line, sizeof line, " %.*s/", modlen, modname);
while (argc > 0) {
if (sargc >= MAX_ARGS - 1) {
arg_overflow:
rprintf(FERROR, "internal: args[] overflowed in do_cmd()\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
}
if (strncmp(*argv, modname, modlen) == 0
&& argv[0][modlen] == '\0')
if (strncmp(*argv, modname, modlen) == 0 && argv[0][modlen] == '\0')
sargs[sargc++] = modname; /* we send "modname/" */
else if (**argv == '-') {
if (asprintf(sargs + sargc++, "./%s", *argv) < 0)
out_of_memory("start_inband_exchange");
} else
sargs[sargc++] = *argv;
else {
char *arg = *argv;
int extra_chars = *arg == '-' ? 2 : 0; /* a leading dash needs a "./" prefix. */
/* If --old-args was not specified, make sure that the arg won't split at a mod name! */
if (!old_style_args && (p = strstr(arg, line)) != NULL) {
do {
extra_chars += 2;
} while ((p = strstr(p+1, line)) != NULL);
}
if (extra_chars) {
char *f = arg;
char *t = arg = new_array(char, strlen(arg) + extra_chars + 1);
if (*f == '-') {
*t++ = '.';
*t++ = '/';
}
while (*f) {
if (*f == ' ' && strncmp(f, line, modlen+2) == 0) {
*t++ = '[';
*t++ = *f++;
*t++ = ']';
} else
*t++ = *f++;
}
*t = '\0';
}
sargs[sargc++] = arg;
}
argv++;
argc--;
}
@@ -355,7 +394,7 @@ int start_inband_exchange(int f_in, int f_out, const char *user, int argc, char
if (rl_nulls) {
for (i = 0; i < sargc; i++) {
if (!sargs[i]) /* stop at --protect-args NULL */
if (!sargs[i]) /* stop at --secluded-args NULL */
break;
write_sbuf(f_out, sargs[i]);
write_byte(f_out, 0);
@@ -403,7 +442,7 @@ static int read_arg_from_pipe(int fd, char *buf, int limit)
}
#endif
static void set_env_str(const char *var, const char *str)
void set_env_str(const char *var, const char *str)
{
#ifdef HAVE_SETENV
if (setenv(var, str, 1) < 0)
@@ -664,7 +703,7 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
int set_uid;
char *p, *err_msg = NULL;
char *name = lp_name(i);
int use_chroot = lp_use_chroot(i);
int use_chroot = lp_use_chroot(i); /* might be 1 (yes), 0 (no), or -1 (unset) */
int ret, pre_exec_arg_fd = -1, pre_exec_error_fd = -1;
int save_munge_symlinks;
pid_t pre_exec_pid = 0;
@@ -789,6 +828,20 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: no path setting.\n");
return -1;
}
if (use_chroot < 0) {
if (strstr(module_dir, "/./") != NULL)
use_chroot = 1; /* The module is expecting a chroot inner & outer path. */
else if (chroot("/") < 0) {
rprintf(FLOG, "chroot test failed: %s. "
"Switching 'use chroot' from unset to false.\n",
strerror(errno));
use_chroot = 0;
} else {
if (chdir("/") < 0)
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chdir(\"/\") failed");
use_chroot = 1;
}
}
if (use_chroot) {
if ((p = strstr(module_dir, "/./")) != NULL) {
*p = '\0'; /* Temporary... */
@@ -925,29 +978,20 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
}
if (use_chroot) {
/*
* XXX: The 'use chroot' flag is a fairly reliable
* source of confusion, because it fails under two
* important circumstances: running as non-root,
* running on Win32 (or possibly others). On the
* other hand, if you are running as root, then it
* might be better to always use chroot.
*
* So, perhaps if we can't chroot we should just issue
* a warning, unless a "require chroot" flag is set,
* in which case we fail.
*/
/* Cache timezone data before chroot makes /etc/localtime inaccessible */
tzset();
if (chroot(module_chdir)) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot %s failed", module_chdir);
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot(\"%s\") failed", module_chdir);
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: chroot failed\n");
return -1;
}
am_chrooted = 1;
module_chdir = module_dir;
}
if (!change_dir(module_chdir, CD_NORMAL))
return path_failure(f_out, module_chdir, True);
if (module_dirlen || (!use_chroot && !*lp_daemon_chroot()))
if (module_dirlen)
sanitize_paths = 1;
if ((munge_symlinks = lp_munge_symlinks(module_id)) < 0)
@@ -964,6 +1008,15 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
}
}
/* Enable secure symlink handling for any non-chrooted daemon module.
* This prevents TOCTOU race attacks where an attacker could switch a
* directory to a symlink between path validation and file open.
* Match the gate used by the do_*_at() wrappers in syscall.c
* (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) -- the protection has nothing to do
* with symlink munging, so a module configured with
* "munge symlinks = false" must still get the secure-open path. */
use_secure_symlinks = am_daemon && !am_chrooted;
if (gid_list.count) {
gid_t *gid_array = gid_list.items;
if (setgid(gid_array[0])) {
@@ -1259,11 +1312,51 @@ int start_daemon(int f_in, int f_out)
if (lp_proxy_protocol() && !read_proxy_protocol_header(f_in))
return -1;
/* Do reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid. The result is cached,
* so the later client_name() call will use this cached value. This
* ensures hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
* after chroot.
*
* "reverse lookup" can be set globally OR per-module, so we also
* scan each module: a deployment with "reverse lookup = no" in the
* global section but "reverse lookup = yes" in a specific module
* still triggers a post-chroot lookup at access-check time
* (rsync_module() in this file), which would also fail in the
* chroot and turn hostname-based deny rules into silent bypasses. */
{
int need_reverse = lp_reverse_lookup(-1);
int j, num_modules = lp_num_modules();
for (j = 0; !need_reverse && j < num_modules; j++) {
if (lp_reverse_lookup(j))
need_reverse = 1;
}
if (need_reverse)
(void)client_name(client_addr(f_in));
}
p = lp_daemon_chroot();
if (*p) {
log_init(0); /* Make use we've initialized syslog before chrooting. */
if (chroot(p) < 0 || chdir("/") < 0) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chroot %s failed", p);
tzset();
if (chroot(p) < 0) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chroot(\"%s\") failed", p);
return -1;
}
/* Deliberately do NOT set am_chrooted here. am_chrooted
* gates the per-module symlink-race defenses
* (secure_relative_open() and the do_*_at() wrappers in
* syscall.c) and means "the kernel is enforcing path
* confinement at the module boundary". The daemon chroot
* confines path resolution to the daemon-chroot directory,
* not to any individual module path -- modules sharing the
* daemon chroot are still distinguishable filesystem
* subtrees and a sender-controlled symlink in module A
* could redirect a syscall to module B (or to other files
* inside the daemon chroot) without the per-module
* defenses. Leave am_chrooted=0 here so secure_relative_open()
* still fires for "use chroot = no" modules. */
if (chdir("/") < 0) {
rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chdir(\"/\") failed");
return -1;
}
}

208
compat.c
View File

@@ -60,13 +60,16 @@ extern char *files_from;
extern char *filesfrom_host;
extern const char *checksum_choice;
extern const char *compress_choice;
extern char *daemon_auth_choices;
extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
extern int need_unsorted_flist;
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
extern iconv_t ic_send, ic_recv;
extern char *iconv_opt;
#endif
extern struct name_num_obj valid_checksums;
extern struct name_num_obj valid_checksums, valid_auth_checksums;
extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
int remote_protocol = 0;
int file_extra_cnt = 0; /* count of file-list extras that everyone gets */
@@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ int inplace_partial = 0;
int do_negotiated_strings = 0;
int xmit_id0_names = 0;
struct name_num_item *xattr_sum_nni;
int xattr_sum_len = 0;
/* These index values are for the file-list's extra-attribute array. */
int pathname_ndx, depth_ndx, atimes_ndx, crtimes_ndx, uid_ndx, gid_ndx, acls_ndx, xattrs_ndx, unsort_ndx;
@@ -91,19 +97,21 @@ int filesfrom_convert = 0;
#define MAX_NSTR_STRLEN 256
struct name_num_obj valid_compressions = {
"compress", NULL, NULL, 0, 0, {
struct name_num_item valid_compressions_items[] = {
#ifdef SUPPORT_ZSTD
{ CPRES_ZSTD, "zstd", NULL },
{ CPRES_ZSTD, 0, "zstd", NULL },
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_LZ4
{ CPRES_LZ4, "lz4", NULL },
{ CPRES_LZ4, 0, "lz4", NULL },
#endif
{ CPRES_ZLIBX, "zlibx", NULL },
{ CPRES_ZLIB, "zlib", NULL },
{ CPRES_NONE, "none", NULL },
{ 0, NULL, NULL }
}
{ CPRES_ZLIBX, 0, "zlibx", NULL },
{ CPRES_ZLIB, 0, "zlib", NULL },
{ CPRES_NONE, 0, "none", NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
};
struct name_num_obj valid_compressions = {
"compress", NULL, 0, 0, valid_compressions_items
};
#define CF_INC_RECURSE (1<<0)
@@ -123,13 +131,9 @@ static const char *client_info;
* of that protocol for it to be advertised as available. */
static void check_sub_protocol(void)
{
char *dot;
const char *dot;
int their_protocol, their_sub;
#if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
int our_sub = protocol_version < PROTOCOL_VERSION ? 0 : SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION;
#else
int our_sub = 0;
#endif
int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
/* client_info starts with VER.SUB string if client is a pre-release. */
if (!(their_protocol = atoi(client_info))
@@ -176,8 +180,8 @@ void set_allow_inc_recurse(void)
void parse_compress_choice(int final_call)
{
if (valid_compressions.negotiated_name)
do_compression = valid_compressions.negotiated_num;
if (valid_compressions.negotiated_nni)
do_compression = valid_compressions.negotiated_nni->num;
else if (compress_choice) {
struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_name(&valid_compressions, compress_choice, -1);
if (!nni) {
@@ -199,8 +203,8 @@ void parse_compress_choice(int final_call)
compress_choice = NULL;
/* Snag the compression name for both write_batch's option output & the following debug output. */
if (valid_compressions.negotiated_name)
compress_choice = valid_compressions.negotiated_name;
if (valid_compressions.negotiated_nni)
compress_choice = valid_compressions.negotiated_nni->name;
else if (compress_choice == NULL) {
struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_num(&valid_compressions, do_compression);
compress_choice = nni ? nni->name : "UNKNOWN";
@@ -210,7 +214,7 @@ void parse_compress_choice(int final_call)
&& (do_compression != CPRES_NONE || do_compression_level != CLVL_NOT_SPECIFIED)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "%s%s compress: %s (level %d)\n",
am_server ? "Server" : "Client",
valid_compressions.negotiated_name ? " negotiated" : "",
valid_compressions.negotiated_nni ? " negotiated" : "",
compress_choice, do_compression_level);
}
}
@@ -223,6 +227,8 @@ struct name_num_item *get_nni_by_name(struct name_num_obj *nno, const char *name
len = strlen(name);
for (nni = nno->list; nni->name; nni++) {
if (nni->num == CSUM_gone)
continue;
if (strncasecmp(name, nni->name, len) == 0 && nni->name[len] == '\0')
return nni;
}
@@ -257,10 +263,12 @@ static void init_nno_saw(struct name_num_obj *nno, int val)
if (!nno->saw) {
nno->saw = new_array0(uchar, nno->saw_len);
/* We'll take this opportunity to make sure that the main_name values are set right. */
/* We'll take this opportunity to set the main_nni values for duplicates. */
for (cnt = 1, nni = nno->list; nni->name; nni++, cnt++) {
if (nni->num == CSUM_gone)
continue;
if (nno->saw[nni->num])
nni->main_name = nno->list[nno->saw[nni->num]-1].name;
nni->main_nni = &nno->list[nno->saw[nni->num]-1];
else
nno->saw[nni->num] = cnt;
}
@@ -286,8 +294,8 @@ static int parse_nni_str(struct name_num_obj *nno, const char *from, char *tobuf
struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_name(nno, tok, to - tok);
if (nni && !nno->saw[nni->num]) {
nno->saw[nni->num] = ++cnt;
if (nni->main_name) {
to = tok + strlcpy(tok, nni->main_name, tobuf_len - (tok - tobuf));
if (nni->main_nni) {
to = tok + strlcpy(tok, nni->main_nni->name, tobuf_len - (tok - tobuf));
if (to - tobuf >= tobuf_len) {
to = tok - 1;
break;
@@ -321,13 +329,44 @@ static int parse_nni_str(struct name_num_obj *nno, const char *from, char *tobuf
return to - tobuf;
}
static int parse_negotiate_str(struct name_num_obj *nno, char *tmpbuf)
{
struct name_num_item *nni, *ret = NULL;
int best = nno->saw_len; /* We want best == 1 from the client list, so start with a big number. */
char *space, *tok = tmpbuf;
while (tok) {
while (*tok == ' ') tok++; /* Should be unneeded... */
if (!*tok)
break;
if ((space = strchr(tok, ' ')) != NULL)
*space = '\0';
nni = get_nni_by_name(nno, tok, -1);
if (space) {
*space = ' ';
tok = space + 1;
} else
tok = NULL;
if (!nni || !nno->saw[nni->num] || best <= nno->saw[nni->num])
continue;
ret = nni;
best = nno->saw[nni->num];
if (best == 1 || am_server) /* The server side stops at the first acceptable client choice */
break;
}
if (ret) {
free(nno->saw);
nno->saw = NULL;
nno->negotiated_nni = ret->main_nni ? ret->main_nni : ret;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* This routine is always called with a tmpbuf of MAX_NSTR_STRLEN length, but the
* buffer may be pre-populated with a "len" length string to use OR a len of -1
* to tell us to read a string from the fd. */
static void recv_negotiate_str(int f_in, struct name_num_obj *nno, char *tmpbuf, int len)
{
struct name_num_item *ret = NULL;
if (len < 0)
len = read_vstring(f_in, tmpbuf, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN);
@@ -338,37 +377,8 @@ static void recv_negotiate_str(int f_in, struct name_num_obj *nno, char *tmpbuf,
rprintf(FINFO, "Server %s list (on client): %s\n", nno->type, tmpbuf);
}
if (len > 0) {
struct name_num_item *nni;
int best = nno->saw_len; /* We want best == 1 from the client list, so start with a big number. */
char *space, *tok = tmpbuf;
while (tok) {
while (*tok == ' ') tok++; /* Should be unneeded... */
if (!*tok)
break;
if ((space = strchr(tok, ' ')) != NULL)
*space = '\0';
nni = get_nni_by_name(nno, tok, -1);
if (space) {
*space = ' ';
tok = space + 1;
} else
tok = NULL;
if (!nni || !nno->saw[nni->num] || best <= nno->saw[nni->num])
continue;
ret = nni;
best = nno->saw[nni->num];
if (best == 1 || am_server) /* The server side stops at the first acceptable client choice */
break;
}
if (ret) {
free(nno->saw);
nno->saw = NULL;
nno->negotiated_name = ret->main_name ? ret->main_name : ret->name;
nno->negotiated_num = ret->num;
return;
}
}
if (len > 0 && parse_negotiate_str(nno, tmpbuf))
return;
if (!am_server || !do_negotiated_strings) {
char *cp = tmpbuf;
@@ -400,11 +410,11 @@ static const char *getenv_nstr(int ntype)
const char *env_str = getenv(ntype == NSTR_COMPRESS ? "RSYNC_COMPRESS_LIST" : "RSYNC_CHECKSUM_LIST");
/* When writing a batch file, we always negotiate an old-style choice. */
if (write_batch)
if (write_batch)
env_str = ntype == NSTR_COMPRESS ? "zlib" : protocol_version >= 30 ? "md5" : "md4";
if (am_server && env_str) {
char *cp = strchr(env_str, '&');
const char *cp = strchr(env_str, '&');
if (cp)
env_str = cp + 1;
}
@@ -433,7 +443,7 @@ void validate_choice_vs_env(int ntype, int num1, int num2)
nno->saw[CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC] = nno->saw[CSUM_MD4_BUSTED] = nno->saw[CSUM_MD4_OLD] = nno->saw[CSUM_MD4];
if (!nno->saw[num1] || (num2 >= 0 && !nno->saw[num2])) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Your --%s-choice value (%s) was refused by the server.\n",
rprintf(FERROR, "Your --%s-choice value (%s) was refused by the server.\n",
ntype == NSTR_COMPRESS ? "compress" : "checksum",
ntype == NSTR_COMPRESS ? compress_choice : checksum_choice);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
@@ -464,8 +474,10 @@ int get_default_nno_list(struct name_num_obj *nno, char *to_buf, int to_buf_len,
init_nno_saw(nno, 0);
for (nni = nno->list, len = 0; nni->name; nni++) {
if (nni->main_name) {
if (!dup_markup)
if (nni->num == CSUM_gone)
continue;
if (nni->main_nni) {
if (!dup_markup || nni->main_nni->num == CSUM_gone)
continue;
delim = dup_markup;
}
@@ -523,6 +535,8 @@ static void negotiate_the_strings(int f_in, int f_out)
{
/* We send all the negotiation strings before we start to read them to help avoid a slow startup. */
init_checksum_choices();
if (!checksum_choice)
send_negotiate_str(f_out, &valid_checksums, NSTR_CHECKSUM);
@@ -552,7 +566,7 @@ static void negotiate_the_strings(int f_in, int f_out)
/* If the other side is too old to negotiate, the above steps just made sure that
* the env didn't disallow the old algorithm. Mark things as non-negotiated. */
if (!do_negotiated_strings)
valid_checksums.negotiated_name = valid_compressions.negotiated_name = NULL;
valid_checksums.negotiated_nni = valid_compressions.negotiated_nni = NULL;
}
void setup_protocol(int f_out,int f_in)
@@ -604,7 +618,7 @@ void setup_protocol(int f_out,int f_in)
if (remote_protocol < MIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION
|| remote_protocol > MAX_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
rprintf(FERROR,"protocol version mismatch -- is your shell clean?\n");
rprintf(FERROR,"(see the rsync man page for an explanation)\n");
rprintf(FERROR,"(see the rsync manpage for an explanation)\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (remote_protocol < OLD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
@@ -801,11 +815,73 @@ void setup_protocol(int f_out,int f_in)
checksum_seed = read_int(f_in);
}
parse_checksum_choice(1); /* Sets checksum_type & xfersum_type */
parse_checksum_choice(1); /* Sets file_sum_nni & xfer_sum_nni */
parse_compress_choice(1); /* Sets do_compression */
/* TODO in the future allow this algorithm to be chosen somehow, but it can't get too
* long or the size starts to cause a problem in the xattr abbrev/non-abbrev code. */
xattr_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
xattr_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(xattr_sum_nni->num, 0);
if (write_batch && !am_server)
write_batch_shell_file();
init_flist();
}
void output_daemon_greeting(int f_out, int am_client)
{
char tmpbuf[MAX_NSTR_STRLEN];
int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
get_default_nno_list(&valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN, '\0');
io_printf(f_out, "@RSYNCD: %d.%d %s\n", protocol_version, our_sub, tmpbuf);
if (am_client && DEBUG_GTE(NSTR, 2))
rprintf(FINFO, "Client %s list (on client): %s\n", valid_auth_checksums.type, tmpbuf);
}
void negotiate_daemon_auth(int f_out, int am_client)
{
char tmpbuf[MAX_NSTR_STRLEN];
int save_am_server = am_server;
int md4_is_old = 0;
if (!am_client)
am_server = 1;
if (daemon_auth_choices)
strlcpy(tmpbuf, daemon_auth_choices, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN);
else {
strlcpy(tmpbuf, protocol_version >= 30 ? "md5" : "md4", MAX_NSTR_STRLEN);
md4_is_old = 1;
}
if (am_client) {
recv_negotiate_str(-1, &valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf, strlen(tmpbuf));
if (DEBUG_GTE(NSTR, 1)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "Client negotiated %s: %s\n", valid_auth_checksums.type,
valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni->name);
}
} else {
if (!parse_negotiate_str(&valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf)) {
get_default_nno_list(&valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN, '\0');
io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client does not support one of our daemon-auth checksums: %s\n",
tmpbuf);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
}
am_server = save_am_server;
if (md4_is_old && valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni->num == CSUM_MD4)
valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni->num = CSUM_MD4_OLD;
}
int get_subprotocol_version()
{
#if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
return protocol_version < PROTOCOL_VERSION ? 0 : SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ AC_INIT([rsync],[ ],[https://rsync.samba.org/bug-tracking.html])
AC_C_BIGENDIAN
AC_HEADER_DIRENT
AC_HEADER_TIME
AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/fcntl.h sys/select.h fcntl.h sys/time.h sys/unistd.h \
unistd.h utime.h compat.h sys/param.h ctype.h sys/wait.h sys/stat.h \
@@ -13,16 +12,17 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/fcntl.h sys/select.h fcntl.h sys/time.h sys/unistd.h \
netdb.h malloc.h float.h limits.h iconv.h libcharset.h langinfo.h mcheck.h \
sys/acl.h acl/libacl.h attr/xattr.h sys/xattr.h sys/extattr.h dl.h \
popt.h popt/popt.h linux/falloc.h netinet/in_systm.h netgroup.h \
zlib.h xxhash.h openssl/md4.h openssl/md5.h zstd.h lz4.h sys/file.h)
zlib.h xxhash.h openssl/md4.h openssl/md5.h zstd.h lz4.h sys/file.h \
bsd/string.h)
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([netinet/ip.h], [], [], [[#include <netinet/in.h>]])
AC_HEADER_MAJOR_FIXED
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([byteorder.h])
AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
AC_PREREQ([2.69])
PACKAGE_VERSION=`sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/' <$srcdir/version.h`
PACKAGE_VERSION=`sed -n 's/.*RSYNC_VERSION.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/p' <$srcdir/version.h`
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Configuring rsync $PACKAGE_VERSION])
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ AC_PROG_AWK
AC_PROG_EGREP
AC_PROG_INSTALL
AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
AC_PROG_CC_STDC
AC_SUBST(SHELL)
AC_PATH_PROG([PERL], [perl])
AC_PATH_PROG([PYTHON3], [python3])
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ if test x"$enable_profile" = x"yes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pg"
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if md2man can create man pages])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if md2man can create manpages])
if test x"$ac_cv_path_PYTHON3" = x; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(no - python3 not found)
md2man_works=no
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we require man-page building])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([md2man],
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-md2man],[disable to omit man page creation]))
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-md2man],[disable to omit manpage creation]))
if test x"$enable_md2man" != x"no"; then
if test -f "$srcdir/rsync.1"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(optional)
@@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ if test x"$enable_md2man" != x"no"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(required)
if test x"$md2man_works" = x"no"; then
err_msg="$err_msg$nl- You need python3 and either the cmarkgfm OR commonmark python3 lib in order"
err_msg="$err_msg$nl to build man pages based on the git source (man pages are included in the"
err_msg="$err_msg$nl to build manpages based on the git source (manpages are included in the"
err_msg="$err_msg$nl official release tar files)."
no_lib="$no_lib md2man"
fi
@@ -135,13 +134,24 @@ if test x"$GCC" = x"yes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -W"
fi
AC_ARG_WITH(openssl-conf,
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-openssl-conf=PATH],[set default OPENSSL_CONF path for rsync]))
case "$with_openssl_conf" in
*[^-/a-zA-Z0-9.,=@+_]*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Invalid path given to --with-openssl-conf]) ;;
/*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -DSET_OPENSSL_CONF=$with_openssl_conf" ;;
no|'') ;;
yes) AC_MSG_ERROR([No path given to --with-openssl-conf]) ;;
*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Non absolute path given to --with-openssl-conf]) ;;
esac
AC_ARG_WITH(rrsync,
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-rrsync],[also install the rrsync script and its man page]))
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-rrsync],[also install the rrsync script and its manpage]))
if test x"$with_rrsync" != x"yes"; then
with_rrsync=no
else
MAKE_RRSYNC='rrsync'
MAKE_RRSYNC_1='rrsync.1'
GEN_RRSYNC='rrsync.1 rrsync.1.html'
fi
AC_SUBST(with_rrsync)
@@ -151,10 +161,10 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(included-popt,
AC_ARG_WITH(included-zlib,
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-included-zlib],[use bundled zlib library, not from system]))
AC_ARG_WITH(protected-args,
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-protected-args],[make --protected-args option the default]))
if test x"$with_protected_args" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RSYNC_USE_PROTECTED_ARGS, 1, [Define to 1 if --protected-args should be the default])
AC_ARG_WITH(secluded-args,
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-secluded-args],[make --secluded-args option the default]))
if test x"$with_secluded_args" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RSYNC_USE_SECLUDED_ARGS, 1, [Define to 1 if --secluded-args should be the default])
fi
AC_ARG_WITH(rsync-path,
@@ -228,12 +238,12 @@ fi
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NOBODY_USER, "$NOBODY_USER", [unprivileged user--e.g. nobody])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NOBODY_GROUP, "$NOBODY_GROUP", [unprivileged group for unprivileged user])
# SIMD optimizations
SIMD=
# rolling-checksum SIMD optimizations
ROLL_SIMD=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable SIMD optimizations])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(simd,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-simd],[enable/disable to control SIMD optimizations (requires c++)]))
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable rolling-checksum SIMD optimizations])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(roll-simd,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-roll-simd],[enable/disable to control rolling-checksum SIMD optimizations (requires c++)]))
# Clag is crashing with -g -O2, so we'll get rid of -g for now.
CXXFLAGS=`echo "$CXXFLAGS" | sed 's/-g //'`
@@ -262,14 +272,14 @@ __attribute__ ((target("ssse3"))) void more_testing(char* buf, int len)
}
]])
if test x"$enable_simd" = x""; then
if test x"$enable_roll_simd" = x""; then
case "$host_os" in
*linux*) ;;
*) enable_simd=no ;;
*) enable_roll_simd=no ;;
esac
fi
if test x"$enable_simd" != x"no"; then
if test x"$enable_roll_simd" != x"no"; then
# For x86-64 SIMD, g++ >=5 or clang++ >=7 is required
if test x"$host_cpu" = x"x86_64" || test x"$host_cpu" = x"amd64"; then
AC_LANG(C++)
@@ -282,23 +292,23 @@ if test x"$enable_simd" != x"no"; then
AC_LANG(C)
if test x"$CXX_OK" = x"yes"; then
# AC_MSG_RESULT() is called below.
SIMD="$host_cpu"
elif test x"$enable_simd" = x"yes"; then
ROLL_SIMD="$host_cpu"
elif test x"$enable_roll_simd" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(error)
AC_MSG_ERROR(The SIMD compilation test failed.
Omit --enable-simd to continue without it.)
AC_MSG_ERROR(The rolling-checksum SIMD compilation test failed.
Omit --enable-roll-simd to continue without it.)
fi
elif test x"$enable_simd" = x"yes"; then
elif test x"$enable_roll_simd" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(unavailable)
AC_MSG_ERROR(The SIMD optimizations are currently x86_64|amd64 only.
Omit --enable-simd to continue without it.)
AC_MSG_ERROR(The rolling-checksum SIMD optimizations are currently x86_64|amd64 only.
Omit --enable-roll-simd to continue without it.)
fi
fi
if test x"$SIMD" != x""; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes ($SIMD)])
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SIMD, 1, [Define to 1 to enable SIMD optimizations])
SIMD='$(SIMD_'"$SIMD)"
if test x"$ROLL_SIMD" != x""; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes ($ROLL_SIMD)])
AC_DEFINE(USE_ROLL_SIMD, 1, [Define to 1 to enable rolling-checksum SIMD optimizations])
ROLL_SIMD='$(ROLL_SIMD_'"$ROLL_SIMD)"
# We only use c++ for its target attribute dispatching, disable unneeded bulky features
CXXFLAGS="$CXXFLAGS -fno-exceptions -fno-rtti"
# Apple often has "g++" as a symlink for clang. Try to find out the truth.
@@ -310,7 +320,7 @@ else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
AC_SUBST(SIMD)
AC_SUBST(ROLL_SIMD)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if assembler accepts noexecstack])
OLD_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
@@ -321,52 +331,19 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ ]], [[return 0;]])],
CFLAGS="$OLD_CFLAGS"
AC_SUBST(NOEXECSTACK)
ASM=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable ASM optimizations])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(asm,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-asm],[enable/disable to control ASM optimizations]))
if test x"$enable_asm" = x""; then
case "$host_os" in
*linux*) ;;
*) enable_asm=no ;;
esac
fi
if test x"$enable_asm" != x"no"; then
if test x"$host_cpu" = x"x86_64" || test x"$host_cpu" = x"amd64"; then
ASM="$host_cpu"
elif test x"$enable_asm" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(unavailable)
AC_MSG_ERROR(The ASM optimizations are currently x86_64|amd64 only.
Omit --enable-asm to continue without it.)
fi
fi
if test x"$ASM" != x""; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes ($ASM)])
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ASM, 1, [Define to 1 to enable ASM optimizations])
ASM='$(ASM_'"$ASM)"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
AC_SUBST(ASM)
# arrgh. libc in some old debian version screwed up the largefile
# stuff, getting byte range locking wrong
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken largefile support],rsync_cv_HAVE_BROKEN_LARGEFILE,[
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
$ac_includes_default
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#elif defined HAVE_SYS_FCNTL_H
# include <sys/fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H
#include <sys/wait.h>
#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
int main(void)
@@ -411,7 +388,7 @@ AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-ipv6],[disable to omit ipv6 support]),
;;
esac ],
AC_TRY_RUN([ /* AF_INET6 avalable check */
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ /* AF_INET6 availability check */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -422,11 +399,11 @@ main()
else
exit(0);
}
],
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
AC_DEFINE(INET6, 1, [true if you have IPv6]),
AC_MSG_RESULT(no),
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
AC_DEFINE(INET6, 1, true if you have IPv6)],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
))
dnl Do you want to disable use of locale functions
@@ -456,7 +433,8 @@ if test x"$enable_openssl" != x"no"; then
if test x"$ac_cv_header_openssl_md4_h" = x"yes" && test x"$ac_cv_header_openssl_md5_h" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(MD5_Init, crypto,
[AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSSL)],
[AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSSL)
enable_openssl=yes],
[err_msg="$err_msg$nl- Failed to find MD5_Init function in openssl crypto lib.";
no_lib="$no_lib openssl"])
else
@@ -464,10 +442,67 @@ if test x"$enable_openssl" != x"no"; then
err_msg="$err_msg$nl- Failed to find openssl/md4.h and openssl/md5.h for openssl crypto lib support."
no_lib="$no_lib openssl"
fi
if test x"$enable_md5_asm" != x"yes"; then
enable_md5_asm=no
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
MD5_ASM=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable MD5 ASM optimizations])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(md5-asm,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-md5-asm],[enable/disable to control MD5 ASM optimizations]))
if test x"$enable_md5_asm" = x""; then
case "$host_os" in
*linux*) ;;
*) enable_md5_asm=no ;;
esac
fi
if test x"$enable_md5_asm" != x"no"; then
if test x"$host_cpu" = x"x86_64" || test x"$host_cpu" = x"amd64"; then
MD5_ASM="$host_cpu"
elif test x"$enable_md5_asm" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(unavailable)
AC_MSG_ERROR(The ASM optimizations are currently x86_64|amd64 only.
Omit --enable-md5-asm to continue without it.)
fi
fi
if test x"$MD5_ASM" != x""; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes ($MD5_ASM)])
AC_DEFINE(USE_MD5_ASM, 1, [Define to 1 to enable MD5 ASM optimizations])
MD5_ASM='$(MD5_ASM_'"$MD5_ASM)"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
AC_SUBST(MD5_ASM)
ROLL_ASM=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable rolling-checksum ASM optimizations])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(roll-asm,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-roll-asm],[enable/disable to control rolling-checksum ASM optimizations (requires --enable-roll-simd)]))
if test x"$ROLL_SIMD" = x""; then
enable_roll_asm=no
fi
if test x"$enable_roll_asm" = x"yes"; then
ROLL_ASM="$host_cpu"
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes ($ROLL_ASM)])
AC_DEFINE(USE_ROLL_ASM, 1, [Define to 1 to enable rolling-checksum ASM optimizations (requires --enable-roll-simd)])
ROLL_ASM='$(ROLL_ASM_'"$ROLL_ASM)"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
AC_SUBST(ROLL_ASM)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable xxhash checksum support])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([xxhash],
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-xxhash],[disable to omit xxhash checksums]))
@@ -491,7 +526,7 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable zstd compression])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([zstd],
AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-zstd], [disable to omit zstd compression]))
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-zstd], [disable to omit zstd compression]))
AH_TEMPLATE([SUPPORT_ZSTD],
[Undefine if you do not want zstd compression. By default this is defined.])
if test x"$enable_zstd" != x"no"; then
@@ -512,7 +547,7 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable LZ4 compression])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([lz4],
AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-lz4], [disable to omit LZ4 compression]))
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-lz4], [disable to omit LZ4 compression]))
AH_TEMPLATE([SUPPORT_LZ4],
[Undefine if you do not want LZ4 compression. By default this is defined.])
if test x"$enable_lz4" != x"no"; then
@@ -537,7 +572,7 @@ if test x"$no_lib" != x; then
echo "$err_msg"
echo ""
echo "See the INSTALL file for hints on how to install the missing libraries and/or"
echo "how to generate (or fetch) man pages:"
echo "how to generate (or fetch) manpages:"
echo " https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/blob/master/INSTALL.md"
echo ""
echo "To disable one or more features, the relevant configure options are:"
@@ -598,7 +633,11 @@ fi
AC_TYPE_UID_T
AC_CHECK_TYPES([mode_t,off_t,size_t,pid_t,id_t])
AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
if test "$cross_compiling" = no; then
AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
else
AC_DEFINE([GETGROUPS_T],[gid_t],[Define to the type of elements in the array set by `getgroups'. Usually this is either `int' or `gid_t'.])
fi
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_rdev,
struct stat.st_mtimensec,
struct stat.st_mtimespec.tv_nsec,
@@ -1040,21 +1079,6 @@ elif test x"$ac_cv_header_popt_h" != x"yes"; then
with_included_popt=yes
fi
if test x"$GCC" = x"yes"; then
if test x"$with_included_popt" != x"yes"; then
# Turn pedantic warnings into errors to ensure an array-init overflow is an error.
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic-errors"
else
# Our internal popt code cannot be compiled with pedantic warnings as errors, so try to
# turn off pedantic warnings (which will not lose the error for array-init overflow).
# Older gcc versions don't understand -Wno-pedantic, so check if --help=warnings lists
# -Wpedantic and use that as a flag.
case `$CC --help=warnings 2>/dev/null | grep Wpedantic` in
*-Wpedantic*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic-errors -Wno-pedantic" ;;
esac
fi
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to use included libpopt])
if test x"$with_included_popt" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT($srcdir/popt)
@@ -1091,7 +1115,7 @@ else
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for unsigned char],rsync_cv_SIGNED_CHAR_OK,[
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[signed char *s = ""]])],[rsync_cv_SIGNED_CHAR_OK=yes],[rsync_cv_SIGNED_CHAR_OK=no])])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[signed char *s = (signed char *)""]])],[rsync_cv_SIGNED_CHAR_OK=yes],[rsync_cv_SIGNED_CHAR_OK=no])])
if test x"$rsync_cv_SIGNED_CHAR_OK" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(SIGNED_CHAR_OK, 1, [Define to 1 if "signed char" is a valid type])
fi
@@ -1257,6 +1281,7 @@ AC_SUBST(BUILD_POPT)
AC_SUBST(BUILD_ZLIB)
AC_SUBST(MAKE_RRSYNC)
AC_SUBST(MAKE_RRSYNC_1)
AC_SUBST(GEN_RRSYNC)
AC_SUBST(MAKE_MAN)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(_acl __acl _facl __facl)
@@ -1365,7 +1390,7 @@ else
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LINUX_XATTRS, 1, [True if you have Linux xattrs (or equivalent)])
AC_DEFINE(SUPPORT_XATTRS, 1)
AC_DEFINE(NO_SYMLINK_USER_XATTRS, 1, [True if symlinks do not support user xattrs])
AC_CHECK_LIB(attr,getxattr)
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(getxattr,attr)
;;
darwin*)
AC_MSG_RESULT(Using OS X xattrs)

