util1: handle out-of-range times in timestring

fixes a one byte stack overflow when using RSYNC_PROXY with a
malicious proxy.

Reach: only when RSYNC_PROXY is set and a malicious or MITM'd
proxy returns the pathological response.  The byte written is
always '\0' and the attacker doesn't choose the offset, so impact
is corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
misbehaviour or crash -- no information disclosure beyond the
existing rprintf of buffer contents.

Reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich

.cirrus.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 freebsd_task:
   name: FreeBSD
   freebsd_instance:
-    image_family: freebsd-13-0
+    image_family: freebsd-13-1
   env:
     PATH: /usr/local/bin:$PATH
   prep_script:

.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+name: Test rsync on AlmaLinux 8
+
+# Older-LTS coverage on the Fedora/RHEL family to help with backporting
+# security fixes. AlmaLinux 8 is the RHEL 8 rebuild and is the oldest
+# active LTS in this family (RHEL 8 full support runs to 2029).
+# GitHub Actions has no native runner for this family, so the job runs
+# inside an almalinux:8 container hosted on ubuntu-latest.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/almalinux-8-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container:
+      image: almalinux:8
+    name: Test rsync on AlmaLinux 8
+    steps:
+    - name: install git
+      # actions/checkout needs git in the container before the checkout step.
+      run: dnf -y install git
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: prep
+      # PowerTools is needed for libzstd-devel etc; xxhash and lz4 dev
+      # headers live in EPEL on RHEL 8. The default python3 on RHEL 8
+      # is 3.6, which is too old for runtests.py (uses capture_output=
+      # / text= introduced in 3.7), so install python39 and point
+      # /usr/bin/python3 at it.
+      run: |
+        dnf -y install epel-release
+        dnf config-manager --set-enabled powertools
+        dnf -y install gcc gcc-c++ make autoconf automake m4 \
+            python39 python39-pip diffutils \
+            openssl openssl-devel \
+            attr libattr-devel acl libacl-devel \
+            zstd libzstd-devel \
+            lz4 lz4-devel \
+            xxhash xxhash-devel
+        alternatives --set python3 /usr/bin/python3.9
+        pip3 install commonmark
+    - name: configure
+      run: ./configure --with-rrsync
+    - name: make
+      run: make
+    - name: info
+      run: ./rsync --version
+    - name: check
+      # In the container we already run as root, so no sudo. The
+      # crtimes-not-supported skip matches the other Linux jobs.
+      run: RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
+    - name: ssl file list
+      run: ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: almalinux-8-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-name: build
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches: [ master ]
-    paths-ignore: [ .cirrus.yml ]
-  pull_request:
-    branches: [ master ]
-    paths-ignore: [ .cirrus.yml ]
-  schedule:
-    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
-
-jobs:
-
-  ubuntu-build:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
-    - name: prep
-      run: |
-        sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl wget
-        wget -O git-version.h https://gist.githubusercontent.com/WayneD/c11243fa374fc64d4e42f2855c8e3827/raw/rsync-git-version.h
-        echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
-    - name: configure
-      run: ./configure --with-rrsync
-    - name: make
-      run: make
-    - name: install
-      run: sudo make install
-    - name: info
-      run: rsync --version
-    - name: check
-      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
-    - name: check30
-      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
-    - name: check29
-      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
-    - name: ssl file list
-      run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
-    - name: save artifact
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
-      with:
-        name: ubuntu-bin
-        path: |
-          rsync
-          rsync-ssl
-          rsync.1
-          rsync-ssl.1
-          rsyncd.conf.5
-          rrsync.1
-          rrsync
-
-  macos-build:
-    runs-on: macos-latest
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
-    - name: prep
-      run: |
-        brew install automake openssl xxhash zstd lz4 wget
-        sudo pip3 install commonmark
-        wget -O git-version.h https://gist.githubusercontent.com/WayneD/c11243fa374fc64d4e42f2855c8e3827/raw/rsync-git-version.h
-        echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
-    - name: configure
-      run: CPPFLAGS=-I/usr/local/opt/openssl/include/ LDFLAGS=-L/usr/local/opt/openssl/lib/ ./configure --with-rrsync
-    - name: make
-      run: make
-    - name: install
-      run: sudo make install
-    - name: info
-      run: rsync --version
-    - name: check
-      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,chmod-temp-dir,chown-fake,devices-fake,dir-sgid,protected-regular,xattrs-hlink,xattrs make check
-    - name: ssl file list
-      run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
-    - name: save artifact
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
-      with:
-        name: macos-bin
-        path: |
-          rsync
-          rsync-ssl
-          rsync.1
-          rsync-ssl.1
-          rsyncd.conf.5
-          rrsync.1
-          rrsync
-
-  cygwin-build:
-    runs-on: windows-2022
-    if: (github.event_name == 'schedule' || contains(github.event.head_commit.message, '[buildall]'))
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
-    - name: cygwin
-      run: choco install -y --no-progress cygwin cyg-get
-    - name: prep
-      run: |
-        cyg-get make autoconf automake gcc-core attr libattr-devel python39 python39-pip libzstd-devel liblz4-devel libssl-devel libxxhash0 libxxhash-devel
-        curl.exe -o git-version.h https://gist.githubusercontent.com/WayneD/c11243fa374fc64d4e42f2855c8e3827/raw/rsync-git-version.h
-        echo "C:/tools/cygwin/bin" >>$Env:GITHUB_PATH
-    - name: commonmark
-      run: bash -c 'python3 -mpip install --user commonmark'
-    - name: configure
-      run: bash -c './configure --with-rrsync'
-    - name: make
-      run: bash -c 'make'
-    - name: install
-      run: bash -c 'make install'
-    - name: info
-      run: bash -c '/usr/local/bin/rsync --version'
-    - name: check
-      run: bash -c 'RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,acls,chown,devices,dir-sgid,protected-regular make check'
-    - name: ssl file list
-      run: bash -c 'PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true'
-    - name: save artifact
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
-      with:
-        name: cygwin-bin
-        path: |
-          rsync.exe
-          rsync-ssl
-          rsync.1
-          rsync-ssl.1
-          rsyncd.conf.5
-          rrsync.1
-          rrsync

.github/workflows/cygwin-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+name: Test rsync on Cygwin
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/cygwin-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/cygwin-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: windows-2022
+    name: Test rsync on Cygwin
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: cygwin
+      run: choco install -y --no-progress cygwin cyg-get
+    - name: prep
+      run: |
+        cyg-get make autoconf automake gcc-core attr libattr-devel python39 python39-pip libzstd-devel liblz4-devel libssl-devel libxxhash0 libxxhash-devel
+        echo "C:/tools/cygwin/bin" >>$Env:GITHUB_PATH
+    - name: commonmark
+      run: bash -c 'python3 -mpip install --user commonmark'
+    - name: configure
+      run: bash -c './configure --with-rrsync'
+    - name: make
+      run: bash -c 'make'
+    - name: install
+      run: bash -c 'make install'
+    - name: info
+      run: bash -c '/usr/local/bin/rsync --version'
+    - name: check
+      run: bash -c 'RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,acls,bare-do-open-symlink-race,chdir-symlink-race,chmod-symlink-race,chown,clean-fname-underflow,daemon-chroot-acl,devices,dir-sgid,protected-regular,sender-flist-symlink-leak,simd-checksum,symlink-dirlink-basis make check'
+    - name: ssl file list
+      run: bash -c 'PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true'
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: cygwin-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync.exe
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/freebsd-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Test rsync on FreeBSD
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/freebsd-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/freebsd-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: Test rsync on FreeBSD
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: Test in FreeBSD VM
+      id: test
+      uses: vmactions/freebsd-vm@v1
+      with:
+        usesh: true
+        prepare: |
+          pkg install -y bash autotools m4 devel/xxhash zstd liblz4 python3 archivers/liblz4 git
+        run: |
+          freebsd-version
+          ./configure --with-rrsync -disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
+          make
+          ./rsync --version
+          make check
+          ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: freebsd-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/macos-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+name: Test rsync on macOS
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/macos-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/macos-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: macos-latest
+    name: Test rsync on macOS
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: prep
+      run: |
+        brew install automake openssl xxhash zstd lz4
+        pip3 install --user --break-system-packages commonmark
+        echo "$(brew --prefix)/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
+    - name: configure
+      run: |
+        BREW_PREFIX=$(brew --prefix)
+        OPENSSL_PREFIX=$(brew --prefix openssl)
+        CPPFLAGS="-I${BREW_PREFIX}/include -I${OPENSSL_PREFIX}/include" \
+        LDFLAGS="-L${BREW_PREFIX}/lib -L${OPENSSL_PREFIX}/lib" \
+        ./configure --with-rrsync
+    - name: make
+      run: make
+    - name: install
+      run: sudo make install
+    - name: info
+      run: rsync --version
+    - name: check
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=acls-default,chmod-temp-dir,chown-fake,clean-fname-underflow,daemon-chroot-acl,devices-fake,dir-sgid,protected-regular,simd-checksum,xattrs-hlink,xattrs make check
+    - name: ssl file list
+      run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: macos-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+name: Test rsync on NetBSD
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/netbsd-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: Test rsync on NetBSD
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: Test in NetBSD VM
+      id: test
+      uses: vmactions/netbsd-vm@v1
+      with:
+        usesh: true
+        prepare: |
+          PATH=/usr/sbin:$PATH pkg_add autoconf automake python312
+          ln -sf /usr/pkg/bin/python3.12 /usr/pkg/bin/python3
+        run: |
+          uname -a
+          ./configure --with-rrsync --disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
+          make
+          ./rsync --version
+          make check
+          ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: netbsd-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+name: Test rsync on OpenBSD
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/openbsd-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: Test rsync on OpenBSD
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: Test in OpenBSD VM
+      id: test
+      uses: vmactions/openbsd-vm@v1
+      with:
+        usesh: true
+        prepare: |
+          pkg_add -I bash autoconf%2.71 automake%1.16
+        run: |
+          uname -a
+          export AUTOCONF_VERSION=2.71
+          export AUTOMAKE_VERSION=1.16
+          ./configure --with-rrsync --disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
+          make
+          ./rsync --version
+          make check
+          ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: openbsd-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/solaris-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Test rsync on Solaris
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/solaris-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/solaris-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: Test rsync on Solaris
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: Test in Solaris VM
+      id: test
+      uses: vmactions/solaris-vm@v1
+      with:
+        usesh: true
+        prepare: |
+          pkg install bash automake gnu-m4 pkg://solaris/runtime/python-35 autoconf gcc git
+        run: |
+          uname -a
+          ./configure --with-rrsync -disable-zstd --disable-md2man --disable-xxhash --disable-lz4
+          make
+          ./rsync --version
+          make check
+          ./rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: solaris-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+name: Test rsync on Ubuntu 22.04
+
+# Older-LTS coverage to help with backporting security fixes. ubuntu-22.04
+# is currently the oldest GitHub Actions runner image (20.04 was retired
+# in April 2025).
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-22.04-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
+    name: Test rsync on Ubuntu 22.04
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: prep
+      run: |
+        sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl
+        echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
+    - name: configure
+      run: ./configure --with-rrsync
+    - name: make
+      run: make
+    - name: install
+      run: sudo make install
+    - name: info
+      run: rsync --version
+    - name: check
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
+    - name: check30
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
+    - name: check29
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
+    - name: ssl file list
+      run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: ubuntu-22.04-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