View File

@@ -7,39 +7,54 @@ basically a summary of clientserver.c and authenticate.c.
This is the protocol used for rsync --daemon; i.e. connections to port
873 rather than invocations over a remote shell.
When the server accepts a connection, it prints a greeting
When the server accepts a connection, it prints a newline-terminated
greeting line:
@RSYNCD: <version>.<subprotocol>
@RSYNCD: <version>.<subprotocol> <digest1> <digestN>
where <version> is the numeric version (see PROTOCOL_VERSION in rsync.h)
'.' is a literal period, and <subprotocol> is the numeric subprotocol
version (see SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION -- it will be 0 for final releases).
Protocols prior to 30 only output <version> alone. The daemon expects
to see a similar greeting back from the client. For protocols prior to
30, an absent ".<subprotocol>" value is assumed to be 0. For protocol
30, an absent value is a fatal error. The daemon then follows this line
with a free-format text message-of-the-day (if any is defined).
The <version> is the numeric version (see PROTOCOL_VERSION in rsync.h)
The <subprotocol> is the numeric subprotocol version (which is 0 for a
final protocol version, as the SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION define discusses).
The <digestN> names are the authentication digest algorithms that the
daemon supports, listed in order of preference.
An rsync prior to 3.2.7 omits the digest names. An rsync prior to 3.0.0
also omits the period and the <subprotocol> value. Since a final
protocol has a subprotocol value of 0, a missing subprotocol value is
assumed to be 0 for any protocol prior to 30. It is considered a fatal
error for protocol 30 and above to omit it. It is considered a fatal
error for protocol 32 and above to omit the digest name list (currently
31 is the newest protocol).
The daemon expects to see a similar greeting line back from the client.
Once received, the daemon follows the opening line with a free-format
text message-of-the-day (if any is defined).
The server is now in the connected state. The client can either send
the command
the command:
#list
to get a listing of modules, or the name of a module. After this, the
(to get a listing of modules) or the name of a module. After this, the
connection is now bound to a particular module. Access per host for
this module is now checked, as is per-module connection limits.
If authentication is required to use this module, the server will say
If authentication is required to use this module, the server will say:
@RSYNCD: AUTHREQD <challenge>
where <challenge> is a random string of base64 characters. The client
must respond with
must respond with:
<user> <response>
where <user> is the username they claim to be, and <response> is the
base64 form of the MD4 hash of challenge+password.
The <user> is the username they claim to be. The <response> is the
base64 form of the digest hash of the challenge+password string. The
chosen digest method is the most preferred client method that is also in
the server's list. If no digest list was explicitly provided, the side
expecting a list assumes the other side provided either the single name
"md5" (for a negotiated protocol 30 or 31), or the single name "md4"
(for an older protocol).
At this point the server applies all remaining constraints before
handing control to the client, including switching uid/gid, setting up
@@ -76,6 +91,13 @@ stay tuned (or write it yourself!).
------------
Protocol version changes
31 (2013-09-28, 3.1.0)
Initial release of protocol 31 had no changes. Rsync 3.2.7
introduced the suffixed list of digest names on the greeting
line. The presence of the list is allowed even if the greeting
indicates an older protocol version number.
30 (2007-10-04, 3.0.0pre1)
The use of a ".<subprotocol>" number was added to

View File

@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ BOOL read_only True
BOOL reverse_lookup True
BOOL strict_modes True
BOOL transfer_logging False
BOOL use_chroot True
BOOL write_only False
BOOL3 munge_symlinks Unset
BOOL3 numeric_ids Unset
BOOL3 open_noatime Unset
BOOL3 use_chroot Unset

View File

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static enum delret delete_dir_contents(char *fname, uint16 flags)
strlcpy(p, fp->basename, remainder);
if (!(fp->mode & S_IWUSR) && !am_root && fp->flags & FLAG_OWNED_BY_US)
do_chmod(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
do_chmod_at(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
/* Save stack by recursing to ourself directly. */
if (S_ISDIR(fp->mode)) {
if (delete_dir_contents(fname, flags | DEL_RECURSE) != DR_SUCCESS)
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
}
if (flags & DEL_NO_UID_WRITE)
do_chmod(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
do_chmod_at(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
if (S_ISDIR(mode) && !(flags & DEL_DIR_IS_EMPTY)) {
/* This only happens on the first call to delete_item() since
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
what = "rmdir";
ok = do_rmdir(fbuf) == 0;
ok = do_rmdir_at(fbuf) == 0;
} else {
if (make_backups > 0 && !(flags & DEL_FOR_BACKUP) && (backup_dir || !is_backup_file(fbuf))) {
what = "make_backup";

341
exclude.c
View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996-2001 Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2002 Martin Pool
* Copyright (C) 2003-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -25,16 +25,21 @@
extern int am_server;
extern int am_sender;
extern int am_generator;
extern int eol_nulls;
extern int io_error;
extern int xfer_dirs;
extern int recurse;
extern int local_server;
extern int prune_empty_dirs;
extern int ignore_perishable;
extern int relative_paths;
extern int delete_mode;
extern int delete_excluded;
extern int cvs_exclude;
extern int sanitize_paths;
extern int protocol_version;
extern int trust_sender_args;
extern int module_id;
extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
@@ -44,8 +49,11 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
int trust_sender_args = 0;
int trust_sender_filter = 0;
/* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
#define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
@@ -70,6 +78,10 @@ static filter_rule **mergelist_parents;
static int mergelist_cnt = 0;
static int mergelist_size = 0;
#define LOCAL_RULE 1
#define REMOTE_RULE 2
static uchar cur_elide_value = REMOTE_RULE;
/* Each filter_list_struct describes a singly-linked list by keeping track
* of both the head and tail pointers. The list is slightly unusual in that
* a parent-dir's content can be appended to the end of the local list in a
@@ -152,13 +164,17 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_
{
const char *cp;
unsigned int pre_len, suf_len, slash_cnt = 0;
char *mention_rule_suffix;
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 2)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_rule(%s%.*s%s)%s\n",
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 1) && pat_len && (pat[pat_len-1] == ' ' || pat[pat_len-1] == '\t'))
mention_rule_suffix = " -- CAUTION: trailing whitespace!";
else
mention_rule_suffix = DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 2) ? "" : NULL;
if (mention_rule_suffix) {
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_rule(%s%.*s%s)%s%s\n",
who_am_i(), get_rule_prefix(rule, pat, 0, NULL),
(int)pat_len, pat,
(rule->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY) ? "/" : "",
listp->debug_type);
(int)pat_len, pat, (rule->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY) ? "/" : "",
listp->debug_type, mention_rule_suffix);
}
/* These flags also indicate that we're reading a list that
@@ -208,6 +224,7 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_
slash_cnt++;
}
}
rule->elide = 0;
strlcpy(rule->pattern + pre_len, pat, pat_len + 1);
pat_len += pre_len;
if (suf_len) {
@@ -288,6 +305,271 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_
}
}
/* If the wildcards failed, the remote shell might give us a file matching the literal
* wildcards. Since "*" & "?" already match themselves, this just needs to deal with
* failed "[foo]" idioms.
*/
static void maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(filter_rule const *based_on, int arg_len)
{
filter_rule *rule;
const char *arg = based_on->pattern, *cp;
char *p;
int cnt = 0;
if (arg_len < 0)
arg_len = strlen(arg);
for (cp = arg; *cp; cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1]) {
cp++;
} else if (*cp == '[')
cnt++;
}
if (!cnt)
return;
rule = new0(filter_rule);
rule->rflags = based_on->rflags;
rule->u.slash_cnt = based_on->u.slash_cnt;
p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + cnt + 1);
for (cp = arg; *cp; ) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1]) {
*p++ = *cp++;
} else if (*cp == '[')
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = *cp++;
}
*p++ = '\0';
rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
implied_filter_list.head = rule;
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s%s)\n", who_am_i(), rule->pattern,
rule->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "");
}
}
static char *partial_string_buf = NULL;
static int partial_string_len = 0;
void implied_include_partial_string(const char *s_start, const char *s_end)
{
partial_string_len = s_end - s_start;
if (partial_string_len <= 0 || partial_string_len >= MAXPATHLEN) { /* too-large should be impossible... */
partial_string_len = 0;
return;
}
if (!partial_string_buf)
partial_string_buf = new_array(char, MAXPATHLEN);
memcpy(partial_string_buf, s_start, partial_string_len);
}
void free_implied_include_partial_string()
{
if (partial_string_buf) {
if (partial_string_len)
add_implied_include("", 0);
free(partial_string_buf);
partial_string_buf = NULL;
}
partial_string_len = 0; /* paranoia */
}
/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
* that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
void add_implied_include(const char *arg, int skip_daemon_module)
{
int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, saw_live_open_brkt = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
int slash_cnt = 0;
const char *cp;
char *p;
if (trust_sender_args)
return;
if (partial_string_len) {
arg_len = strlen(arg);
if (partial_string_len + arg_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
partial_string_len = 0;
return; /* Should be impossible... */
}
memcpy(partial_string_buf + partial_string_len, arg, arg_len + 1);
partial_string_len = 0;
arg = partial_string_buf;
}
if (skip_daemon_module) {
if ((cp = strchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
arg = cp + 1;
else
arg = "";
}
if (relative_paths) {
if ((cp = strstr(arg, "/./")) != NULL)
arg = cp + 3;
} else if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL) {
arg = cp + 1;
}
if (*arg == '.' && arg[1] == '\0')
arg++;
arg_len = strlen(arg);
if (arg_len) {
char *new_pat;
if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
/* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
for (cp = arg; (cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL; cp++)
arg_len++;
saw_wild = 1;
}
arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
p = new_pat = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
*p++ = '/';
slash_cnt++;
for (cp = arg; *cp; ) {
switch (*cp) {
case '\\':
if (cp[1] == ']') {
if (!saw_wild)
cp++; /* A \] in a non-wild filter causes a problem, so drop the \ . */
} else if (!strchr("*[?", cp[1])) {
backslash_cnt++;
if (saw_wild)
*p++ = '\\';
}
*p++ = *cp++;
break;
case '/':
if (p[-1] == '/') { /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
if (*++cp == '\0') {
slash_cnt--;
p--;
}
} else if (cp[1] == '\0') {
cp++;
} else {
slash_cnt++;
*p++ = *cp++;
}
break;
case '.':
if (p[-1] == '/') {
if (cp[1] == '/') {
cp += 2;
if (!*cp) {
slash_cnt--;
p--;
}
} else if (cp[1] == '\0') {
cp++;
slash_cnt--;
p--;
} else
*p++ = *cp++;
} else
*p++ = *cp++;
break;
case '[':
saw_live_open_brkt = 1;
*p++ = *cp++;
break;
default:
*p++ = *cp++;
break;
}
}
*p = '\0';
arg_len = p - new_pat;
if (!arg_len)
free(new_pat);
else {
filter_rule *rule = new0(filter_rule);
rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
arg = rule->pattern = new_pat;
if (!implied_filter_list.head)
implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
else {
rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
implied_filter_list.head = rule;
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3))
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s)\n", who_am_i(), arg);
if (saw_live_open_brkt)
maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(rule, arg_len);
if (relative_paths && slash_cnt) {
int sub_slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
while ((p = strrchr(new_pat, '/')) != NULL && p != new_pat) {
filter_rule const *ent;
filter_rule *R_rule;
int found = 0;
*p = '\0';
for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, new_pat) == 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (found) {
*p = '/';
break; /* We added all parent dirs already */
}
R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_DIRECTORY;
/* Check if our sub-path has wildcards or escaped backslashes */
if (saw_wild && strpbrk(new_pat, "*[?\\"))
R_rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_WILD;
R_rule->pattern = strdup(new_pat);
R_rule->u.slash_cnt = --sub_slash_cnt;
R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s/)\n",
who_am_i(), R_rule->pattern);
}
if (saw_live_open_brkt)
maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(R_rule, -1);
}
for (p = new_pat; sub_slash_cnt < slash_cnt; sub_slash_cnt++) {
p += strlen(p);
*p = '/';
}
}
}
}
if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
/* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
filter_rule *rule = new0(filter_rule);
rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
if (recurse)
rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_WILD2;
/* We must leave enough room for / * * \0. */
if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
/* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
for (cp = arg; *cp; ) { /* Note that arg_len != 0 because backslash_cnt > 0 */
if (*cp == '\\')
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = *cp++;
}
} else {
p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
if (arg_len) {
memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
p += arg_len;
}
}
*p++ = '/';
*p++ = '*';
if (recurse)
*p++ = '*';
*p = '\0';
rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
implied_filter_list.head = rule;
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3))
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s)\n", who_am_i(), rule->pattern);
if (saw_live_open_brkt)
maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(rule, p - rule->pattern);
}
}
/* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
{
@@ -438,7 +720,8 @@ static BOOL setup_merge_file(int mergelist_num, filter_rule *ex,
parent_dirscan = True;
while (*y) {
char save[MAXPATHLEN];
strlcpy(save, y, MAXPATHLEN);
/* copylen is strlen(y) which is < MAXPATHLEN. +1 for \0 */
size_t copylen = strlcpy(save, y, MAXPATHLEN) + 1;
*y = '\0';
dirbuf_len = y - dirbuf;
strlcpy(x, ex->pattern, MAXPATHLEN - (x - buf));
@@ -452,7 +735,7 @@ static BOOL setup_merge_file(int mergelist_num, filter_rule *ex,
lp->head = NULL;
}
lp->tail = NULL;
strlcpy(y, save, MAXPATHLEN);
strlcpy(y, save, copylen);
while ((*x++ = *y++) != '/') {}
}
parent_dirscan = False;
@@ -621,11 +904,11 @@ static int rule_matches(const char *fname, filter_rule *ex, int name_flags)
{
int slash_handling, str_cnt = 0, anchored_match = 0;
int ret_match = ex->rflags & FILTRULE_NEGATE ? 0 : 1;
char *p, *pattern = ex->pattern;
const char *p, *pattern = ex->pattern;
const char *strings[16]; /* more than enough */
const char *name = fname + (*fname == '/');
if (!*name)
if (!*name || ex->elide == cur_elide_value)
return 0;
if (!(name_flags & NAME_IS_XATTR) ^ !(ex->rflags & FILTRULE_XATTR))
@@ -702,11 +985,12 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum logcode code, char const *name,
filter_rule const *ent,
int name_flags, const char *type)
{
int log_level = am_sender || am_generator ? 1 : 3;
/* If a trailing slash is present to match only directories,
* then it is stripped out by add_rule(). So as a special
* case we add it back in here. */
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 1)) {
* case we add it back in the log output. */
if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, log_level)) {
static char *actions[2][2]
= { {"show", "hid"}, {"risk", "protect"} };
const char *w = who_am_i();
@@ -714,7 +998,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum logcode code, char const *name,
: name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
: "file";
rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
t, name, ent->pattern,
ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
}
@@ -740,6 +1024,15 @@ int name_is_excluded(const char *fname, int name_flags, int filter_level)
return 0;
}
int check_server_filter(filter_rule_list *listp, enum logcode code, const char *name, int name_flags)
{
int ret;
cur_elide_value = LOCAL_RULE;
ret = check_filter(listp, code, name, name_flags);
cur_elide_value = REMOTE_RULE;
return ret;
}
/* Return -1 if file "name" is defined to be excluded by the specified
* exclude list, 1 if it is included, and 0 if it was not matched. */
int check_filter(filter_rule_list *listp, enum logcode code,
@@ -886,6 +1179,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const char **rulestr_ptr,
}
switch (ch) {
case ':':
trust_sender_filter = 1;
rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
| FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
/* FALL THROUGH */
@@ -1294,7 +1588,7 @@ char *get_rule_prefix(filter_rule *rule, const char *pat, int for_xfer,
static void send_rules(int f_out, filter_rule_list *flp)
{
filter_rule *ent, *prev = NULL;
filter_rule *ent;
for (ent = flp->head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
unsigned int len, plen, dlen;
@@ -1309,21 +1603,15 @@ static void send_rules(int f_out, filter_rule_list *flp)
* merge files as an optimization (since they can only have
* include/exclude rules). */
if (ent->rflags & FILTRULE_SENDER_SIDE)
elide = am_sender ? 1 : -1;
elide = am_sender ? LOCAL_RULE : REMOTE_RULE;
if (ent->rflags & FILTRULE_RECEIVER_SIDE)
elide = elide ? 0 : am_sender ? -1 : 1;
elide = elide ? 0 : am_sender ? REMOTE_RULE : LOCAL_RULE;
else if (delete_excluded && !elide
&& (!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE)
|| ent->rflags & FILTRULE_NO_PREFIXES))
elide = am_sender ? 1 : -1;
if (elide < 0) {
if (prev)
prev->next = ent->next;
else
flp->head = ent->next;
} else
prev = ent;
if (elide > 0)
elide = am_sender ? LOCAL_RULE : REMOTE_RULE;
ent->elide = elide;
if (elide == LOCAL_RULE)
continue;
if (ent->rflags & FILTRULE_CVS_IGNORE
&& !(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_MERGE_FILE)) {
@@ -1351,7 +1639,6 @@ static void send_rules(int f_out, filter_rule_list *flp)
if (dlen)
write_byte(f_out, '/');
}
flp->tail = prev;
}
/* This is only called by the client. */

92
flist.c
View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2002-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2002-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ extern int am_sender;
extern int am_generator;
extern int inc_recurse;
extern int always_checksum;
extern int checksum_type;
extern int module_id;
extern int ignore_errors;
extern int numeric_ids;
@@ -43,6 +42,7 @@ extern int use_qsort;
extern int xfer_dirs;
extern int filesfrom_fd;
extern int one_file_system;
extern int copy_devices;
extern int copy_dirlinks;
extern int preserve_uid;
extern int preserve_gid;
@@ -72,18 +72,20 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
extern int output_needs_newline;
extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
extern int trust_sender_filter;
extern int unsort_ndx;
extern uid_t our_uid;
extern struct stats stats;
extern char *filesfrom_host;
extern char *usermap, *groupmap;
extern struct name_num_item *file_sum_nni;
extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
extern int filesfrom_convert;
@@ -144,7 +146,8 @@ void init_flist(void)
rprintf(FINFO, "FILE_STRUCT_LEN=%d, EXTRA_LEN=%d\n",
(int)FILE_STRUCT_LEN, (int)EXTRA_LEN);
}
flist_csum_len = csum_len_for_type(checksum_type, 1);
/* Note that this isn't identical to file_sum_len in the case of CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: */
flist_csum_len = csum_len_for_type(file_sum_nni->num, 1);
show_filelist_progress = INFO_GTE(FLIST, 1) && xfer_dirs && !am_server && !inc_recurse;
}
@@ -700,6 +703,7 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
int alloc_len, basename_len, linkname_len;
int extra_len = file_extra_cnt * EXTRA_LEN;
int first_hlink_ndx = -1;
char real_ISREG_entry;
int64 file_length;
#ifdef CAN_SET_NSEC
uint32 modtime_nsec;
@@ -752,7 +756,7 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
if (*thisname
&& (clean_fname(thisname, CFN_REFUSE_DOT_DOT_DIRS) < 0 || (!relative_paths && *thisname == '/'))) {
rprintf(FERROR, "ABORTING due to unsafe pathname from sender: %s\n", thisname);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
if (sanitize_paths)
@@ -814,6 +818,7 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
linkname_len = strlen(F_SYMLINK(first)) + 1;
else
linkname_len = 0;
real_ISREG_entry = S_ISREG(mode) ? 1 : 0;
goto create_object;
}
}
@@ -831,13 +836,13 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
}
#endif
} else
modtime = read_int(f);
modtime = read_uint(f);
}
if (xflags & XMIT_MOD_NSEC)
#ifndef CAN_SET_NSEC
(void)read_varint(f);
(void)read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_NSEC, "modtime_nsec");
#else
modtime_nsec = read_varint(f);
modtime_nsec = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_NSEC, "modtime_nsec");
else
modtime_nsec = 0;
#endif
@@ -856,8 +861,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
#endif
}
#endif
if (!(xflags & XMIT_SAME_MODE))
if (!(xflags & XMIT_SAME_MODE)) {
mode = from_wire_mode(read_int(f));
/* Reject modes whose type bits are not one of the standard
* file types; otherwise garbage mode values propagate through
* the file-type checks below unpredictably. */
if (!S_ISREG(mode) && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !S_ISLNK(mode)
&& !S_ISCHR(mode) && !S_ISBLK(mode)
&& !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid file mode 0%o for %s [%s]\n",
(unsigned)mode, lastname, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
}
if (atimes_ndx && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !(xflags & XMIT_SAME_ATIME)) {
atime = read_varlong(f, 4);
#if SIZEOF_TIME_T < SIZEOF_INT64
@@ -941,10 +957,20 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
#endif
linkname_len = 0;
if (copy_devices && IS_DEVICE(mode)) {
/* This is impossible in the official release, but some pre-release patches
* didn't convert the device into a file before sending, so we'll do it here
* (even though the length is typically 0 and any checksum data is zeros). */
mode = S_IFREG | (mode & ACCESSPERMS);
modtime = time(NULL); /* The mtime on the device is not up-to-date, so set it to "now". */
real_ISREG_entry = 0;
} else
real_ISREG_entry = S_ISREG(mode) ? 1 : 0;
#ifdef SUPPORT_HARD_LINKS
create_object:
if (preserve_hard_links) {
if (protocol_version < 28 && S_ISREG(mode))
if (protocol_version < 28 && real_ISREG_entry)
xflags |= XMIT_HLINKED;
if (xflags & XMIT_HLINKED)
extra_len += (inc_recurse+1) * EXTRA_LEN;
@@ -973,6 +999,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
if (*thisname == '/' ? thisname[1] != '.' || thisname[2] != '\0' : *thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
&& filter_list.head && check_server_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
}
if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
if (one_file_system) {
/* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
@@ -1160,8 +1199,8 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
}
#endif
if (always_checksum && (S_ISREG(mode) || protocol_version < 28)) {
if (S_ISREG(mode))
if (always_checksum && (real_ISREG_entry || protocol_version < 28)) {
if (real_ISREG_entry)
bp = F_SUM(file);
else {
/* Prior to 28, we get a useless set of nulls. */
@@ -1360,6 +1399,18 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char *fname, struct file_list *flist,
linkname_len = 0;
#endif
if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
if (st.st_size == 0) {
int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
if (fd >= 0) {
st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname);
close(fd);
}
}
st.st_mode = S_IFREG | (st.st_mode & ACCESSPERMS);
st.st_mtime = time(NULL); /* The mtime on the device is not up-to-date, so set it to "now". */
}
#ifdef ST_MTIME_NSEC
if (st.ST_MTIME_NSEC && protocol_version >= 31)
extra_len += EXTRA_LEN;
@@ -2544,6 +2595,19 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
init_hard_links();
#endif
if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) {
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST;
}
flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list");
flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE);
@@ -2602,7 +2666,7 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
rprintf(FERROR,
"ABORTING due to invalid path from sender: %s/%s\n",
cur_dir, file->basename);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
good_dirname = cur_dir;
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996-2000 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ extern int inc_recurse;
extern int relative_paths;
extern int implied_dirs;
extern int keep_dirlinks;
extern int write_devices;
extern int preserve_acls;
extern int preserve_xattrs;
extern int preserve_links;
extern int preserve_devices;
extern int write_devices;
extern int preserve_specials;
extern int preserve_hard_links;
extern int preserve_executability;
@@ -229,11 +229,13 @@ static int read_delay_line(char *buf, int *flags_p)
*flags_p = 0;
if (sscanf(bp, "%x ", &mode) != 1) {
invalid_data:
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: invalid data in delete-delay file.\n");
return -1;
goto invalid_data;
}
past_space = strchr(bp, ' ') + 1;
past_space = strchr(bp, ' ');
if (!past_space) {
goto invalid_data;
}
past_space++;
len = j - read_pos - (past_space - bp) + 1; /* count the '\0' */
read_pos = j + 1;
@@ -247,6 +249,10 @@ static int read_delay_line(char *buf, int *flags_p)
memcpy(buf, past_space, len);
return mode;
invalid_data:
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: invalid data in delete-delay file.\n");
return -1;
}
static void do_delayed_deletions(char *delbuf)
@@ -532,7 +538,7 @@ void itemize(const char *fnamecmp, struct file_struct *file, int ndx, int statre
iflags |= ITEM_REPORT_CRTIME;
}
#endif
#if !defined HAVE_LCHMOD && !defined HAVE_SETATTRLIST
#ifndef CAN_CHMOD_SYMLINK
if (S_ISLNK(file->mode)) {
;
} else
@@ -875,9 +881,12 @@ static struct file_struct *find_fuzzy(struct file_struct *file, struct file_list
len = strlen(name);
suf = find_filename_suffix(name, len, &suf_len);
dist = fuzzy_distance(name, len, fname, fname_len);
/* Add some extra weight to how well the suffixes match. */
dist += fuzzy_distance(suf, suf_len, fname_suf, fname_suf_len) * 10;
dist = fuzzy_distance(name, len, fname, fname_len, lowest_dist);
/* Add some extra weight to how well the suffixes match unless we've already disqualified
* this file based on a heuristic. */
if (dist < 0xFFFF0000U) {
dist += fuzzy_distance(suf, suf_len, fname_suf, fname_suf_len, 0xFFFF0000U) * 10;
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(FUZZY, 2)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "fuzzy distance for %s = %d.%05d\n",
f_name(fp, NULL), (int)(dist>>16), (int)(dist&0xFFFF));
@@ -981,7 +990,7 @@ static int try_dests_reg(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, int ndx,
if (find_exact_for_existing) {
if (alt_dest_type == LINK_DEST && real_st.st_dev == sxp->st.st_dev && real_st.st_ino == sxp->st.st_ino)
return -1;
if (do_unlink(fname) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
if (do_unlink_at(fname) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
goto got_nothing_for_ya;
}
#ifdef SUPPORT_HARD_LINKS
@@ -1109,7 +1118,7 @@ static int try_dests_non(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, int ndx,
&& !IS_SPECIAL(file->mode) && !IS_DEVICE(file->mode)
#endif
&& !S_ISDIR(file->mode)) {
if (do_link(cmpbuf, fname) < 0) {
if (do_link_at(cmpbuf, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"failed to hard-link %s with %s",
cmpbuf, fname);
@@ -1312,7 +1321,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
}
}
if (relative_paths && !implied_dirs && file->mode != 0
&& do_stat(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
&& do_stat_at(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
if (dry_run)
goto parent_is_dry_missing;
if (make_path(fname, MKP_DROP_NAME | MKP_SKIP_SLASH) < 0) {
@@ -1424,7 +1433,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
&& (stype == FT_DIR
|| delete_item(fname, sx.st.st_mode, del_opts | DEL_FOR_DIR) != 0))
goto cleanup; /* Any errors get reported later. */
if (do_mkdir(fname, (file->mode|added_perms) & 0700) == 0)
if (do_mkdir_at(fname, (file->mode|added_perms) & 0700) == 0)
file->flags |= FLAG_DIR_CREATED;
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -1466,10 +1475,10 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
itemize(fnamecmp, file, ndx, statret, &sx,
statret ? ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE : 0, 0, NULL);
}
if (real_ret != 0 && do_mkdir(fname,file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
if (real_ret != 0 && do_mkdir_at(fname,file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
if (!relative_paths || errno != ENOENT
|| make_path(fname, MKP_DROP_NAME | MKP_SKIP_SLASH) < 0
|| (do_mkdir(fname, file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)) {
|| (do_mkdir_at(fname, file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"recv_generator: mkdir %s failed",
full_fname(fname));
@@ -1496,7 +1505,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
#ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
if (!am_root && (file->mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU && dir_tweaking) {
mode_t mode = file->mode | S_IRWXU;
if (do_chmod(fname, mode) < 0) {
if (do_chmod_at(fname, mode) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"failed to modify permissions on %s",
full_fname(fname));
@@ -1793,13 +1802,19 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
goto cleanup;
}
if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) {
/* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */
if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0)
real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp);
}
if (fnamecmp_type <= FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_HIGH)
;
else if (fnamecmp_type >= FNAMECMP_FUZZY)
;
else if (quick_check_ok(FT_REG, fnamecmp, file, &sx.st)) {
if (partialptr) {
do_unlink(partialptr);
do_unlink_at(partialptr);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
set_file_attrs(fname, file, &sx, NULL, maybe_ATTRS_REPORT | maybe_ATTRS_ACCURATE_TIME);
@@ -1813,7 +1828,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
goto cleanup;
return_with_success:
if (!dry_run)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
send_msg_success(fname, ndx);
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -1858,7 +1873,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
}
/* open the file */
if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing",
full_fname(fnamecmp));
pretend_missing:
@@ -1875,11 +1890,9 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
if (inplace && make_backups > 0 && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_FNAME) {
if (!(backupptr = get_backup_name(fname))) {
close(fd);
goto cleanup;
}
if (!(back_file = make_file(fname, NULL, NULL, 0, NO_FILTERS))) {
close(fd);
goto pretend_missing;
}
if (robust_unlink(backupptr) && errno != ENOENT) {
@@ -1887,14 +1900,12 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
full_fname(backupptr));
unmake_file(back_file);
back_file = NULL;
close(fd);
goto cleanup;
}
if ((f_copy = do_open(backupptr, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
if ((f_copy = do_open_at(backupptr, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(backupptr));
unmake_file(back_file);
back_file = NULL;
close(fd);
goto cleanup;
}
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BACKUP;
@@ -1945,7 +1956,6 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
write_sum_head(f_out, NULL);
else if (sx.st.st_size <= 0) {
write_sum_head(f_out, NULL);
close(fd);
} else {
if (generate_and_send_sums(fd, sx.st.st_size, f_out, f_copy) < 0) {
rprintf(FWARNING,
@@ -1953,10 +1963,11 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
fnamecmp);
write_sum_head(f_out, NULL);
}
close(fd);
}
cleanup:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (back_file) {
int save_preserve_xattrs = preserve_xattrs;
if (f_copy >= 0)
@@ -2011,7 +2022,7 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
if (slnk) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
if (do_symlink(slnk, create_name) < 0) {
if (do_symlink_at(slnk, create_name) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "symlink %s -> \"%s\" failed",
full_fname(create_name), slnk);
return 0;
@@ -2027,7 +2038,7 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
return 0;
#endif
} else {
if (do_mknod(create_name, file->mode, rdev) < 0) {
if (do_mknod_at(create_name, file->mode, rdev) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "mknod %s failed",
full_fname(create_name));
return 0;
@@ -2035,10 +2046,14 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
}
if (!skip_atomic) {
if (do_rename(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
if (do_rename_at(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
char *full_tmpname = strdup(full_fname(tmpname));
if (full_tmpname == NULL)
out_of_memory("atomic_create");
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\" failed",
full_fname(tmpname), full_fname(fname));
do_unlink(tmpname);
full_tmpname, full_fname(fname));
free(full_tmpname);
do_unlink_at(tmpname);
return 0;
}
}
@@ -2102,7 +2117,7 @@ static void touch_up_dirs(struct file_list *flist, int ndx)
continue;
fname = f_name(file, NULL);
if (fix_dir_perms)
do_chmod(fname, file->mode);
do_chmod_at(fname, file->mode);
if (need_retouch_dir_times) {
STRUCT_STAT st;
if (link_stat(fname, &st, 0) == 0 && mtime_differs(&st, file)) {
@@ -2137,6 +2152,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
if (send_failed)
ndx = get_hlink_num();
flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.1");
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
assert(file->flags & FLAG_HLINKED);
if (send_failed)
@@ -2165,6 +2182,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
flist = cur_flist;
cur_flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.2");
if (ndx < cur_flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
if (solo_file)