.github/workflows/ubuntu-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+name: Test rsync on Ubuntu
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-build.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '.github/workflows/*.yml'
+      - '!.github/workflows/ubuntu-build.yml'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '42 8 * * *'
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: Test rsync on Ubuntu
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      with:
+        fetch-depth: 0
+    - name: prep
+      run: |
+        sudo apt-get install acl libacl1-dev attr libattr1-dev liblz4-dev libzstd-dev libxxhash-dev python3-cmarkgfm openssl
+        echo "/usr/local/bin" >>$GITHUB_PATH
+    - name: configure
+      run: ./configure --with-rrsync
+    - name: make
+      run: make
+    - name: install
+      run: sudo make install
+    - name: info
+      run: rsync --version
+    - name: check
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check
+    - name: check30
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check30
+    - name: check29
+      run: sudo RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED=crtimes make check29
+    - name: ssl file list
+      run: rsync-ssl --no-motd download.samba.org::rsyncftp/ || true
+    - name: save artifact
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      with:
+        name: ubuntu-bin
+        path: |
+          rsync
+          rsync-ssl
+          rsync.1
+          rsync-ssl.1
+          rsyncd.conf.5
+          rrsync.1
+          rrsync

Makefile.in

@@ -57,12 +57,13 @@ TLS_OBJ = tls.o syscall.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/perms
 
 # Programs we must have to run the test cases
 CHECK_PROGS = rsync$(EXEEXT) tls$(EXEEXT) getgroups$(EXEEXT) getfsdev$(EXEEXT) \
-	testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT)
+	testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT) \
+	t_secure_relpath$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT) simdtest$(EXEEXT)
 
 CHECK_SYMLINKS = testsuite/chown-fake.test testsuite/devices-fake.test testsuite/xattrs-hlink.test
 
 # Objects for CHECK_PROGS to clean
-CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
+CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o t_chmod_secure.o t_secure_relpath.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
 
 # note that the -I. is needed to handle config.h when using VPATH
 .c.o:
@@ -70,6 +71,8 @@ CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.
 	$(CC) -I. -I$(srcdir) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< @CC_SHOBJ_FLAG@
 @OBJ_RESTORE@
 
+# NOTE: consider running "packaging/smart-make" instead of "make" to auto-handle
+# any changes to configure.sh and the main Makefile prior to a "make all".
 all: Makefile rsync$(EXEEXT) stunnel-rsyncd.conf @MAKE_RRSYNC@ @MAKE_MAN@
 .PHONY: all
 
@@ -176,6 +179,14 @@ T_UNSAFE_OBJ = t_unsafe.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/sn
 t_unsafe$(EXEEXT): $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ)
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
 
+T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ = t_chmod_secure.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
+t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT): $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
+
+T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ = t_secure_relpath.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
+t_secure_relpath$(EXEEXT): $(T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_SECURE_RELPATH_OBJ) $(LIBS)
+
 .PHONY: conf
 conf: configure.sh config.h.in
 
@@ -332,6 +343,14 @@ wildtest.o: wildtest.c t_stub.o lib/wildmatch.c rsync.h config.h
 wildtest$(EXEEXT): wildtest.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o @BUILD_POPT@
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ wildtest.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o @BUILD_POPT@ $(LIBS)
 
+simdtest$(EXEEXT): simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp $(HEADERS)
+	@if test x"@ROLL_SIMD@" != x; then \
+	    $(CXX) -I. $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -DTEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 \
+	        -o $@ $(srcdir)/simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp @ROLL_ASM@ $(LIBS); \
+	else \
+	    touch $@; \
+	fi
+
 testsuite/chown-fake.test:
 	ln -s chown.test $(srcdir)/testsuite/chown-fake.test
 

NEWS.md

@@ -1,3 +1,103 @@
+# NEWS for rsync 3.2.7 (20 Oct 2022)
+
+## Changes in this version:
+
+### BUG FIXES:
+
+- Fixed the client-side validating of the remote sender's filtering behavior.
+
+- More fixes for the "unrequested file-list name" name, including a copy of
+  "/" with `--relative` enabled and a copy with a lot of related paths with
+  `--relative` enabled (often derived from a `--files-from` list).
+
+- When rsync gets an unpack error on an ACL, mention the filename.
+
+- Avoid over-setting sanitize_paths when a daemon is serving "/" (even if
+  "use chroot" is false).
+
+### ENHANCEMENTS:
+
+- Added negotiated daemon-auth support that allows a stronger checksum digest
+  to be used to validate a user's login to the daemon.  Added SHA512, SHA256,
+  and SHA1 digests to MD5 & MD4.  These new digests are at the highest priority
+  in the new daemon-auth negotiation list.
+
+- Added support for the SHA1 digest in file checksums.  While this tends to be
+  overkill, it is available if someone really needs it.  This overly-long
+  checksum is at the lowest priority in the normal checksum negotiation list.
+  See [`--checksum-choice`](rsync.1#opt) (`--cc`) and the `RSYNC_CHECKSUM_LIST`
+  environment var for how to customize this.
+
+- Improved the xattr hash table to use a 64-bit key without slowing down the
+  key's computation.  This should make extra sure that a hash collision doesn't
+  happen.
+
+- If the `--version` option is repeated (e.g. `-VV`) then the information is
+  output in a (still readable) JSON format.  Client side only.
+
+- The script `support/json-rsync-version` is available to get the JSON style
+  version output from any rsync.  The script accepts either text on stdin
+  **or** an arg that specifies an rsync executable to run with a doubled
+  `--version` option.  If the text we get isn't already in JSON format, it is
+  converted. Newer rsync versions will provide more complete json info than
+  older rsync versions. Various tweaks are made to keep the flag names
+  consistent across versions.
+
+- The [`use chroot`](rsyncd.conf.5#) daemon parameter now defaults to "unset"
+  so that rsync can use chroot when it works and a sanitized copy when chroot
+  is not supported (e.g., for a non-root daemon).  Explicitly setting the
+  parameter to true or false (on or off) behaves the same way as before.
+
+- The `--fuzzy` option was optimized a bit to try to cut down on the amount of
+  computations when considering a big pool of files. The simple heuristic from
+  Kenneth Finnegan resuled in about a 2x speedup.
+
+- If rsync is forced to use protocol 29 or before (perhaps due to talking to an
+  rsync before 3.0.0), the modify time of a file is limited to 4-bytes.  Rsync
+  now interprets this value as an unsigned integer so that a current year past
+  2038 can continue to be represented. This does mean that years prior to 1970
+  cannot be represented in an older protocol, but this trade-off seems like the
+  right choice given that (1) 2038 is very rapidly approaching, and (2) newer
+  protocols support a much wider range of old and new dates.
+
+- The rsync client now treats an empty destination arg as an error, just like
+  it does for an empty source arg. This doesn't affect a `host:` arg (which is
+  treated the same as `host:.`) since the arg is not completely empty.  The use
+  of [`--old-args`](rsync.1#opt) (including via `RSYNC_OLD_ARGS`) allows the
+  prior behavior of treating an empty destination arg as a ".".
+
+### PACKAGING RELATED:
+
+- The checksum code now uses openssl's EVP methods, which gets rid of various
+  deprecation warnings and makes it easy to support more digest methods.  On
+  newer systems, the MD4 digest is marked as legacy in the openssl code, which
+  makes openssl refuse to support it via EVP.  You can choose to ignore this
+  and allow rsync's MD4 code to be used for older rsync connections (when
+  talking to an rsync prior to 3.0.0) or you can choose to configure rsync to
+  tell openssl to enable legacy algorithms (see below).
+
+- A simple openssl config file is supplied that can be installed for rsync to
+  use.  If you install packaging/openssl-rsync.cnf to a public spot (such as
+  `/etc/ssl/openssl-rsync.cnf`) and then run configure with the option
+  `--with-openssl-conf=/path/name.cnf`, this will cause rsync to export the
+  configured path in the OPENSSL_CONF environment variable (when the variable
+  is not already set).  This will enable openssl's MD4 code for rsync to use.
+
+- The packager may wish to include an explicit "use chroot = true" in the top
+  section of their supplied /etc/rsyncd.conf file if the daemon is being
+  installed to run as the root user (though rsync should behave the same even
+  with the value unset, a little extra paranoia doesn't hurt).
+
+- I've noticed that some packagers haven't installed support/nameconvert for
+  users to use in their chrooted rsync configs.  Even if it is not installed
+  as an executable script (to avoid a python3 dependency) it would be good to
+  install it with the other rsync-related support scripts.
+
+- It would be good to add support/json-rsync-version to the list of installed
+  support scripts.
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 # NEWS for rsync 3.2.6 (9 Sep 2022)
 
 ## Changes in this version:
@@ -4592,6 +4692,7 @@
 
 | RELEASE DATE | VER.   | DATE OF COMMIT\* | PROTOCOL    |
 |--------------|--------|------------------|-------------|
+| 20 Oct 2022  | 3.2.7  |                  | 31          |
 | 09 Sep 2022  | 3.2.6  |                  | 31          |
 | 14 Aug 2022  | 3.2.5  |                  | 31          |
 | 15 Apr 2022  | 3.2.4  |                  | 31          |

access.c

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static void make_mask(char *mask, int plen, int addrlen)
 	return;
 }
 
-static int match_address(const char *addr, const char *tok)
+static int match_address(const char *addr, char *tok)
 {
 	char *p;
 	struct addrinfo hints, *resa, *rest;

acls.c

@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ static int get_rsync_acl(const char *fname, rsync_acl *racl,
 
 		sys_acl_free_acl(sacl);
 		if (!ok) {
+			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "get_acl: unpack_smb_acl(%s)", fname);
 			return -1;
 		}
 	} else if (no_acl_syscall_error(errno)) {
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ static uint32 recv_acl_access(int f, uchar *name_follows_ptr)
 static uchar recv_ida_entries(int f, ida_entries *ent)
 {
 	uchar computed_mask_bits = 0;
-	int i, count = read_varint(f);
+	int i, count = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_ACL_COUNT, "ACL count");
 
 	ent->idas = count ? new_array(id_access, count) : NULL;
 	ent->count = count;
@@ -712,7 +713,7 @@ static uchar recv_ida_entries(int f, ida_entries *ent)
 			else
 				id = recv_group_name(f, id, NULL);
 		} else if (access & NAME_IS_USER) {
-			if (inc_recurse && am_root && !numeric_ids)
+			if (inc_recurse && !numeric_ids)
 				id = match_uid(id);
 		} else {
 			if (inc_recurse && (!am_root || !numeric_ids))

authenticate.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Support rsync daemon authentication.
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2000 Andrew Tridgell
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2020 Wayne Davison
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2022 Wayne Davison
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 
 extern int read_only;
 extern char *password_file;
+extern struct name_num_obj valid_auth_checksums;
 
 /***************************************************************************
 encode a buffer using base64 - simple and slow algorithm. null terminates
@@ -72,9 +73,9 @@ static void gen_challenge(const char *addr, char *challenge)
 	SIVAL(input, 20, tv.tv_usec);
 	SIVAL(input, 24, getpid());
 
-	sum_init(-1, 0);
+	len = sum_init(valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni, 0);
 	sum_update(input, sizeof input);
-	len = sum_end(digest);
+	sum_end(digest);
 
 	base64_encode(digest, len, challenge, 0);
 }
@@ -86,10 +87,10 @@ static void generate_hash(const char *in, const char *challenge, char *out)
 	char buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
 	int len;
 