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Routines to provide a memory-efficient hashtable.
*
* Copyright (C) 2007-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ void *hashtable_find(struct hashtable *tbl, int64 key, void *data_when_new)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#define NON_ZERO_32(x) ((x) ? (x) : (uint32_t)1)
#define NON_ZERO_64(x, y) ((x) || (y) ? (y) | (int64)(x) << 32 | (y) : (int64)1)
uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
{
uint32_t a,b,c; /* internal state */
@@ -390,7 +393,7 @@ uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[2])<<16; /* fall through */
case 2 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[1])<<8; /* fall through */
case 1 : a+=k8[0]; break;
case 0 : return c;
case 0 : return NON_ZERO_32(c);
}
} else if (HASH_LITTLE_ENDIAN && ((u.i & 0x1) == 0)) {
const uint16_t *k = (const uint16_t *)key; /* read 16-bit chunks */
@@ -436,7 +439,7 @@ uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
break;
case 1 : a+=k8[0];
break;
case 0 : return c; /* zero length requires no mixing */
case 0 : return NON_ZERO_32(c); /* zero length requires no mixing */
}
} else { /* need to read the key one byte at a time */
@@ -489,10 +492,171 @@ uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 1 : a+=k[0];
break;
case 0 : return c;
case 0 : return NON_ZERO_32(c);
}
}
final(a,b,c);
return c;
return NON_ZERO_32(c);
}
#if SIZEOF_INT64 >= 8
/*
* hashlittle2: return 2 32-bit hash values joined into an int64.
*
* This is identical to hashlittle(), except it returns two 32-bit hash
* values instead of just one. This is good enough for hash table
* lookup with 2^^64 buckets, or if you want a second hash if you're not
* happy with the first, or if you want a probably-unique 64-bit ID for
* the key. *pc is better mixed than *pb, so use *pc first. If you want
* a 64-bit value do something like "*pc + (((uint64_t)*pb)<<32)".
*/
int64 hashlittle2(const void *key, size_t length)
{
uint32_t a,b,c; /* internal state */
union { const void *ptr; size_t i; } u; /* needed for Mac Powerbook G4 */
/* Set up the internal state */
a = b = c = 0xdeadbeef + ((uint32_t)length);
u.ptr = key;
if (HASH_LITTLE_ENDIAN && ((u.i & 0x3) == 0)) {
const uint32_t *k = (const uint32_t *)key; /* read 32-bit chunks */
const uint8_t *k8;
/*------ all but last block: aligned reads and affect 32 bits of (a,b,c) */
while (length > 12)
{
a += k[0];
b += k[1];
c += k[2];
mix(a,b,c);
length -= 12;
k += 3;
}
/*----------------------------- handle the last (probably partial) block */
k8 = (const uint8_t *)k;
switch(length)
{
case 12: c+=k[2]; b+=k[1]; a+=k[0]; break;
case 11: c+=((uint32_t)k8[10])<<16; /* fall through */
case 10: c+=((uint32_t)k8[9])<<8; /* fall through */
case 9 : c+=k8[8]; /* fall through */
case 8 : b+=k[1]; a+=k[0]; break;
case 7 : b+=((uint32_t)k8[6])<<16; /* fall through */
case 6 : b+=((uint32_t)k8[5])<<8; /* fall through */
case 5 : b+=k8[4]; /* fall through */
case 4 : a+=k[0]; break;
case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[2])<<16; /* fall through */
case 2 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[1])<<8; /* fall through */
case 1 : a+=k8[0]; break;
case 0 : return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);
}
} else if (HASH_LITTLE_ENDIAN && ((u.i & 0x1) == 0)) {
const uint16_t *k = (const uint16_t *)key; /* read 16-bit chunks */
const uint8_t *k8;
/*--------------- all but last block: aligned reads and different mixing */
while (length > 12)
{
a += k[0] + (((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
b += k[2] + (((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
c += k[4] + (((uint32_t)k[5])<<16);
mix(a,b,c);
length -= 12;
k += 6;
}
/*----------------------------- handle the last (probably partial) block */
k8 = (const uint8_t *)k;
switch(length)
{
case 12: c+=k[4]+(((uint32_t)k[5])<<16);
b+=k[2]+(((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
break;
case 11: c+=((uint32_t)k8[10])<<16; /* fall through */
case 10: c+=k[4];
b+=k[2]+(((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
break;
case 9 : c+=k8[8]; /* fall through */
case 8 : b+=k[2]+(((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
break;
case 7 : b+=((uint32_t)k8[6])<<16; /* fall through */
case 6 : b+=k[2];
a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
break;
case 5 : b+=k8[4]; /* fall through */
case 4 : a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
break;
case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[2])<<16; /* fall through */
case 2 : a+=k[0];
break;
case 1 : a+=k8[0];
break;
case 0 : return NON_ZERO_64(b, c); /* zero length strings require no mixing */
}
} else { /* need to read the key one byte at a time */
const uint8_t *k = (const uint8_t *)key;
/*--------------- all but the last block: affect some 32 bits of (a,b,c) */
while (length > 12)
{
a += k[0];
a += ((uint32_t)k[1])<<8;
a += ((uint32_t)k[2])<<16;
a += ((uint32_t)k[3])<<24;
b += k[4];
b += ((uint32_t)k[5])<<8;
b += ((uint32_t)k[6])<<16;
b += ((uint32_t)k[7])<<24;
c += k[8];
c += ((uint32_t)k[9])<<8;
c += ((uint32_t)k[10])<<16;
c += ((uint32_t)k[11])<<24;
mix(a,b,c);
length -= 12;
k += 12;
}
/*-------------------------------- last block: affect all 32 bits of (c) */
switch(length) /* all the case statements fall through */
{
case 12: c+=((uint32_t)k[11])<<24;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 11: c+=((uint32_t)k[10])<<16;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 10: c+=((uint32_t)k[9])<<8;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 9 : c+=k[8];
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 8 : b+=((uint32_t)k[7])<<24;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 7 : b+=((uint32_t)k[6])<<16;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 6 : b+=((uint32_t)k[5])<<8;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 5 : b+=k[4];
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 4 : a+=((uint32_t)k[3])<<24;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k[2])<<16;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 2 : a+=((uint32_t)k[1])<<8;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 1 : a+=k[0];
break;
case 0 : return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);
}
}
final(a,b,c);
return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);
}
#else
#define hashlittle2(key, len) hashlittle(key, len)
#endif

10
hlink.c
View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void match_gnums(int32 *ndx_list, int ndx_count)
struct ht_int32_node *node = NULL;
int32 gnum, gnum_next;
qsort(ndx_list, ndx_count, sizeof ndx_list[0], (int (*)()) hlink_compare_gnum);
qsort(ndx_list, ndx_count, sizeof ndx_list[0], (int (*)(const void*, const void*))hlink_compare_gnum);
for (from = 0; from < ndx_count; from++) {
file = hlink_flist->sorted[ndx_list[from]];
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int hard_link_check(struct file_struct *file, int ndx, char *fname,
return -1;
if (remove_source_files == 1 && do_xfers)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
send_msg_success(fname, ndx);
return 1;
}
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ int hard_link_check(struct file_struct *file, int ndx, char *fname,
int hard_link_one(struct file_struct *file, const char *fname,
const char *oldname, int terse)
{
if (do_link(oldname, fname) < 0) {
if (do_link_at(oldname, fname) < 0) {
enum logcode code;
if (terse) {
if (!INFO_GTE(NAME, 1))
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ void finish_hard_link(struct file_struct *file, const char *fname, int fin_ndx,
if (val < 0)
continue;
if (remove_source_files == 1 && do_xfers)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
send_msg_success(fname, ndx);
}
if (inc_recurse) {

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Inline functions for rsync.
*
* Copyright (C) 2007-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by

113
io.c
View File

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern int am_server;
extern int am_sender;
extern int am_receiver;
extern int am_generator;
extern int local_server;
extern int msgs2stderr;
extern int inc_recurse;
extern int io_error;
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ extern int read_batch;
extern int compat_flags;
extern int protect_args;
extern int checksum_seed;
extern int xfer_sum_len;
extern int daemon_connection;
extern int protocol_version;
extern int remove_source_files;
@@ -84,6 +86,8 @@ int sock_f_out = -1;
int64 total_data_read = 0;
int64 total_data_written = 0;
char num_dev_ino_buf[4 + 8 + 8];
static struct {
xbuf in, out, msg;
int in_fd;
@@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
free_xbuf(&ff_xb);
if (ff_reenable_multiplex >= 0)
io_start_multiplex_out(ff_reenable_multiplex);
free_implied_include_partial_string();
}
return;
}
@@ -419,6 +424,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
while (s != eob) {
if (*s++ == '\0') {
ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
add_implied_include(sob, 0);
if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
@@ -434,6 +440,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
ff_lastchar = '\0';
else {
/* Handle a partial string specially, saving any incomplete chars. */
implied_include_partial_string(sob, s);
flags &= ~ICB_INCLUDE_INCOMPLETE;
if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0) {
if (errno == E2BIG)
@@ -450,13 +457,17 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
char *t = ff_xb.buf;
char *eob = f + len;
char *cur = t;
/* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
while (f != eob) {
if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
add_implied_include(cur, 0);
cur = t;
while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
f++;
}
}
implied_include_partial_string(cur, t);
ff_lastchar = f[-1];
if ((len = t - ff_xb.buf) != 0) {
/* This will not circle back to perform_io() because we only get
@@ -1057,10 +1068,31 @@ void send_msg_int(enum msgcode code, int num)
send_msg(code, numbuf, 4, -1);
}
void send_msg_success(const char *fname, int num)
{
if (local_server) {
STRUCT_STAT st;
if (DEBUG_GTE(IO, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] send_msg_success(%d)\n", who_am_i(), num);
if (stat(fname, &st) < 0)
memset(&st, 0, sizeof (STRUCT_STAT));
SIVAL(num_dev_ino_buf, 0, num);
SIVAL64(num_dev_ino_buf, 4, st.st_dev);
SIVAL64(num_dev_ino_buf, 4+8, st.st_ino);
send_msg(MSG_SUCCESS, num_dev_ino_buf, sizeof num_dev_ino_buf, -1);
} else
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, num);
}
static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
{
struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "got_flist_entry_status");
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
if (remove_source_files) {
active_filecnt--;
active_bytecnt -= F_LENGTH(flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start]);
@@ -1071,8 +1103,12 @@ static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
switch (status) {
case FES_SUCCESS:
if (remove_source_files)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
if (remove_source_files) {
if (local_server)
send_msg(MSG_SUCCESS, num_dev_ino_buf, sizeof num_dev_ino_buf, -1);
else
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
case FES_NO_SEND:
#ifdef SUPPORT_HARD_LINKS
@@ -1125,8 +1161,8 @@ void set_io_timeout(int secs)
static void check_for_d_option_error(const char *msg)
{
static char rsync263_opts[] = "BCDHIKLPRSTWabceghlnopqrtuvxz";
char *colon;
static const char rsync263_opts[] = "BCDHIKLPRSTWabceghlnopqrtuvxz";
const char *colon;
int saw_d = 0;
if (*msg != 'r'
@@ -1567,14 +1603,15 @@ static void read_a_msg(void)
}
break;
case MSG_SUCCESS:
if (msg_bytes != 4) {
if (msg_bytes != (local_server ? 4+8+8 : 4)) {
invalid_msg:
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid multi-message %d:%lu [%s%s]\n",
tag, (unsigned long)msg_bytes, who_am_i(),
inc_recurse ? "/inc" : "");
exit_cleanup(RERR_STREAMIO);
}
val = raw_read_int();
raw_read_buf(num_dev_ino_buf, msg_bytes);
val = IVAL(num_dev_ino_buf, 0);
iobuf.in_multiplexed = 1;
if (am_generator)
got_flist_entry_status(FES_SUCCESS, val);
@@ -1751,6 +1788,13 @@ int32 read_int(int f)
return num;
}
uint32 read_uint(int f)
{
char b[4];
read_buf(f, b, 4);
return IVAL(b, 0);
}
int32 read_varint(int f)
{
union {
@@ -1824,6 +1868,45 @@ int64 read_varlong(int f, uchar min_bytes)
return u.x;
}
/* Read an int32 and verify lo <= v <= hi. On out-of-range, abort with a
* protocol error naming "what". The bound is co-located with the read so it
* cannot be forgotten by a downstream user. */
int32 read_int_bounded(int f, int32 lo, int32 hi, const char *what)
{
int32 v = read_int(f);
if (v < lo || v > hi) {
rprintf(FERROR, "wire value %s out of range: %ld not in [%ld,%ld] [%s]\n",
what, (long)v, (long)lo, (long)hi, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
return v;
}
/* As read_int_bounded but for varint-encoded values. */
int32 read_varint_bounded(int f, int32 lo, int32 hi, const char *what)
{
int32 v = read_varint(f);
if (v < lo || v > hi) {
rprintf(FERROR, "wire value %s out of range: %ld not in [%ld,%ld] [%s]\n",
what, (long)v, (long)lo, (long)hi, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
return v;
}
/* Read a varint that will be used as a size_t. Rejects negative values
* (which would wrap to ~SIZE_MAX) and values exceeding the supplied max. */
size_t read_varint_size(int f, size_t max, const char *what)
{
int32 v = read_varint(f);
if (v < 0 || (size_t)v > max) {
rprintf(FERROR, "wire size %s out of range: %ld > %lu [%s]\n",
what, (long)v, (unsigned long)max, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
return (size_t)v;
}
int64 read_longint(int f)
{
#if SIZEOF_INT64 >= 8
@@ -1843,6 +1926,7 @@ int64 read_longint(int f)
#endif
}
/* Debugging note: this will be named read_buf_() when using an external zlib. */
void read_buf(int f, char *buf, size_t len)
{
if (f != iobuf.in_fd) {
@@ -1929,6 +2013,21 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum)
(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
/* Guard against integer overflow in downstream allocations sized by
* count*element_size. my_alloc uses divide-not-multiply so it is
* already wraparound-safe, but checking here gives a clearer error
* and also covers the (size_t)count * xfer_sum_len arithmetic that
* is performed *before* reaching my_alloc. */
if (xfer_sum_len > 0 && (size_t)sum->count > SIZE_MAX / (size_t)xfer_sum_len) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum count %ld (too large) [%s]\n",
(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if ((size_t)sum->count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(struct sum_buf)) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum count %ld (sum_buf overflow) [%s]\n",
(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
sum->blength = read_int(f);
if (sum->blength < 0 || sum->blength > max_blength) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid block length %ld [%s]\n",
@@ -1936,7 +2035,7 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
sum->s2length = protocol_version < 27 ? csum_length : (int)read_int(f);
if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) {
if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > xfer_sum_len) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum length %d [%s]\n",
sum->s2length, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Inline functions for rsync.
*
* Copyright (C) 2007-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,28 @@
/* Keep this simple so both C and ASM can use it */
/* These allow something like CFLAGS=-DDISABLE_SHA512_DIGEST */
#ifdef DISABLE_SHA256_DIGEST
#undef SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
#endif
#ifdef DISABLE_SHA512_DIGEST
#undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
#endif
#define MD4_DIGEST_LEN 16
#define MD5_DIGEST_LEN 16
#if defined SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
#elif defined SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
#elif defined SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
#else
#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN MD5_DIGEST_LEN
#endif
#define CSUM_CHUNK 64
#define CSUM_gone -1
#define CSUM_NONE 0
#define CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC 1
#define CSUM_MD4_BUSTED 2
@@ -15,3 +32,6 @@
#define CSUM_XXH64 6
#define CSUM_XXH3_64 7
#define CSUM_XXH3_128 8
#define CSUM_SHA1 9
#define CSUM_SHA256 10
#define CSUM_SHA512 11

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#include "config.h"
#include "md-defines.h"
#if !defined USE_OPENSSL && CSUM_CHUNK == 64
#ifdef USE_MD5_ASM /* { */
#ifdef __APPLE__
#define md5_process_asm _md5_process_asm
@@ -698,4 +698,4 @@ md5_process_asm:
pop %rbp
ret
#endif /* !USE_OPENSSL ... */
#endif /* } USE_MD5_ASM */

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2001-2003 Christophe Devine
* Copyright (C) 2007-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
#include "rsync.h"
#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
void md5_begin(md_context *ctx)
{
ctx->A = 0x67452301;
@@ -148,7 +147,10 @@ static void md5_process(md_context *ctx, const uchar data[CSUM_CHUNK])
ctx->D += D;
}
#if defined HAVE_ASM && CSUM_CHUNK == 64
#ifdef USE_MD5_ASM
#if CSUM_CHUNK != 64
#error The MD5 ASM code does not support CSUM_CHUNK != 64
#endif
extern void md5_process_asm(md_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t num);
#endif
@@ -176,20 +178,20 @@ void md5_update(md_context *ctx, const uchar *input, uint32 length)
left = 0;
}
#if defined HAVE_ASM && CSUM_CHUNK == 64
#ifdef USE_MD5_ASM /* { */
if (length >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
uint32 chunks = length / CSUM_CHUNK;
md5_process_asm(ctx, input, chunks);
length -= chunks * CSUM_CHUNK;
input += chunks * CSUM_CHUNK;
}
#else
#else /* } { */
while (length >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
md5_process(ctx, input);
length -= CSUM_CHUNK;
input += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
#endif
#endif /* } */
if (length)
memcpy(ctx->buffer + left, input, length);
@@ -221,9 +223,8 @@ void md5_result(md_context *ctx, uchar digest[MD5_DIGEST_LEN])
SIVALu(digest, 8, ctx->C);
SIVALu(digest, 12, ctx->D);
}
#endif
#ifdef TEST_MD5
#ifdef TEST_MD5 /* { */
void get_md5(uchar *out, const uchar *input, int n)
{
@@ -317,4 +318,4 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
return 0;
}
#endif
#endif /* } */

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/* The include file for both the MD4 and MD5 routines. */
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include "openssl/md4.h"
#include "openssl/md5.h"
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "md-defines.h"
@@ -17,13 +17,6 @@ void mdfour_begin(md_context *md);
void mdfour_update(md_context *md, const uchar *in, uint32 length);
void mdfour_result(md_context *md, uchar digest[MD4_DIGEST_LEN]);
#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
#define MD5_CTX md_context
#define MD5_Init md5_begin
#define MD5_Update md5_update
#define MD5_Final(digest, cptr) md5_result(cptr, digest)
void md5_begin(md_context *ctx);
void md5_update(md_context *ctx, const uchar *input, uint32 length);
void md5_result(md_context *ctx, uchar digest[MD5_DIGEST_LEN]);
#endif

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ struct alloc_pool
size_t size; /* extent size */
size_t quantum; /* allocation quantum */
struct pool_extent *extents; /* top extent is "live" */
void (*bomb)(); /* called if malloc fails */
void (*bomb)(const char*, const char*, int); /* called if malloc fails */
int flags;
/* statistical data */

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* for string length. This covers a nasty loophole.
*
* The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
* causing nast effects.
* causing nasty effects.
*
* More Recently:
* Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
* Based on the Samba ACL support code.
* Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2000.
* Copyright (C) 2007-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* The permission functions have been changed to get/set all bits via
* one call. Some functions that rsync doesn't need were also removed.
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int sys_acl_delete_def_file(const char *name)
return acl_delete_def_file(name);
}
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T the_acl)
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T the_acl)
{
return acl_free(the_acl);
}
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T the_acl)
* The interface to DEC/Compaq Tru64 UNIX ACLs
* is based on Draft 13 of the POSIX spec which is
* slightly different from the Draft 16 interface.
*
*
* Also, some of the permset manipulation functions
* such as acl_clear_perm() and acl_add_perm() appear
* to be broken on Tru64 so we have to manipulate
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ int sys_acl_delete_def_file(const char *name)
return acl_delete_def_file((char *)name);
}
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T the_acl)
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T the_acl)
{
return acl_free(the_acl);
}
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
break;
}
ndefault = count - naccess;
/*
* if the caller wants the default ACL we have to copy
* the entries down to the start of the acl[] buffer
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_fd(int fd)
if (acl_d->acl[naccess].a_type & ACL_DEFAULT)
break;
}
acl_d->count = naccess;
return acl_d;
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ int sys_acl_get_info(SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry, SMB_ACL_TAG_T *tag_type_p, uint32 *b
if (*tag_type_p == SMB_ACL_USER || *tag_type_p == SMB_ACL_GROUP)
*u_g_id_p = entry->a_id;
return 0;
}
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int acl_sort(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
}
return 0;
}
int sys_acl_valid(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
{
return acl_sort(acl_d);
@@ -755,11 +755,11 @@ int sys_acl_delete_def_file(const char *path)
ret = acl(path, SETACL, acl_d->count, acl_d->acl);
sys_acl_free_acl(acl_d);
return ret;
}
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
{
SAFE_FREE(acl_d);
return 0;
@@ -895,10 +895,10 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
int ndefault; /* # of default ACL entries */
if (hpux_acl_call_presence() == False) {
/* Looks like we don't have the acl() system call on HPUX.
/* Looks like we don't have the acl() system call on HPUX.
* May be the system doesn't have the latest version of JFS.
*/
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (type != SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && type != SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
break;
}
ndefault = count - naccess;
/*
* if the caller wants the default ACL we have to copy
* the entries down to the start of the acl[] buffer
@@ -1109,9 +1109,9 @@ struct hpux_acl_types {
* aclp - Array of ACL structures.
* acl_type_count - Pointer to acl_types structure. Should already be
* allocated.
* Output:
* Output:
*
* acl_type_count - This structure is filled up with counts of various
* acl_type_count - This structure is filled up with counts of various
* acl types.
*/
@@ -1123,28 +1123,28 @@ static void hpux_count_obj(int acl_count, struct acl *aclp, struct hpux_acl_type
for (i = 0; i < acl_count; i++) {
switch (aclp[i].a_type) {
case USER:
case USER:
acl_type_count->n_user++;
break;
case USER_OBJ:
case USER_OBJ:
acl_type_count->n_user_obj++;
break;
case DEF_USER_OBJ:
case DEF_USER_OBJ:
acl_type_count->n_def_user_obj++;
break;
case GROUP:
case GROUP:
acl_type_count->n_group++;
break;
case GROUP_OBJ:
case GROUP_OBJ:
acl_type_count->n_group_obj++;
break;
case DEF_GROUP_OBJ:
case DEF_GROUP_OBJ:
acl_type_count->n_def_group_obj++;
break;
case OTHER_OBJ:
case OTHER_OBJ:
acl_type_count->n_other_obj++;
break;
case DEF_OTHER_OBJ:
case DEF_OTHER_OBJ:
acl_type_count->n_def_other_obj++;
break;
case CLASS_OBJ:
@@ -1159,14 +1159,14 @@ static void hpux_count_obj(int acl_count, struct acl *aclp, struct hpux_acl_type
case DEF_GROUP:
acl_type_count->n_def_group++;
break;
default:
default:
acl_type_count->n_illegal_obj++;
break;
}
}
}
/* swap_acl_entries: Swaps two ACL entries.
/* swap_acl_entries: Swaps two ACL entries.
*
* Inputs: aclp0, aclp1 - ACL entries to be swapped.
*/
@@ -1189,25 +1189,25 @@ static void hpux_swap_acl_entries(struct acl *aclp0, struct acl *aclp1)
}
/* prohibited_duplicate_type
* Identifies if given ACL type can have duplicate entries or
* Identifies if given ACL type can have duplicate entries or
* not.
*
* Inputs: acl_type - ACL Type.
*
* Outputs:
* Outputs:
*
* Return..
* Return..
*
* True - If the ACL type matches any of the prohibited types.
* False - If the ACL type doesn't match any of the prohibited types.
*/
*/
static BOOL hpux_prohibited_duplicate_type(int acl_type)
{
switch (acl_type) {
case USER:
case GROUP:
case DEF_USER:
case DEF_USER:
case DEF_GROUP:
return True;
default:
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ static BOOL hpux_prohibited_duplicate_type(int acl_type)
/* get_needed_class_perm
* Returns the permissions of a ACL structure only if the ACL
* type matches one of the pre-determined types for computing
* type matches one of the pre-determined types for computing
* CLASS_OBJ permissions.
*
* Inputs: aclp - Pointer to ACL structure.
@@ -1226,17 +1226,17 @@ static BOOL hpux_prohibited_duplicate_type(int acl_type)
static int hpux_get_needed_class_perm(struct acl *aclp)
{
switch (aclp->a_type) {
case USER:
case GROUP_OBJ:
case GROUP:
case DEF_USER_OBJ:
case USER:
case GROUP_OBJ:
case GROUP:
case DEF_USER_OBJ:
case DEF_USER:
case DEF_GROUP_OBJ:
case DEF_GROUP_OBJ:
case DEF_GROUP:
case DEF_CLASS_OBJ:
case DEF_OTHER_OBJ:
case DEF_OTHER_OBJ:
return aclp->a_perm;
default:
default:
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1267,15 +1267,15 @@ static int hpux_acl_sort(int acl_count, int calclass, struct acl *aclp)
#if !defined(HAVE_HPUX_ACLSORT)
/*
* The aclsort() system call is available on the latest HPUX General
* Patch Bundles. So for HPUX, we developed our version of acl_sort
* function. Because, we don't want to update to a new
* Patch Bundles. So for HPUX, we developed our version of acl_sort
* function. Because, we don't want to update to a new
* HPUX GR bundle just for aclsort() call.
*/
struct hpux_acl_types acl_obj_count;
int n_class_obj_perm = 0;
int i, j;
if (!acl_count) {
DEBUG(10, ("Zero acl count passed. Returning Success\n"));
return 0;
@@ -1290,8 +1290,8 @@ static int hpux_acl_sort(int acl_count, int calclass, struct acl *aclp)
hpux_count_obj(acl_count, aclp, &acl_obj_count);
/* There should be only one entry each of type USER_OBJ, GROUP_OBJ,
* CLASS_OBJ and OTHER_OBJ
/* There should be only one entry each of type USER_OBJ, GROUP_OBJ,
* CLASS_OBJ and OTHER_OBJ
*/
if (acl_obj_count.n_user_obj != 1
@@ -1313,15 +1313,15 @@ or DEF_USER_OBJ or DEF_GROUP_OBJ or DEF_OTHER_OBJ\n"));
return -1;
}
/* We now have proper number of OBJ and DEF_OBJ entries. Now sort the acl
* structures.
/* We now have proper number of OBJ and DEF_OBJ entries. Now sort the acl
* structures.
*
* Sorting crieteria - First sort by ACL type. If there are multiple entries of
* same ACL type, sort by ACL id.
*
* I am using the trivial kind of sorting method here because, performance isn't
* I am using the trivial kind of sorting method here because, performance isn't
* really effected by the ACLs feature. More over there aren't going to be more
* than 17 entries on HPUX.
* than 17 entries on HPUX.
*/
for (i = 0; i < acl_count; i++) {
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ static int acl_sort(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
}
return 0;
}
int sys_acl_valid(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
{
return acl_sort(acl_d);
@@ -1405,11 +1405,11 @@ int sys_acl_set_file(const char *name, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type, SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
int ret;
if (hpux_acl_call_presence() == False) {
/* Looks like we don't have the acl() system call on HPUX.
/* Looks like we don't have the acl() system call on HPUX.
* May be the system doesn't have the latest version of JFS.
*/
errno=ENOSYS;
return -1;
return -1;
}
if (type != SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && type != SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
@@ -1538,11 +1538,11 @@ int sys_acl_delete_def_file(const char *path)
ret = acl(path, ACL_SET, acl_d->count, acl_d->acl);
sys_acl_free_acl(acl_d);
return ret;
}
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
{
free(acl_d);
return 0;
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ int sys_acl_delete_def_file(const char *name)
return acl_delete_def_file(name);
}
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T acl_d)
{
if (acl_d->freeaclp) {
acl_free(acl_d->aclp);
@@ -1834,12 +1834,12 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
}
/* Get the acl using statacl */
DEBUG(10, ("Entering sys_acl_get_file\n"));
DEBUG(10, ("path_p is %s\n", path_p));
file_acl = (struct acl *)SMB_MALLOC(BUFSIZ);
if (file_acl == NULL) {
errno=ENOMEM;
DEBUG(0, ("Error in AIX sys_acl_get_file: %d\n", errno));
@@ -1931,9 +1931,9 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
* to be specified but, it's better than leaving it 0 */
acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_type = acl_entry->ace_type;
acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_access = acl_entry->ace_access;
memcpy(acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_id, idp, sizeof (struct ace_id));
/* The access in the acl entries must be left shifted by *
@@ -1962,7 +1962,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
DEBUG(10, ("acl_entry = %d\n", acl_entry));
DEBUG(10, ("The ace_type is %d\n", acl_entry->ace_type));
acl_entry = acl_nxt(acl_entry);
}
} /* end of if enabled */
@@ -2014,12 +2014,12 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_file(const char *path_p, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T type)
new_acl_entry->ace_access = file_acl->o_access << 6;
idp->id_type = SMB_ACL_OTHER;
break;
case 1:
new_acl_entry->ace_access = file_acl->u_access << 6;
idp->id_type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
break;
default:
return NULL;
@@ -2048,7 +2048,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_fd(int fd)
int rc = 0;
/* Get the acl using fstatacl */
DEBUG(10, ("Entering sys_acl_get_fd\n"));
DEBUG(10, ("fd is %d\n", fd));
file_acl = (struct acl *)SMB_MALLOC(BUFSIZ);
@@ -2095,12 +2095,12 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_fd(int fd)
DEBUG(10, ("acl_entry is %d\n", acl_entry));
DEBUG(10, ("acl_last(file_acl) id %d\n", acl_last(file_acl)));
/* Check if the extended acl bit is on. *
* If it isn't, do not show the *
* contents of the acl since AIX intends *
* the extended info to remain unused */
if (file_acl->acl_mode & S_IXACL){
/* while we are not pointing to the very end */
while (acl_entry < acl_last(file_acl)) {
@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_fd(int fd)
}
idp = acl_entry->ace_id;
/* Check if this is the first entry in the linked list. *
* The first entry needs to keep prevp pointing to NULL *
* and already has entryp allocated. */
@@ -2177,7 +2177,7 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_fd(int fd)
DEBUG(10, ("acl_entry = %d\n", acl_entry));
DEBUG(10, ("The ace_type is %d\n", acl_entry->ace_type));
acl_entry = acl_nxt(acl_entry);
}
} /* end of if enabled */
@@ -2210,43 +2210,43 @@ SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_get_fd(int fd)
}
acl_entry_link->nextp = NULL;
new_acl_entry = acl_entry_link->entryp;
idp = new_acl_entry->ace_id;
new_acl_entry->ace_len = sizeof (struct acl_entry);
new_acl_entry->ace_type = ACC_PERMIT;
idp->id_len = sizeof (struct ace_id);
DEBUG(10, ("idp->id_len = %d\n", idp->id_len));
memset(idp->id_data, 0, sizeof (uid_t));
switch (i) {
case 2:
new_acl_entry->ace_access = file_acl->g_access << 6;
idp->id_type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
break;
case 3:
new_acl_entry->ace_access = file_acl->o_access << 6;
idp->id_type = SMB_ACL_OTHER;
break;
case 1:
new_acl_entry->ace_access = file_acl->u_access << 6;
idp->id_type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
acl_entry_link_head->count++;
DEBUG(10, ("new_acl_entry->ace_access = %d\n", new_acl_entry->ace_access));
}
acl_entry_link_head->count = 0;
SAFE_FREE(file_acl);
return acl_entry_link_head;
}
#endif
@@ -2274,7 +2274,7 @@ int sys_acl_get_info(SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry, SMB_ACL_TAG_T *tag_type_p, uint32 *b
SMB_ACL_T sys_acl_init(int count)
{
struct acl_entry_link *theacl = NULL;
if (count < 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
return NULL;
@@ -2383,9 +2383,9 @@ int sys_acl_valid(SMB_ACL_T theacl)
}
DEBUG(10, ("user_obj=%d, group_obj=%d, other_obj=%d\n", user_obj, group_obj, other_obj));
if (user_obj != 1 || group_obj != 1 || other_obj != 1)
return -1;
return -1;
return 0;
}
@@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@ int sys_acl_set_file(const char *name, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T acltype, SMB_ACL_T theacl)
DEBUG(10, ("Entering sys_acl_set_file\n"));
DEBUG(10, ("File name is %s\n", name));
/* AIX has no default ACL */
if (acltype == SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
return 0;
@@ -2449,7 +2449,7 @@ int sys_acl_set_file(const char *name, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T acltype, SMB_ACL_T theacl)
errno = ENOMEM;
DEBUG(0, ("Error in sys_acl_set_file is %d\n", errno));
return -1;
}
}
memcpy(file_acl_temp, file_acl, file_acl->acl_len);
SAFE_FREE(file_acl);
@@ -2460,15 +2460,15 @@ int sys_acl_set_file(const char *name, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T acltype, SMB_ACL_T theacl)
file_acl->acl_len += sizeof (struct acl_entry);
acl_entry->ace_len = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_len;
acl_entry->ace_access = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_access;
/* In order to use this, we'll need to wait until we can get denies */
/* if (!acl_entry->ace_access && acl_entry->ace_type == ACC_PERMIT)
acl_entry->ace_type = ACC_SPECIFY; */
acl_entry->ace_type = ACC_SPECIFY;
ace_id = acl_entry->ace_id;
ace_id->id_type = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_id->id_type;
DEBUG(10, ("The id type is %d\n", ace_id->id_type));
ace_id->id_len = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_id->id_len;
@@ -2496,7 +2496,7 @@ int sys_acl_set_fd(int fd, SMB_ACL_T theacl)
uint user_id;
uint acl_length;
uint rc;
DEBUG(10, ("Entering sys_acl_set_fd\n"));
acl_length = BUFSIZ;
file_acl = (struct acl *)SMB_MALLOC(BUFSIZ);
@@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@ int sys_acl_set_fd(int fd, SMB_ACL_T theacl)
}
memset(file_acl, 0, BUFSIZ);
file_acl->acl_len = ACL_SIZ;
file_acl->acl_mode = S_IXACL;
@@ -2550,22 +2550,22 @@ int sys_acl_set_fd(int fd, SMB_ACL_T theacl)
file_acl->acl_len += sizeof (struct acl_entry);
acl_entry->ace_len = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_len;
acl_entry->ace_access = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_access;
/* In order to use this, we'll need to wait until we can get denies */
/* if (!acl_entry->ace_access && acl_entry->ace_type == ACC_PERMIT)
acl_entry->ace_type = ACC_SPECIFY; */
acl_entry->ace_type = ACC_SPECIFY;
ace_id = acl_entry->ace_id;
ace_id->id_type = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_id->id_type;
DEBUG(10, ("The id type is %d\n", ace_id->id_type));
ace_id->id_len = acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_id->id_len;
memcpy(&user_id, acl_entry_link->entryp->ace_id->id_data, sizeof (uid_t));
memcpy(ace_id->id_data, &user_id, sizeof (uid_t));
}
rc = fchacl(fd, file_acl, file_acl->acl_len);
DEBUG(10, ("errno is %d\n", errno));
DEBUG(10, ("return code is %d\n", rc));
@@ -2594,7 +2594,7 @@ int sys_acl_free_acl(SMB_ACL_T posix_acl)
SAFE_FREE(acl_entry_link->prevp);
SAFE_FREE(acl_entry_link->entryp);
SAFE_FREE(acl_entry_link);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Version 2.2.x
* Portable SMB ACL interface
* Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2000
* Copyright (C) 2007-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ struct new_acl_entry{
#define SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T struct new_acl_entry*
#define SMB_ACL_T struct acl_entry_link*
#define SMB_ACL_TAG_T unsigned short
#define SMB_ACL_TYPE_T int