-	sum_init(-1, 0);
+	len = sum_init(valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni, 0);
 	sum_update(in, strlen(in));
 	sum_update(challenge, strlen(challenge));
-	len = sum_end(buf);
+	sum_end(buf);
 
 	base64_encode(buf, len, out, 0);
 }
@@ -238,6 +239,7 @@ char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
 	if (!users || !*users)
 		return "";
 
+	negotiate_daemon_auth(f_out, 0);
 	gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
 
 	io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
@@ -350,6 +352,7 @@ void auth_client(int fd, const char *user, const char *challenge)
 
 	if (!user || !*user)
 		user = "nobody";
+	negotiate_daemon_auth(-1, 1);
 
 	if (!(pass = getpassf(password_file))
 	 && !(pass = getenv("RSYNC_PASSWORD"))) {

backup.c

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int validate_backup_dir(void)
 {
 	STRUCT_STAT st;
 
-	if (do_lstat(backup_dir_buf, &st) < 0) {
+	if (do_lstat_at(backup_dir_buf, &st) < 0) {
 		if (errno == ENOENT)
 			return 0;
 		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "backup lstat %s failed", backup_dir_buf);
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static BOOL copy_valid_path(const char *fname)
 	for ( ; b; name = b + 1, b = strchr(name, '/')) {
 		*b = '\0';
 
-		while (do_mkdir(backup_dir_buf, ACCESSPERMS) < 0) {
+		while (do_mkdir_at(backup_dir_buf, ACCESSPERMS) < 0) {
 			if (errno == EEXIST) {
 				val = validate_backup_dir();
 				if (val > 0)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static inline int link_or_rename(const char *from, const char *to,
 		if (IS_SPECIAL(stp->st_mode) || IS_DEVICE(stp->st_mode))
 			return 0; /* Use copy code. */
 #endif
-		if (do_link(from, to) == 0) {
+		if (do_link_at(from, to) == 0) {
 			if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
 				rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: HLINK %s successful.\n", from);
 			return 2;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline int link_or_rename(const char *from, const char *to,
 			return 0;
 	}
 #endif
-	if (do_rename(from, to) == 0) {
+	if (do_rename_at(from, to) == 0) {
 		if (stp->st_nlink > 1 && !S_ISDIR(stp->st_mode)) {
 			/* If someone has hard-linked the file into the backup
 			 * dir, rename() might return success but do nothing! */
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
 		goto success;
 	if (errno == EEXIST || errno == EISDIR) {
 		STRUCT_STAT bakst;
-		if (do_lstat(buf, &bakst) == 0) {
+		if (do_lstat_at(buf, &bakst) == 0) {
 			int flags = get_del_for_flag(bakst.st_mode) | DEL_FOR_BACKUP | DEL_RECURSE;
 			if (delete_item(buf, bakst.st_mode, flags) != 0)
 				return 0;
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
 	/* Check to see if this is a device file, or link */
 	if ((am_root && preserve_devices && IS_DEVICE(file->mode))
 	 || (preserve_specials && IS_SPECIAL(file->mode))) {
-		if (do_mknod(buf, file->mode, sx.st.st_rdev) < 0)
+		if (do_mknod_at(buf, file->mode, sx.st.st_rdev) < 0)
 			rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "mknod %s failed", full_fname(buf));
 		else if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
 			rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: DEVICE %s successful.\n", fname);
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ int make_backup(const char *fname, BOOL prefer_rename)
 			}
 			ret = 2;
 		} else {
-			if (do_symlink(sl, buf) < 0)
+			if (do_symlink_at(sl, buf) < 0)
 				rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "link %s -> \"%s\"", full_fname(buf), sl);
 			else if (DEBUG_GTE(BACKUP, 1))
 				rprintf(FINFO, "make_backup: SYMLINK %s successful.\n", fname);

checksum.c

@@ -42,49 +42,95 @@ extern int protocol_version;
 extern int proper_seed_order;
 extern const char *checksum_choice;
 
+#define NNI_BUILTIN (1<<0)
+#define NNI_EVP (1<<1)
+#define NNI_EVP_OK (1<<2)
+
 struct name_num_item valid_checksums_items[] = {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
-	{ CSUM_XXH3_128, "xxh128", NULL },
-	{ CSUM_XXH3_64, "xxh3", NULL },
+	{ CSUM_XXH3_128, 0, "xxh128", NULL },
+	{ CSUM_XXH3_64, 0, "xxh3", NULL },
 #endif
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
-	{ CSUM_XXH64, "xxh64", NULL },
-	{ CSUM_XXH64, "xxhash", NULL },
+	{ CSUM_XXH64, 0, "xxh64", NULL },
+	{ CSUM_XXH64, 0, "xxhash", NULL },
 #endif
-	{ CSUM_MD5, "md5", NULL },
-	{ CSUM_MD4, "md4", NULL },
-	{ CSUM_NONE, "none", NULL },
-	{ 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ CSUM_MD5, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md5", NULL },
+	{ CSUM_MD4, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md4", NULL },
+#ifdef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	{ CSUM_SHA1, NNI_EVP, "sha1", NULL },
+#endif
+	{ CSUM_NONE, 0, "none", NULL },
+	{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct name_num_obj valid_checksums = {
-	"checksum", NULL, NULL, 0, 0, valid_checksums_items
+	"checksum", NULL, 0, 0, valid_checksums_items
 };
 
-int xfersum_type = 0; /* used for the file transfer checksums */
-int checksum_type = 0; /* used for the pre-transfer (--checksum) checksums */
+struct name_num_item valid_auth_checksums_items[] = {
+#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	{ CSUM_SHA512, NNI_EVP, "sha512", NULL },
+#endif
+#ifdef SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	{ CSUM_SHA256, NNI_EVP, "sha256", NULL },
+#endif
+#ifdef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	{ CSUM_SHA1, NNI_EVP, "sha1", NULL },
+#endif
+	{ CSUM_MD5, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md5", NULL },
+	{ CSUM_MD4, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP, "md4", NULL },
+	{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct name_num_obj valid_auth_checksums = {
+	"daemon auth checksum", NULL, 0, 0, valid_auth_checksums_items
+};
+
+/* These cannot make use of openssl, so they're marked just as built-in */
+struct name_num_item implied_checksum_md4 =
+    { CSUM_MD4, NNI_BUILTIN, "md4", NULL };
+struct name_num_item implied_checksum_md5 =
+    { CSUM_MD5, NNI_BUILTIN, "md5", NULL };
+
+struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni; /* used for the transfer checksum2 computations */
+int xfer_sum_len;
+struct name_num_item *file_sum_nni; /* used for the pre-transfer --checksum computations */
+int file_sum_len, file_sum_extra_cnt;
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+const EVP_MD *xfer_sum_evp_md;
+const EVP_MD *file_sum_evp_md;
+EVP_MD_CTX *ctx_evp = NULL;
+#endif
 
 static int initialized_choices = 0;
 
-int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
+struct name_num_item *parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
 {
 	struct name_num_item *nni;
 
 	if (len < 0 && name)
 		len = strlen(name);
 
-	if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
-		if (protocol_version >= 30)
-			return CSUM_MD5;
-		if (protocol_version >= 27)
-			return CSUM_MD4_OLD;
-		if (protocol_version >= 21)
-			return CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
-		return CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC;
-	}
+	init_checksum_choices();
 
-	if (!initialized_choices)
-		init_checksum_choices();
+	if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
+		if (protocol_version >= 30) {
+			if (!proper_seed_order)
+				return &implied_checksum_md5;
+			name = "md5";
+			len = 3;
+		} else {
+			if (protocol_version >= 27)
+				implied_checksum_md4.num = CSUM_MD4_OLD;
+			else if (protocol_version >= 21)
+				implied_checksum_md4.num = CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
+			else
+				implied_checksum_md4.num = CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC;
+			return &implied_checksum_md4;
+		}
+	}
 
 	nni = get_nni_by_name(&valid_checksums, name, len);
 
@@ -93,44 +139,74 @@ int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 	}
 
-	return nni->num;
+	return nni;
 }
 
-static const char *checksum_name(int num)
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+static const EVP_MD *csum_evp_md(struct name_num_item *nni)
 {
-	struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_num(&valid_checksums, num);
+	const EVP_MD *emd;
+	if (!(nni->flags & NNI_EVP))
+		return NULL;
 
-	return nni ? nni->name : num < CSUM_MD4 ? "md4" : "UNKNOWN";
+#ifdef USE_MD5_ASM
+	if (nni->num == CSUM_MD5)
+		emd = NULL;
+	else
+#endif
+		emd = EVP_get_digestbyname(nni->name);                                               
+	if (emd && !(nni->flags & NNI_EVP_OK)) { /* Make sure it works before we advertise it */
+		if (!ctx_evp && !(ctx_evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
+			out_of_memory("csum_evp_md");
+		/* Some routines are marked as legacy and are not enabled in the openssl.cnf file.
+		 * If we can't init the emd, we'll fall back to our built-in code. */
+		if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx_evp, emd, NULL) == 0)
+			emd = NULL;
+		else
+			nni->flags = (nni->flags & ~NNI_BUILTIN) | NNI_EVP_OK;
+	}
+	if (!emd)
+		nni->flags &= ~NNI_EVP;
+	return emd;
 }
+#endif
 
 void parse_checksum_choice(int final_call)
 {
-	if (valid_checksums.negotiated_name)
-		xfersum_type = checksum_type = valid_checksums.negotiated_num;
+	if (valid_checksums.negotiated_nni)
+		xfer_sum_nni = file_sum_nni = valid_checksums.negotiated_nni;
 	else {
-		char *cp = checksum_choice ? strchr(checksum_choice, ',') : NULL;
+		const char *cp = checksum_choice ? strchr(checksum_choice, ',') : NULL;
 		if (cp) {
-			xfersum_type = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, cp - checksum_choice);
-			checksum_type = parse_csum_name(cp+1, -1);
+			xfer_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, cp - checksum_choice);
+			file_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(cp+1, -1);
 		} else
-			xfersum_type = checksum_type = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, -1);
+			xfer_sum_nni = file_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(checksum_choice, -1);
 		if (am_server && checksum_choice)
-			validate_choice_vs_env(NSTR_CHECKSUM, xfersum_type, checksum_type);
+			validate_choice_vs_env(NSTR_CHECKSUM, xfer_sum_nni->num, file_sum_nni->num);
 	}
+	xfer_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(xfer_sum_nni->num, 0);
+	file_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(file_sum_nni->num, 0);
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	xfer_sum_evp_md = csum_evp_md(xfer_sum_nni);
+	file_sum_evp_md = csum_evp_md(file_sum_nni);
+#endif
 
-	if (xfersum_type == CSUM_NONE)
+	file_sum_extra_cnt = (file_sum_len + EXTRA_LEN - 1) / EXTRA_LEN;
+
+	if (xfer_sum_nni->num == CSUM_NONE)
 		whole_file = 1;
 