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Extended attribute support for rsync.
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
* Written by Jay Fenlason.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify

View File

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static char *expand_vars(const char *str)
for (t = buf, f = str; bufsize && *f; ) {
if (*f == '%' && isUpper(f+1)) {
char *percent = strchr(f+1, '%');
const char *percent = strchr(f+1, '%');
if (percent && percent - f < bufsize) {
char *val;
strlcpy(t, f+1, percent - f);

24
log.c
View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2001 Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2000-2001 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ extern int protocol_version;
extern int always_checksum;
extern int preserve_mtimes;
extern int msgs2stderr;
extern int xfersum_type;
extern int checksum_type;
extern int stdout_format_has_i;
extern int stdout_format_has_o_or_i;
extern int logfile_format_has_i;
@@ -62,6 +60,8 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
extern const char undetermined_hostname[];
extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni, *file_sum_nni;
static int log_initialised;
static int logfile_was_closed;
static FILE *logfile_fp;
@@ -456,11 +456,17 @@ void rsyserr(enum logcode code, int errcode, const char *format, ...)
char buf[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
size_t len;
/* snprintf returns the would-have-been length on truncation, so
* each cumulative call must be guarded; if not, sizeof buf - len
* can underflow when promoted to size_t and the next call writes
* past the buffer. */
len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, RSYNC_NAME ": [%s] ", who_am_i());
va_start(ap, format);
len += vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len, format, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (len < sizeof buf) {
va_start(ap, format);
len += vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len, format, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
if (len < sizeof buf) {
len += snprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len,
@@ -680,12 +686,12 @@ static void log_formatted(enum logcode code, const char *format, const char *op,
n = NULL;
if (S_ISREG(file->mode)) {
if (always_checksum)
n = sum_as_hex(checksum_type, F_SUM(file), 1);
n = sum_as_hex(file_sum_nni->num, F_SUM(file), 1);
else if (iflags & ITEM_TRANSFER)
n = sum_as_hex(xfersum_type, sender_file_sum, 0);
n = sum_as_hex(xfer_sum_nni->num, sender_file_sum, 0);
}
if (!n) {
int sum_len = csum_len_for_type(always_checksum ? checksum_type : xfersum_type,
int sum_len = csum_len_for_type(always_checksum ? file_sum_nni->num : xfer_sum_nni->num,
always_checksum);
memset(buf2, ' ', sum_len*2);
buf2[sum_len*2] = '\0';

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
dnl AC_HAVE_TYPE(TYPE,INCLUDES)
AC_DEFUN([AC_HAVE_TYPE], [
AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC])
cv=`echo "$1" | sed 'y%./+- %__p__%'`
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1)
AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_type_$cv],

70
main.c
View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996-2001 Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ extern int called_from_signal_handler;
extern int need_messages_from_generator;
extern int kluge_around_eof;
extern int got_xfer_error;
extern int old_style_args;
extern int msgs2stderr;
extern int module_id;
extern int read_only;
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
extern struct file_list *first_flist;
extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
uid_t our_uid;
gid_t our_gid;
@@ -236,11 +237,11 @@ void write_del_stats(int f)
void read_del_stats(int f)
{
stats.deleted_files = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = read_varint(f);
stats.deleted_files = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_files");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_dirs");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_symlinks");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_devices");
stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_specials");
}
static void become_copy_as_user()
@@ -391,9 +392,18 @@ static void output_itemized_counts(const char *prefix, int *counts)
counts[0] -= counts[1] + counts[2] + counts[3] + counts[4];
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
if (counts[j]) {
/* snprintf can return more than its size arg
* on truncation; keep len <= sizeof buf - 2 so
* the closing ')' and trailing NUL always
* have room and the next iteration's
* sizeof buf - len - 2 cannot underflow. */
if (len >= (int)sizeof buf - 2)
break;
len += snprintf(buf+len, sizeof buf - len - 2,
"%s%s: %s",
pre, labels[j], comma_num(counts[j]));
if (len > (int)sizeof buf - 2)
len = (int)sizeof buf - 2;
pre = ", ";
}
}
@@ -477,7 +487,7 @@ static void show_malloc_stats(void)
#define PRINT_ALLOC_NUM(title, descr, num) \
rprintf(FINFO, " %-11s%10" SIZE_T_FMT_MOD "d (" descr ")\n", \
title ":", (SIZE_T_FMT_CAST)(num));
title ":", (SIZE_T_FMT_CAST)(num));
PRINT_ALLOC_NUM("arena", "bytes from sbrk", mi.arena);
PRINT_ALLOC_NUM("ordblks", "chunks not in use", mi.ordblks);
@@ -607,11 +617,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in
rprintf(FERROR, "internal: args[] overflowed in do_cmd()\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
}
if (**remote_argv == '-') {
if (asprintf(args + argc++, "./%s", *remote_argv++) < 0)
out_of_memory("do_cmd");
} else
args[argc++] = *remote_argv++;
args[argc++] = safe_arg(NULL, *remote_argv++);
remote_argc--;
}
}
@@ -663,6 +669,16 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in
return pid;
}
/* Older versions turn an empty string as a reference to the current directory.
* We now treat this as an error unless --old-args was used. */
static char *dot_dir_or_error()
{
if (old_style_args || am_server)
return ".";
rprintf(FERROR, "Empty destination arg specified (use \".\" or see --old-args).\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
}
/* The receiving side operates in one of two modes:
*
* 1. it receives any number of files into a destination directory,
@@ -690,9 +706,8 @@ static char *get_local_name(struct file_list *flist, char *dest_path)
if (!dest_path || list_only)
return NULL;
/* Treat an empty string as a copy into the current directory. */
if (!*dest_path)
dest_path = ".";
dest_path = dot_dir_or_error();
if (daemon_filter_list.head) {
char *slash = strrchr(dest_path, '/');
@@ -1079,6 +1094,7 @@ static int do_recv(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
}
am_generator = 1;
implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = NULL;
flist_receiving_enabled = True;
io_end_multiplex_in(MPLX_SWITCHING);
@@ -1434,6 +1450,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
if (argc > 1) {
p = argv[--argc];
if (!*p)
p = dot_dir_or_error();
remote_argv = argv + argc;
} else {
static char *dotarg[1] = { "." };
@@ -1474,6 +1492,10 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
rsync_port = 0;
}
/* A local transfer doesn't unbackslash anything, so leave the args alone. */
if (local_server)
old_style_args = 2;
if (!rsync_port && remote_argc && !**remote_argv) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
*remote_argv = ".";
@@ -1499,6 +1521,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
char *dummy_host;
int dummy_port = rsync_port;
int i;
if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
add_implied_include(remote_argv[0], daemon_connection);
/* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
* the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
@@ -1522,6 +1546,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
arg = ".";
remote_argv[i] = arg;
add_implied_include(arg, daemon_connection);
}
}
@@ -1552,6 +1577,10 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
shell_user = shell_machine;
shell_machine = p+1;
}
if (*shell_machine == '-') {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid remote host: hostnames may not start with '-'.\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
}
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(CMD, 2)) {
@@ -1738,6 +1767,17 @@ int main(int argc,char *argv[])
unset_env_var("DISPLAY");
#if defined USE_OPENSSL && defined SET_OPENSSL_CONF
#define TO_STR2(x) #x
#define TO_STR(x) TO_STR2(x)
/* ./configure --with-openssl-conf=/etc/ssl/openssl-rsync.cnf
* defines SET_OPENSSL_CONF as that unquoted pathname. */
if (!getenv("OPENSSL_CONF")) /* Don't override it if it's already set. */
set_env_str("OPENSSL_CONF", TO_STR(SET_OPENSSL_CONF));
#undef TO_STR
#undef TO_STR2
#endif
memset(&stats, 0, sizeof(stats));
/* Even a non-daemon runs needs the default config values to be set, e.g.

31
match.c
View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2003-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
extern int checksum_seed;
extern int append_mode;
extern int xfersum_type;
extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
extern int xfer_sum_len;
int updating_basis_file;
char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -145,6 +147,9 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
int more;
schar *map;
// prevent possible memory leaks
memset(sum2, 0, sizeof sum2);
/* want_i is used to encourage adjacent matches, allowing the RLL
* coding of the output to work more efficiently. */
want_i = 0;
@@ -230,7 +235,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
done_csum2 = 1;
}
if (memcmp(sum2,s->sums[i].sum2,s->s2length) != 0) {
if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0) {
false_alarms++;
continue;
}
@@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
if (i != aligned_i) {
if (sum != s->sums[aligned_i].sum1
|| l != s->sums[aligned_i].len
|| memcmp(sum2, s->sums[aligned_i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
|| memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, aligned_i), s->s2length) != 0)
goto check_want_i;
i = aligned_i;
}
@@ -269,7 +274,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
if (sum != s->sums[i].sum1)
goto check_want_i;
get_checksum2((char *)map, l, sum2);
if (memcmp(sum2, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0)
goto check_want_i;
/* OK, we have a re-alignment match. Bump the offset
* forward to the new match point. */
@@ -288,7 +293,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
&& (!updating_basis_file || s->sums[want_i].offset >= offset
|| s->sums[want_i].flags & SUMFLG_SAME_OFFSET)
&& sum == s->sums[want_i].sum1
&& memcmp(sum2, s->sums[want_i].sum2, s->s2length) == 0) {
&& memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, want_i), s->s2length) == 0) {
/* we've found an adjacent match - the RLL coder
* will be happy */
i = want_i;
@@ -356,15 +361,13 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
**/
void match_sums(int f, struct sum_struct *s, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T len)
{
int sum_len;
last_match = 0;
false_alarms = 0;
hash_hits = 0;
matches = 0;
data_transfer = 0;
sum_init(xfersum_type, checksum_seed);
sum_init(xfer_sum_nni, checksum_seed);
if (append_mode > 0) {
if (append_mode == 2) {
@@ -405,22 +408,22 @@ void match_sums(int f, struct sum_struct *s, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T len)
matched(f, s, buf, len, -1);
}
sum_len = sum_end(sender_file_sum);
sum_end(sender_file_sum);
/* If we had a read error, send a bad checksum. We use all bits
* off as long as the checksum doesn't happen to be that, in
* which case we turn the last 0 bit into a 1. */
if (buf && buf->status != 0) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sum_len && sender_file_sum[i] == 0; i++) {}
memset(sender_file_sum, 0, sum_len);
if (i == sum_len)
for (i = 0; i < xfer_sum_len && sender_file_sum[i] == 0; i++) {}
memset(sender_file_sum, 0, xfer_sum_len);
if (i == xfer_sum_len)
sender_file_sum[i-1]++;
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 2))
rprintf(FINFO,"sending file_sum\n");
write_buf(f, sender_file_sum, sum_len);
write_buf(f, sender_file_sum, xfer_sum_len);
if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 2)) {
rprintf(FINFO, "false_alarms=%d hash_hits=%d matches=%d\n",

View File

@@ -32,11 +32,14 @@
import os, sys, re, argparse, subprocess, time
from html.parser import HTMLParser
CONSUMES_TXT = set('h1 h2 p li pre'.split())
VALID_PAGES = 'README INSTALL COPYING rsync.1 rrsync.1 rsync-ssl.1 rsyncd.conf.5'.split()
CONSUMES_TXT = set('h1 h2 h3 p li pre'.split())
HTML_START = """\
<html><head>
<title>%s</title>
<title>%TITLE%</title>
<meta charset="UTF-8"/>
<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Roboto&family=Roboto+Mono&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
<style>
body {
@@ -46,6 +49,10 @@ body {
body, b, strong, u {
font-family: 'Roboto', sans-serif;
}
a.tgt { font-face: symbol; font-weight: 400; font-size: 70%; visibility: hidden; text-decoration: none; color: #ddd; padding: 0 4px; border: 0; }
a.tgt:after { content: '🔗'; }
a.tgt:hover { color: #444; background-color: #eaeaea; }
h1:hover > a.tgt, h2:hover > a.tgt, h3:hover > a.tgt, dt:hover > a.tgt { visibility: visible; }
code {
font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace;
font-weight: bold;
@@ -106,9 +113,27 @@ UNDR_FONT = ('\3', r"\fI")
NBR_DASH = ('\4', r"\-")
NBR_SPACE = ('\xa0', r"\ ")
FILENAME_RE = re.compile(r'^(?P<fn>(?P<srcdir>.+/)?(?P<name>(?P<prog>[^/]+?)(\.(?P<sect>\d+))?)\.md)$')
ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile(r'^(\w+)=(.+)')
VER_RE = re.compile(r'^#define\s+RSYNC_VERSION\s+"(\d.+?)"', re.M)
TZ_RE = re.compile(r'^#define\s+MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET\s+(-?\d+(\.\d+)?)', re.M)
VAR_REF_RE = re.compile(r'\$\{(\w+)\}')
VERSION_RE = re.compile(r' (\d[.\d]+)[, ]')
BIN_CHARS_RE = re.compile(r'[\1-\7]+')
SPACE_DOUBLE_DASH_RE = re.compile(r'\s--(\s)')
NON_SPACE_SINGLE_DASH_RE = re.compile(r'(^|\W)-')
WHITESPACE_RE = re.compile(r'\s')
CODE_BLOCK_RE = re.compile(r'[%s]([^=%s]+)[=%s]' % (BOLD_FONT[0], NORM_FONT[0], NORM_FONT[0]))
NBR_DASH_RE = re.compile(r'[%s]' % NBR_DASH[0])
INVALID_TARGET_CHARS_RE = re.compile(r'[^-A-Za-z0-9._]')
INVALID_START_CHAR_RE = re.compile(r'^([^A-Za-z0-9])')
MANIFY_LINESTART_RE = re.compile(r"^(['.])", flags=re.M)
md_parser = None
env_subs = { }
warning_count = 0
def main():
for mdfn in args.mdfiles:
parse_md_file(mdfn)
@@ -118,15 +143,15 @@ def main():
def parse_md_file(mdfn):
fi = re.match(r'^(?P<fn>(?P<srcdir>.+/)?(?P<name>(?P<prog>[^/]+?)(\.(?P<sect>\d+))?)\.md)$', mdfn)
fi = FILENAME_RE.match(mdfn)
if not fi:
die('Failed to parse a md input file name:', mdfn)
fi = argparse.Namespace(**fi.groupdict())
fi.want_manpage = not not fi.sect
if fi.want_manpage:
fi.title = fi.prog + '(' + fi.sect + ') man page'
fi.title = fi.prog + '(' + fi.sect + ') manpage'
else:
fi.title = fi.prog
fi.title = fi.prog + ' for rsync'
if fi.want_manpage:
if not env_subs:
@@ -165,6 +190,8 @@ def parse_md_file(mdfn):
if fi.want_manpage:
output_list += [ (fi.name, fi.man_out) ]
for fn, txt in output_list:
if args.dest and args.dest != '.':
fn = os.path.join(args.dest, fn)
if os.path.lexists(fn):
os.unlink(fn)
print("Wrote:", fn)
@@ -187,6 +214,7 @@ def find_man_substitutions():
env_subs['VERSION'] = '1.0.0'
env_subs['bindir'] = '/usr/bin'
env_subs['libdir'] = '/usr/lib/rsync'
tz_offset = 0
else:
for fn in (srcdir + 'version.h', 'Makefile'):
try:
@@ -198,24 +226,26 @@ def find_man_substitutions():
with open(srcdir + 'version.h', 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
txt = fh.read()
m = re.search(r'"(.+?)"', txt)
m = VER_RE.search(txt)
env_subs['VERSION'] = m.group(1)
m = TZ_RE.search(txt) # the tzdata lib may not be installed, so we use a simple hour offset
tz_offset = float(m.group(1)) * 60 * 60
with open('Makefile', 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
for line in fh:
m = re.match(r'^(\w+)=(.+)', line)
m = ASSIGNMENT_RE.match(line)
if not m:
continue
var, val = (m.group(1), m.group(2))
if var == 'prefix' and env_subs[var] is not None:
continue
while re.search(r'\$\{', val):
val = re.sub(r'\$\{(\w+)\}', lambda m: env_subs[m.group(1)], val)
while VAR_REF_RE.search(val):
val = VAR_REF_RE.sub(lambda m: env_subs[m.group(1)], val)
env_subs[var] = val
if var == 'srcdir':
break
env_subs['date'] = time.strftime('%d %b %Y', time.localtime(mtime))
env_subs['date'] = time.strftime('%d %b %Y', time.gmtime(mtime + tz_offset)).lstrip('0')
def html_via_commonmark(txt):
@@ -226,6 +256,8 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
def __init__(self, fi):
HTMLParser.__init__(self, convert_charrefs=True)
self.fn = fi.fn
st = self.state = argparse.Namespace(
list_state = [ ],
p_macro = ".P\n",
@@ -234,10 +266,18 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
dt_from = None,
in_pre = False,
in_code = False,
html_out = [ HTML_START % fi.title ],
html_out = [ HTML_START.replace('%TITLE%', fi.title) ],
man_out = [ ],
txt = '',
want_manpage = fi.want_manpage,
created_hashtags = set(),
derived_hashtags = set(),
referenced_hashtags = set(),
bad_hashtags = set(),
latest_targets = [ ],
opt_prefix = 'opt',
a_txt_start = None,
target_suf = '',
)
if st.want_manpage:
@@ -260,6 +300,20 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
fi.man_out = ''.join(st.man_out)
st.man_out = None
for tgt, txt in st.derived_hashtags:
derived = txt2target(txt, tgt)
if derived not in st.created_hashtags:
txt = BIN_CHARS_RE.sub('', txt.replace(NBR_DASH[0], '-').replace(NBR_SPACE[0], ' '))
warn('Unknown derived hashtag link in', self.fn, 'based on:', (tgt, txt))
for bad in st.bad_hashtags:
if bad in st.created_hashtags:
warn('Missing "#" in hashtag link in', self.fn + ':', bad)
else:
warn('Unknown non-hashtag link in', self.fn + ':', bad)
for bad in st.referenced_hashtags - st.created_hashtags:
warn('Unknown hashtag link in', self.fn + ':', '#' + bad)
def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs_list):
st = self.state
@@ -300,7 +354,7 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
st.txt += BOLD_FONT[0]
elif tag == 'em' or tag == 'i':
if st.want_manpage:
tag = 'u' # Change it into underline to be more like the man page
tag = 'u' # Change it into underline to be more like the manpage
st.txt += UNDR_FONT[0]
elif tag == 'ol':
start = 1
@@ -328,6 +382,25 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
st.man_out.append(".l\n")
st.html_out.append("<hr />")
return
elif tag == 'a':
st.a_href = None
for var, val in attrs_list:
if var == 'href':
if val.startswith(('https://', 'http://', 'mailto:', 'ftp:')):
pass # nothing to check
elif '#' in val:
pg, tgt = val.split('#', 1)
if pg and pg not in VALID_PAGES or '#' in tgt:
st.bad_hashtags.add(val)
elif tgt in ('', 'opt', 'dopt'):
st.a_href = val
elif pg == '':
st.referenced_hashtags.add(tgt)
if tgt in st.latest_targets:
warn('Found link to the current section in', self.fn + ':', val)
elif val not in VALID_PAGES:
st.bad_hashtags.add(val)
st.a_txt_start = len(st.txt)
st.html_out.append('<' + tag + ''.join(' ' + var + '="' + htmlify(val) + '"' for var, val in attrs_list) + '>')
st.at_first_tag_in_dd = False
@@ -343,13 +416,27 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
txt = None
add_to_txt = None
if tag == 'h1':
st.man_out.append(st.p_macro + '.SH "' + manify(txt) + '"\n')
tgt = txt
target_suf = ''
if tgt.startswith('NEWS for '):
m = VERSION_RE.search(tgt)
if m:
tgt = m.group(1)
st.target_suf = '-' + tgt
self.add_targets(tag, tgt)
elif tag == 'h2':
st.man_out.append(st.p_macro + '.SH "' + manify(txt) + '"\n')
self.add_targets(tag, txt, st.target_suf)
st.opt_prefix = 'dopt' if txt == 'DAEMON OPTIONS' else 'opt'
elif tag == 'h3':
st.man_out.append(st.p_macro + '.SS "' + manify(txt) + '"\n')
self.add_targets(tag, txt, st.target_suf)
elif tag == 'p':
if st.dt_from == 'p':
tag = 'dt'
st.man_out.append('.IP "' + manify(txt) + '"\n')
if txt.startswith(BOLD_FONT[0]):
self.add_targets(tag, txt)
st.dt_from = None
elif txt != '':
st.man_out.append(manify(txt) + "\n")
@@ -373,7 +460,7 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
add_to_txt = NORM_FONT[0]
elif tag == 'em' or tag == 'i':
if st.want_manpage:
tag = 'u' # Change it into underline to be more like the man page
tag = 'u' # Change it into underline to be more like the manpage
add_to_txt = NORM_FONT[0]
elif tag == 'ol' or tag == 'ul':
if st.list_state.pop() == 'dl':
@@ -385,6 +472,22 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
st.at_first_tag_in_dd = False
elif tag == 'hr':
return
elif tag == 'a':
if st.a_href:
atxt = st.txt[st.a_txt_start:]
find = 'href="' + st.a_href + '"'
for j in range(len(st.html_out)-1, 0, -1):
if find in st.html_out[j]:
pg, tgt = st.a_href.split('#', 1)
derived = txt2target(atxt, tgt)
if pg == '':
if derived in st.latest_targets:
warn('Found link to the current section in', self.fn + ':', st.a_href)
st.derived_hashtags.add((tgt, atxt))
st.html_out[j] = st.html_out[j].replace(find, 'href="' + pg + '#' + derived + '"')
break
else:
die('INTERNAL ERROR: failed to find href in html data:', find)
st.html_out.append('</' + tag + '>')
if add_to_txt:
if txt is None:
@@ -403,21 +506,56 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
def handle_data(self, txt):
st = self.state
if '](' in txt:
warn('Malformed link in', self.fn + ':', txt)
if args.debug:
self.output_debug('DATA', (txt,))
if st.in_pre:
html = htmlify(txt)
else:
txt = re.sub(r'\s--(\s)', NBR_SPACE[0] + r'--\1', txt).replace('--', NBR_DASH[0]*2)
txt = re.sub(r'(^|\W)-', r'\1' + NBR_DASH[0], txt)
txt = SPACE_DOUBLE_DASH_RE.sub(NBR_SPACE[0] + r'--\1', txt).replace('--', NBR_DASH[0]*2)
txt = NON_SPACE_SINGLE_DASH_RE.sub(r'\1' + NBR_DASH[0], txt)
html = htmlify(txt)
if st.in_code:
txt = re.sub(r'\s', NBR_SPACE[0], txt)
txt = WHITESPACE_RE.sub(NBR_SPACE[0], txt)
html = html.replace(NBR_DASH[0], '-').replace(NBR_SPACE[0], ' ') # <code> is non-breaking in CSS
st.html_out.append(html.replace(NBR_SPACE[0], '&nbsp;').replace(NBR_DASH[0], '-&#8288;'))
st.txt += txt
def add_targets(self, tag, txt, suf=None):
st = self.state
tag = '<' + tag + '>'
targets = CODE_BLOCK_RE.findall(txt)
if not targets:
targets = [ txt ]
tag_pos = 0
for txt in targets:
txt = txt2target(txt, st.opt_prefix)
if not txt:
continue
if suf:
txt += suf
if txt in st.created_hashtags:
for j in range(2, 1000):
chk = txt + '-' + str(j)
if chk not in st.created_hashtags:
print('Made link target unique:', chk)
txt = chk
break
if tag_pos == 0:
tag_pos -= 1
while st.html_out[tag_pos] != tag:
tag_pos -= 1
st.html_out[tag_pos] = tag[:-1] + ' id="' + txt + '">'
st.html_out.append('<a href="#' + txt + '" class="tgt"></a>')
tag_pos -= 1 # take into account the append
else:
st.html_out[tag_pos] = '<span id="' + txt + '"></span>' + st.html_out[tag_pos]
st.created_hashtags.add(txt)
st.latest_targets = targets
def output_debug(self, event, extra):
import pprint
st = self.state
@@ -431,13 +569,28 @@ class TransformHtml(HTMLParser):
pprint.PrettyPrinter(indent=2).pprint(vars(st))
def txt2target(txt, opt_prefix):
txt = txt.strip().rstrip(':')
m = CODE_BLOCK_RE.search(txt)
if m:
txt = m.group(1)
txt = NBR_DASH_RE.sub('-', txt)
txt = BIN_CHARS_RE.sub('', txt)
txt = INVALID_TARGET_CHARS_RE.sub('_', txt)
if opt_prefix and txt.startswith('-'):
txt = opt_prefix + txt
else:
txt = INVALID_START_CHAR_RE.sub(r't\1', txt)
return txt
def manify(txt):
return re.sub(r"^(['.])", r'\&\1', txt.replace('\\', '\\\\')
return MANIFY_LINESTART_RE.sub(r'\&\1', txt.replace('\\', '\\\\')
.replace(NBR_SPACE[0], NBR_SPACE[1])
.replace(NBR_DASH[0], NBR_DASH[1])
.replace(NORM_FONT[0], NORM_FONT[1])
.replace(BOLD_FONT[0], BOLD_FONT[1])
.replace(UNDR_FONT[0], UNDR_FONT[1]), flags=re.M)
.replace(UNDR_FONT[0], UNDR_FONT[1]))
def htmlify(txt):
@@ -446,6 +599,8 @@ def htmlify(txt):
def warn(*msg):
print(*msg, file=sys.stderr)
global warning_count
warning_count += 1
def die(*msg):
@@ -454,11 +609,12 @@ def die(*msg):
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Output html and (optionally) nroff for markdown pages.", add_help=False)
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Convert markdown into html and (optionally) nroff. Each input filename must have a .md suffix, which is changed to .html for the output filename. If the input filename ends with .num.md (e.g. foo.1.md) then a nroff file is also output with the input filename's .md suffix removed (e.g. foo.1).", add_help=False)
parser.add_argument('--test', action='store_true', help="Just test the parsing without outputting any files.")
parser.add_argument('--dest', metavar='DIR', help="Create files in DIR instead of the current directory.")
parser.add_argument('--debug', '-D', action='count', default=0, help='Output copious info on the html parsing. Repeat for even more.')
parser.add_argument("--help", "-h", action="help", help="Output this help message and exit.")
parser.add_argument("mdfiles", nargs='+', help="The source .md files to convert.")
parser.add_argument("mdfiles", metavar='FILE.md', nargs='+', help="One or more .md files to convert.")
args = parser.parse_args()
try:
@@ -474,3 +630,5 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
gfm_parser = None
main()
if warning_count:
sys.exit(1)

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
#!/bin/sh
srcdir=`dirname $0`
gitver=`git describe --abbrev=8 2>/dev/null`
if [ ! -f git-version.h ]; then
touch git-version.h
fi
case "$gitver" in
*.*)
if test -d "$srcdir/.git" || test -f "$srcdir/.git"; then
gitver=`git describe --abbrev=8 2>/dev/null`
# NOTE: I'm avoiding "|" in sed since I'm not sure if sed -r is portable and "\|" fails on some OSes.
verchk=`echo "$gitver-" | sed -n '/^v3\.[0-9][0-9]*\.[0-9][0-9]*\(pre[0-9]*\)*-/p'`
if [ -n "$verchk" ]; then
echo "#define RSYNC_GITVER \"$gitver\"" >git-version.h.new
if ! diff git-version.h.new git-version.h >/dev/null; then
echo "Updating git-version.h"
@@ -16,5 +18,5 @@ case "$gitver" in
else
rm git-version.h.new
fi
;;
esac
fi
fi