 	/* Snag the checksum name for both write_batch's option output & the following debug output. */
-	if (valid_checksums.negotiated_name)
-		checksum_choice = valid_checksums.negotiated_name;
+	if (valid_checksums.negotiated_nni)
+		checksum_choice = valid_checksums.negotiated_nni->name;
 	else if (checksum_choice == NULL)
-		checksum_choice = checksum_name(xfersum_type);
+		checksum_choice = xfer_sum_nni->name;
 
 	if (final_call && DEBUG_GTE(NSTR, am_server ? 3 : 1)) {
 		rprintf(FINFO, "%s%s checksum: %s\n",
 			am_server ? "Server" : "Client",
-			valid_checksums.negotiated_name ? " negotiated" : "",
+			valid_checksums.negotiated_nni ? " negotiated" : "",
 			checksum_choice);
 	}
 }
@@ -150,6 +226,18 @@ int csum_len_for_type(int cst, BOOL flist_csum)
 		return MD4_DIGEST_LEN;
 	  case CSUM_MD5:
 		return MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
+#ifdef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	  case CSUM_SHA1:
+		return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#endif
+#ifdef SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	  case CSUM_SHA256:
+		return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#endif
+#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+	  case CSUM_SHA512:
+		return SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#endif
 	  case CSUM_XXH64:
 	  case CSUM_XXH3_64:
 		return 64/8;
@@ -175,6 +263,9 @@ int canonical_checksum(int csum_type)
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_MD4:
 	  case CSUM_MD5:
+	  case CSUM_SHA1:
+	  case CSUM_SHA256:
+	  case CSUM_SHA512:
 		return -1;
 	  case CSUM_XXH64:
 	  case CSUM_XXH3_64:
@@ -211,7 +302,22 @@ uint32 get_checksum1(char *buf1, int32 len)
 
 void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
 {
-	switch (xfersum_type) {
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	if (xfer_sum_evp_md) {
+		static EVP_MD_CTX *evp = NULL;
+		uchar seedbuf[4];
+		if (!evp && !(evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
+			out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
+		EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, xfer_sum_evp_md, NULL);
+		if (checksum_seed) {
+			SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
+			EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, seedbuf, 4);
+		}
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, (uchar *)buf, len);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, (uchar *)sum, NULL);
+	} else
+#endif
+	switch (xfer_sum_nni->num) {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
 	  case CSUM_XXH64:
 		SIVAL64(sum, 0, XXH64(buf, len, checksum_seed));
@@ -229,7 +335,7 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
 	  }
 #endif
 	  case CSUM_MD5: {
-		md5_context m5;
+		md_context m5;
 		uchar seedbuf[4];
 		md5_begin(&m5);
 		if (proper_seed_order) {
@@ -249,20 +355,6 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
 		break;
 	  }
 	  case CSUM_MD4:
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-	  {
-		MD4_CTX m4;
-		MD4_Init(&m4);
-		MD4_Update(&m4, (uchar *)buf, len);
-		if (checksum_seed) {
-			uchar seedbuf[4];
-			SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
-			MD4_Update(&m4, seedbuf, 4);
-		}
-		MD4_Final((uchar *)sum, &m4);
-		break;
-	  }
-#endif
 	  case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: {
@@ -273,9 +365,8 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
 
 		mdfour_begin(&m);
 
-		if (len > len1) {
-			if (buf1)
-				free(buf1);
+		if (len > len1 || !buf1) {
+			free(buf1);
 			buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
 			len1 = len;
 		}
@@ -295,7 +386,7 @@ void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
 		 * are multiples of 64.  This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
 		 * even when there are no more bytes.
 		 */
-		if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
+		if (len - i > 0 || xfer_sum_nni->num > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
 			mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
 
 		mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
@@ -313,15 +404,33 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
 	int32 remainder;
 	int fd;
 
-	memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
-
-	fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
-	if (fd == -1)
+	fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		memset(sum, 0, file_sum_len);
 		return;
+	}
 
 	buf = map_file(fd, len, MAX_MAP_SIZE, CHUNK_SIZE);
 
-	switch (checksum_type) {
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	if (file_sum_evp_md) {
+		static EVP_MD_CTX *evp = NULL;
+		if (!evp && !(evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
+			out_of_memory("file_checksum");
+
+		EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, file_sum_evp_md, NULL);
+
+		for (i = 0; i + CHUNK_SIZE <= len; i += CHUNK_SIZE)
+			EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
+
+		remainder = (int32)(len - i);
+		if (remainder > 0)
+			EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
+
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, (uchar *)sum, NULL);
+	} else
+#endif
+	switch (file_sum_nni->num) {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
 	  case CSUM_XXH64: {
 		static XXH64_state_t* state = NULL;
@@ -381,7 +490,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
 	  }
 #endif
 	  case CSUM_MD5: {
-		md5_context m5;
+		md_context m5;
 
 		md5_begin(&m5);
 
@@ -396,23 +505,6 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
 		break;
 	  }
 	  case CSUM_MD4:
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-	  {
-		MD4_CTX m4;
-
-		MD4_Init(&m4);
-
-		for (i = 0; i + CHUNK_SIZE <= len; i += CHUNK_SIZE)
-			MD4_Update(&m4, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CHUNK_SIZE), CHUNK_SIZE);
-
-		remainder = (int32)(len - i);
-		if (remainder > 0)
-			MD4_Update(&m4, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
-
-		MD4_Final((uchar *)sum, &m4);
-		break;
-	  }
-#endif
 	  case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: {
@@ -428,7 +520,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
 		 * are multiples of 64.  This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
 		 * even when there are no more bytes. */
 		remainder = (int32)(len - i);
-		if (remainder > 0 || checksum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
+		if (remainder > 0 || file_sum_nni->num > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
 			mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
 
 		mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
@@ -436,7 +528,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
 	  }
 	  default:
 		rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum-choice for --checksum: %s (%d)\n",
-			checksum_name(checksum_type), checksum_type);
+			file_sum_nni->name, file_sum_nni->num);
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 	}
 
@@ -445,30 +537,43 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
 }
 
 static int32 sumresidue;
-static union {
-	md_context md;
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-	MD4_CTX m4;
-#endif
-	md5_context m5;
-} ctx;
+static md_context ctx_md;
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
 static XXH64_state_t* xxh64_state;
 #endif
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
 static XXH3_state_t* xxh3_state;
 #endif
-static int cursum_type;
+static struct name_num_item *cur_sum_nni;
+int cur_sum_len;
 
-void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+static const EVP_MD *cur_sum_evp_md;
+#endif
+
+/* Initialize a hash digest accumulator.  Data is supplied via
+ * sum_update() and the resulting binary digest is retrieved via
+ * sum_end().  This only supports one active sum at a time. */
+int sum_init(struct name_num_item *nni, int seed)
 {
 	char s[4];
 
-	if (csum_type < 0)
-		csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
-	cursum_type = csum_type;
+	if (!nni)
+		nni = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
+	cur_sum_nni = nni;
+	cur_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(nni->num, 0);
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	cur_sum_evp_md = csum_evp_md(nni);
+#endif
 
-	switch (csum_type) {
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	if (cur_sum_evp_md) {
+		if (!ctx_evp && !(ctx_evp = EVP_MD_CTX_create()))
+			out_of_memory("file_checksum");
+		EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx_evp, cur_sum_evp_md, NULL);
+	} else
+#endif
+	switch (cur_sum_nni->num) {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
 	  case CSUM_XXH64:
 		if (!xxh64_state && !(xxh64_state = XXH64_createState()))
@@ -489,20 +594,16 @@ void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
 		break;
 #endif
 	  case CSUM_MD5:
-		md5_begin(&ctx.m5);
+		md5_begin(&ctx_md);
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_MD4:
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-		MD4_Init(&ctx.m4);
-#else
-		mdfour_begin(&ctx.md);
+		mdfour_begin(&ctx_md);
 		sumresidue = 0;
-#endif
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
-		mdfour_begin(&ctx.md);
+		mdfour_begin(&ctx_md);
 		sumresidue = 0;
 		SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
 		sum_update(s, 4);
@@ -512,19 +613,19 @@ void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
 	  default: /* paranoia to prevent missing case values */
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 	}
+
+	return cur_sum_len;
 }
 
-/**
- * Feed data into an MD4 accumulator, md.  The results may be
- * retrieved using sum_end().  md is used for different purposes at
- * different points during execution.
- *
- * @todo Perhaps get rid of md and just pass in the address each time.
- * Very slightly clearer and slower.
- **/
+/* Feed data into a hash digest accumulator. */
 void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
 {
-	switch (cursum_type) {
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	if (cur_sum_evp_md) {
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx_evp, (uchar *)p, len);
+	} else
+#endif
+	switch (cur_sum_nni->num) {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
 	  case CSUM_XXH64:
 		XXH64_update(xxh64_state, p, len);
@@ -539,39 +640,35 @@ void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
 		break;
 #endif
 	  case CSUM_MD5:
-		md5_update(&ctx.m5, (uchar *)p, len);
+		md5_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)p, len);
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_MD4:
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-		MD4_Update(&ctx.m4, (uchar *)p, len);
-		break;
-#endif
 	  case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
 		if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
-			memcpy(ctx.md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
+			memcpy(ctx_md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
 			sumresidue += len;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		if (sumresidue) {
 			int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
-			memcpy(ctx.md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
-			mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)ctx.md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
+			memcpy(ctx_md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
+			mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)ctx_md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
 			len -= i;
 			p += i;
 		}
 
 		while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
-			mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
+			mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
 			len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
 			p += CSUM_CHUNK;
 		}
 
 		sumresidue = len;
 		if (sumresidue)
-			memcpy(ctx.md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
+			memcpy(ctx_md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_NONE:
 		break;
@@ -580,13 +677,18 @@ void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
 	}
 }
 
-/* NOTE: all the callers of sum_end() pass in a pointer to a buffer that is
- * MAX_DIGEST_LEN in size, so even if the csum-len is shorter than that (i.e.
- * CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC), we don't have to worry about limiting the data we write
- * into the "sum" buffer. */
-int sum_end(char *sum)
+/* The sum buffer only needs to be as long as the current checksum's digest
+ * len, not MAX_DIGEST_LEN. Note that for CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC that is the full
+ * MD4_DIGEST_LEN even if the file-list code is going to ignore all but the
+ * first 2 bytes of it. */
+void sum_end(char *sum)
 {
-	switch (cursum_type) {
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	if (cur_sum_evp_md) {
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx_evp, (uchar *)sum, NULL);
+	} else
+#endif
+	switch (cur_sum_nni->num) {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XXHASH
 	  case CSUM_XXH64:
 		SIVAL64(sum, 0, XXH64_digest(xxh64_state));
@@ -604,22 +706,18 @@ int sum_end(char *sum)
 	  }
 #endif
 	  case CSUM_MD5:
-		md5_result(&ctx.m5, (uchar *)sum);
+		md5_result(&ctx_md, (uchar *)sum);
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_MD4:
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-		MD4_Final((uchar *)sum, &ctx.m4);
-		break;
-#endif
 	  case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
-		mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)ctx.md.buffer, sumresidue);
-		mdfour_result(&ctx.md, (uchar *)sum);
+		mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)ctx_md.buffer, sumresidue);
+		mdfour_result(&ctx_md, (uchar *)sum);
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
 	  case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
 		if (sumresidue)
-			mdfour_update(&ctx.md, (uchar *)ctx.md.buffer, sumresidue);
-		mdfour_result(&ctx.md, (uchar *)sum);
+			mdfour_update(&ctx_md, (uchar *)ctx_md.buffer, sumresidue);
+		mdfour_result(&ctx_md, (uchar *)sum);
 		break;
 	  case CSUM_NONE:
 		*sum = '\0';
@@ -627,34 +725,74 @@ int sum_end(char *sum)
 	  default: /* paranoia to prevent missing case values */
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 	}
-
-	return csum_len_for_type(cursum_type, 0);
 }
 