217
options.c
View File

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
extern int module_id;
extern int local_server;
extern int sanitize_paths;
extern int trust_sender_args;
extern int trust_sender_filter;
extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ int append_mode = 0;
int keep_dirlinks = 0;
int copy_dirlinks = 0;
int copy_links = 0;
int copy_devices = 0;
int write_devices = 0;
int preserve_links = 0;
int preserve_hard_links = 0;
@@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ int preserve_atimes = 0;
int preserve_crtimes = 0;
int omit_dir_times = 0;
int omit_link_times = 0;
int trust_sender = 0;
int update_only = 0;
int open_noatime = 0;
int cvs_exclude = 0;
@@ -102,17 +106,27 @@ int filesfrom_fd = -1;
char *filesfrom_host = NULL;
int eol_nulls = 0;
int protect_args = -1;
int old_style_args = -1;
int human_readable = 1;
int recurse = 0;
int mkpath_dest_arg = 0;
int allow_inc_recurse = 1;
int xfer_dirs = -1;
int am_daemon = 0;
/* Set after a successful per-module chroot ("use chroot = yes") in
* clientserver.c. NOT set for the daemon-level "daemon chroot = /X"
* chroot: that confines path resolution to /X, but module paths
* /X/modA, /X/modB, etc. are not chroot boundaries, so the per-module
* symlink-race defenses (secure_relative_open() / do_*_at() in
* syscall.c, gated by `am_daemon && !am_chrooted`) must still fire
* even when the daemon is inside a daemon chroot. */
int am_chrooted = 0;
int connect_timeout = 0;
int keep_partial = 0;
int safe_symlinks = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
int munge_symlinks = 0;
int use_secure_symlinks = 0;
int size_only = 0;
int daemon_bwlimit = 0;
int bwlimit = 0;
@@ -291,7 +305,7 @@ static struct output_struct debug_words[COUNT_DEBUG+1] = {
DEBUG_WORD(DELTASUM, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug delta-transfer checksumming (levels 1-4)"),
DEBUG_WORD(DUP, W_REC, "Debug weeding of duplicate names"),
DEBUG_WORD(EXIT, W_CLI|W_SRV, "Debug exit events (levels 1-3)"),
DEBUG_WORD(FILTER, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug filter actions (levels 1-2)"),
DEBUG_WORD(FILTER, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug filter actions (levels 1-3)"),
DEBUG_WORD(FLIST, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug file-list operations (levels 1-4)"),
DEBUG_WORD(FUZZY, W_REC, "Debug fuzzy scoring (levels 1-2)"),
DEBUG_WORD(GENR, W_REC, "Debug generator functions"),
@@ -577,7 +591,7 @@ enum {OPT_SERVER = 1000, OPT_DAEMON, OPT_SENDER, OPT_EXCLUDE, OPT_EXCLUDE_FROM,
OPT_READ_BATCH, OPT_WRITE_BATCH, OPT_ONLY_WRITE_BATCH, OPT_MAX_SIZE,
OPT_NO_D, OPT_APPEND, OPT_NO_ICONV, OPT_INFO, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_BLOCK_SIZE,
OPT_USERMAP, OPT_GROUPMAP, OPT_CHOWN, OPT_BWLIMIT, OPT_STDERR,
OPT_OLD_COMPRESS, OPT_NEW_COMPRESS, OPT_NO_COMPRESS,
OPT_OLD_COMPRESS, OPT_NEW_COMPRESS, OPT_NO_COMPRESS, OPT_OLD_ARGS,
OPT_STOP_AFTER, OPT_STOP_AT,
OPT_REFUSED_BASE = 9000};
@@ -655,6 +669,7 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
{"no-D", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, 0, OPT_NO_D, 0, 0 },
{"devices", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &preserve_devices, 1, 0, 0 },
{"no-devices", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &preserve_devices, 0, 0, 0 },
{"copy-devices", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, &copy_devices, 0, 0, 0 },
{"write-devices", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &write_devices, 1, 0, 0 },
{"no-write-devices", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &write_devices, 0, 0, 0 },
{"specials", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &preserve_specials, 1, 0, 0 },
@@ -780,9 +795,14 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = {
{"files-from", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, &files_from, 0, 0, 0 },
{"from0", '0', POPT_ARG_VAL, &eol_nulls, 1, 0, 0},
{"no-from0", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &eol_nulls, 0, 0, 0},
{"protect-args", 's', POPT_ARG_VAL, &protect_args, 1, 0, 0},
{"old-args", 0, POPT_ARG_NONE, 0, OPT_OLD_ARGS, 0, 0},
{"no-old-args", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &old_style_args, 0, 0, 0},
{"secluded-args", 's', POPT_ARG_VAL, &protect_args, 1, 0, 0},
{"no-secluded-args", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &protect_args, 0, 0, 0},
{"protect-args", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &protect_args, 1, 0, 0},
{"no-protect-args", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &protect_args, 0, 0, 0},
{"no-s", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &protect_args, 0, 0, 0},
{"trust-sender", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &trust_sender, 1, 0, 0},
{"numeric-ids", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &numeric_ids, 1, 0, 0 },
{"no-numeric-ids", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &numeric_ids, 0, 0, 0 },
{"usermap", 0, POPT_ARG_STRING, 0, OPT_USERMAP, 0, 0 },
@@ -941,11 +961,12 @@ static void set_refuse_options(void)
if (!am_daemon
|| op->shortName == 'e' /* Required for compatibility flags */
|| op->shortName == '0' /* --from0 just modifies --files-from, so refuse that instead (or not) */
|| op->shortName == 's' /* --protect-args is always OK */
|| op->shortName == 's' /* --secluded-args is always OK */
|| op->shortName == 'n' /* --dry-run is always OK */
|| strcmp("iconv", longName) == 0
|| strcmp("no-iconv", longName) == 0
|| strcmp("checksum-seed", longName) == 0
|| strcmp("copy-devices", longName) == 0 /* disable wild-match (it gets refused below) */
|| strcmp("write-devices", longName) == 0 /* disable wild-match (it gets refused below) */
|| strcmp("log-format", longName) == 0 /* aka out-format (NOT log-file-format) */
|| strcmp("sender", longName) == 0
@@ -957,6 +978,7 @@ static void set_refuse_options(void)
assert(list_end != NULL);
if (am_daemon) { /* Refused by default, but can be accepted via a negated exact match. */
parse_one_refuse_match(0, "copy-devices", list_end);
parse_one_refuse_match(0, "write-devices", list_end);
}
@@ -1142,7 +1164,7 @@ static time_t parse_time(const char *arg)
{
const char *cp;
time_t val, now = time(NULL);
struct tm t, *today = localtime(&now);
struct tm t, tmp, *today = localtime_r(&now, &tmp);
int in_date, old_mday, n;
memset(&t, 0, sizeof t);
@@ -1359,6 +1381,10 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
if (pc)
poptFreeContext(pc);
pc = poptGetContext(RSYNC_NAME, argc, argv, long_options, 0);
if (pc == NULL) {
strlcpy(err_buf, "poptGetContext returned NULL\n", sizeof err_buf);
return 0;
}
if (!am_server) {
poptReadDefaultConfig(pc, 0);
popt_unalias(pc, "--daemon");
@@ -1605,6 +1631,13 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
compress_choice = NULL;
break;
case OPT_OLD_ARGS:
if (old_style_args <= 0)
old_style_args = 1;
else
old_style_args++;
break;
case 'M':
arg = poptGetOptArg(pc);
if (*arg != '-') {
@@ -1906,7 +1939,7 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
saw_stderr_opt = 1;
if (version_opt_cnt) {
print_rsync_version(FINFO);
print_rsync_version(version_opt_cnt > 1 && !am_server ? FNONE : FINFO);
exit_cleanup(0);
}
@@ -1922,13 +1955,28 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
max_alloc = size;
}
if (old_style_args < 0) {
if (!am_server && protect_args <= 0 && (arg = getenv("RSYNC_OLD_ARGS")) != NULL && *arg) {
protect_args = 0;
old_style_args = atoi(arg);
} else
old_style_args = 0;
} else if (old_style_args) {
if (protect_args > 0) {
snprintf(err_buf, sizeof err_buf,
"--secluded-args conflicts with --old-args.\n");
return 0;
}
protect_args = 0;
}
if (protect_args < 0) {
if (am_server)
protect_args = 0;
else if ((arg = getenv("RSYNC_PROTECT_ARGS")) != NULL && *arg)
protect_args = atoi(arg) ? 1 : 0;
else {
#ifdef RSYNC_USE_PROTECTED_ARGS
#ifdef RSYNC_USE_SECLUDED_ARGS
protect_args = 1;
#else
protect_args = 0;
@@ -2436,6 +2484,11 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
}
}
if (trust_sender || am_server || read_batch)
trust_sender_args = trust_sender_filter = 1;
else if (old_style_args || filesfrom_host != NULL)
trust_sender_args = 1;
am_starting_up = 0;
return 1;
@@ -2447,6 +2500,73 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
}
static char SPLIT_ARG_WHEN_OLD[1];
/**
* Do backslash quoting of any weird chars in "arg", append the resulting
* string to the end of the "opt" (which gets a "=" appended if it is not
* an empty or NULL string), and return the (perhaps malloced) result.
* If opt is NULL, arg is considered a filename arg that allows wildcards.
* If it is "" or any other value, it is considered an option.
**/
char *safe_arg(const char *opt, const char *arg)
{
#define SHELL_CHARS "!#$&;|<>(){}\"' \t\\"
#define WILD_CHARS "*?[]" /* We don't allow remote brace expansion */
BOOL is_filename_arg = !opt;
char *escapes = is_filename_arg ? SHELL_CHARS : WILD_CHARS SHELL_CHARS;
BOOL escape_leading_dash = is_filename_arg && *arg == '-';
BOOL escape_leading_tilde = 0;
int len1 = opt && *opt ? strlen(opt) + 1 : 0;
int len2 = strlen(arg);
int extras = escape_leading_dash ? 2 : 0;
char *ret;
if (!protect_args && old_style_args < 2 && (!old_style_args || (!is_filename_arg && opt != SPLIT_ARG_WHEN_OLD))) {
const char *f;
if (!trust_sender_args && *arg == '~'
&& ((relative_paths && !strstr(arg, "/./"))
|| !strchr(arg, '/'))) {
extras++;
escape_leading_tilde = 1;
}
for (f = arg; *f; f++) {
if (strchr(escapes, *f))
extras++;
}
}
if (!len1 && !extras)
return (char*)arg;
ret = new_array(char, len1 + len2 + extras + 1);
if (len1) {
memcpy(ret, opt, len1-1);
ret[len1-1] = '=';
}
if (escape_leading_dash) {
ret[len1++] = '.';
ret[len1++] = '/';
extras -= 2;
}
if (!extras)
memcpy(ret + len1, arg, len2);
else {
const char *f = arg;
char *t = ret + len1;
if (escape_leading_tilde)
*t++ = '\\';
while (*f) {
if (*f == '\\') {
if (!is_filename_arg || !strchr(WILD_CHARS, f[1]))
*t++ = '\\';
} else if (strchr(escapes, *f))
*t++ = '\\';
*t++ = *f++;
}
}
ret[len1+len2+extras] = '\0';
return ret;
}
/**
* Construct a filtered list of options to pass through from the
* client to the server.
@@ -2590,9 +2710,7 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
set++;
else
set = iconv_opt;
if (asprintf(&arg, "--iconv=%s", set) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--iconv", set);
}
#endif
@@ -2658,33 +2776,24 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
}
if (backup_dir) {
/* This split idiom allows for ~/path expansion via the shell. */
args[ac++] = "--backup-dir";
args[ac++] = backup_dir;
args[ac++] = safe_arg("", backup_dir);
}
/* Only send --suffix if it specifies a non-default value. */
if (strcmp(backup_suffix, backup_dir ? "" : BACKUP_SUFFIX) != 0) {
/* We use the following syntax to avoid weirdness with '~'. */
if (asprintf(&arg, "--suffix=%s", backup_suffix) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
}
if (strcmp(backup_suffix, backup_dir ? "" : BACKUP_SUFFIX) != 0)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--suffix", backup_suffix);
if (checksum_choice) {
if (asprintf(&arg, "--checksum-choice=%s", checksum_choice) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
}
if (checksum_choice)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--checksum-choice", checksum_choice);
if (do_compression == CPRES_ZLIBX)
args[ac++] = "--new-compress";
else if (compress_choice && do_compression == CPRES_ZLIB)
args[ac++] = "--old-compress";
else if (compress_choice) {
if (asprintf(&arg, "--compress-choice=%s", compress_choice) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
}
else if (compress_choice)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--compress-choice", compress_choice);
if (am_sender) {
if (max_delete > 0) {
@@ -2693,14 +2802,10 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
args[ac++] = arg;
} else if (max_delete == 0)
args[ac++] = "--max-delete=-1";
if (min_size >= 0) {
args[ac++] = "--min-size";
args[ac++] = min_size_arg;
}
if (max_size >= 0) {
args[ac++] = "--max-size";
args[ac++] = max_size_arg;
}
if (min_size >= 0)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--min-size", min_size_arg);
if (max_size >= 0)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--max-size", max_size_arg);
if (delete_before)
args[ac++] = "--delete-before";
else if (delete_during == 2)
@@ -2724,17 +2829,12 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
if (do_stats)
args[ac++] = "--stats";
} else {
if (skip_compress) {
if (asprintf(&arg, "--skip-compress=%s", skip_compress) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
}
if (skip_compress)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--skip-compress", skip_compress);
}
if (max_alloc_arg && max_alloc != DEFAULT_MAX_ALLOC) {
args[ac++] = "--max-alloc";
args[ac++] = max_alloc_arg;
}
if (max_alloc_arg && max_alloc != DEFAULT_MAX_ALLOC)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--max-alloc", max_alloc_arg);
/* --delete-missing-args needs the cooperation of both sides, but
* the sender can handle --ignore-missing-args by itself. */
@@ -2759,7 +2859,7 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
if (partial_dir && am_sender) {
if (partial_dir != tmp_partialdir) {
args[ac++] = "--partial-dir";
args[ac++] = partial_dir;
args[ac++] = safe_arg("", partial_dir);
}
if (delay_updates)
args[ac++] = "--delay-updates";
@@ -2782,17 +2882,11 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
args[ac++] = "--use-qsort";
if (am_sender) {
if (usermap) {
if (asprintf(&arg, "--usermap=%s", usermap) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
}
if (usermap)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--usermap", usermap);
if (groupmap) {
if (asprintf(&arg, "--groupmap=%s", groupmap) < 0)
goto oom;
args[ac++] = arg;
}
if (groupmap)
args[ac++] = safe_arg("--groupmap", groupmap);
if (ignore_existing)
args[ac++] = "--ignore-existing";
@@ -2803,7 +2897,7 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
if (tmpdir) {
args[ac++] = "--temp-dir";
args[ac++] = tmpdir;
args[ac++] = safe_arg("", tmpdir);
}
if (do_fsync)
@@ -2816,7 +2910,7 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
*/
for (i = 0; i < basis_dir_cnt; i++) {
args[ac++] = alt_dest_opt(0);
args[ac++] = basis_dir[i];
args[ac++] = safe_arg("", basis_dir[i]);
}
}
}
@@ -2834,14 +2928,14 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
} else if (inplace) {
args[ac++] = "--inplace";
/* Work around a bug in older rsync versions (on the remote side) for --inplace --sparse */
if (sparse_files && !whole_file)
if (sparse_files && !whole_file && am_sender)
args[ac++] = "--no-W";
}
if (files_from && (!am_sender || filesfrom_host)) {
if (filesfrom_host) {
args[ac++] = "--files-from";
args[ac++] = files_from;
args[ac++] = safe_arg("", files_from);
if (eol_nulls)
args[ac++] = "--from0";
} else {
@@ -2863,6 +2957,9 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
else if (remove_source_files)
args[ac++] = "--remove-sent-files";
if (copy_devices && !am_sender)
args[ac++] = "--copy-devices";
if (preallocate_files && am_sender)
args[ac++] = "--preallocate";
@@ -2884,7 +2981,7 @@ void server_options(char **args, int *argc_p)
exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
}
for (j = 1; j <= remote_option_cnt; j++)
args[ac++] = (char*)remote_options[j];
args[ac++] = safe_arg(SPLIT_ARG_WHEN_OLD, remote_options[j]);
}
*argc_p = ac;

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
import re, argparse
short_no_arg = { }
short_with_num = { '@': 1 };
short_with_num = { '@': 1 }
long_opts = { # These include some extra long-args that BackupPC uses:
'block-size': 1,
'daemon': -1,
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ long_opts = { # These include some extra long-args that BackupPC uses:
'recursive': 0,
'stderr': 1,
'times': 0,
'copy-devices': -1,
'write-devices': -1,
}
@@ -57,11 +58,13 @@ def main():
continue
if last_long_opt:
m = re.search(r'args\[ac\+\+\] = ([^["\s]+);', line)
m = re.search(r'args\[ac\+\+\] = safe_arg\("", ([^[("\s]+)\);', line)
if m:
long_opts[last_long_opt] = 2
last_long_opt = None
continue
if 'args[ac++] = ' in line:
last_long_opt = None
m = re.search(r'return "--([^"]+-dest)";', line)
if m:
@@ -73,7 +76,9 @@ def main():
if not m:
m = re.search(r'args\[ac\+\+\] = "--([^"=]+)=', line)
if not m:
m = re.search(r'fmt = .*: "--([^"=]+)=', line)
m = re.search(r'args\[ac\+\+\] = safe_arg\("--([^"=]+)"', line)
if not m:
m = re.search(r'fmt = .*: "--([^"=]+)=', line)
if m:
long_opts[m.group(1)] = 1
last_long_opt = None
@@ -81,7 +86,7 @@ def main():
long_opts['files-from'] = 3
txt = """\
### START of options data produced by the cull_options script. ###
### START of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
# To disable a short-named option, add its letter to this string:
"""
@@ -119,7 +124,7 @@ def main():
print("}")
else:
print(");")
print("\n### END of options data produced by the cull_options script. ###")
print("\n### END of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###")
def str_assign(name, val, comment=None):

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
Summary: A fast, versatile, remote (and local) file-copying tool
Name: rsync
Version: 3.2.4
%define fullversion %{version}pre1
Release: 0.1.pre1
%define srcdir src-previews
Version: 3.2.7
%define fullversion %{version}
Release: 1
%define srcdir src
Group: Applications/Internet
License: GPL
Source0: https://rsync.samba.org/ftp/rsync/%{srcdir}/rsync-%{fullversion}.tar.gz
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%dir /etc/rsync-ssl/certs
%changelog
* Sun Jan 02 2022 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Released 3.2.4pre1.
* Thu Oct 20 2022 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Released 3.2.7.
* Fri Mar 21 2008 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Added installation of /etc/xinetd.d/rsync file and some commented-out

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
# This config file can be used with rsync to enable legacy digests
# (such as MD4) by using the OPENSSL_CONF environment variable.
# See rsync's configure --with-openssl-conf=/path/name option.
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
providers = provider_sect
[provider_sect]
default = default_sect
legacy = legacy_sect
[default_sect]
activate = 1
[legacy_sect]
activate = 1

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def _tweak_opts(cmd, opts, **maybe_set_args):
opts = opts.copy()
_maybe_set(opts, **maybe_set_args)
if type(cmd) == str:
if isinstance(cmd, str):
_maybe_set(opts, shell=True)
want_raw = opts.pop('raw', False)
@@ -176,12 +176,12 @@ def mandate_gensend_hook():
print('Creating hook file:', hook)
cmd_chk(['./rsync', '-a', 'packaging/pre-push', hook])
else:
ct = cmd_txt(['fgrep', 'make gensend', hook], discard='output')
ct = cmd_txt(['grep', 'make gensend', hook], discard='output')
if ct.rc:
die('Please add a "make gensend" into your', hook, 'script.')
# Snag the GENFILES values out of the Makefile.in file and return them as a list.
# Snag the GENFILES values out of the Makefile file and return them as a list.
def get_gen_files(want_dir_plus_list=False):
cont_re = re.compile(r'\\\n')
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ def get_gen_files(want_dir_plus_list=False):
auto_dir = os.path.join('auto-build-save', cmd_txt('git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD').out.strip().replace('/', '%'))
with open('Makefile.in', 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
with open(auto_dir + '/Makefile', 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
for line in fh:
if not gen_files:
chk = re.sub(r'^GENFILES=', '', line)

View File

@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ def main():
if not re.match(r'^del', ans, flags=re.I):
die("Aborted")
cmd_chk(['git', 'tag', '-d', v_ver])
if os.path.isdir('patches/.git'):
cmd_chk(f"cd patches && git tag -d '{v_ver}'")
version = re.sub(r'[-.]*pre[-.]*', 'pre', version)
if 'pre' in version and not curversion.endswith('dev'):
@@ -193,7 +195,9 @@ About to:
with open(fn, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
old_txt = txt = fh.read()
if fn == 'version.h':
txt = f'#define RSYNC_VERSION "{version}"\n'
x_re = re.compile(r'^(#define RSYNC_VERSION).*', re.M)
msg = f"Unable to update RSYNC_VERSION in {fn}"
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, r'\1 "%s"' % version, txt, msg)
elif '.spec' in fn:
for var, val in specvars.items():
x_re = re.compile(r'^%s .*' % re.escape(var), re.M)
@@ -206,10 +210,10 @@ About to:
txt = replace_or_die(x_re, repl, txt, f"Unable to find SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION define in {fn}")
elif fn == 'NEWS.md':
efv = re.escape(finalversion)
x_re = re.compile(r'^<.+>\s+# NEWS for rsync %s \(UNRELEASED\)\s+## Changes in this version:\n' % efv
x_re = re.compile(r'^# NEWS for rsync %s \(UNRELEASED\)\s+## Changes in this version:\n' % efv
+ r'(\n### PROTOCOL NUMBER:\s+- The protocol number was changed to \d+\.\n)?')
rel_day = 'UNRELEASED' if pre else today
repl = (f'<a name="{finalversion}"></a>\n\n# NEWS for rsync {finalversion} ({rel_day})\n\n'
repl = (f'# NEWS for rsync {finalversion} ({rel_day})\n\n'
+ '## Changes in this version:\n')
if proto_changed:
repl += f'\n### PROTOCOL NUMBER:\n\n - The protocol number was changed to {protocol_version}.\n'
@@ -230,7 +234,7 @@ About to:
cmd_chk(['packaging/year-tweak'])
print(dash_line)
cmd_run("git diff --color | less -p '^diff .*'")
cmd_run("git diff".split())
srctar_name = f"{rsync_ver}.tar.gz"
pattar_name = f"rsync-patches-{version}.tar.gz"
@@ -245,20 +249,20 @@ About to:
About to:
- git commit all changes
- generate the manpages
- run a full build, ensuring that the manpages & configure.sh are up-to-date
- merge the {args.master_branch} branch into the patch/{args.master_branch}/* branches
- update the files in the "patches" dir and OPTIONALLY (if you type 'y') to
run patch-update with the --make option (which opens a shell on error)
""")
ans = input("<Press Enter OR 'y' to continue> ")
s = cmd_run(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f'Preparing for release of {version}'])
s = cmd_run(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f'Preparing for release of {version} [buildall]'])
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting')
cmd_chk('make gen')
cmd_chk('touch configure.ac && packaging/smart-make && make gen')
print(f'Creating any missing patch branches.')
print('Creating any missing patch branches.')
s = cmd_run(f'packaging/branch-from-patch --branch={args.master_branch} --add-missing')
if s.returncode:
die('Aborting')
@@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ About to:
md_files = 'README.md NEWS.md INSTALL.md'.split()
html_files = [ fn for fn in gen_pathnames if fn.endswith('.html') ]
cmd_chk(['rsync', '-a', *md_files, *html_files, dest])
cmd_chk(["./md-convert"] + [ dest +'/'+ fn for fn in md_files ])
cmd_chk(["./md-convert", "--dest", dest, *md_files])
cmd_chk(f"git log --name-status | gzip -9 >{dest}/ChangeLog.gz")

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Documentation=man:rsync(1) man:rsyncd.conf(5)
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/bin/rsync --daemon --no-detach
RestartSec=1
Restart=on-failure
# Citing README.md:
#

View File

@@ -36,9 +36,15 @@ int poptDupArgv(int argc, const char **argv,
dst += (argc + 1) * sizeof(*argv);
/*@-branchstate@*/
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
argv2[i] = dst;
dst += strlcpy(dst, argv[i], nb) + 1;
{
char * const end_buf = (char *)argv2 + nb;
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
argv2[i] = dst;
/* nb is the TOTAL buffer size, not the remaining bytes; use the
* remaining bytes from dst to end_buf so glibc 2.39+ fortified
* strlcpy doesn't trip __bos() and abort. */
dst += strlcpy(dst, argv[i], end_buf - dst) + 1;
}
}
/*@=branchstate@*/
argv2[argc] = NULL;

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
#
# build build the config files [the default w/no arg]
# fetch fetch the latest dev autoconfig files
# fetchgen fetch all the latest dev generated files (including man pages)
# fetchgen fetch all the latest dev generated files (including manpages)
# fetchSRC fetch the latest dev source files [NON-GENERATED FILES]
#
# The script stops after the first successful action.

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996-2000 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2003-2020 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -115,13 +115,13 @@ static void rprint_progress(OFF_T ofs, OFF_T size, struct timeval *now, int is_l
units = "kB/s";
}
if (remain < 0)
if (remain < 0 || remain > 9999.0 * 3600.0)
strlcpy(rembuf, " ??:??:??", sizeof rembuf);
else {
snprintf(rembuf, sizeof rembuf, "%4d:%02d:%02d",
(int) (remain / 3600.0),
(int) (remain / 60.0) % 60,
(int) remain % 60);
snprintf(rembuf, sizeof rembuf, "%4u:%02u:%02u",
(unsigned int) (remain / 3600.0),
(unsigned int) (remain / 60.0) % 60,
(unsigned int) remain % 60);
}
output_needs_newline = 0;

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1996-2000 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ extern int inplace;
extern int inplace_partial;
extern int allowed_lull;
extern int delay_updates;
extern int xfersum_type;
extern BOOL want_progress_now;
extern mode_t orig_umask;
extern struct stats stats;
@@ -67,6 +66,11 @@ extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
extern OFF_T preallocated_len;
extern int fuzzy_basis;
extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
extern int xfer_sum_len;
extern int use_secure_symlinks;
static struct bitbag *delayed_bits = NULL;
static int phase = 0, redoing = 0;
@@ -211,7 +215,12 @@ int open_tmpfile(char *fnametmp, const char *fname, struct file_struct *file)
* access to ensure that there is no race condition. They will be
* correctly updated after the right owner and group info is set.
* (Thanks to snabb@epipe.fi for pointing this out.) */
fd = do_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
/* When use_secure_symlinks is on (non-chroot daemon with munge_symlinks),
* use secure_mkstemp to prevent symlink race attacks on parent directories. */
if (use_secure_symlinks)
fd = secure_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
else
fd = do_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
#if 0
/* In most cases parent directories will already exist because their
@@ -240,7 +249,6 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
static char file_sum1[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
struct map_struct *mapbuf;
struct sum_struct sum;
int sum_len;
int32 len;
OFF_T total_size = F_LENGTH(file);
OFF_T offset = 0;
@@ -280,7 +288,7 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
} else
mapbuf = NULL;
sum_init(xfersum_type, checksum_seed);
sum_init(xfer_sum_nni, checksum_seed);
if (append_mode > 0) {
OFF_T j;
@@ -310,7 +318,12 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
}
}
while ((i = recv_token(f_in, &data)) != 0) {
while (1) {
data = NULL;
i = recv_token(f_in, &data);
if (i == 0)
break;
if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
show_progress(offset, total_size);
@@ -318,6 +331,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
maybe_send_keepalive(time(NULL), MSK_ALLOW_FLUSH | MSK_ACTIVE_RECEIVER);
if (i > 0) {
if (!data) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid literal token with no data [%s]\n", who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
rprintf(FINFO,"data recv %d at %s\n",
i, big_num(offset));
@@ -335,6 +352,11 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
}
i = -(i+1);
if (i < 0 || i >= sum.count) {
rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid block index %d (count=%ld) [%s]\n",
i, (long)sum.count, who_am_i());
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
offset2 = i * (OFF_T)sum.blength;
len = sum.blength;
if (i == (int)sum.count-1 && sum.remainder != 0)
@@ -393,7 +415,7 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
end_progress(total_size);
sum_len = sum_end(file_sum1);
sum_end(file_sum1);
if (do_fsync && fd != -1 && fsync(fd) != 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "fsync failed on %s", full_fname(fname));
@@ -403,10 +425,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
if (mapbuf)
unmap_file(mapbuf);
read_buf(f_in, sender_file_sum, sum_len);
read_buf(f_in, sender_file_sum, xfer_sum_len);
if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 2))
rprintf(FINFO,"got file_sum\n");
if (fd != -1 && memcmp(file_sum1, sender_file_sum, sum_len) != 0)
if (fd != -1 && memcmp(file_sum1, sender_file_sum, xfer_sum_len) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -434,14 +456,13 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
}
/* We don't use robust_rename() here because the
* partial-dir must be on the same drive. */
if (do_rename(partialptr, fname) < 0) {
if (do_rename_at(partialptr, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"rename failed for %s (from %s)",
full_fname(fname), partialptr);
} else {
if (remove_source_files
|| (preserve_hard_links && F_IS_HLINKED(file)))
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
if (remove_source_files || (preserve_hard_links && F_IS_HLINKED(file)))
send_msg_success(fname, ndx);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
}
@@ -451,7 +472,10 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
{
struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
struct file_struct *file;
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
@@ -551,6 +575,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
progress_init();
while (1) {
const char *basedir = NULL;
cleanup_disable();
/* This call also sets cur_flist. */
@@ -586,6 +612,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
else
file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
@@ -593,10 +621,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
&& check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
fname);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
}
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
@@ -695,7 +726,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
if (!am_server)
discard_receive_data(f_in, file);
if (inc_recurse)
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
send_msg_success(fname, ndx);
continue;
}
@@ -713,28 +744,34 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
break;
case FNAMECMP_FUZZY:
if (fuzzy_basis == 0) {
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious fuzzy operation for %s\n", xname);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (file->dirname) {
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
} else
fnamecmp = xname;
basedir = file->dirname;
}
fnamecmp = xname;
break;
default:
if (fnamecmp_type > FNAMECMP_FUZZY && fnamecmp_type-FNAMECMP_FUZZY <= basis_dir_cnt) {
fnamecmp_type -= FNAMECMP_FUZZY + 1;
if (file->dirname) {
stringjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], "/", file->dirname, "/", xname, NULL);
} else
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], xname);
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], file->dirname);
basedir = fnamecmpbuf;
} else {
basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type];
}
fnamecmp = xname;
} else if (fnamecmp_type >= basis_dir_cnt) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"invalid basis_dir index: %d.\n",
fnamecmp_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
} else
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], fname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
} else {
basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type];
fnamecmp = fname;
}
break;
}
if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head
@@ -757,25 +794,31 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
}
/* open the file */
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
if (fnamecmp != fname) {
fnamecmp = fname;
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY);
}
if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
/* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
basis_dir[0], fname);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
basedir = basis_dir[0];
fnamecmp = fname;
fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_LOW;
fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
}
}
if (basedir) {
// for the following code we need the full
// path name as a single string
pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basedir, fnamecmp);
fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
}
one_inplace = inplace_partial && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR;
updating_basis_or_equiv = one_inplace
|| (inplace && (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP));
@@ -808,14 +851,16 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
continue;
}
if (fd1 != -1 && !(S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)))) {
if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
if (fd1 != -1 && st.st_size == 0)
st.st_size = get_device_size(fd1, fname);
/* Mark the file entry as a device so that we don't try to truncate it later on. */
file->mode = S_IFBLK | (file->mode & ACCESSPERMS);
} else if (fd1 != -1 && !(S_ISREG(st.st_mode))) {
close(fd1);
fd1 = -1;
}
if (fd1 != -1 && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode) && st.st_size == 0)
st.st_size = get_device_size(fd1, fname);
/* If we're not preserving permissions, change the file-list's
* mode based on the local permissions and some heuristics. */
if (!preserve_perms) {
@@ -834,11 +879,21 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
/* We now check to see if we are writing the file "inplace" */
if (inplace || one_inplace) {
fnametmp = one_inplace ? partialptr : fname;
fd2 = do_open(fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
/* When use_secure_symlinks is on (non-chroot daemon),
* use secure open to prevent symlink race attacks where an
* attacker could switch a directory to a symlink between
* path validation and file open. */
if (use_secure_symlinks)
fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
else
fd2 = do_open(fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
#ifdef linux
if (fd2 == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
/* Maybe the error was due to protected_regular setting? */
fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
if (use_secure_symlinks)
fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
else
fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
}
#endif
if (fd2 == -1) {
@@ -890,7 +945,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
recv_ok = -1;
else if (fnamecmp == partialptr) {
if (!one_inplace)
do_unlink(partialptr);
do_unlink_at(partialptr);
handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
}
} else if (keep_partial && partialptr && (!one_inplace || delay_updates)) {
@@ -899,7 +954,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
"Unable to create partial-dir for %s -- discarding %s.\n",
local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, NULL),
recv_ok ? "completed file" : "partial file");
do_unlink(fnametmp);
do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
recv_ok = -1;
} else if (!finish_transfer(partialptr, fnametmp, fnamecmp, NULL,
file, recv_ok, !partial_dir))
@@ -910,7 +965,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
} else
partialptr = NULL;
} else if (!one_inplace)
do_unlink(fnametmp);
do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
cleanup_disable();
@@ -921,9 +976,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remove_source_files || inc_recurse
|| (preserve_hard_links && F_IS_HLINKED(file)))
send_msg_int(MSG_SUCCESS, ndx);
if (remove_source_files || inc_recurse || (preserve_hard_links && F_IS_HLINKED(file)))
send_msg_success(fname, ndx);
break;
case 0: {
enum logcode msgtype = redoing ? FERROR_XFER : FWARNING;

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
# NAME
## NAME
rsync-ssl - a helper script for connecting to an ssl rsync daemon
# SYNOPSIS
## SYNOPSIS
```
rsync-ssl [--type=SSL_TYPE] RSYNC_ARGS
```
# DESCRIPTION
The online version of this manpage (that includes cross-linking of topics)
is available at <https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/rsync-ssl.1>.
## DESCRIPTION
The rsync-ssl script helps you to run an rsync copy to/from an rsync daemon
that requires ssl connections.
@@ -20,7 +23,7 @@ environment. You can specify an overriding port via `--port` or by including
it in the normal spot in the URL format, though both of those require your
rsync version to be at least 3.2.0.
# OPTIONS
## OPTIONS
If the **first** arg is a `--type=SSL_TYPE` option, the script will only use
that particular program to open an ssl connection instead of trying to find an
@@ -32,35 +35,56 @@ required for this particular option.
All the other options are passed through to the rsync command, so consult the
**rsync**(1) manpage for more information on how it works.
# ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
## ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
The ssl helper scripts are affected by the following environment variables:
0. `RSYNC_SSL_TYPE` Specifies the program type that should be used to open the
ssl connection. It must be one of `openssl` or `stunnel`. The
`--type=SSL_TYPE` option overrides this, when specified.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_PORT` If specified, the value is the port number that is used as
the default when the user does not specify a port in their rsync command.
When not specified, the default port number is 874. (Note that older rsync
versions (prior to 3.2.0) did not communicate an overriding port number
value to the helper script.)
0. `RSYNC_SSL_CERT` If specified, the value is a filename that contains a
certificate to use for the connection.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_KEY` If specified, the value is a filename that contains a
key for the provided certificate to use for the connection.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_CA_CERT` If specified, the value is a filename that contains a
certificate authority certificate that is used to validate the connection.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_OPENSSL` Specifies the openssl executable to run when the
connection type is set to openssl. If unspecified, the $PATH is searched
for "openssl".
0. `RSYNC_SSL_GNUTLS` Specifies the gnutls-cli executable to run when the
connection type is set to gnutls. If unspecified, the $PATH is searched
for "gnutls-cli".
0. `RSYNC_SSL_STUNNEL` Specifies the stunnel executable to run when the
connection type is set to stunnel. If unspecified, the $PATH is searched
first for "stunnel4" and then for "stunnel".
0. `RSYNC_SSL_TYPE`
# EXAMPLES
Specifies the program type that should be used to open the ssl connection.
It must be one of `openssl` or `stunnel`. The `--type=SSL_TYPE` option
overrides this, when specified.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_PORT`
If specified, the value is the port number that is used as the default when
the user does not specify a port in their rsync command. When not
specified, the default port number is 874. (Note that older rsync versions
(prior to 3.2.0) did not communicate an overriding port number value to the
helper script.)
0. `RSYNC_SSL_CERT`
If specified, the value is a filename that contains a certificate to use
for the connection.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_KEY`
If specified, the value is a filename that contains a key for the provided
certificate to use for the connection.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_CA_CERT`
If specified, the value is a filename that contains a certificate authority
certificate that is used to validate the connection.
0. `RSYNC_SSL_OPENSSL`
Specifies the openssl executable to run when the connection type is set to
openssl. If unspecified, the $PATH is searched for "openssl".
0. `RSYNC_SSL_GNUTLS`
Specifies the gnutls-cli executable to run when the connection type is set
to gnutls. If unspecified, the $PATH is searched for "gnutls-cli".
0. `RSYNC_SSL_STUNNEL`
Specifies the stunnel executable to run when the connection type is set to
stunnel. If unspecified, the $PATH is searched first for "stunnel4" and
then for "stunnel".
## EXAMPLES
> rsync-ssl -aiv example.com::mod/ dest
@@ -70,11 +94,16 @@ The ssl helper scripts are affected by the following environment variables:
> rsync-ssl -aiv rsync://example.com:9874/mod/ dest
# SEE ALSO
## THE SERVER SIDE
**rsync**(1), **rsyncd.conf**(5)
For help setting up an SSL/TLS supporting rsync, see the [instructions in
rsyncd.conf](rsyncd.conf.5#SSL_TLS_Daemon_Setup).
# CAVEATS
## SEE ALSO
[**rsync**(1)](rsync.1), [**rsyncd.conf**(5)](rsyncd.conf.5)
## CAVEATS
Note that using an stunnel connection requires at least version 4 of stunnel,
which should be the case on modern systems. Also, it does not verify a
@@ -87,23 +116,23 @@ release the gnutls-cli command was dropping output, making it unusable. If
that bug has been fixed in your version, feel free to put gnutls into an
exported RSYNC_SSL_TYPE environment variable to make its use the default.
# BUGS
## BUGS
Please report bugs! See the web site at <https://rsync.samba.org/>.
# VERSION
## VERSION
This man page is current for version @VERSION@ of rsync.
This manpage is current for version @VERSION@ of rsync.
# CREDITS
## CREDITS
rsync is distributed under the GNU General Public License. See the file
COPYING for details.
Rsync is distributed under the GNU General Public License. See the file
[COPYING](COPYING) for details.
A web site is available at <https://rsync.samba.org/>. The site includes an
FAQ-O-Matic which may cover questions unanswered by this manual page.
# AUTHOR
## AUTHOR
This manpage was written by Wayne Davison.