+#if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL
+static void verify_digest(struct name_num_item *nni, BOOL check_auth_list)
+{
+#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
+	static int xxh3_result = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	static int prior_num = 0, prior_flags = 0, prior_result = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
+	if (nni->num == CSUM_XXH3_64 || nni->num == CSUM_XXH3_128) {
+		if (!xxh3_result) {
+			char buf[32816];
+			int j;
+			for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof buf; j++)
+				buf[j] = ' ' + (j % 96);
+			sum_init(nni, 0);
+			sum_update(buf, 32816);
+			sum_update(buf, 31152);
+			sum_update(buf, 32474);
+			sum_update(buf, 9322);
+			xxh3_result = XXH3_64bits_digest(xxh3_state) != 0xadbcf16d4678d1de ? -1 : 1;
+		}
+		if (xxh3_result < 0)
+			nni->num = CSUM_gone;
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	if (BITS_SETnUNSET(nni->flags, NNI_EVP, NNI_BUILTIN|NNI_EVP_OK)) {
+		if (nni->num == prior_num && nni->flags == prior_flags) {
+			nni->flags = prior_result;
+			if (!(nni->flags & NNI_EVP))
+				nni->num = CSUM_gone;
+		} else {
+			prior_num = nni->num;
+			prior_flags = nni->flags;
+			if (!csum_evp_md(nni))
+				nni->num = CSUM_gone;
+			prior_result = nni->flags;
+			if (check_auth_list && (nni = get_nni_by_num(&valid_auth_checksums, prior_num)) != NULL)
+				verify_digest(nni, False);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
 void init_checksum_choices()
 {
-#ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3
-	char buf[32816];
-	int j;
-	for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof buf; j++) {
-		buf[j] = ' ' + (j % 96);
-	}
-	sum_init(CSUM_XXH3_64, 0);
-	sum_update(buf, 32816);
-	sum_update(buf, 31152);
-	sum_update(buf, 32474);
-	sum_update(buf, 9322);
-	if (XXH3_64bits_digest(xxh3_state) != 0xadbcf16d4678d1de) {
-		int t, f;
-		struct name_num_item *nni = valid_checksums.list;
-		for (t = f = 0; nni[f].name; f++) {
-			if (nni[f].num == CSUM_XXH3_64 || nni[f].num == CSUM_XXH3_128)
-				continue;
-			if (t != f)
-				nni[t++] = nni[f];
-		}
-		nni[t].name = NULL;
-	}
+#if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL
+	struct name_num_item *nni;
 #endif
+
+	if (initialized_choices)
+		return;
+
+#if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL
+	for (nni = valid_checksums.list; nni->name; nni++)
+		verify_digest(nni, True);
+
+	for (nni = valid_auth_checksums.list; nni->name; nni++)
+		verify_digest(nni, False);
+#endif
+
 	initialized_choices = 1;
 }

cleanup.c

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ NORETURN void _exit_cleanup(int code, const char *file, int line)
 		switch_step++;
 
 		if (cleanup_fname)
-			do_unlink(cleanup_fname);
+			do_unlink_at(cleanup_fname);
 		if (exit_code)
 			kill_all(SIGUSR1);
 		if (cleanup_pid && cleanup_pid == getpid()) {

clientname.c

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int read_proxy_protocol_header(int fd)
 			char sig[PROXY_V2_SIG_SIZE];
 			char ver_cmd;
 			char fam;
-			char len[2];
+			unsigned char len[2];
 			union {
 				struct {
 					char src_addr[4];

clientserver.c

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ extern int list_only;
 extern int am_sender;
 extern int am_server;
 extern int am_daemon;
+extern int am_chrooted;
 extern int am_root;
 extern int msgs2stderr;
 extern int rsync_port;
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ extern int ignore_errors;
 extern int preserve_xattrs;
 extern int kluge_around_eof;
 extern int munge_symlinks;
+extern int use_secure_symlinks;
 extern int open_noatime;
 extern int sanitize_paths;
 extern int numeric_ids;
@@ -67,6 +69,7 @@ extern uid_t our_uid;
 extern gid_t our_gid;
 
 char *auth_user;
+char *daemon_auth_choices;
 int read_only = 0;
 int module_id = -1;
 int pid_file_fd = -1;
@@ -149,13 +152,9 @@ int start_socket_client(char *host, int remote_argc, char *remote_argv[],
 static int exchange_protocols(int f_in, int f_out, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int am_client)
 {
 	int remote_sub = -1;
-#if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
-	int our_sub = protocol_version < PROTOCOL_VERSION ? 0 : SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION;
-#else
-	int our_sub = 0;
-#endif
+	int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
 
-	io_printf(f_out, "@RSYNCD: %d.%d\n", protocol_version, our_sub);
+	output_daemon_greeting(f_out, am_client);
 	if (!am_client) {
 		char *motd = lp_motd_file();
 		if (motd && *motd) {
@@ -187,16 +186,30 @@ static int exchange_protocols(int f_in, int f_out, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int
 	}
 
 	if (remote_sub < 0) {
-		if (remote_protocol == 30) {
+		if (remote_protocol >= 30) {
 			if (am_client)
-				rprintf(FERROR, "rsync: server is speaking an incompatible beta of protocol 30\n");
+				rprintf(FERROR, "rsync: the server omitted the subprotocol value: %s\n", buf);
 			else
-				io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client is speaking an incompatible beta of protocol 30\n");
+				io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client omitted the subprotocol value: %s\n", buf);
 			return -1;
 		}
 		remote_sub = 0;
 	}
 
+	daemon_auth_choices = strchr(buf + 9, ' ');
+	if (daemon_auth_choices) {
+		char *cp;
+		daemon_auth_choices = strdup(daemon_auth_choices + 1);
+		if ((cp = strchr(daemon_auth_choices, '\n')) != NULL)
+			*cp = '\0';
+	} else if (remote_protocol > 31) {
+		if (am_client)
+			rprintf(FERROR, "rsync: the server omitted the digest name list: %s\n", buf);
+		else
+			io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client omitted the digest name list: %s\n", buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (protocol_version > remote_protocol) {
 		protocol_version = remote_protocol;
 		if (remote_sub)
@@ -429,7 +442,7 @@ static int read_arg_from_pipe(int fd, char *buf, int limit)
 }
 #endif
 
-static void set_env_str(const char *var, const char *str)
+void set_env_str(const char *var, const char *str)
 {
 #ifdef HAVE_SETENV
 	if (setenv(var, str, 1) < 0)
@@ -690,7 +703,7 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
 	int set_uid;
 	char *p, *err_msg = NULL;
 	char *name = lp_name(i);
-	int use_chroot = lp_use_chroot(i);
+	int use_chroot = lp_use_chroot(i); /* might be 1 (yes), 0 (no), or -1 (unset) */
 	int ret, pre_exec_arg_fd = -1, pre_exec_error_fd = -1;
 	int save_munge_symlinks;
 	pid_t pre_exec_pid = 0;
@@ -815,6 +828,20 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
 		io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: no path setting.\n");
 		return -1;
 	}
+	if (use_chroot < 0) {
+		if (strstr(module_dir, "/./") != NULL)
+			use_chroot = 1; /* The module is expecting a chroot inner & outer path. */
+		else if (chroot("/") < 0) {
+			rprintf(FLOG, "chroot test failed: %s. "
+				      "Switching 'use chroot' from unset to false.\n",
+				      strerror(errno));
+			use_chroot = 0;
+		} else {
+			if (chdir("/") < 0)
+			    rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chdir(\"/\") failed");
+			use_chroot = 1;
+		}
+	}
 	if (use_chroot) {
 		if ((p = strstr(module_dir, "/./")) != NULL) {
 			*p = '\0'; /* Temporary... */
@@ -951,29 +978,20 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
 	}
 
 	if (use_chroot) {
-		/*
-		 * XXX: The 'use chroot' flag is a fairly reliable
-		 * source of confusion, because it fails under two
-		 * important circumstances: running as non-root,
-		 * running on Win32 (or possibly others).  On the
-		 * other hand, if you are running as root, then it
-		 * might be better to always use chroot.
-		 *
-		 * So, perhaps if we can't chroot we should just issue
-		 * a warning, unless a "require chroot" flag is set,
-		 * in which case we fail.
-		 */
+		/* Cache timezone data before chroot makes /etc/localtime inaccessible */
+		tzset();
 		if (chroot(module_chdir)) {
-			rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot %s failed", module_chdir);
+			rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "chroot(\"%s\") failed", module_chdir);
 			io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: chroot failed\n");
 			return -1;
 		}
+		am_chrooted = 1;
 		module_chdir = module_dir;
 	}
 
 	if (!change_dir(module_chdir, CD_NORMAL))
 		return path_failure(f_out, module_chdir, True);
-	if (module_dirlen || (!use_chroot && !*lp_daemon_chroot()))
+	if (module_dirlen)
 		sanitize_paths = 1;
 
 	if ((munge_symlinks = lp_munge_symlinks(module_id)) < 0)
@@ -990,6 +1008,15 @@ static int rsync_module(int f_in, int f_out, int i, const char *addr, const char
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* Enable secure symlink handling for any non-chrooted daemon module.
+	 * This prevents TOCTOU race attacks where an attacker could switch a
+	 * directory to a symlink between path validation and file open.
+	 * Match the gate used by the do_*_at() wrappers in syscall.c
+	 * (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) -- the protection has nothing to do
+	 * with symlink munging, so a module configured with
+	 * "munge symlinks = false" must still get the secure-open path. */
+	use_secure_symlinks = am_daemon && !am_chrooted;
+
 	if (gid_list.count) {
 		gid_t *gid_array = gid_list.items;
 		if (setgid(gid_array[0])) {
@@ -1285,11 +1312,51 @@ int start_daemon(int f_in, int f_out)
 	if (lp_proxy_protocol() && !read_proxy_protocol_header(f_in))
 		return -1;
 
+	/* Do reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid. The result is cached,
+	 * so the later client_name() call will use this cached value. This
+	 * ensures hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
+	 * after chroot.
+	 *
+	 * "reverse lookup" can be set globally OR per-module, so we also
+	 * scan each module: a deployment with "reverse lookup = no" in the
+	 * global section but "reverse lookup = yes" in a specific module
+	 * still triggers a post-chroot lookup at access-check time
+	 * (rsync_module() in this file), which would also fail in the
+	 * chroot and turn hostname-based deny rules into silent bypasses. */
+	{
+		int need_reverse = lp_reverse_lookup(-1);
+		int j, num_modules = lp_num_modules();
+		for (j = 0; !need_reverse && j < num_modules; j++) {
+			if (lp_reverse_lookup(j))
+				need_reverse = 1;
+		}
+		if (need_reverse)
+			(void)client_name(client_addr(f_in));
+	}
+
 	p = lp_daemon_chroot();
 	if (*p) {
 		log_init(0); /* Make use we've initialized syslog before chrooting. */
-		if (chroot(p) < 0 || chdir("/") < 0) {
-			rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chroot %s failed", p);
+		tzset();
+		if (chroot(p) < 0) {
+			rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chroot(\"%s\") failed", p);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		/* Deliberately do NOT set am_chrooted here.  am_chrooted
+		 * gates the per-module symlink-race defenses
+		 * (secure_relative_open() and the do_*_at() wrappers in
+		 * syscall.c) and means "the kernel is enforcing path
+		 * confinement at the module boundary".  The daemon chroot
+		 * confines path resolution to the daemon-chroot directory,
+		 * not to any individual module path -- modules sharing the
+		 * daemon chroot are still distinguishable filesystem
+		 * subtrees and a sender-controlled symlink in module A
+		 * could redirect a syscall to module B (or to other files
+		 * inside the daemon chroot) without the per-module
+		 * defenses.  Leave am_chrooted=0 here so secure_relative_open()
+		 * still fires for "use chroot = no" modules. */
+		if (chdir("/") < 0) {
+			rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "daemon chdir(\"/\") failed");
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}

compat.c

@@ -60,13 +60,16 @@ extern char *files_from;
 extern char *filesfrom_host;
 extern const char *checksum_choice;
 extern const char *compress_choice;
+extern char *daemon_auth_choices;
 extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
 extern int need_unsorted_flist;
 #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
 extern iconv_t ic_send, ic_recv;
 extern char *iconv_opt;
 #endif
-extern struct name_num_obj valid_checksums;
+extern struct name_num_obj valid_checksums, valid_auth_checksums;
+
+extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
 
 int remote_protocol = 0;
 int file_extra_cnt = 0; /* count of file-list extras that everyone gets */
@@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ int inplace_partial = 0;
 int do_negotiated_strings = 0;
 int xmit_id0_names = 0;
 
+struct name_num_item *xattr_sum_nni;
+int xattr_sum_len = 0;
+
 /* These index values are for the file-list's extra-attribute array. */
 int pathname_ndx, depth_ndx, atimes_ndx, crtimes_ndx, uid_ndx, gid_ndx, acls_ndx, xattrs_ndx, unsort_ndx;
 
@@ -93,19 +99,19 @@ int filesfrom_convert = 0;
 
 struct name_num_item valid_compressions_items[] = {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_ZSTD
-	{ CPRES_ZSTD, "zstd", NULL },
+	{ CPRES_ZSTD, 0, "zstd", NULL },
 #endif
 #ifdef SUPPORT_LZ4
-	{ CPRES_LZ4, "lz4", NULL },
+	{ CPRES_LZ4, 0, "lz4", NULL },
 #endif
-	{ CPRES_ZLIBX, "zlibx", NULL },
-	{ CPRES_ZLIB, "zlib", NULL },
-	{ CPRES_NONE, "none", NULL },
-	{ 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ CPRES_ZLIBX, 0, "zlibx", NULL },
+	{ CPRES_ZLIB, 0, "zlib", NULL },
+	{ CPRES_NONE, 0, "none", NULL },
+	{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct name_num_obj valid_compressions = {
-	"compress", NULL, NULL, 0, 0, valid_compressions_items
+	"compress", NULL, 0, 0, valid_compressions_items
 };
 
 #define CF_INC_RECURSE	 (1<<0)
@@ -125,13 +131,9 @@ static const char *client_info;
  * of that protocol for it to be advertised as available. */
 static void check_sub_protocol(void)
 {
-	char *dot;
+	const char *dot;
 	int their_protocol, their_sub;
-#if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
-	int our_sub = protocol_version < PROTOCOL_VERSION ? 0 : SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION;
-#else
-	int our_sub = 0;
-#endif
+	int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
 
 	/* client_info starts with VER.SUB string if client is a pre-release. */
 	if (!(their_protocol = atoi(client_info))
@@ -178,8 +180,8 @@ void set_allow_inc_recurse(void)
 
 void parse_compress_choice(int final_call)
 {
-	if (valid_compressions.negotiated_name)
-		do_compression = valid_compressions.negotiated_num;
+	if (valid_compressions.negotiated_nni)
+		do_compression = valid_compressions.negotiated_nni->num;
 	else if (compress_choice) {
 		struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_name(&valid_compressions, compress_choice, -1);
 		if (!nni) {
@@ -201,8 +203,8 @@ void parse_compress_choice(int final_call)
 		compress_choice = NULL;
 
 	/* Snag the compression name for both write_batch's option output & the following debug output. */
-	if (valid_compressions.negotiated_name)
-		compress_choice = valid_compressions.negotiated_name;
+	if (valid_compressions.negotiated_nni)
+		compress_choice = valid_compressions.negotiated_nni->name;
 	else if (compress_choice == NULL) {
 		struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_num(&valid_compressions, do_compression);
 		compress_choice = nni ? nni->name : "UNKNOWN";
@@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ void parse_compress_choice(int final_call)
 	 && (do_compression != CPRES_NONE || do_compression_level != CLVL_NOT_SPECIFIED)) {
 		rprintf(FINFO, "%s%s compress: %s (level %d)\n",
 			am_server ? "Server" : "Client",
-			valid_compressions.negotiated_name ? " negotiated" : "",
+			valid_compressions.negotiated_nni ? " negotiated" : "",
 			compress_choice, do_compression_level);
 	}
 }
@@ -225,6 +227,8 @@ struct name_num_item *get_nni_by_name(struct name_num_obj *nno, const char *name
 		len = strlen(name);
 
 	for (nni = nno->list; nni->name; nni++) {
+		if (nni->num == CSUM_gone)
+			continue;
 		if (strncasecmp(name, nni->name, len) == 0 && nni->name[len] == '\0')
 			return nni;
 	}
@@ -259,10 +263,12 @@ static void init_nno_saw(struct name_num_obj *nno, int val)
 	if (!nno->saw) {
 		nno->saw = new_array0(uchar, nno->saw_len);
 
-		/* We'll take this opportunity to make sure that the main_name values are set right. */
+		/* We'll take this opportunity to set the main_nni values for duplicates. */
 		for (cnt = 1, nni = nno->list; nni->name; nni++, cnt++) {
+			if (nni->num == CSUM_gone)
+				continue;
 			if (nno->saw[nni->num])
-				nni->main_name = nno->list[nno->saw[nni->num]-1].name;
+				nni->main_nni = &nno->list[nno->saw[nni->num]-1];
 			else
 				nno->saw[nni->num] = cnt;
 		}
@@ -288,8 +294,8 @@ static int parse_nni_str(struct name_num_obj *nno, const char *from, char *tobuf
 				struct name_num_item *nni = get_nni_by_name(nno, tok, to - tok);
 				if (nni && !nno->saw[nni->num]) {
 					nno->saw[nni->num] = ++cnt;
-					if (nni->main_name) {
-						to = tok + strlcpy(tok, nni->main_name, tobuf_len - (tok - tobuf));
+					if (nni->main_nni) {
+						to = tok + strlcpy(tok, nni->main_nni->name, tobuf_len - (tok - tobuf));
 						if (to - tobuf >= tobuf_len) {
 							to = tok - 1;
 							break;
@@ -323,13 +329,44 @@ static int parse_nni_str(struct name_num_obj *nno, const char *from, char *tobuf
 	return to - tobuf;
 }
 
+static int parse_negotiate_str(struct name_num_obj *nno, char *tmpbuf)
+{
+	struct name_num_item *nni, *ret = NULL;
+	int best = nno->saw_len; /* We want best == 1 from the client list, so start with a big number. */
+	char *space, *tok = tmpbuf;
+	while (tok) {
+		while (*tok == ' ') tok++; /* Should be unneeded... */
+		if (!*tok)
+			break;
+		if ((space = strchr(tok, ' ')) != NULL)
+			*space = '\0';
+		nni = get_nni_by_name(nno, tok, -1);
+		if (space) {
+			*space = ' ';
+			tok = space + 1;
+		} else
+			tok = NULL;
+		if (!nni || !nno->saw[nni->num] || best <= nno->saw[nni->num])
+			continue;
+		ret = nni;
+		best = nno->saw[nni->num];
+		if (best == 1 || am_server) /* The server side stops at the first acceptable client choice */
+			break;
+	}
+	if (ret) {
+		free(nno->saw);
+		nno->saw = NULL;
+		nno->negotiated_nni = ret->main_nni ? ret->main_nni : ret;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* This routine is always called with a tmpbuf of MAX_NSTR_STRLEN length, but the
  * buffer may be pre-populated with a "len" length string to use OR a len of -1
  * to tell us to read a string from the fd. */
 static void recv_negotiate_str(int f_in, struct name_num_obj *nno, char *tmpbuf, int len)
 {
-	struct name_num_item *ret = NULL;
-
 	if (len < 0)
 		len = read_vstring(f_in, tmpbuf, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN);
 
@@ -340,37 +377,8 @@ static void recv_negotiate_str(int f_in, struct name_num_obj *nno, char *tmpbuf,
 			rprintf(FINFO, "Server %s list (on client): %s\n", nno->type, tmpbuf);
 	}
 
-	if (len > 0) {
-		struct name_num_item *nni;
-		int best = nno->saw_len; /* We want best == 1 from the client list, so start with a big number. */
-		char *space, *tok = tmpbuf;
-		while (tok) {
-			while (*tok == ' ') tok++; /* Should be unneeded... */
-			if (!*tok)
-				break;
-			if ((space = strchr(tok, ' ')) != NULL)
-				*space = '\0';
-			nni = get_nni_by_name(nno, tok, -1);
-			if (space) {
-				*space = ' ';
-				tok = space + 1;
-			} else
-				tok = NULL;
-			if (!nni || !nno->saw[nni->num] || best <= nno->saw[nni->num])
-				continue;
-			ret = nni;
-			best = nno->saw[nni->num];
-			if (best == 1 || am_server) /* The server side stops at the first acceptable client choice */
-				break;
-		}
-		if (ret) {
-			free(nno->saw);
-			nno->saw = NULL;
-			nno->negotiated_name = ret->main_name ? ret->main_name : ret->name;
-			nno->negotiated_num = ret->num;
-			return;
-		}
-	}
+	if (len > 0 && parse_negotiate_str(nno, tmpbuf))
+		return;
 
 	if (!am_server || !do_negotiated_strings) {
 		char *cp = tmpbuf;
@@ -406,7 +414,7 @@ static const char *getenv_nstr(int ntype)
 		env_str = ntype == NSTR_COMPRESS ? "zlib" : protocol_version >= 30 ? "md5" : "md4";
 
 	if (am_server && env_str) {
-		char *cp = strchr(env_str, '&');
+		const char *cp = strchr(env_str, '&');
 		if (cp)
 			env_str = cp + 1;
 	}
@@ -466,8 +474,10 @@ int get_default_nno_list(struct name_num_obj *nno, char *to_buf, int to_buf_len,
 	init_nno_saw(nno, 0);
 
 	for (nni = nno->list, len = 0; nni->name; nni++) {
-		if (nni->main_name) {
-			if (!dup_markup)
+		if (nni->num == CSUM_gone)
+			continue;
+		if (nni->main_nni) {
+			if (!dup_markup || nni->main_nni->num == CSUM_gone)
 				continue;
 			delim = dup_markup;
 		}
@@ -556,7 +566,7 @@ static void negotiate_the_strings(int f_in, int f_out)
 	/* If the other side is too old to negotiate, the above steps just made sure that
 	 * the env didn't disallow the old algorithm. Mark things as non-negotiated. */
 	if (!do_negotiated_strings)
-		valid_checksums.negotiated_name = valid_compressions.negotiated_name = NULL;
+		valid_checksums.negotiated_nni = valid_compressions.negotiated_nni = NULL;
 }
 
 void setup_protocol(int f_out,int f_in)
@@ -805,11 +815,73 @@ void setup_protocol(int f_out,int f_in)
 		checksum_seed = read_int(f_in);
 	}
 