2854
rsync.1.md
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

17
rsync.c
View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -437,7 +437,10 @@ int read_ndx_and_attrs(int f_in, int f_out, int *iflag_ptr, uchar *type_ptr, cha
*/
void free_sums(struct sum_struct *s)
{
if (s->sums) free(s->sums);
if (s->sums) {
free(s->sums);
free(s->sum2_array);
}
free(s);
}
@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
if (am_root >= 0) {
uid_t uid = change_uid ? (uid_t)F_OWNER(file) : sxp->st.st_uid;
gid_t gid = change_gid ? (gid_t)F_GROUP(file) : sxp->st.st_gid;
if (do_lchown(fname, uid, gid) != 0) {
if (do_lchown_at(fname, uid, gid) != 0) {
/* We shouldn't have attempted to change uid
* or gid unless have the privilege. */
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "%s %s failed",
@@ -642,7 +645,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
#ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS
/* It's OK to call set_acl() now, even for a dir, as the generator
* will enable owner-writability using chmod, if necessary.
*
*
* If set_acl() changes permission bits in the process of setting
* an access ACL, it changes sxp->st.st_mode so we know whether we
* need to chmod(). */
@@ -654,7 +657,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
#ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
if (!BITS_EQUAL(sxp->st.st_mode, new_mode, CHMOD_BITS)) {
int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod(fname, new_mode);
int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod_at(fname, new_mode);
if (ret < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"failed to set permissions on %s",
@@ -755,7 +758,7 @@ int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
if (!partialptr || (ret == -2 && temp_copy_name)
|| robust_rename(fnametmp, partialptr, NULL, file->mode) < 0)
do_unlink(fnametmp);
do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
return 0;
}
if (ret == 0) {
@@ -771,7 +774,7 @@ int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
ok_to_set_time ? ATTRS_ACCURATE_TIME : ATTRS_SKIP_MTIME | ATTRS_SKIP_ATIME | ATTRS_SKIP_CRTIME);
if (temp_copy_name) {
if (do_rename(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
if (do_rename_at(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\"",
full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
return 0;

68
rsync.h
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 1996, 2000 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -18,11 +18,6 @@
* with this program; if not, visit the http://fsf.org website.
*/
/* a non-zero CHAR_OFFSET makes the rolling sum stronger, but is
incompatible with older versions :-( */
#define CHAR_OFFSET 0
#ifndef AVX2_ASM /* do not include the rest of file for assembly */
#define False 0
#define True 1
#define Unset (-1) /* Our BOOL values are always an int. */
@@ -43,6 +38,9 @@
#define BACKUP_SUFFIX "~"
/* a non-zero CHAR_OFFSET makes the rolling sum stronger, but is
incompatible with older versions :-( */
#define CHAR_OFFSET 0
/* These flags are only used during the flist transfer. */
@@ -86,6 +84,7 @@
#define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */
#define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */
#define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
#define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
#define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
#define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */
@@ -164,6 +163,29 @@
/* For compatibility with older rsyncs */
#define OLD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ((int32)1 << 29)
/* Policy ceilings on attacker-controlled wire values. Picked well above any
* legitimate filesystem / protocol traffic but well below sizes that could
* cause integer overflow or DoS-grade allocations. See input_checking.txt.
*
* Note on MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN: xattr datum size is bounded only by the
* wire-format maximum (signed int32 varint, ~2GB). macOS resource forks
* are transferred as the com.apple.ResourceFork xattr and can legitimately
* be many GB; --max-alloc (default 1GB, configurable) is the real
* allocation cap. read_varint_size() still rejects negative values so a
* hostile peer cannot wrap to ~SIZE_MAX. */
#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_COUNT 65536
#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_NAMELEN 4096
#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN ((int32)0x7fffffff)
#define MAX_WIRE_ACL_COUNT 65536
#define MAX_WIRE_NSEC 999999999
/* MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT is the per-category cap for read_del_stats() in main.c,
* which accumulates 5 wire-supplied counts into the int32 stats.deleted_files
* accumulator. Capped at 2^28 so 5 * 2^28 = 1.34 GB stays under INT32_MAX
* (2.15 GB) with margin -- a higher cap (e.g. 2^30) would let a hostile peer
* supplying 3+ max-sized counts overflow the accumulator, which is signed-int
* UB. 2^28 is still well above any plausible real transfer's deletion count. */
#define MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT ((int32)1 << 28)
#define ROUND_UP_1024(siz) ((siz) & (1024-1) ? ((siz) | (1024-1)) + 1 : (siz))
#define IOERR_GENERAL (1<<0) /* For backward compatibility, this must == 1 */
@@ -340,6 +362,9 @@ enum delret {
# endif
# include <string.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_STRING_H
# include <bsd/string.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
#endif
@@ -365,16 +390,10 @@ enum delret {
#include <sys/socket.h>
#endif
#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#else
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#else
#endif
#include <time.h>
#endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
#include <fcntl.h>
@@ -825,6 +844,7 @@ extern int uid_ndx;
extern int gid_ndx;
extern int acls_ndx;
extern int xattrs_ndx;
extern int file_sum_extra_cnt;
#ifdef USE_FLEXIBLE_ARRAY
#define FILE_STRUCT_LEN (sizeof (struct file_struct))
@@ -835,7 +855,7 @@ extern int xattrs_ndx;
#define DEV_EXTRA_CNT 2
#define DIRNODE_EXTRA_CNT 3
#define EXTRA64_CNT ((sizeof (union file_extras64) + EXTRA_LEN - 1) / EXTRA_LEN)
#define SUM_EXTRA_CNT ((MAX_DIGEST_LEN + EXTRA_LEN - 1) / EXTRA_LEN)
#define SUM_EXTRA_CNT file_sum_extra_cnt
#define REQ_EXTRA(f,ndx) ((union file_extras*)(f) - (ndx))
#define OPT_EXTRA(f,bump) ((union file_extras*)(f) - file_extra_cnt - 1 - (bump))
@@ -962,12 +982,12 @@ struct sum_buf {
uint32 sum1; /**< simple checksum */
int32 chain; /**< next hash-table collision */
short flags; /**< flag bits */
char sum2[SUM_LENGTH]; /**< checksum */
};
struct sum_struct {
OFF_T flength; /**< total file length */
struct sum_buf *sums; /**< points to info for each chunk */
char *sum2_array; /**< checksums of length xfer_sum_len */
int32 count; /**< how many chunks */
int32 blength; /**< block_length */
int32 remainder; /**< flength % block_length */
@@ -986,6 +1006,8 @@ struct map_struct {
int status; /* first errno from read errors */
};
#define sum2_at(s, i) ((s)->sum2_array + ((size_t)(i) * xfer_sum_len))
#define NAME_IS_FILE (0) /* filter name as a file */
#define NAME_IS_DIR (1<<0) /* filter name as a dir */
#define NAME_IS_XATTR (1<<2) /* filter name as an xattr */
@@ -1022,6 +1044,7 @@ typedef struct filter_struct {
int slash_cnt;
struct filter_list_struct *mergelist;
} u;
uchar elide;
} filter_rule;
typedef struct filter_list_struct {
@@ -1161,19 +1184,23 @@ typedef struct {
#define NSTR_COMPRESS 1
struct name_num_item {
int num;
const char *name, *main_name;
int num, flags;
const char *name;
struct name_num_item *main_nni;
};
struct name_num_obj {
const char *type;
const char *negotiated_name;
struct name_num_item *negotiated_nni;
uchar *saw;
int saw_len;
int negotiated_num;
struct name_num_item list[10]; /* we'll get a compile error/warning if this is ever too small */
struct name_num_item *list;
};
#ifdef EXTERNAL_ZLIB
#define read_buf read_buf_
#endif
#ifndef __cplusplus
#include "proto.h"
#endif
@@ -1477,7 +1504,6 @@ const char *get_panic_action(void);
fprintf(stderr, "%s in %s at line %d\n", msg, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED); \
} while (0)
#endif /* AVX2_ASM */
#ifdef HAVE_MALLINFO2
#define MEM_ALLOC_INFO mallinfo2

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
# NAME
## NAME
rsyncd.conf - configuration file for rsync in daemon mode
# SYNOPSIS
## SYNOPSIS
rsyncd.conf
# DESCRIPTION
The online version of this manpage (that includes cross-linking of topics)
is available at <https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/rsyncd.conf.5>.
## DESCRIPTION
The rsyncd.conf file is the runtime configuration file for rsync when run as an
rsync daemon.
@@ -14,7 +17,7 @@ rsync daemon.
The rsyncd.conf file controls authentication, access, logging and available
modules.
# FILE FORMAT
## FILE FORMAT
The file consists of modules and parameters. A module begins with the name of
the module in square brackets and continues until the next module begins.
@@ -40,10 +43,9 @@ The values following the equals sign in parameters are all either a string (no
quotes needed) or a boolean, which may be given as yes/no, 0/1 or true/false.
Case is not significant in boolean values, but is preserved in string values.
# LAUNCHING THE RSYNC DAEMON
## LAUNCHING THE RSYNC DAEMON
The rsync daemon is launched by specifying the `--daemon` option to
rsync.
The rsync daemon is launched by specifying the `--daemon` option to rsync.
The daemon must run with root privileges if you wish to use chroot, to bind to
a port numbered under 1024 (as is the default 873), or to set file ownership.
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ reread its config file.
Note that you should **not** send the rsync daemon a HUP signal to force it to
reread the `rsyncd.conf` file. The file is re-read on each client connection.
# GLOBAL PARAMETERS
## GLOBAL PARAMETERS
The first parameters in the file (before a [module] header) are the global
parameters. Rsync also allows for the use of a "[global]" module name to
@@ -96,9 +98,9 @@ a literal % into a value is to use %%.
0. `motd file`
This parameter allows you to specify a "message of the day" to display to
clients on each connect. This usually contains site information and any
legal notices. The default is no motd file. This can be overridden by the
This parameter allows you to specify a "message of the day" (MOTD) to display
to clients on each connect. This usually contains site information and any
legal notices. The default is no MOTD file. This can be overridden by the
`--dparam=motdfile=FILE` command-line option when starting the daemon.
0. `pid file`
@@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ a literal % into a value is to use %%.
This parameter can provide endless fun for people who like to tune their
systems to the utmost degree. You can set all sorts of socket options which
may make transfers faster (or slower!). Read the man page for the
may make transfers faster (or slower!). Read the manpage for the
**setsockopt()** system call for details on some of the options you may be
able to set. By default no special socket options are set. These settings
can also be specified via the `--sockopts` command-line option.
@@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ a literal % into a value is to use %%.
You can override the default backlog value when the daemon listens for
connections. It defaults to 5.
# MODULE PARAMETERS
## MODULE PARAMETERS
After the global parameters you should define a number of modules, each module
exports a directory tree as a symbolic name. Modules are exported by specifying
@@ -162,6 +164,16 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
available in this module. You must specify this parameter for each module
in `rsyncd.conf`.
If the value contains a "/./" element then the path will be divided at that
point into a chroot dir and an inner-chroot subdir. If [`use chroot`](#)
is set to false, though, the extraneous dot dir is just cleaned out of the
path. An example of this idiom is:
> path = /var/rsync/./module1
This will (when chrooting) chroot to "/var/rsync" and set the inside-chroot
path to "/module1".
You may base the path's value off of an environment variable by surrounding
the variable name with percent signs. You can even reference a variable
that is set by rsync when the user connects. For example, this would use
@@ -177,7 +189,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
0. `use chroot`
If "use chroot" is true, the rsync daemon will chroot to the "path" before
If "use chroot" is true, the rsync daemon will chroot to the "[path](#)" before
starting the file transfer with the client. This has the advantage of
extra protection against possible implementation security holes, but it has
the disadvantages of requiring super-user privileges, of not being able to
@@ -185,30 +197,48 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
path, and of complicating the preservation of users and groups by name (see
below).
As an additional safety feature, you can specify a dot-dir in the module's
"path" to indicate the point where the chroot should occur. This allows
rsync to run in a chroot with a non-"/" path for the top of the transfer
hierarchy. Doing this guards against unintended library loading (since
those absolute paths will not be inside the transfer hierarchy unless you
have used an unwise pathname), and lets you setup libraries for the chroot
that are outside of the transfer. For example, specifying
"/var/rsync/./module1" will chroot to the "/var/rsync" directory and set
the inside-chroot path to "/module1". If you had omitted the dot-dir, the
chroot would have used the whole path, and the inside-chroot path would
have been "/".
If `use chroot` is not set, it defaults to trying to enable a chroot but
allows the daemon to continue (after logging a warning) if it fails. The
one exception to this is when a module's [`path`](#) has a "/./" chroot
divider in it -- this causes an unset value to be treated as true for that
module.
When both "use chroot" and "daemon chroot" are false, OR the inside-chroot
path of "use chroot" is not "/", rsync will: (1) munge symlinks by default
for security reasons (see "munge symlinks" for a way to turn this off, but
only if you trust your users), (2) substitute leading slashes in absolute
paths with the module's path (so that options such as `--backup-dir`,
`--compare-dest`, etc. interpret an absolute path as rooted in the module's
"path" dir), and (3) trim ".." path elements from args if rsync believes
they would escape the module hierarchy. The default for "use chroot" is
true, and is the safer choice (especially if the module is not read-only).
Prior to rsync 3.2.7, the default value was "true". The new "unset"
default makes it easier to setup an rsync daemon as a non-root user or to
run a daemon on a system where chroot fails. Explicitly setting the value
to "true" in rsyncd.conf will always require the chroot to succeed.
When this parameter is enabled *and* the "name converter" parameter is
*not* set, the "numeric ids" parameter will default to being enabled
It is also possible to specify a dot-dir in the module's "[path](#)" to
indicate that you want to chdir to the earlier part of the path and then
serve files from inside the latter part of the path (with sanitizing and
default symlink munging). This can be useful if you need some library dirs
inside the chroot (typically for uid & gid lookups) but don't want to put
the lib dir into the top of the served path (even though they can be hidden
with an [`exclude`](#) directive). However, a better choice for a modern
rsync setup is to use a [`name converter`](#)" and try to avoid inner lib
dirs altogether. See also the [`daemon chroot`](#) parameter, which causes
rsync to chroot into its own chroot area before doing any path-related
chrooting.
If the daemon is serving the "/" dir (either directly or due to being
chrooted to the module's path), rsync does not do any path sanitizing or
(default) munging.
When it has to limit access to a particular subdir (either due to chroot
being disabled or having an inside-chroot path set), rsync will munge
symlinks (by default) and sanitize paths. Those that dislike munged
symlinks (and really, really trust their users to not break out of the
subdir) can disable the symlink munging via the "[munge symlinks](#)"
parameter.
When rsync is sanitizing paths, it trims ".." path elements from args that
it believes would escape the module hierarchy. It also substitutes leading
slashes in absolute paths with the module's path (so that options such as
`--backup-dir` & `--compare-dest` interpret an absolute path as rooted in
the module's "[path](#)" dir).
When a chroot is in effect *and* the "[name converter](#)" parameter is
*not* set, the "[numeric ids](#)" parameter will default to being enabled
(disabling name lookups). This means that if you manually setup
name-lookup libraries in your chroot (instead of using a name converter)
that you need to explicitly set `numeric ids = false` for rsync to do name
@@ -217,16 +247,16 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
If you copy library resources into the module's chroot area, you should
protect them through your OS's normal user/group or ACL settings (to
prevent the rsync module's user from being able to change them), and then
hide them from the user's view via "exclude" (see how in the discussion of
hide them from the user's view via "[exclude](#)" (see how in the discussion of
that parameter). However, it's easier and safer to setup a name converter.
0. `daemon chroot`
This parameter specifies a path to which the daemon will chroot before
beginning communication with clients. Module paths (and any "use chroot"
beginning communication with clients. Module paths (and any "[use chroot](#)"
settings) will then be related to this one. This lets you choose if you
want the whole daemon to be chrooted (with this setting), just the
transfers to be chrooted (with "use chroot"), or both. Keep in mind that
transfers to be chrooted (with "[use chroot](#)"), or both. Keep in mind that
the "daemon chroot" area may need various OS/lib/etc files installed to
allow the daemon to function. By default the daemon runs without any
chrooting.
@@ -284,11 +314,11 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
transfer behave as if the client had passed the `--numeric-ids`
command-line option. By default, this parameter is enabled for chroot
modules and disabled for non-chroot modules. Also keep in mind that
uid/gid preservation requires the module to be running as root (see "uid")
or for "fake super" to be configured.
uid/gid preservation requires the module to be running as root (see "[uid](#)")
or for "[fake super](#)" to be configured.
A chroot-enabled module should not have this parameter set to false unless
you're using a "name converter" program *or* you've taken steps to ensure
you're using a "[name converter](#)" program *or* you've taken steps to ensure
that the module has the necessary resources it needs to translate names and
that it is not possible for a user to change those resources.
@@ -298,12 +328,12 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
(non-daemon-affecting) `--munge-links` command-line option (using a method
described below). This should help protect your files from user trickery
when your daemon module is writable. The default is disabled when
"use chroot" is on with an inside-chroot path of "/", OR if "daemon chroot"
"[use chroot](#)" is on with an inside-chroot path of "/", OR if "[daemon chroot](#)"
is on, otherwise it is enabled.
If you disable this parameter on a daemon that is not read-only, there are
tricks that a user can play with uploaded symlinks to access
daemon-excluded items (if your module has any), and, if "use chroot" is
daemon-excluded items (if your module has any), and, if "[use chroot](#)" is
off, rsync can even be tricked into showing or changing data that is
outside the module's path (as access-permissions allow).
@@ -324,7 +354,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
the source code named "munge-symlinks" that can be used to add or remove
this prefix from your symlinks.
When this parameter is disabled on a writable module and "use chroot" is
When this parameter is disabled on a writable module and "[use chroot](#)" is
off (or the inside-chroot path is not "/"), incoming symlinks will be
modified to drop a leading slash and to remove ".." path elements that
rsync believes will allow a symlink to escape the module's hierarchy.
@@ -340,10 +370,10 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
conversion in a chroot module without extra files in the chroot area, and
also ensures that name-translation is done in a consistent manner. If the
"charset" parameter is not set, the `--iconv` option is refused, just as if
"iconv" had been specified via "refuse options".
"iconv" had been specified via "[refuse options](#)".
If you wish to force users to always use `--iconv` for a particular module,
add "no-iconv" to the "refuse options" parameter. Keep in mind that this
add "no-iconv" to the "[refuse options](#)" parameter. Keep in mind that this
will restrict access to your module to very new rsync clients.
0. `max connections`
@@ -352,7 +382,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
connections you will allow. Any clients connecting when the maximum has
been reached will receive a message telling them to try later. The default
is 0, which means no limit. A negative value disables the module. See
also the "lock file" parameter.
also the "[lock file](#)" parameter.
0. `log file`
@@ -381,7 +411,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
facility name which is defined on your system. Common names are auth,
authpriv, cron, daemon, ftp, kern, lpr, mail, news, security, syslog, user,
uucp, local0, local1, local2, local3, local4, local5, local6 and local7.
The default is daemon. This setting has no effect if the "log file"
The default is daemon. This setting has no effect if the "[log file](#)"
setting is a non-empty string (either set in the per-modules settings, or
inherited from the global settings).
@@ -389,7 +419,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter allows you to specify the syslog tag to use when logging
messages from the rsync daemon. The default is "rsyncd". This setting has
no effect if the "log file" setting is a non-empty string (either set in
no effect if the "[log file](#)" setting is a non-empty string (either set in
the per-modules settings, or inherited from the global settings).
For example, if you wanted each authenticated user's name to be included in
@@ -414,7 +444,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
0. `lock file`
This parameter specifies the file to use to support the "max connections"
This parameter specifies the file to use to support the "[max connections](#)"
parameter. The rsync daemon uses record locking on this file to ensure that
the max connections limit is not exceeded for the modules sharing the lock
file. The default is `/var/run/rsyncd.lock`.
@@ -426,7 +456,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
"read only" is false then uploads will be possible if file permissions on
the daemon side allow them. The default is for all modules to be read only.
Note that "auth users" can override this setting on a per-user basis.
Note that "[auth users](#)" can override this setting on a per-user basis.
0. `write only`
@@ -460,8 +490,8 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter determines whether this module is listed when the client
asks for a listing of available modules. In addition, if this is false,
the daemon will pretend the module does not exist when a client denied by
"hosts allow" or "hosts deny" attempts to access it. Realize that if
"reverse lookup" is disabled globally but enabled for the module, the
"[hosts allow](#)" or "[hosts deny](#)" attempts to access it. Realize that if
"[reverse lookup](#)" is disabled globally but enabled for the module, the
resulting reverse lookup to a potentially client-controlled DNS server may
still reveal to the client that it hit an existing module. The default is
for modules to be listable.
@@ -470,10 +500,10 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter specifies the user name or user ID that file transfers to
and from that module should take place as when the daemon was run as root.
In combination with the "gid" parameter this determines what file
In combination with the "[gid](#)" parameter this determines what file
permissions are available. The default when run by a super-user is to
switch to the system's "nobody" user. The default for a non-super-user is
to not try to change the user. See also the "gid" parameter.
to not try to change the user. See also the "[gid](#)" parameter.
The RSYNC_USER_NAME environment variable may be used to request that rsync
run as the authorizing user. For example, if you want a rsync to run as
@@ -489,7 +519,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
accessing the module. The first one will be the default group, and any
extra ones be set as supplemental groups. You may also specify a "`*`" as
the first gid in the list, which will be replaced by all the normal groups
for the transfer's user (see "uid"). The default when run by a super-user
for the transfer's user (see "[uid](#)"). The default when run by a super-user
is to switch to your OS's "nobody" (or perhaps "nogroup") group with no
other supplementary groups. The default for a non-super-user is to not
change any group attributes (and indeed, your OS may not allow a
@@ -505,13 +535,13 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter specifies a uid under which the daemon will run. The daemon
usually runs as user root, and when this is left unset the user is left
unchanged. See also the "uid" parameter.
unchanged. See also the "[uid](#)" parameter.
0. `daemon gid`
This parameter specifies a gid under which the daemon will run. The daemon
usually runs as group root, and when this is left unset, the group is left
unchanged. See also the "gid" parameter.
unchanged. See also the "[gid](#)" parameter.
0. `fake super`
@@ -532,8 +562,8 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
or tampering with private administrative files, such as files you may add
to support uid/gid name translations.
The daemon filter chain is built from the "filter", "include from",
"include", "exclude from", and "exclude" parameters, in that order of
The daemon filter chain is built from the "filter", "[include from](#)",
"[include](#)", "[exclude from](#)", and "[exclude](#)" parameters, in that order of
priority. Anchored patterns are anchored at the root of the module. To
prevent access to an entire subtree, for example, "`/secret`", you **must**
exclude everything in the subtree; the easiest way to do this is with a
@@ -560,8 +590,8 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
0. `include`
Use an "include" to override the effects of the "exclude" parameter. Only
one "include" parameter can apply to a given module. See the "filter"
Use an "include" to override the effects of the "[exclude](#)" parameter. Only
one "include" parameter can apply to a given module. See the "[filter](#)"
parameter for a description of how excluded files affect the daemon.
0. `exclude from`
@@ -569,14 +599,14 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter specifies the name of a file on the daemon that contains
daemon exclude patterns, one per line. Only one "exclude from" parameter
can apply to a given module; if you have multiple exclude-from files, you
can specify them as a merge file in the "filter" parameter. See the
"filter" parameter for a description of how excluded files affect the
can specify them as a merge file in the "[filter](#)" parameter. See the
"[filter](#)" parameter for a description of how excluded files affect the
daemon.
0. `include from`
Analogue of "exclude from" for a file of daemon include patterns. Only one
"include from" parameter can apply to a given module. See the "filter"
Analogue of "[exclude from](#)" for a file of daemon include patterns. Only one
"include from" parameter can apply to a given module. See the "[filter](#)"
parameter for a description of how excluded files affect the daemon.
0. `incoming chmod`
@@ -611,7 +641,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
to supply a username and password to connect to the module. A challenge
response authentication protocol is used for this exchange. The plain text
usernames and passwords are stored in the file specified by the
"secrets file" parameter. The default is for all users to be able to
"[secrets file](#)" parameter. The default is for all users to be able to
connect without a password (this is called "anonymous rsync").
In addition to username matching, you can specify groupname matching via a
@@ -623,7 +653,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
Finally, options may be specified after a colon (:). The options allow you
to "deny" a user or a group, set the access to "ro" (read-only), or set the
access to "rw" (read/write). Setting an auth-rule-specific ro/rw setting
overrides the module's "read only" setting.
overrides the module's "[read only](#)" setting.
Be sure to put the rules in the order you want them to be matched, because
the checking stops at the first matching user or group, and that is the
@@ -661,7 +691,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter specifies the name of a file that contains the
username:password and/or @groupname:password pairs used for authenticating
this module. This file is only consulted if the "auth users" parameter is
this module. This file is only consulted if the "[auth users](#)" parameter is
specified. The file is line-based and contains one name:password pair per
line. Any line has a hash (#) as the very first character on the line is
considered a comment and is skipped. The passwords can contain any
@@ -675,14 +705,14 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
"@groupname:password" line for the group that triggered the authentication.
It is up to you what kind of password entries you want to include, either
users, groups, or both. The use of group rules in "auth users" does not
users, groups, or both. The use of group rules in "[auth users](#)" does not
require that you specify a group password if you do not want to use shared
passwords.
There is no default for the "secrets file" parameter, you must choose a
name (such as `/etc/rsyncd.secrets`). The file must normally not be
readable by "other"; see "strict modes". If the file is not found or is
rejected, no logins for a "user auth" module will be possible.
readable by "other"; see "[strict modes](#)". If the file is not found or is
rejected, no logins for an "[auth users](#)" module will be possible.
0. `strict modes`
@@ -714,11 +744,11 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
addresses which match the masked IP address will be allowed in.
- a hostname pattern using wildcards. If the hostname of the connecting IP
(as determined by a reverse lookup) matches the wildcarded name (using
the same rules as normal unix filename matching), the client is allowed
in. This only works if "reverse lookup" is enabled (the default).
the same rules as normal Unix filename matching), the client is allowed
in. This only works if "[reverse lookup](#)" is enabled (the default).
- a hostname. A plain hostname is matched against the reverse DNS of the
connecting IP (if "reverse lookup" is enabled), and/or the IP of the
given hostname is matched against the connecting IP (if "forward lookup"
connecting IP (if "[reverse lookup](#)" is enabled), and/or the IP of the
given hostname is matched against the connecting IP (if "[forward lookup](#)"
is enabled, as it is by default). Any match will be allowed in.
- an '@' followed by a netgroup name, which will match if the reverse DNS
of the connecting IP is in the specified netgroup.
@@ -730,11 +760,11 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
> fe80::%link1/64
> fe80::%link1/ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff::
You can also combine "hosts allow" with "hosts deny" as a way to add
You can also combine "hosts allow" with "[hosts deny](#)" as a way to add
exceptions to your deny list. When both parameters are specified, the
"hosts allow" parameter is checked first and a match results in the client
being able to connect. A non-allowed host is then matched against the
"hosts deny" list to see if it should be rejected. A host that does not
"[hosts deny](#)" list to see if it should be rejected. A host that does not
match either list is allowed to connect.
The default is no "hosts allow" parameter, which means all hosts can
@@ -745,7 +775,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
This parameter allows you to specify a list of comma- and/or
whitespace-separated patterns that are matched against a connecting clients
hostname and IP address. If the pattern matches then the connection is
rejected. See the "hosts allow" parameter for more information.
rejected. See the "[hosts allow](#)" parameter for more information.
The default is no "hosts deny" parameter, which means all hosts can
connect.
@@ -753,8 +783,8 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
0. `reverse lookup`
Controls whether the daemon performs a reverse lookup on the client's IP
address to determine its hostname, which is used for "hosts allow" &
"hosts deny" checks and the "%h" log escape. This is enabled by default,
address to determine its hostname, which is used for "[hosts allow](#)" &
"[hosts deny](#)" checks and the "%h" log escape. This is enabled by default,
but you may wish to disable it to save time if you know the lookup will not
return a useful result, in which case the daemon will use the name
"UNDETERMINED" instead.
@@ -794,7 +824,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
logs the transfer at the end, so if a transfer is aborted, no mention will
be made in the log file.
If you want to customize the log lines, see the "log format" parameter.
If you want to customize the log lines, see the "[log format](#)" parameter.
0. `log format`
@@ -811,7 +841,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
(e.g. "`%''l %'b %f`").
The default log format is "`%o %h [%a] %m (%u) %f %l`", and a "`%t [%p] `"
is always prefixed when using the "log file" parameter. (A perl script
is always prefixed when using the "[log file](#)" parameter. (A perl script
that will summarize this default log format is included in the rsync source
code distribution in the "support" subdirectory: rsyncstats.)
@@ -892,7 +922,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
> refuse options = * !a !v !compress*
Don't worry that the "`*`" will refuse certain vital options such as
`--dry-run`, `--server`, `--no-iconv`, `--protect-args`, etc. These
`--dry-run`, `--server`, `--no-iconv`, `--seclude-args`, etc. These
important options are not matched by wild-card, so they must be overridden
by their exact name. For instance, if you're forcing iconv transfers you
could use something like this:
@@ -922,7 +952,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
> refuse options = * !a !delete* delete-after
A note on refusing "compress": it may be better to set the "dont compress"
A note on refusing "compress": it may be better to set the "[dont compress](#)"
daemon parameter to "`*`" and ensure that `RSYNC_COMPRESS_LIST=zlib` is set
in the environment of the daemon in order to disable compression silently
instead of returning an error that forces the client to remove the `-z`
@@ -931,9 +961,10 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
If you are un-refusing the compress option, you may want to match
"`!compress*`" if you also want to allow the `--compress-level` option.
Note that the "write-devices" option is refused by default, but can be
explicitly accepted with "`!write-devices`". The options "log-file" and
"log-file-format" are forcibly refused and cannot be accepted.
Note that the "copy-devices" & "write-devices" options are refused by
default, but they can be explicitly accepted with "`!copy-devices`" and/or
"`!write-devices`". The options "log-file" and "log-file-format" are
forcibly refused and cannot be accepted.
Here are all the options that are not matched by wild-cards:
@@ -943,12 +974,12 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
receiver. While rsync passes the older alias `--log-format` for
compatibility reasons, this options should not be confused with
`--log-file-format`.
- `--sender`: Use "write only" parameter instead of refusing this.
- `--sender`: Use "[write only](#)" parameter instead of refusing this.
- `--dry-run`, `-n`: Who would want to disable this?
- `--protect-args`, `-s`: This actually makes transfers safer.
- `--seclude-args`, `-s`: Is the oldest arg-protection method.
- `--from0`, `-0`: Makes it easier to accept/refuse `--files-from` without
affecting this helpful modifier.
- `--iconv`: This is auto-disabled based on "charset" parameter.
- `--iconv`: This is auto-disabled based on "[charset](#)" parameter.
- `--no-iconv`: Most transfers use this option.
- `--checksum-seed`: Is a fairly rare, safe option.
- `--write-devices`: Is non-wild but also auto-disabled.
@@ -1038,7 +1069,7 @@ the values of parameters. See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
**system()** call's default shell), and use RSYNC_NO_XFER_EXEC to disable
both options completely.
# CONFIG DIRECTIVES
## CONFIG DIRECTIVES
There are currently two config directives available that allow a config file to
incorporate the contents of other files: `&include` and `&merge`. Both allow
@@ -1093,7 +1124,7 @@ This would merge any `/etc/rsyncd.d/*.inc` files (for global values that should
stay in effect), and then include any `/etc/rsyncd.d/*.conf` files (defining
modules without any global-value cross-talk).
# AUTHENTICATION STRENGTH
## AUTHENTICATION STRENGTH
The authentication protocol used in rsync is a 128 bit MD4 based challenge
response system. This is fairly weak protection, though (with at least one
@@ -1108,18 +1139,18 @@ authentication is provided. Use ssh as the transport if you want encryption.
You can also make use of SSL/TLS encryption if you put rsync behind an
SSL proxy.
# SSL/TLS Daemon Setup
## SSL/TLS Daemon Setup
When setting up an rsync daemon for access via SSL/TLS, you will need to
configure a proxy (such as haproxy or nginx) as the front-end that handles the
encryption.
configure a TCP proxy (such as haproxy or nginx) as the front-end that handles
the encryption.
- You should limit the access to the backend-rsyncd port to only allow the
proxy to connect. If it is on the same host as the proxy, then configuring
it to only listen on localhost is a good idea.
- You should consider turning on the `proxy protocol` parameter if your proxy
supports sending that information. The examples below assume that this is
enabled.
- You should consider turning on the `proxy protocol` rsync-daemon parameter if
your proxy supports sending that information. The examples below assume that
this is enabled.
An example haproxy setup is as follows:
@@ -1146,14 +1177,14 @@ An example nginx proxy setup is as follows:
> ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/example.com/privkey.pem;
>
> proxy_pass localhost:873;
> proxy_protocol on; # Requires "proxy protocol = true"
> proxy_protocol on; # Requires rsyncd.conf "proxy protocol = true"
> proxy_timeout 1m;
> proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
> }
> }
> ```
# EXAMPLES
## DAEMON CONFIG EXAMPLES
A simple rsyncd.conf file that allow anonymous rsync to a ftp area at
`/home/ftp` would be:
@@ -1202,46 +1233,41 @@ The /etc/rsyncd.secrets file would look something like this:
> tridge:mypass
> susan:herpass
# FILES
## FILES
/etc/rsyncd.conf or rsyncd.conf
# SEE ALSO
## SEE ALSO
**rsync**(1), **rsync-ssl**(1)
[**rsync**(1)](rsync.1), [**rsync-ssl**(1)](rsync-ssl.1)
# BUGS
## BUGS
Please report bugs! The rsync bug tracking system is online at
<https://rsync.samba.org/>.
# VERSION
## VERSION
This man page is current for version @VERSION@ of rsync.
This manpage is current for version @VERSION@ of rsync.
# CREDITS
## CREDITS
rsync is distributed under the GNU General Public License. See the file
COPYING for details.
Rsync is distributed under the GNU General Public License. See the file
[COPYING](COPYING) for details.
The primary ftp site for rsync is <ftp://rsync.samba.org/pub/rsync>
An rsync web site is available at <https://rsync.samba.org/> and its github
project is <https://github.com/WayneD/rsync>.
A web site is available at <https://rsync.samba.org/>.
We would be delighted to hear from you if you like this program.
This program uses the zlib compression library written by Jean-loup Gailly and
Mark Adler.
# THANKS
## THANKS
Thanks to Warren Stanley for his original idea and patch for the rsync daemon.
Thanks to Karsten Thygesen for his many suggestions and documentation!
# AUTHOR
## AUTHOR
rsync was written by Andrew Tridgell and Paul Mackerras. Many people have
later contributed to it.
Rsync was originally written by Andrew Tridgell and Paul Mackerras. Many
people have later contributed to it. It is currently maintained by Wayne
Davison.
Mailing lists for support and development are available at
<https://lists.samba.org/>.