-	parse_checksum_choice(1); /* Sets checksum_type & xfersum_type */
+	parse_checksum_choice(1); /* Sets file_sum_nni & xfer_sum_nni */
 	parse_compress_choice(1); /* Sets do_compression */
 
+	/* TODO in the future allow this algorithm to be chosen somehow, but it can't get too
+	 * long or the size starts to cause a problem in the xattr abbrev/non-abbrev code. */
+	xattr_sum_nni = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
+	xattr_sum_len = csum_len_for_type(xattr_sum_nni->num, 0);
+
 	if (write_batch && !am_server)
 		write_batch_shell_file();
 
 	init_flist();
 }
+
+void output_daemon_greeting(int f_out, int am_client)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[MAX_NSTR_STRLEN];
+	int our_sub = get_subprotocol_version();
+
+	get_default_nno_list(&valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN, '\0');
+
+	io_printf(f_out, "@RSYNCD: %d.%d %s\n", protocol_version, our_sub, tmpbuf);
+
+	if (am_client && DEBUG_GTE(NSTR, 2))
+		rprintf(FINFO, "Client %s list (on client): %s\n", valid_auth_checksums.type, tmpbuf);
+}
+
+void negotiate_daemon_auth(int f_out, int am_client)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[MAX_NSTR_STRLEN];
+	int save_am_server = am_server;
+	int md4_is_old = 0;
+
+	if (!am_client)
+		am_server = 1;
+
+	if (daemon_auth_choices)
+		strlcpy(tmpbuf, daemon_auth_choices, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN);
+	else {
+		strlcpy(tmpbuf, protocol_version >= 30 ? "md5" : "md4", MAX_NSTR_STRLEN);
+		md4_is_old = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (am_client) {
+		recv_negotiate_str(-1, &valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf, strlen(tmpbuf));
+		if (DEBUG_GTE(NSTR, 1)) {
+			rprintf(FINFO, "Client negotiated %s: %s\n", valid_auth_checksums.type,
+				valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni->name);
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (!parse_negotiate_str(&valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf)) {
+			get_default_nno_list(&valid_auth_checksums, tmpbuf, MAX_NSTR_STRLEN, '\0');
+			io_printf(f_out, "@ERROR: your client does not support one of our daemon-auth checksums: %s\n",
+				  tmpbuf);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
+		}
+	}
+	am_server = save_am_server;
+	if (md4_is_old && valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni->num == CSUM_MD4)
+		valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni->num = CSUM_MD4_OLD;
+}
+
+int get_subprotocol_version()
+{
+#if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
+	return protocol_version < PROTOCOL_VERSION ? 0 : SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}

configure.ac

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ AC_INIT([rsync],[ ],[https://rsync.samba.org/bug-tracking.html])
 
 AC_C_BIGENDIAN
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
-AC_HEADER_TIME
 AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/fcntl.h sys/select.h fcntl.h sys/time.h sys/unistd.h \
     unistd.h utime.h compat.h sys/param.h ctype.h sys/wait.h sys/stat.h \
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ AC_HEADER_MAJOR_FIXED
 
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([byteorder.h])
-AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
 AC_PREREQ([2.69])
 
 PACKAGE_VERSION=`sed -n 's/.*RSYNC_VERSION.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/p' <$srcdir/version.h`
@@ -61,7 +60,6 @@ AC_PROG_AWK
 AC_PROG_EGREP
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
 AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
-AC_PROG_CC_STDC
 AC_SUBST(SHELL)
 AC_PATH_PROG([PERL], [perl])
 AC_PATH_PROG([PYTHON3], [python3])
@@ -136,6 +134,16 @@ if test x"$GCC" = x"yes"; then
 	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -W"
 fi
 
+AC_ARG_WITH(openssl-conf,
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-openssl-conf=PATH],[set default OPENSSL_CONF path for rsync]))
+case "$with_openssl_conf" in
+    *[^-/a-zA-Z0-9.,=@+_]*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Invalid path given to --with-openssl-conf]) ;;
+    /*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -DSET_OPENSSL_CONF=$with_openssl_conf" ;;
+    no|'') ;;
+    yes) AC_MSG_ERROR([No path given to --with-openssl-conf]) ;;
+    *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Non absolute path given to --with-openssl-conf]) ;;
+esac
+
 AC_ARG_WITH(rrsync,
         AS_HELP_STRING([--with-rrsync],[also install the rrsync script and its manpage]))
 if test x"$with_rrsync" != x"yes"; then
@@ -380,7 +388,7 @@ AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-ipv6],[disable to omit ipv6 support]),
 	;;
   esac ],
 
-  AC_TRY_RUN([ /* AF_INET6 availability check */
+  AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ /* AF_INET6 availability check */
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -391,11 +399,11 @@ main()
    else
      exit(0);
 }
-],
-  AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-  AC_DEFINE(INET6, 1, [true if you have IPv6]),
-  AC_MSG_RESULT(no),
-  AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+]])],
+  [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+  AC_DEFINE(INET6, 1, true if you have IPv6)],
+  [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
+  [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
 ))
 
 dnl Do you want to disable use of locale functions
@@ -518,7 +526,7 @@ fi
 
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable zstd compression])
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([zstd],
-        AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-zstd], [disable to omit zstd compression]))
+        AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-zstd], [disable to omit zstd compression]))
 AH_TEMPLATE([SUPPORT_ZSTD],
 [Undefine if you do not want zstd compression.  By default this is defined.])
 if test x"$enable_zstd" != x"no"; then
@@ -539,7 +547,7 @@ fi
 
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable LZ4 compression])
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([lz4],
-        AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-lz4], [disable to omit LZ4 compression]))
+        AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-lz4], [disable to omit LZ4 compression]))
 AH_TEMPLATE([SUPPORT_LZ4],
 [Undefine if you do not want LZ4 compression.  By default this is defined.])
 if test x"$enable_lz4" != x"no"; then
@@ -1382,7 +1390,7 @@ else
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LINUX_XATTRS, 1, [True if you have Linux xattrs (or equivalent)])
 	AC_DEFINE(SUPPORT_XATTRS, 1)
 	AC_DEFINE(NO_SYMLINK_USER_XATTRS, 1, [True if symlinks do not support user xattrs])
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(attr,getxattr)
+	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(getxattr,attr)
 	;;
     darwin*)
 	AC_MSG_RESULT(Using OS X xattrs)

csprotocol.txt

@@ -7,39 +7,54 @@ basically a summary of clientserver.c and authenticate.c.
 This is the protocol used for rsync --daemon; i.e. connections to port
 873 rather than invocations over a remote shell.
 
-When the server accepts a connection, it prints a greeting
+When the server accepts a connection, it prints a newline-terminated
+greeting line:
 
-  @RSYNCD: <version>.<subprotocol>
+  @RSYNCD: <version>.<subprotocol> <digest1> <digestN>
 
-where <version> is the numeric version (see PROTOCOL_VERSION in rsync.h)
-'.' is a literal period, and <subprotocol> is the numeric subprotocol
-version (see SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION -- it will be 0 for final releases).
-Protocols prior to 30 only output <version> alone.  The daemon expects
-to see a similar greeting back from the client.  For protocols prior to
-30, an absent ".<subprotocol>" value is assumed to be 0.  For protocol
-30, an absent value is a fatal error.  The daemon then follows this line
-with a free-format text message-of-the-day (if any is defined).
+The <version> is the numeric version (see PROTOCOL_VERSION in rsync.h)
+The <subprotocol> is the numeric subprotocol version (which is 0 for a
+final protocol version, as the SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION define discusses).
+The <digestN> names are the authentication digest algorithms that the
+daemon supports, listed in order of preference.
+
+An rsync prior to 3.2.7 omits the digest names.  An rsync prior to 3.0.0
+also omits the period and the <subprotocol> value.  Since a final
+protocol has a subprotocol value of 0, a missing subprotocol value is
+assumed to be 0 for any protocol prior to 30.  It is considered a fatal
+error for protocol 30 and above to omit it.  It is considered a fatal
+error for protocol 32 and above to omit the digest name list (currently
+31 is the newest protocol).
+
+The daemon expects to see a similar greeting line back from the client.
+Once received, the daemon follows the opening line with a free-format
+text message-of-the-day (if any is defined).
 
 The server is now in the connected state.  The client can either send
-the command
+the command:
 
   #list
 
-to get a listing of modules, or the name of a module.  After this, the
+(to get a listing of modules) or the name of a module.  After this, the
 connection is now bound to a particular module.  Access per host for
 this module is now checked, as is per-module connection limits.
 
-If authentication is required to use this module, the server will say
+If authentication is required to use this module, the server will say:
 
   @RSYNCD: AUTHREQD <challenge>
 
 where <challenge> is a random string of base64 characters.  The client
-must respond with
+must respond with:
 
   <user> <response>
 
-where <user> is the username they claim to be, and <response> is the
-base64 form of the MD4 hash of challenge+password.
+The <user> is the username they claim to be. The <response> is the
+base64 form of the digest hash of the challenge+password string. The
+chosen digest method is the most preferred client method that is also in
+the server's list.  If no digest list was explicitly provided, the side
+expecting a list assumes the other side provided either the single name
+"md5" (for a negotiated protocol 30 or 31), or the single name "md4"
+(for an older protocol).
 
 At this point the server applies all remaining constraints before
 handing control to the client, including switching uid/gid, setting up
@@ -76,6 +91,13 @@ stay tuned (or write it yourself!).
 ------------
 Protocol version changes
 
+31	(2013-09-28, 3.1.0)
+
+	Initial release of protocol 31 had no changes.  Rsync 3.2.7
+	introduced the suffixed list of digest names on the greeting
+	line.  The presence of the list is allowed even if the greeting
+	indicates an older protocol version number.
+
 30	(2007-10-04, 3.0.0pre1)
 
 	The use of a ".<subprotocol>" number was added to

daemon-parm.txt

@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ BOOL	read_only		True
 BOOL	reverse_lookup		True
 BOOL	strict_modes		True
 BOOL	transfer_logging	False
-BOOL	use_chroot		True
 BOOL	write_only		False
 
 BOOL3	munge_symlinks		Unset
 BOOL3	numeric_ids		Unset
 BOOL3	open_noatime		Unset
+BOOL3	use_chroot		Unset

delete.c

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static enum delret delete_dir_contents(char *fname, uint16 flags)
 
 		strlcpy(p, fp->basename, remainder);
 		if (!(fp->mode & S_IWUSR) && !am_root && fp->flags & FLAG_OWNED_BY_US)
-			do_chmod(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
+			do_chmod_at(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
 		/* Save stack by recursing to ourself directly. */
 		if (S_ISDIR(fp->mode)) {
 			if (delete_dir_contents(fname, flags | DEL_RECURSE) != DR_SUCCESS)
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
 	}
 
 	if (flags & DEL_NO_UID_WRITE)
-		do_chmod(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
+		do_chmod_at(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
 
 	if (S_ISDIR(mode) && !(flags & DEL_DIR_IS_EMPTY)) {
 		/* This only happens on the first call to delete_item() since
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
 
 	if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
 		what = "rmdir";
-		ok = do_rmdir(fbuf) == 0;
+		ok = do_rmdir_at(fbuf) == 0;
 	} else {
 		if (make_backups > 0 && !(flags & DEL_FOR_BACKUP) && (backup_dir || !is_backup_file(fbuf))) {
 			what = "make_backup";

exclude.c

@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ static filter_rule **mergelist_parents;
 static int mergelist_cnt = 0;
 static int mergelist_size = 0;
 