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#! /bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 by Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
# Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
# Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ failed=0
# failure to aid investigation. We don't remove the testtmp subdir at
# the end so that it can be configured as a symlink to a filesystem that
# has ACLs and xattr support enabled (if desired).
scratchbase="$TOOLDIR"/testtmp
scratchbase="${scratchbase:-$TOOLDIR}"/testtmp
echo " scratchbase=$scratchbase"
[ -d "$scratchbase" ] || mkdir "$scratchbase"

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -25,11 +25,13 @@
extern int do_xfers;
extern int am_server;
extern int am_daemon;
extern int local_server;
extern int inc_recurse;
extern int log_before_transfer;
extern int stdout_format_has_i;
extern int logfile_format_has_i;
extern int want_xattr_optim;
extern int xfer_sum_len;
extern int csum_length;
extern int append_mode;
extern int copy_links;
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ extern int io_error;
extern int flist_eof;
extern int whole_file;
extern int allowed_lull;
extern int copy_devices;
extern int preserve_xattrs;
extern int protocol_version;
extern int remove_source_files;
@@ -45,11 +48,14 @@ extern int make_backups;
extern int inplace;
extern int inplace_partial;
extern int batch_fd;
extern int use_secure_symlinks;
extern char *module_dir;
extern int write_batch;
extern int file_old_total;
extern BOOL want_progress_now;
extern struct stats stats;
extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
extern char num_dev_ino_buf[4 + 8 + 8];
BOOL extra_flist_sending_enabled;
@@ -91,10 +97,11 @@ static struct sum_struct *receive_sums(int f)
return(s);
s->sums = new_array(struct sum_buf, s->count);
s->sum2_array = new_array(char, (size_t)s->count * xfer_sum_len);
for (i = 0; i < s->count; i++) {
s->sums[i].sum1 = read_int(f);
read_buf(f, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length);
read_buf(f, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length);
s->sums[i].offset = offset;
s->sums[i].flags = 0;
@@ -133,6 +140,8 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
return;
flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "successful_send");
if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
if (!change_pathname(file, NULL, 0))
return;
@@ -143,6 +152,13 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
goto failed;
}
if (local_server
&& (int64)st.st_dev == IVAL64(num_dev_ino_buf, 4)
&& (int64)st.st_ino == IVAL64(num_dev_ino_buf, 4 + 8)) {
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "ERROR: Skipping sender remove of destination file: %s\n", fname);
return;
}
if (st.st_size != F_LENGTH(file) || st.st_mtime != file->modtime
#ifdef ST_MTIME_NSEC
|| (NSEC_BUMP(file) && (uint32)st.ST_MTIME_NSEC != F_MOD_NSEC(file))
@@ -250,6 +266,8 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
else
file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
if (F_PATHNAME(file)) {
@@ -338,7 +356,25 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (use_secure_symlinks) {
/* Open from module root to prevent TOCTOU race where
* change_pathname's chdir follows a directory symlink.
* Reconstruct the full path relative to module_dir
* from F_PATHNAME (path) and f_name (fname). */
char secure_path[MAXPATHLEN];
int slen = snprintf(secure_path, sizeof secure_path, "%s%s%s", path, slash, fname);
if (slen >= (int)sizeof secure_path) {
io_error |= IOERR_GENERAL;
rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "path too long: %s%s%s\n", path, slash, fname);
free_sums(s);
if (protocol_version >= 30)
send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
continue;
}
fd = secure_relative_open(module_dir, secure_path, O_RDONLY, 0);
} else {
fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
}
if (fd == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING;
@@ -366,6 +402,15 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
exit_cleanup(RERR_FILEIO);
}
if (IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
if (!copy_devices) {
rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to copy device contents without --copy-devices\n");
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
}
if (st.st_size == 0)
st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname);
}
if (append_mode > 0 && st.st_size < F_LENGTH(file)) {
rprintf(FWARNING, "skipped diminished file: %s\n",
full_fname(fname));

View File

@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
#include "config.h"
#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM /* { */
#define CHAR_OFFSET 0 /* Keep this the same as rsync.h, which isn't likely to change. */
#ifdef __APPLE__
#define get_checksum1_avx2 _get_checksum1_avx2
#define get_checksum1_avx2_asm _get_checksum1_avx2_asm
#endif
.intel_syntax noprefix
.text
.p2align 5
.globl get_checksum1_avx2
.globl get_checksum1_avx2_asm
# rdi=*buf, esi=len, edx=i, rcx= *ps1, r8= *ps2
get_checksum1_avx2:
get_checksum1_avx2_asm:
vmovd xmm6,[rcx] # load *ps1
lea eax, [rsi-128] # at least 128 bytes to process?
cmp edx, eax
@@ -167,3 +173,5 @@ get_checksum1_avx2:
.byte 3
.byte 2
.byte 1
#endif /* } USE_ROLL_ASM */

View File

@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@
* GCC 4.x are not supported to ease configure.ac logic.
*/
#ifdef __x86_64__
#ifdef __cplusplus
#ifdef __x86_64__ /* { */
#ifdef __cplusplus /* { */
#include "rsync.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SIMD
#ifdef USE_ROLL_SIMD /* { */
#include <immintrin.h>
@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ typedef long long __m256i_u __attribute__((__vector_size__(32), __may_alias__, _
#define SSE2_HADDS_EPI16(a, b) _mm_adds_epi16(SSE2_INTERLEAVE_EVEN_EPI16(a, b), SSE2_INTERLEAVE_ODD_EPI16(a, b))
#define SSE2_MADDUBS_EPI16(a, b) _mm_adds_epi16(SSE2_MULU_EVEN_EPI8(a, b), SSE2_MULU_ODD_EPI8(a, b))
#ifndef USE_ROLL_ASM
__attribute__ ((target("default"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_avx2_64(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2) { return i; }
#endif
__attribute__ ((target("default"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_ssse3_32(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2) { return i; }
__attribute__ ((target("default"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_sse2_32(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2) { return i; }
@@ -245,7 +248,7 @@ __attribute__ ((target("sse2"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_sse2_32(schar* buf
// (4*buf[i] + 3*buf[i+1]), (2*buf[i+2], buf[i+3]), ... 2*[int16*8]
__m128i mul_const = _mm_set1_epi32(4 + (3 << 8) + (2 << 16) + (1 << 24));
__m128i mul_add16_1 = SSE2_MADDUBS_EPI16(mul_const, in8_1);
__m128i mul_add16_1 = SSE2_MADDUBS_EPI16(mul_const, in8_1);
__m128i mul_add16_2 = SSE2_MADDUBS_EPI16(mul_const, in8_2);
// s2 += 32*s1
@@ -310,7 +313,126 @@ __attribute__ ((target("sse2"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_sse2_32(schar* buf
return i;
}
extern "C" __attribute__ ((target("avx2"))) int32 get_checksum1_avx2(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2);
#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM /* { */
extern "C" __attribute__ ((target("avx2"))) int32 get_checksum1_avx2_asm(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2);
#else /* } { */
/*
AVX2 loop per 64 bytes:
int16 t1[16];
int16 t2[16];
for (int j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
t1[j] = buf[j*4 + i] + buf[j*4 + i+1] + buf[j*4 + i+2] + buf[j*4 + i+3];
t2[j] = 4*buf[j*4 + i] + 3*buf[j*4 + i+1] + 2*buf[j*4 + i+2] + buf[j*4 + i+3];
}
s2 += 64*s1 + (uint32)(
60*t1[0] + 56*t1[1] + 52*t1[2] + 48*t1[3] + 44*t1[4] + 40*t1[5] + 36*t1[6] + 32*t1[7] + 28*t1[8] + 24*t1[9] + 20*t1[10] + 16*t1[11] + 12*t1[12] + 8*t1[13] + 4*t1[14] +
t2[0] + t2[1] + t2[2] + t2[3] + t2[4] + t2[5] + t2[6] + t2[7] + t2[8] + t2[9] + t2[10] + t2[11] + t2[12] + t2[13] + t2[14] + t2[15]
) + 2080*CHAR_OFFSET;
s1 += (uint32)(t1[0] + t1[1] + t1[2] + t1[3] + t1[4] + t1[5] + t1[6] + t1[7] + t1[8] + t1[9] + t1[10] + t1[11] + t1[12] + t1[13] + t1[14] + t1[15]) +
64*CHAR_OFFSET;
*/
__attribute__ ((target("avx2"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_avx2_64(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2)
{
if (len > 64) {
uint32 x[4] = {0};
__m128i ss1 = _mm_cvtsi32_si128(*ps1);
__m128i ss2 = _mm_cvtsi32_si128(*ps2);
const char mul_t1_buf[16] = {60, 56, 52, 48, 44, 40, 36, 32, 28, 24, 20, 16, 12, 8, 4, 0};
__m128i tmp = _mm_load_si128((__m128i*) mul_t1_buf);
__m256i mul_t1 = _mm256_cvtepu8_epi16(tmp);
__m256i mul_const = _mm256_broadcastd_epi32(_mm_cvtsi32_si128(4 | (3 << 8) | (2 << 16) | (1 << 24)));
__m256i mul_one = _mm256_set1_epi8(1);
for (; i < (len-64); i+=64) {
// Load ... 4*[int8*16]
__m256i in8_1, in8_2;
__m128i in8_1_low, in8_2_low, in8_1_high, in8_2_high;
in8_1_low = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i_u*)&buf[i]);
in8_2_low = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i_u*)&buf[i+16]);
in8_1_high = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i_u*)&buf[i+32]);
in8_2_high = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i_u*)&buf[i+48]);
in8_1 = _mm256_inserti128_si256(_mm256_castsi128_si256(in8_1_low), in8_1_high,1);
in8_2 = _mm256_inserti128_si256(_mm256_castsi128_si256(in8_2_low), in8_2_high,1);
// (1*buf[i] + 1*buf[i+1]), (1*buf[i+2], 1*buf[i+3]), ... 2*[int16*8]
// Fastest, even though multiply by 1
__m256i add16_1 = _mm256_maddubs_epi16(mul_one, in8_1);
__m256i add16_2 = _mm256_maddubs_epi16(mul_one, in8_2);
// (4*buf[i] + 3*buf[i+1]), (2*buf[i+2], buf[i+3]), ... 2*[int16*8]
__m256i mul_add16_1 = _mm256_maddubs_epi16(mul_const, in8_1);
__m256i mul_add16_2 = _mm256_maddubs_epi16(mul_const, in8_2);
// s2 += 64*s1
ss2 = _mm_add_epi32(ss2, _mm_slli_epi32(ss1, 6));
// [sum(t1[0]..t1[7]), X, X, X] [int32*4]; faster than multiple _mm_hadds_epi16
__m256i sum_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(add16_1, add16_2);
sum_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(sum_add32, _mm256_srli_epi32(sum_add32, 16));
sum_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(sum_add32, _mm256_srli_si256(sum_add32, 4));
sum_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(sum_add32, _mm256_srli_si256(sum_add32, 8));
// [sum(t2[0]..t2[7]), X, X, X] [int32*4]; faster than multiple _mm_hadds_epi16
__m256i sum_mul_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(mul_add16_1, mul_add16_2);
sum_mul_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(sum_mul_add32, _mm256_srli_epi32(sum_mul_add32, 16));
sum_mul_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(sum_mul_add32, _mm256_srli_si256(sum_mul_add32, 4));
sum_mul_add32 = _mm256_add_epi16(sum_mul_add32, _mm256_srli_si256(sum_mul_add32, 8));
// s1 += t1[0] + t1[1] + t1[2] + t1[3] + t1[4] + t1[5] + t1[6] + t1[7]
__m128i sum_add32_hi = _mm256_extracti128_si256(sum_add32, 0x1);
ss1 = _mm_add_epi32(ss1, _mm256_castsi256_si128(sum_add32));
ss1 = _mm_add_epi32(ss1, sum_add32_hi);
// s2 += t2[0] + t2[1] + t2[2] + t2[3] + t2[4] + t2[5] + t2[6] + t2[7]
__m128i sum_mul_add32_hi = _mm256_extracti128_si256(sum_mul_add32, 0x1);
ss2 = _mm_add_epi32(ss2, _mm256_castsi256_si128(sum_mul_add32));
ss2 = _mm_add_epi32(ss2, sum_mul_add32_hi);
// [t1[0] + t1[1], t1[2] + t1[3] ...] [int16*8]
// We could've combined this with generating sum_add32 above and
// save an instruction but benchmarking shows that as being slower
__m256i add16 = _mm256_hadds_epi16(add16_1, add16_2);
// [t1[0], t1[1], ...] -> [t1[0]*28 + t1[1]*24, ...] [int32*4]
__m256i mul32 = _mm256_madd_epi16(add16, mul_t1);
// [sum(mul32), X, X, X] [int32*4]; faster than multiple _mm_hadd_epi32
mul32 = _mm256_add_epi32(mul32, _mm256_srli_si256(mul32, 4));
mul32 = _mm256_add_epi32(mul32, _mm256_srli_si256(mul32, 8));
// prefetch 2 cacheline ahead
_mm_prefetch(&buf[i + 160], _MM_HINT_T0);
// s2 += 28*t1[0] + 24*t1[1] + 20*t1[2] + 16*t1[3] + 12*t1[4] + 8*t1[5] + 4*t1[6]
__m128i mul32_hi = _mm256_extracti128_si256(mul32, 0x1);
ss2 = _mm_add_epi32(ss2, _mm256_castsi256_si128(mul32));
ss2 = _mm_add_epi32(ss2, mul32_hi);
#if CHAR_OFFSET != 0
// s1 += 32*CHAR_OFFSET
__m128i char_offset_multiplier = _mm_set1_epi32(32 * CHAR_OFFSET);
ss1 = _mm_add_epi32(ss1, char_offset_multiplier);
// s2 += 528*CHAR_OFFSET
char_offset_multiplier = _mm_set1_epi32(528 * CHAR_OFFSET);
ss2 = _mm_add_epi32(ss2, char_offset_multiplier);
#endif
}
_mm_store_si128((__m128i_u*)x, ss1);
*ps1 = x[0];
_mm_store_si128((__m128i_u*)x, ss2);
*ps2 = x[0];
}
return i;
}
#endif /* } !USE_ROLL_ASM */
static int32 get_checksum1_default_1(schar* buf, int32 len, int32 i, uint32* ps1, uint32* ps2)
{
@@ -338,7 +460,11 @@ static inline uint32 get_checksum1_cpp(char *buf1, int32 len)
uint32 s2 = 0;
// multiples of 64 bytes using AVX2 (if available)
i = get_checksum1_avx2((schar*)buf1, len, i, &s1, &s2);
#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM
i = get_checksum1_avx2_asm((schar*)buf1, len, i, &s1, &s2);
#else
i = get_checksum1_avx2_64((schar*)buf1, len, i, &s1, &s2);
#endif
// multiples of 32 bytes using SSSE3 (if available)
i = get_checksum1_ssse3_32((schar*)buf1, len, i, &s1, &s2);
@@ -407,7 +533,11 @@ int main() {
benchmark("Raw-C", get_checksum1_default_1, (schar*)buf, BLOCK_LEN);
benchmark("SSE2", get_checksum1_sse2_32, (schar*)buf, BLOCK_LEN);
benchmark("SSSE3", get_checksum1_ssse3_32, (schar*)buf, BLOCK_LEN);
benchmark("AVX2", get_checksum1_avx2, (schar*)buf, BLOCK_LEN);
#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM
benchmark("AVX2-ASM", get_checksum1_avx2_asm, (schar*)buf, BLOCK_LEN);
#else
benchmark("AVX2", get_checksum1_avx2_64, (schar*)buf, BLOCK_LEN);
#endif
free(buf);
return 0;
@@ -417,6 +547,118 @@ int main() {
#pragma clang optimize on
#endif /* BENCHMARK_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 */
#endif /* HAVE_SIMD */
#endif /* __cplusplus */
#endif /* __x86_64__ */
#ifdef TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1
static uint32 checksum_via_default(char *buf, int32 len)
{
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
static uint32 checksum_via_sse2(char *buf, int32 len)
{
int32 i;
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
i = get_checksum1_sse2_32((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
static uint32 checksum_via_ssse3(char *buf, int32 len)
{
int32 i;
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
i = get_checksum1_ssse3_32((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
static uint32 checksum_via_avx2(char *buf, int32 len)
{
int32 i;
uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM
i = get_checksum1_avx2_asm((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
#else
i = get_checksum1_avx2_64((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
#endif
get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
}
int main()
{
static const int sizes[] = {1, 4, 31, 32, 33, 63, 64, 65, 128, 129, 256, 700, 1024, 4096, 65536};
int num_sizes = sizeof(sizes) / sizeof(sizes[0]);
int max_size = sizes[num_sizes - 1];
int failures = 0;
/* Allocate with extra bytes for unaligned test */
unsigned char *raw = (unsigned char *)malloc(max_size + 64 + 1);
if (!raw) {
fprintf(stderr, "malloc failed\n");
return 1;
}
/* Fill with deterministic data */
for (int i = 0; i < max_size + 64 + 1; i++)
raw[i] = (i + (i % 3) + (i % 11)) % 256;
/* Test with aligned buffer (64-byte aligned) */
unsigned char *aligned = raw + (64 - ((uintptr_t)raw % 64));
/* Test with unaligned buffer (+1 byte offset) */
unsigned char *unaligned = aligned + 1;
struct { const char *name; unsigned char *buf; } buffers[] = {
{"aligned", aligned},
{"unaligned", unaligned},
};
for (int b = 0; b < 2; b++) {
char *buf = (char *)buffers[b].buf;
const char *bname = buffers[b].name;
for (int s = 0; s < num_sizes; s++) {
int32 len = sizes[s];
uint32 ref = checksum_via_default(buf, len);
uint32 cs_sse2 = checksum_via_sse2(buf, len);
uint32 cs_ssse3 = checksum_via_ssse3(buf, len);
uint32 cs_avx2 = checksum_via_avx2(buf, len);
uint32 cs_auto = get_checksum1(buf, len);
if (cs_sse2 != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: SSE2=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_sse2, ref);
failures++;
}
if (cs_ssse3 != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: SSSE3=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_ssse3, ref);
failures++;
}
if (cs_avx2 != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: AVX2=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_avx2, ref);
failures++;
}
if (cs_auto != ref) {
printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: auto=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_auto, ref);
failures++;
}
}
}
free(raw);
if (failures) {
printf("%d checksum mismatches!\n", failures);
return 1;
}
printf("All SIMD checksum tests passed.\n");
return 0;
}
#endif /* TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 */
#endif /* } USE_ROLL_SIMD */
#endif /* } __cplusplus */
#endif /* } __x86_64__ */

View File

@@ -47,21 +47,23 @@ static struct sigaction sigact;
static int sock_exec(const char *prog);
#define PROXY_BUF_SIZE 1024
/* Establish a proxy connection on an open socket to a web proxy by using the
* CONNECT method. If proxy_user and proxy_pass are not NULL, they are used to
* authenticate to the proxy using the "Basic" proxy-authorization protocol. */
static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_user, char *proxy_pass)
{
char *cp, buffer[1024];
char *authhdr, authbuf[1024];
char *cp, buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
char *authhdr, authbuf[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
int len;
if (proxy_user && proxy_pass) {
stringjoin(buffer, sizeof buffer,
stringjoin(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE,
proxy_user, ":", proxy_pass, NULL);
len = strlen(buffer);
if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= (int)sizeof authbuf - 3) {
if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 3) {
rprintf(FERROR,
"authentication information is too long\n");
return -1;
@@ -74,14 +76,14 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
authhdr = "";
}
len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
assert(len > 0 && len < (int)sizeof buffer);
len = snprintf(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
assert(len > 0 && len < PROXY_BUF_SIZE);
if (write(fd, buffer, len) != len) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to write to proxy");
return -1;
}
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]; cp++) {
if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to read from proxy");
return -1;
@@ -90,11 +92,13 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
break;
}
if (*cp != '\n')
cp++;
*cp-- = '\0';
if (*cp == '\r')
*cp = '\0';
if (cp == &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]) {
rprintf(FERROR, "proxy response line too long\n");
return -1;
}
*cp = '\0';
if (cp > buffer && cp[-1] == '\r')
cp[-1] = '\0';
if (strncmp(buffer, "HTTP/", 5) != 0) {
rprintf(FERROR, "bad response from proxy -- %s\n",
buffer);
@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
}
/* throw away the rest of the HTTP header */
while (1) {
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE]; cp++) {
if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
rsyserr(FERROR, errno,
"failed to read from proxy");

View File

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ def main():
print_line(fn, mtime, mtime)
ls.discard(fn)
cmd = git + 'log -r --name-only --no-color --pretty=raw --no-renames -z'.split()
cmd = git + 'log -r --name-only --format=%x00commit%x20%H%n%x00commit_time%x20%ct%n --no-renames -z'.split()
if args.tree:
cmd.append(args.tree)
cmd += ['--'] + args.files
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ def main():
proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, encoding='utf-8')
for line in proc.stdout:
line = line.strip()
m = re.match(r'^committer .*? (\d+) [-+]\d+$', line)
m = re.match(r'^\0commit_time (\d+)$', line)
if m:
commit_time = int(m[1])
elif NULL_COMMIT_RE.search(line):

93
support/json-rsync-version Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
#!/usr/bin/python3
import sys, argparse, subprocess, json
TWEAK_NAME = {
'asm': 'asm_roll',
'ASM': 'asm_roll',
'hardlink_special': 'hardlink_specials',
'protect_args': 'secluded_args',
'protected_args': 'secluded_args',
'SIMD': 'SIMD_roll',
}
MOVE_OPTIM = set('asm_roll SIMD_roll'.split())
def main():
if not args.rsync or args.rsync == '-':
ver_out = sys.stdin.read().strip()
else:
ver_out = subprocess.check_output([args.rsync, '--version', '--version'], encoding='utf-8').strip()
if ver_out.startswith('{'):
print(ver_out)
return
info = { }
misplaced_optims = { }
for line in ver_out.splitlines():
if line.startswith('rsync '):
prog, vstr, ver, pstr, vstr2, proto = line.split()
info['program'] = prog
if ver.startswith('v'):
ver = ver[1:]
info[vstr] = ver
if '.' not in proto:
proto += '.0'
else:
proto = proto.replace('.PR', '.')
info[pstr] = proto
elif line.startswith('Copyright '):
info['copyright'] = line[10:]
elif line.startswith('Web site: '):
info['url'] = line[10:]
elif line.startswith(' '):
if not saw_comma and ',' in line:
saw_comma = True
info[sect_name] = { }
if saw_comma:
for x in line.strip(' ,').split(', '):
if ' ' in x:
val, var = x.split(' ', 1)
if val == 'no':
val = False
elif val.endswith('-bit'):
var = var[:-1] + '_bits'
val = int(val.split('-')[0])
else:
var = x
val = True
var = var.replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_')
if var in TWEAK_NAME:
var = TWEAK_NAME[var]
if sect_name[0] != 'o' and var in MOVE_OPTIM:
misplaced_optims[var] = val
else:
info[sect_name][var] = val
else:
info[sect_name] += [ x for x in line.split() if not x.startswith('(') ]
elif line == '':
break
else:
sect_name = line.strip(' :').replace(' ', '_').lower()
info[sect_name] = [ ]
saw_comma = False
for chk in 'capabilities optimizations'.split():
if chk not in info:
info[chk] = { }
if misplaced_optims:
info['optimizations'].update(misplaced_optims)
for chk in 'checksum_list compress_list daemon_auth_list'.split():
if chk not in info:
info[chk] = [ ]
info['license'] = 'GPLv3' if ver[0] == '3' else 'GPLv2'
info['caveat'] = 'rsync comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY'
print(json.dumps(info))
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Output rsync's version data in JSON format, even if the rsync doesn't support a native json-output method.", add_help=False)
parser.add_argument('rsync', nargs='?', help="Specify an rsync command to run. Otherwise stdin is consumed.")
parser.add_argument("--help", "-h", action="help", help="Output this help message and exit.")
args = parser.parse_args()
main()
# vim: sw=4 et

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
# for testing or for running a local copy where the sender and the
# receiver needs to use different options (e.g. --fake-super). If
# we get a -l USER option, we try to use "sudo -u USER" to run the
# command.
# command. Supports only the hostnames "localhost" and "lh", with
# the latter implying the --no-cd option.
user=''
do_cd=y # Default path is user's home dir (just like ssh) unless host is "lh".

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ LOGFILE = 'rrsync.log' # NOTE: the file must exist for a line to be appended!
# NOTE when disabling: check for both a short & long version of the option!
### START of options data produced by the cull_options script. ###
### START of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
# To disable a short-named option, add its letter to this string:
short_disabled = 's'
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ long_opts = {
'compress-choice': 1,
'compress-level': 1,
'copy-dest': 2,
'copy-devices': -1,
'copy-unsafe-links': 0,
'daemon': -1,
'debug': 1,
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ long_opts = {
'files-from': 3,
'force': 0,
'from0': 0,
'fsync': 2,
'fsync': 0,
'fuzzy': 0,
'group': 0,
'groupmap': 1,
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ long_opts = {
'write-devices': -1,
}
### END of options data produced by the cull_options script. ###
### END of options data produced by the cull-options script. ###
import os, sys, re, argparse, glob, socket, time, subprocess
from argparse import RawTextHelpFormatter
@@ -360,9 +361,9 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
only_group = arg_parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
only_group.add_argument('-ro', action='store_true', help="Allow only reading from the DIR. Implies -no-del and -no-lock.")
only_group.add_argument('-wo', action='store_true', help="Allow only writing to the DIR.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-munge', action='store_true', help="Enable rsync's --munge-links on the server side.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-del', action='store_true', help="Disable rsync's --delete* and --remove* options.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-no-lock', action='store_true', help="Avoid the single-run (per-user) lock check.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-munge', action='store_true', help="Enable rsync's --munge-links on the server side.")
arg_parser.add_argument('-help', '-h', action='help', help="Output this help message and exit.")
arg_parser.add_argument('dir', metavar='DIR', help="The restricted directory to use.")
args = arg_parser.parse_args()

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,30 @@
# NAME
## NAME
rrsync - a script to setup restricted rsync users via ssh logins
# SYNOPSIS
## SYNOPSIS
```
rrsync [-ro|-rw] [-munge] [-no-del] DIR
rrsync [-ro|-rw] [-munge] [-no-del] [-no-lock] DIR
```
# DESCRIPTION
The single non-option argument specifies the restricted _DIR_ to use. It can be
relative to the user's home directory or an absolute path.
The online version of this manpage (that includes cross-linking of topics)
is available at <https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/rrsync.1>.
## DESCRIPTION
A user's ssh login can be restricted to only allow the running of an rsync
transfer in one of two easy ways: forcing the running of the rrsync script
or forcing the running of an rsync daemon-over-ssh command.
transfer in one of two easy ways:
* forcing the running of the rrsync script
* forcing the running of an rsync daemon-over-ssh command.
Both of these setups use a feature of ssh that allows a command to be forced to
run instead of an interactive shell. However, if the user's home shell is bash,
please see [BASH SECURITY ISSUE](#) for a potential issue.
To use the rrsync script, edit the user's `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` file and add
a prefix like one of the following (followed by a space) in front of each
@@ -27,7 +39,7 @@ ssh-key line that should be restricted:
Then, ensure that the rrsync script has your desired option restrictions. You
may want to copy the script to a local bin dir with a unique name if you want
to have multiple configurations. One or more rrsync options can be specified
prior to the `DIR` if you want to further restrict the transfer.
prior to the _DIR_ if you want to further restrict the transfer.
To use an rsync daemon setup, edit the user's `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` file and
add a prefix like one of the following (followed by a space) in front of each
@@ -39,41 +51,57 @@ ssh-key line that should be restricted:
> ```
Then, ensure that the rsyncd.conf file is created with one or more module names
with the appropriate path and option restrictions. If the `--config` option is
omitted, it defaults to `~/rsyncd.conf`. See the `rsyncd.conf` man page for
details of how to configure an rsync daemon.
with the appropriate path and option restrictions. If rsync's
[`--config`](rsync.1#dopt) option is omitted, it defaults to `~/rsyncd.conf`.
See the [**rsyncd.conf**(5)](rsyncd.conf.5) manpage for details of how to
configure an rsync daemon.
When using rrsync, there can be just one restricted dir per authorized key. A
daemon setup, on the other hand, allows multiple module names inside the config
file, each one with its own path setting.
The remainder of this man page is dedicated to using the rrsync script.
The remainder of this manpage is dedicated to using the rrsync script.
# OPTION SUMMARY
## OPTIONS
```
-ro Allow only reading from the DIR. Implies -no-del.
-wo Allow only writing to the DIR.
-no-del Disable rsync's --delete* and --remove* options.
-munge Enable rsync's --munge-links on the server side.
-help, -h Output this help message and exit.
```
0. `-ro`
A single non-option argument specifies the restricted DIR to use. It can be
relative to the user's home directory or an absolute path.
Allow only reading from the DIR. Implies [`-no-del`](#opt) and
[`-no-lock`](#opt).
# SECURITY RESTRICTIONS
0. `-wo`
Allow only writing to the DIR.
0. `-munge`
Enable rsync's [`--munge-links`](rsync.1#opt) on the server side.
0. `-no-del`
Disable rsync's `--delete*` and `--remove*` options.
0. `-no-lock`
Avoid the single-run (per-user) lock check. Useful with [`-munge`](#opt).
0. `-help`, `-h`
Output this help message and exit.
## SECURITY RESTRICTIONS
The rrsync script validates the path arguments it is sent to try to restrict
them to staying within the specified DIR.
The rrsync script rejects rsync's `--copy-links`` option (by default) so that a
copy cannot dereference a symlink within the DIR to get to a file outside the
DIR.
The rrsync script rejects rsync's [`--copy-links`](rsync.1#opt) option (by
default) so that a copy cannot dereference a symlink within the DIR to get to a
file outside the DIR.
The rrsync script rejects rsync's `--protect-args` (`-s`) option because it
would allow options to be sent to the server-side that the script could not
check. If you want to support `--protect-args`, use a daemon-over-ssh setup.
The rrsync script rejects rsync's [`--protect-args`](rsync.1#opt) (`-s`) option
because it would allow options to be sent to the server-side that the script
cannot check. If you want to support `--protect-args`, use a daemon-over-ssh
setup.
The rrsync script accepts just a subset of rsync's options that the real rsync
uses when running the server command. A few extra convenience options are also
@@ -83,11 +111,56 @@ overrides.
The script (or a copy of it) can be manually edited if you want it to customize
the option handling.
# EXAMPLES
## BASH SECURITY ISSUE
The `.ssh/authorized_keys` file might have lines in it like this:
If your users have bash set as their home shell, bash may try to be overly
helpful and ensure that the user's login bashrc files are run prior to
executing the forced command. This can be a problem if the user can somehow
update their home bashrc files, perhaps via the restricted copy, a shared home
directory, or something similar.
One simple way to avoid the issue is to switch the user to a simpler shell,
such as dash. When choosing the new home shell, make sure that you're not
choosing bash in disguise, as it is unclear if it avoids the security issue.
Another potential fix is to ensure that the user's home directory is not a
shared mount and that they have no means of copying files outside of their
restricted directories. This may require you to force the enabling of symlink
munging on the server side.
A future version of openssh may have a change to the handling of forced
commands that allows it to avoid using the user's home shell.
## EXAMPLES
The `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` file might have lines in it like this:
> ```
> command="rrsync client/logs" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEAzG...
> command="rrsync -ro results" ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEAmk...
> ```
## FILES
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
## SEE ALSO
[**rsync**(1)](rsync.1), [**rsyncd.conf**(5)](rsyncd.conf.5)
## VERSION
This manpage is current for version @VERSION@ of rsync.
## CREDITS
rsync is distributed under the GNU General Public License. See the file
[COPYING](COPYING) for details.
An rsync web site is available at <https://rsync.samba.org/> and its github
project is <https://github.com/WayneD/rsync>.
## AUTHOR
The original rrsync perl script was written by Joe Smith. Many people have
later contributed to it. The python version was created by Wayne Davison.

1361
syscall.c
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

117
t_chmod_secure.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
/*
* Test harness for do_chmod_at(). Confirms the symlink-TOCTOU
* primitive used by CVE-2026-29518 (and its incomplete-fix follow-up
* for chmod) is closed by do_chmod_at(): a parent directory component
* being a symlink that escapes the receiver's confinement must be
* rejected, while a parent symlink that resolves *within* the tree
* must still work (so legitimate dir-symlinks are not regressed).
*
* Not linked into rsync itself.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include "rsync.h"
#include <sys/stat.h>
int dry_run = 0;
int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 0;
int read_only = 0;
int list_only = 0;
int copy_links = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
static int errs = 0;
static void check(const char *label, int actual_rc, int expect_ok,
const char *path, mode_t expected_mode)
{
struct stat st;
int got_ok = (actual_rc == 0);
if (got_ok != expect_ok) {
fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: rc=%d errno=%d (%s), expected %s\n",
label, actual_rc, errno, strerror(errno),
expect_ok ? "success" : "rejection");
errs++;
return;
}
if (path && stat(path, &st) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: stat(%s) failed: %s\n",
label, path, strerror(errno));
errs++;
return;
}
if (path && (st.st_mode & 07777) != expected_mode) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [%s]: %s mode is 0%o, expected 0%o\n",
label, path, st.st_mode & 07777, expected_mode);
errs++;
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "OK [%s]\n", label);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <module-dir>\n", argv[0]);
return 2;
}
if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
perror("chdir");
return 2;
}
/* Simulate the daemon-without-chroot deployment that do_chmod_at()
* defends. With am_daemon=0 or am_chrooted=1 the wrapper falls
* through to plain do_chmod() and the symlink-race test would be
* meaningless. */
am_daemon = 1;
am_chrooted = 0;
/* Test layout (all inside the directory we just chdir'd to):
*
* ./realdir/sentinel -- regular target file
* ./inside_link -> realdir -- legitimate dir-symlink within the tree
* ./escape_link -> ../trap -- attacker swap, target outside tree
* ../trap/sentinel -- the file the attacker wants to alter
*
* The shell wrapper that calls this helper has set both sentinel
* files to mode 0600 so we have a clean baseline to compare.
*/
/* Scenario A: legitimate parent dir-symlink, chmod must succeed. */
int rc = do_chmod_at("inside_link/sentinel", 0640);
check("A: legit dir-symlink within tree",
rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0640);
/* Scenario B: parent symlink escapes the tree -- chmod must be
* rejected and the outside file's mode must be unchanged. */
rc = do_chmod_at("escape_link/sentinel", 0666);
check("B: parent symlink escapes tree (the attack)",
rc, 0, "../trap/sentinel", 0600);
/* Scenario C: plain relative path with no symlink components,
* regression check that the safe wrapper doesn't break the
* normal case. */
rc = do_chmod_at("realdir/sentinel", 0644);
check("C: plain relative path (regression check)",
rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0644);
/* Scenario D: top-level file, no parent directory component.
* Falls back to do_chmod(); should succeed. */
rc = do_chmod_at("topfile", 0640);
check("D: top-level file, no parent component",
rc, 1, "topfile", 0640);
if (errs)
fprintf(stderr, "%d failure(s)\n", errs);
return errs ? 1 : 0;
}

151
t_secure_relpath.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
/*
* Test harness for secure_relative_open()'s front-door input
* validation. Codex audit Finding 5 noted that the existing check
*
* if (strncmp(relpath, "../", 3) == 0 || strstr(relpath, "/../"))
*
* catches "../foo" and "foo/../bar" but misses bare ".." (an actual
* one-level escape on platforms that fall back to the per-component
* walk), as well as "a/..", "foo/..", and any other form that
* decomposes to a ".." component when split on "/". The kernel-
* enforced RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) and O_RESOLVE_BENEATH
* (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) reject these in-kernel; the per-
* component fallback used on NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, Cygwin and
* pre-5.6 Linux does not, so the validation must happen at the
* front door.
*
* This helper invokes secure_relative_open() with each suspect
* input and checks both the failure (rc < 0) and the errno
* (EINVAL means "rejected at the front door"). Pre-fix, the kernel
* may reject with a different errno (EXDEV from RESOLVE_BENEATH);
* post-fix, the front-door check catches every variant up front
* with a consistent EINVAL across platforms.
*
* Not linked into rsync itself.
*/
#include "rsync.h"
#include <sys/stat.h>
int dry_run = 0;
int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 0;
int read_only = 0;
int list_only = 0;
int copy_links = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
static int errs = 0;
static void check_relpath(const char *relpath)
{
int fd;
int saved_errno;
errno = 0;
fd = secure_relative_open(NULL, relpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
if (fd >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [relpath=%-12s]: returned valid fd %d (escape) -- expected -1 EINVAL\n",
relpath, fd);
close(fd);
errs++;
return;
}
if (saved_errno != EINVAL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [relpath=%-12s]: rejected but errno=%d (%s), expected EINVAL\n",
relpath, saved_errno, strerror(saved_errno));
errs++;
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "OK [relpath=%-12s]: rejected with EINVAL\n", relpath);
}
static void check_basedir(const char *basedir)
{
int fd;
int saved_errno;
errno = 0;
fd = secure_relative_open(basedir, "ok", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
if (fd >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [basedir=%-12s]: returned valid fd %d -- expected -1 EINVAL\n",
basedir, fd);
close(fd);
errs++;
return;
}
if (saved_errno != EINVAL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"FAIL [basedir=%-12s]: rejected but errno=%d (%s), expected EINVAL\n",
basedir, saved_errno, strerror(saved_errno));
errs++;
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "OK [basedir=%-12s]: rejected with EINVAL\n", basedir);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <test-dir>\n", argv[0]);
return 2;
}
if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
perror("chdir");
return 2;
}
/* secure_relative_open's daemon-only confinement protections only
* fire when am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the threat model is the
* daemon-no-chroot deployment), but the front-door input
* validation runs unconditionally. We set am_daemon anyway so the
* helper exercises the same code shape the receiver does. */
am_daemon = 1;
am_chrooted = 0;
mkdir("subdir", 0755);
/* Each of these relpaths must be rejected with EINVAL at the
* secure_relative_open() front door. ".." is the actual one-level
* escape; the others ("subdir/..", "subdir/../subdir") resolve
* back to the start dir on systems that allow them, but we still
* reject them as defence-in-depth: a path containing a ".." token
* is suspicious and the caller should normalise before passing
* it in. The "../foo" / "foo/../bar" / "/foo" / "/" cases are
* regression checks for the existing checks. */
check_relpath("..");
check_relpath("../foo");
check_relpath("subdir/..");
check_relpath("subdir/../subdir");
check_relpath("foo/../bar");
check_relpath("/foo");
check_relpath("/");
/* Same checks against basedir (which the codex Finding 2 fix
* routes through the same RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent). Absolute
* basedirs are operator-trusted and intentionally not validated
* here. */
check_basedir("..");
check_basedir("../subdir");
check_basedir("subdir/..");
check_basedir("foo/../bar");
if (errs)
fprintf(stderr, "\n%d failure(s)\n", errs);
return errs ? 1 : 0;
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* functions, so that module test harnesses can run standalone.
*
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
* Copyright (C) 2003-2021 Wayne Davison
* Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -23,13 +23,14 @@
int do_fsync = 0;
int inplace = 0;
int am_daemon = 0;
int am_chrooted = 0;
int modify_window = 0;
int preallocate_files = 0;
int protect_args = 0;
int module_id = -1;
int relative_paths = 0;
int module_dirlen = 0;
int preserve_mtimes = 0;
int preserve_xattrs = 0;
int preserve_perms = 0;
int preserve_executability = 0;

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0;
int am_sender = 1;
int read_only = 0;
int list_only = 0;
int copy_links = 0;
int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
int

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
#!/bin/sh
test_fail() {
echo "$@" >&2
exit 1
}
# Test some foundational things.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
RSYNC_RSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
export RSYNC_RSH
echo $0 running
@@ -12,3 +14,48 @@ $RSYNC --version || test_fail '--version output failed'
$RSYNC --info=help || test_fail '--info=help output failed'
$RSYNC --debug=help || test_fail '--debug=help output failed'
weird_name="A weird)name"
mkdir "$fromdir"
mkdir "$fromdir/$weird_name"
append_line() {
echo "$1"
echo "$1" >>"$fromdir/$weird_name/file"
}
append_line test1
checkit "$RSYNC -ai '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$fromdir" "$todir"
copy_weird() {
checkit "$RSYNC $1 --rsync-path='$RSYNC' '$2$fromdir/$weird_name/' '$3$todir/$weird_name'" "$fromdir" "$todir"
}
append_line test2
copy_weird '-ai' 'lh:' ''
append_line test3
copy_weird '-ai' '' 'lh:'
append_line test4
copy_weird '-ais' 'lh:' ''
append_line test5
copy_weird '-ais' '' 'lh:'
echo test6
touch "$fromdir/one" "$fromdir/two"
(cd "$fromdir" && $RSYNC -ai --old-args --rsync-path="$RSYNC" lh:'one two' "$todir/")
if [ ! -f "$todir/one" ] || [ ! -f "$todir/two" ]; then
test_fail "old-args copy of 'one two' failed"
fi
echo test7
rm "$todir/one" "$todir/two"
(cd "$fromdir" && RSYNC_OLD_ARGS=1 $RSYNC -ai --rsync-path="$RSYNC" lh:'one two' "$todir/")
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
. $suitedir/rsync.fns
$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] ACLs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
$RSYNC -VV | grep '"ACLs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
case "$setfacl_nodef" in
true) test_skipped "I don't know how to use your setfacl command" ;;

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
. $suitedir/rsync.fns
$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] ACLs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
$RSYNC -VV | grep '"ACLs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
makepath "$fromdir/foo"
echo something >"$fromdir/file1"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the basedir-confinement gap in
# secure_relative_open(). The function opens basedir with a plain
# openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY), without
# RESOLVE_BENEATH or a per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk, so a parent
# symlink ON basedir is followed unrestrictedly. RESOLVE_BENEATH is
# then applied only to relpath, anchored at the wrong directory.
#
# The receiver's basis-file lookup at receiver.c passes
# basis_dir[fnamecmp_type] (from --copy-dest / --link-dest /
# --compare-dest -- all sender-controllable in daemon mode) as
# basedir. A daemon-module attacker with write access can plant a
# symlink at module/cd -> /outside, then run --link-dest=cd to
# make the daemon's basis-file lookup resolve into /outside,
# leaking the contents of daemon-readable files via the rsync
# delta-rolling read-disclosure primitive.
#
# We detect the escape by leveraging --link-dest: when basis
# matches source exactly (content + mtime + mode), --link-dest
# hard-links the destination to the basis file. With the bug, the
# destination ends up as a hard link to the outside-the-module
# file (same inode). With the fix, no basis is found and the
# destination is a fresh copy (different inode).
#
# The vulnerable code path is the same on every platform
# (including the per-component fallback on systems without
# RESOLVE_BENEATH), so this test is not platform-gated.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
# Portable inode-number helper (GNU coreutils stat -c, BSD stat -f).
file_inode() {
stat -c %i "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %i "$1"
}
# Outside-the-module file an attacker would like the daemon to
# treat as a basis.
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
# The symlink trap planted in the module by the local attacker.
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
# Source file matches outside/target.txt exactly (content + mtime
# + mode) so --link-dest will hard-link the destination to the
# basis file iff the daemon's basedir lookup reaches outside/.
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$src/target.txt"
touch -r "$outside/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by
# default, which can't write into the test scratch dir. Force the
# daemon to keep our uid/gid in that case so the basis-link
# transfer can actually create the destination file. (Non-root
# can't specify uid/gid in rsyncd.conf -- comment them out then.)
my_uid=`get_testuid`
root_uid=`get_rootuid`
root_gid=`get_rootgid`
uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
fi
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
# Recursive --link-dest push directly into the module root. We
# avoid pushing into a destination subdir because the receiver
# would chdir into it before resolving --link-dest, making the
# relative basedir "cd" resolve in the wrong CWD and masking the
# bug. The realistic attack pushes into the module root (or the
# attacker uses a basedir path that resolves correctly from
# whichever subdir the receiver chdirs into).
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rtp --link-dest=cd "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/ \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ ! -f "$mod/target.txt" ]; then
test_fail "destination file was not created -- daemon transfer failed before the test could observe the basedir behaviour"
fi
outside_inode=$(file_inode "$outside/target.txt")
dst_inode=$(file_inode "$mod/target.txt")
if [ "$outside_inode" = "$dst_inode" ]; then
test_fail "basedir-escape: --link-dest hard-linked module/target.txt to outside/target.txt (inode $outside_inode); daemon's basis-file lookup followed the parent symlink on the basedir"
fi
exit 0

68
testsuite/alt-dest.test Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Test rsync handling of --compare-dest and similar options.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
alt1dir="$tmpdir/alt1"
alt2dir="$tmpdir/alt2"
alt3dir="$tmpdir/alt3"
SSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
# Build some files/dirs/links to copy
hands_setup
# Setup the alt and chk dirs
$RSYNC -av --include=text --include='*/' --exclude='*' "$fromdir/" "$alt1dir/"
$RSYNC -av --include=etc-ltr-list --include='*/' --exclude='*' "$fromdir/" "$alt2dir/"
# Create a side dir where there is a candidate destfile of the same name as a sourcefile
echo "This is a test file" >"$fromdir/likely"
mkdir "$alt3dir"
echo "This is a test file" >"$alt3dir/likely"
sleep 1
touch "$fromdir/dir/text" "$fromdir/likely"
$RSYNC -av --exclude=/text --exclude=etc-ltr-list "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
# Let's do it!
checkit "$RSYNC -avv --no-whole-file \
--compare-dest='$alt1dir' --compare-dest='$alt2dir' \
'$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
rm -rf "$todir"
checkit "$RSYNC -avv --no-whole-file \
--copy-dest='$alt1dir' --copy-dest='$alt2dir' \
'$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$fromdir" "$todir"
# Test that copy_file() works correctly with tmpfiles
for maybe_inplace in '' --inplace; do
rm -rf "$todir"
checkit "$RSYNC -av $maybe_inplace --copy-dest='$alt3dir' \
'$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$fromdir" "$todir"
for srchost in '' 'localhost:'; do
if [ -z "$srchost" ]; then
desthost='localhost:'
else
desthost=''
fi
rm -rf "$todir"
checkit "$RSYNC -ave '$SSH' --rsync-path='$RSYNC' $maybe_inplace \
--copy-dest='$alt3dir' '$srchost$fromdir/' '$desthost$todir/'" \
"$fromdir" "$todir"
done
done
# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
exit 0

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] atimes" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without atimes support"
$RSYNC -VV | grep '"atimes": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without atimes support"
mkdir "$fromdir"

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2004-2021 Wayne Davison
# Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for codex audit Findings 3b and 3c:
#
# 3b: generator.c:1905 -- the in-place backup creation opens
# backupptr via bare do_open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_EXCL).
# With --backup-dir set to an attacker-planted parent symlink,
# the backup file is written outside the module under the
# daemon's authority.
#
# 3c-symlink: syscall.c:207 -- do_symlink_at falls through to bare
# do_symlink for am_root < 0 (fake-super), which then opens
# the destination path with bare open() (final-component
# fake-super file). A parent symlink on the destination path
# redirects the file creation outside the module.
#
# 3c-mknod: syscall.c:506 -- do_mknod_at falls through to bare
# do_mknod for am_root < 0, same path-based open(). For
# FIFOs/sockets/devices the bare path is also used.
#
# Each scenario plants a "secret" file outside the module at a
# location the symlink trap points to. The check is that the
# outside file's content and mode are unchanged after the attack
# attempt.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
# All three scenarios depend on receiver-side daemon code paths
# that are only secured on platforms with a working
# secure_relative_open. The chdir/chmod tests already skip the
# same set; mirror that.
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "secure_relative_open relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
# Portable inode-and-mode helpers.
file_mode() {
stat -c %a "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp "$1"
}
setup() {
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
echo "OUTSIDE_PROTECTED_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
outside_pristine="$scratchdir/outside-pristine.txt"
cp -p "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
}
verify_outside_unchanged() {
label="$1"
mode=$(file_mode "$outside/target.txt")
case "$mode" in
644|0644) ;;
*) test_fail "$label: outside/target.txt mode changed from 644 to $mode" ;;
esac
if ! cmp -s "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"; then
test_fail "$label: outside/target.txt content changed -- daemon followed the cd symlink"
fi
}
verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent() {
label="$1"
target="$2" # specific file under outside/ to check absence of
if [ -e "$outside/$target" ]; then
test_fail "$label: outside/$target was created -- daemon followed the cd symlink"
fi
}
# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by default
# and fail to write into the test scratch dir. Force it to keep our
# uid/gid in that case so the receiver actually runs the code paths
# we want to test.
my_uid=`get_testuid`
root_uid=`get_rootuid`
root_gid=`get_rootgid`
uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
fi
############################################################
# Scenario 3b: --inplace --backup --backup-dir=cd
#
# Pre-create module/target.txt so the receiver enters the in-place
# update path; a backup of the existing content must be made
# before the update. With --backup-dir=cd, backupptr resolves to
# "cd/target.txt"; with the bug, robust_unlink and the bare
# do_open at generator.c:1905 both follow the cd symlink, the
# unlink deletes outside/target.txt and the create writes the
# pre-existing module/target.txt content there.
############################################################
setup
echo "EXISTING_MODULE_DATA" > "$mod/target.txt"
chmod 0666 "$mod/target.txt"
echo "NEW_DATA_FROM_SENDER" > "$src/target.txt"
chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC --inplace --backup --backup-dir=cd "$src/target.txt" \
rsync://localhost/upload/target.txt >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_outside_unchanged "3b inplace+backup-dir=cd"
############################################################
# Scenario 3c-symlink: fake-super symlink push to a path with a
# symlinked parent
#
# With "fake super = yes" set on the module, the receiver
# represents symlinks as fake-super files (regular files with the
# link target written to them). The path-based open() in
# do_symlink's fake-super branch follows parent symlinks. We push
# a single symlink to the destination path "cd/sym" so the
# receiver's create-file call lands at "cd/sym" relative to the
# module root, where cd is the symlink trap.
############################################################
setup
mkdir -p "$src/cd"
ln -s /etc/passwd "$src/cd/sym"
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload_fake]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
fake super = yes
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rl "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload_fake/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent "3c-symlink fake-super symlink push" "sym"
############################################################
# Scenario 3c-mknod: fake-super FIFO push to a path with a
# symlinked parent
#
# Similar to 3c-symlink but for special files. mkfifo works
# without root; we push a FIFO and verify the receiver doesn't
# create a fake-super file at outside/fifo.
############################################################
setup
mkdir -p "$src/cd"
mkfifo "$src/cd/fifo" 2>/dev/null
if [ ! -p "$src/cd/fifo" ]; then
test_skipped "mkfifo unavailable; cannot exercise 3c-mknod"
fi
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
$uid_setting
$gid_setting
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload_fake]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
fake super = yes
EOF
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC -rD "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload_fake/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent "3c-mknod fake-super FIFO push" "fifo"
exit 0

135
testsuite/chdir-symlink-race.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug at the receiver's
# chdir(). After the CVE-2026-29518 fix to secure_relative_open(), an
# attack remained where the receiver's chdir() into a destination
# subdirectory followed an attacker-planted symlink, escaping the
# module. Every subsequent path-relative syscall (open, chmod, lchown,
# utimes, etc.) inherited the escape -- secure_relative_open's
# RESOLVE_BENEATH anchor itself was outside the module by then, so it
# stopped protecting against anything.
#
# This test runs an actual rsync daemon (via RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG to
# avoid the network) configured with "use chroot = no", plants a
# symlink at module/subdir -> ../outside, and runs four flavours of
# rsync transfer that previously all reached files in ../outside:
#
# 1. single-file dest = subdir/target.txt (the original poc_chmod)
# 2. -r src/subdir/ to upload/subdir/ (the chdir-escape case)
# 3. -r src/subdir/ to upload/subdir/ (no --size-only: forces basis read+write)
# 4. -r src/ to upload/ (was already protected by the
# original CVE-2026-29518 fix;
# regression-checked here)
#
# All four must leave the outside-the-module sentinel file's mode AND
# content unchanged.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "secure chdir relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
outside="$scratchdir/outside"
src="$scratchdir/src"
conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src" "$src/subdir"
# Portable octal-mode helper -- macOS and FreeBSD's stat use -f, GNU
# coreutils stat uses -c.
file_mode() {
stat -c %a "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp "$1"
}
# The "secret" file outside the module the attacker is trying to alter.
# Save a pristine copy alongside it so we can compare with cmp(1) rather
# than depending on sha1sum/shasum/sha1, which differ across platforms.
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
chmod 0600 "$outside/target.txt"
outside_pristine="$scratchdir/outside-pristine.txt"
cp -p "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"
# Symlink trap planted in the module by the local attacker.
ln -s "$outside" "$mod/subdir"
# Source files the sender will push: same size as the outside target,
# different content, mode 0666 (the perms the attacker tries to push).
SIZE=$(stat -c %s "$outside/target.txt" 2>/dev/null \
|| stat -f %z "$outside/target.txt")
head -c "$SIZE" /dev/urandom > "$src/target.txt"
head -c "$SIZE" /dev/urandom > "$src/subdir/target.txt"
chmod 0666 "$src/target.txt" "$src/subdir/target.txt"
cat > "$conf" <<EOF
use chroot = no
log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
[upload]
path = $mod
use chroot = no
read only = no
EOF
reset_outside() {
chmod 0600 "$outside/target.txt"
echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
}
verify_unchanged() {
label="$1"
mode=$(file_mode "$outside/target.txt")
case "$mode" in
600|0600) ;;
*) test_fail "$label: outside file mode changed from 600 to $mode (chmod escape)" ;;
esac
if ! cmp -s "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"; then
test_fail "$label: outside file content changed (write escape)"
fi
}
run_attack() {
label="$1"; shift
reset_outside
RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
$RSYNC "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
verify_unchanged "$label"
}
# 1. The original poc_chmod scenario: single file, dest path with
# the symlinked subdir as a path component. With --size-only the
# receiver normally skips the basis open and goes straight to chmod
# -- only the chdir-escape blocks the chmod from reaching outside.
run_attack "single-file --size-only" \
-tp --size-only \
"$src/target.txt" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/target.txt
# 2. -r push into the symlinked subdir: receiver chdir's into "subdir",
# follows the symlink, ends up in outside.
run_attack "-r --size-only into subdir/" \
-rtp --size-only \
"$src/subdir/" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/
# 3. Same but no --size-only -- forces the basis-file open and a real
# rename, so this exercises the read-disclosure and write-escape
# paths together.
run_attack "-r without --size-only into subdir/" \
-rtp \
"$src/subdir/" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/
# 4. -r src/ to upload/ -- this case was already covered by the
# original CVE-2026-29518 fix because the receiver stays at module
# root and operates on slashed paths. Regression check.
run_attack "-r --size-only into upload/ root" \
-rtp --size-only \
"$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/
exit 0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).
# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug applied to
# chmod() on the receiver side. The CVE-2026-29518 fix used
# secure_relative_open() for the basis-file open, but every other
# path-based syscall the receiver runs on sender-controllable paths
# is vulnerable to the same primitive: a local attacker swaps a
# symlink into one of the parent directory components between the
# receiver's check and its act, and the syscall escapes the module.
#
# This test exercises the new do_chmod_at() wrapper via the
# t_chmod_secure helper. The helper sets up two scenarios:
# - a parent dir-symlink that resolves WITHIN the module tree
# (legitimate -K-style use, must continue to work)
# - a parent dir-symlink that escapes the module tree (the
# attack, must be rejected)
# plus two regression scenarios (plain relative path, top-level
# file) that just confirm the safe wrapper doesn't break the
# normal case.
#
# The kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path resolution is
# only available on Linux 5.6+, FreeBSD 13+, and macOS 15+.
# Skip on platforms that fall back to per-component O_NOFOLLOW
# (Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Cygwin); the per-component fallback
# would also reject the attack but the legitimate dir-symlink
# scenario would fail there.
. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
case "$(uname -s)" in
SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
test_skipped "do_chmod_at relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
;;
esac
mod="$scratchdir/module"
trap_outside="$scratchdir/trap"
rm -rf "$mod" "$trap_outside"
mkdir -p "$mod/realdir" "$trap_outside"
# Set up the four file-system objects the helper expects:
echo bystander > "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
chmod 0600 "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
echo target > "$trap_outside/sentinel"
chmod 0600 "$trap_outside/sentinel"
ln -s realdir "$mod/inside_link"
ln -s ../trap "$mod/escape_link"
echo top > "$mod/topfile"
chmod 0600 "$mod/topfile"
"$TOOLDIR/t_chmod_secure" "$mod" || \
test_fail "t_chmod_secure reported failures (see stderr above)"
# Sanity-check from the shell side too: the outside file's mode must
# still be 0600 -- the helper checked this, but a second look from
# the shell guards against a helper-internal stat() bug.
mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null \
|| stat -f '%Lp' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then
test_fail "outside sentinel mode changed from 600 to $mode -- chmod escaped the module"
fi
exit 0

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2004-2021 Wayne Davison
# Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2004-2021 Wayne Davison
# Copyright (C) 2004-2022 Wayne Davison
# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
# COPYING).

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
case $0 in
*fake*)
$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] xattrs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync needs xattrs for fake device tests"
$RSYNC -VV | grep '"xattrs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync needs xattrs for fake device tests"
RSYNC="$RSYNC --fake-super"
TLS_ARGS="$TLS_ARGS --fake-super"
case "$HOST_OS" in

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
#!/bin/sh
# clean-fname-underflow.test
# Ensure clean_fname() does not read-before-buffer when collapsing "..".
# This exercises the --server path where a crafted merge filename hits clean_fname().
#
# Usage:
# ./configure && make
# make check TESTS='clean-fname-underflow.test'
set -eu
# clean_fname() is platform-agnostic; the test only needs to run on one
# host. Skip on non-Linux to avoid quirks in older /bin/sh implementations
# (Solaris exited silently here, producing an empty log under set -eu).
# runtests.sh expects $scratchdir/whyskipped to exist when a test exits 77.
case "$(uname -s)" in
Linux) ;;
*)
if [ -n "${scratchdir:-}" ]; then
echo "Linux-only test (uname -s = $(uname -s))" > "$scratchdir/whyskipped"
fi
exit 77 ;;
esac
# Try to find the just-built rsync binary if RSYNC_BIN isn't set.
if [ -z "${RSYNC_BIN:-}" ]; then
if [ -x "./rsync" ]; then
RSYNC_BIN=$(pwd)/rsync
elif [ -x "../rsync" ]; then
RSYNC_BIN=$(cd .. && pwd)/rsync
else
RSYNC_BIN=rsync
fi
fi
workdir="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/rsync-clean-fname.$$"
mkdir -p "$workdir"
trap 'rm -rf "$workdir"' EXIT INT TERM
cd "$workdir"
# Minimal rsyncd.conf using chroot so the crafted path reaches the server parser.
cat > rsyncd.conf <<'EOF'
pid file = rsyncd.pid
use chroot = true
[mod]
path = ./mod
read only = false
EOF
mkdir -p mod
# Start daemon on a random high port.
PORT=$(awk 'BEGIN{srand(); printf "%d", 20000+int(rand()*20000)}')
"$RSYNC_BIN" --daemon --no-detach --config=rsyncd.conf --port="$PORT" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
DAEMON_PID=$!
# Give the daemon a moment to come up.
# Use integer second; subsecond sleep is not portable (e.g. Solaris /usr/bin/sleep).
sleep 1
# Invoke the server-side path. We don't need a real transfer; we just want to
# ensure clean_fname() doesn't crash when given "a/../test" via --filter=merge.
EXIT_OK=0
if "$RSYNC_BIN" --server --sender -vlr --filter='merge a/../test' . mod/ >/dev/null 2>&1; then
EXIT_OK=1
else
status=$?
# Non-zero exit is expected for bogus input; ensure it wasn't a signal/crash.
if [ $status -lt 128 ]; then
EXIT_OK=1
fi
fi
kill "$DAEMON_PID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ "$EXIT_OK" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "clean-fname-underflow.test: rsync exited due to a signal or unexpected status"
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: clean_fname() handled 'a/../test' without crashing"
exit 0

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