+#define LOCAL_RULE   1
+#define REMOTE_RULE  2
+static uchar cur_elide_value = REMOTE_RULE;
+
 /* Each filter_list_struct describes a singly-linked list by keeping track
  * of both the head and tail pointers.  The list is slightly unusual in that
  * a parent-dir's content can be appended to the end of the local list in a
@@ -220,6 +224,7 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_
 				slash_cnt++;
 		}
 	}
+	rule->elide = 0;
 	strlcpy(rule->pattern + pre_len, pat, pat_len + 1);
 	pat_len += pre_len;
 	if (suf_len) {
@@ -488,10 +493,11 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg, int skip_daemon_module)
 			if (saw_live_open_brkt)
 				maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(rule, arg_len);
 			if (relative_paths && slash_cnt) {
-				filter_rule const *ent;
-				int found = 0;
-				slash_cnt = 1;
-				for (p = new_pat + 1; (p = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL; p++) {
+				int sub_slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
+				while ((p = strrchr(new_pat, '/')) != NULL && p != new_pat) {
+					filter_rule const *ent;
+					filter_rule *R_rule;
+					int found = 0;
 					*p = '\0';
 					for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
 						if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, new_pat) == 0) {
@@ -499,25 +505,29 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg, int skip_daemon_module)
 							break;
 						}
 					}
-					if (!found) {
-						filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
-						R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_DIRECTORY;
-						/* Check if our sub-path has wildcards or escaped backslashes */
-						if (saw_wild && strpbrk(rule->pattern, "*[?\\"))
-							R_rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_WILD;
-						R_rule->pattern = strdup(new_pat);
-						R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
-						R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
-						implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
-						if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3)) {
-							rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s/)\n",
-								who_am_i(), R_rule->pattern);
-						}
-						if (saw_live_open_brkt)
-							maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(R_rule, -1);
+					if (found) {
+						*p = '/';
+						break; /* We added all parent dirs already */
 					}
+					R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
+					R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_DIRECTORY;
+					/* Check if our sub-path has wildcards or escaped backslashes */
+					if (saw_wild && strpbrk(new_pat, "*[?\\"))
+						R_rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_WILD;
+					R_rule->pattern = strdup(new_pat);
+					R_rule->u.slash_cnt = --sub_slash_cnt;
+					R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+					implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
+					if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3)) {
+						rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s/)\n",
+							who_am_i(), R_rule->pattern);
+					}
+					if (saw_live_open_brkt)
+						maybe_add_literal_brackets_rule(R_rule, -1);
+				}
+				for (p = new_pat; sub_slash_cnt < slash_cnt; sub_slash_cnt++) {
+					p += strlen(p);
 					*p = '/';
-					slash_cnt++;
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -545,15 +555,12 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg, int skip_daemon_module)
 				p += arg_len;
 			}
 		}
-		if (p[-1] != '/') {
-			*p++ = '/';
-			slash_cnt++;
-		}
+		*p++ = '/';
 		*p++ = '*';
 		if (recurse)
 			*p++ = '*';
 		*p = '\0';
-		rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
+		rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
 		rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
 		implied_filter_list.head = rule;
 		if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3))
@@ -713,7 +720,8 @@ static BOOL setup_merge_file(int mergelist_num, filter_rule *ex,
 	parent_dirscan = True;
 	while (*y) {
 		char save[MAXPATHLEN];
-		strlcpy(save, y, MAXPATHLEN);
+		/* copylen is strlen(y) which is < MAXPATHLEN. +1 for \0 */
+		size_t copylen = strlcpy(save, y, MAXPATHLEN) + 1;
 		*y = '\0';
 		dirbuf_len = y - dirbuf;
 		strlcpy(x, ex->pattern, MAXPATHLEN - (x - buf));
@@ -727,7 +735,7 @@ static BOOL setup_merge_file(int mergelist_num, filter_rule *ex,
 			lp->head = NULL;
 		}
 		lp->tail = NULL;
-		strlcpy(y, save, MAXPATHLEN);
+		strlcpy(y, save, copylen);
 		while ((*x++ = *y++) != '/') {}
 	}
 	parent_dirscan = False;
@@ -896,11 +904,11 @@ static int rule_matches(const char *fname, filter_rule *ex, int name_flags)
 {
 	int slash_handling, str_cnt = 0, anchored_match = 0;
 	int ret_match = ex->rflags & FILTRULE_NEGATE ? 0 : 1;
-	char *p, *pattern = ex->pattern;
+	const char *p, *pattern = ex->pattern;
 	const char *strings[16]; /* more than enough */
 	const char *name = fname + (*fname == '/');
 
-	if (!*name)
+	if (!*name || ex->elide == cur_elide_value)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!(name_flags & NAME_IS_XATTR) ^ !(ex->rflags & FILTRULE_XATTR))
@@ -1016,6 +1024,15 @@ int name_is_excluded(const char *fname, int name_flags, int filter_level)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int check_server_filter(filter_rule_list *listp, enum logcode code, const char *name, int name_flags)
+{
+	int ret;
+	cur_elide_value = LOCAL_RULE;
+	ret = check_filter(listp, code, name, name_flags);
+	cur_elide_value = REMOTE_RULE;
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /* Return -1 if file "name" is defined to be excluded by the specified
  * exclude list, 1 if it is included, and 0 if it was not matched. */
 int check_filter(filter_rule_list *listp, enum logcode code,
@@ -1571,7 +1588,7 @@ char *get_rule_prefix(filter_rule *rule, const char *pat, int for_xfer,
 
 static void send_rules(int f_out, filter_rule_list *flp)
 {
-	filter_rule *ent, *prev = NULL;
+	filter_rule *ent;
 
 	for (ent = flp->head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
 		unsigned int len, plen, dlen;
@@ -1586,21 +1603,15 @@ static void send_rules(int f_out, filter_rule_list *flp)
 		 * merge files as an optimization (since they can only have
 		 * include/exclude rules). */
 		if (ent->rflags & FILTRULE_SENDER_SIDE)
-			elide = am_sender ? 1 : -1;
+			elide = am_sender ? LOCAL_RULE : REMOTE_RULE;
 		if (ent->rflags & FILTRULE_RECEIVER_SIDE)
-			elide = elide ? 0 : am_sender ? -1 : 1;
+			elide = elide ? 0 : am_sender ? REMOTE_RULE : LOCAL_RULE;
 		else if (delete_excluded && !elide
 		 && (!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE)
 		  || ent->rflags & FILTRULE_NO_PREFIXES))
-			elide = am_sender ? 1 : -1;
-		if (elide < 0) {
-			if (prev)
-				prev->next = ent->next;
-			else
-				flp->head = ent->next;
-		} else
-			prev = ent;
-		if (elide > 0)
+			elide = am_sender ? LOCAL_RULE : REMOTE_RULE;
+		ent->elide = elide;
+		if (elide == LOCAL_RULE)
 			continue;
 		if (ent->rflags & FILTRULE_CVS_IGNORE
 		    && !(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_MERGE_FILE)) {
@@ -1628,7 +1639,6 @@ static void send_rules(int f_out, filter_rule_list *flp)
 		if (dlen)
 			write_byte(f_out, '/');
 	}
-	flp->tail = prev;
 }
 
 /* This is only called by the client. */

flist.c

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ extern int am_sender;
 extern int am_generator;
 extern int inc_recurse;
 extern int always_checksum;
-extern int checksum_type;
 extern int module_id;
 extern int ignore_errors;
 extern int numeric_ids;
@@ -80,6 +79,8 @@ extern struct stats stats;
 extern char *filesfrom_host;
 extern char *usermap, *groupmap;
 
+extern struct name_num_item *file_sum_nni;
+
 extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
 
 extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ void init_flist(void)
 		rprintf(FINFO, "FILE_STRUCT_LEN=%d, EXTRA_LEN=%d\n",
 			(int)FILE_STRUCT_LEN, (int)EXTRA_LEN);
 	}
-	flist_csum_len = csum_len_for_type(checksum_type, 1);
+	/* Note that this isn't identical to file_sum_len in the case of CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: */
+	flist_csum_len = csum_len_for_type(file_sum_nni->num, 1);
 
 	show_filelist_progress = INFO_GTE(FLIST, 1) && xfer_dirs && !am_server && !inc_recurse;
 }
@@ -754,7 +756,7 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
 	if (*thisname
 	 && (clean_fname(thisname, CFN_REFUSE_DOT_DOT_DIRS) < 0 || (!relative_paths && *thisname == '/'))) {
 		rprintf(FERROR, "ABORTING due to unsafe pathname from sender: %s\n", thisname);
-		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 	}
 
 	if (sanitize_paths)
@@ -834,13 +836,13 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
 			}
 #endif
 		} else
-			modtime = read_int(f);
+			modtime = read_uint(f);
 	}
 	if (xflags & XMIT_MOD_NSEC)
 #ifndef CAN_SET_NSEC
-		(void)read_varint(f);
+		(void)read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_NSEC, "modtime_nsec");
 #else
-		modtime_nsec = read_varint(f);
+		modtime_nsec = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_NSEC, "modtime_nsec");
 	else
 		modtime_nsec = 0;
 #endif
@@ -859,8 +861,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
 #endif
 	}
 #endif
-	if (!(xflags & XMIT_SAME_MODE))
+	if (!(xflags & XMIT_SAME_MODE)) {
 		mode = from_wire_mode(read_int(f));
+		/* Reject modes whose type bits are not one of the standard
+		 * file types; otherwise garbage mode values propagate through
+		 * the file-type checks below unpredictably. */
+		if (!S_ISREG(mode) && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !S_ISLNK(mode)
+		 && !S_ISCHR(mode) && !S_ISBLK(mode)
+		 && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "invalid file mode 0%o for %s [%s]\n",
+				(unsigned)mode, lastname, who_am_i());
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
+	}
 	if (atimes_ndx && !S_ISDIR(mode) && !(xflags & XMIT_SAME_ATIME)) {
 		atime = read_varlong(f, 4);
 #if SIZEOF_TIME_T < SIZEOF_INT64
@@ -986,16 +999,16 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 	}
 
-	if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
+	if (*thisname == '/' ? thisname[1] != '.' || thisname[2] != '\0' : *thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
 		int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
 		if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
-		 && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
+		 && filter_list.head && check_server_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
 			rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
-			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 		}
 		if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
 			rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
-			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1388,7 +1401,7 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char *fname, struct file_list *flist,
 
 	if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
 		if (st.st_size == 0) {
-			int fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
+			int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
 			if (fd >= 0) {
 				st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname);
 				close(fd);
@@ -2582,6 +2595,19 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
 		init_hard_links();
 #endif
 
+	if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
+		if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) {
+			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
+		struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
+		if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
+			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
+		file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST;
+	}
+
 	flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list");
 	flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE);
 
@@ -2640,7 +2666,7 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
 					rprintf(FERROR,
 						"ABORTING due to invalid path from sender: %s/%s\n",
 						cur_dir, file->basename);
-					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+					exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
 				}
 				good_dirname = cur_dir;
 			}

generator.c

@@ -229,11 +229,13 @@ static int read_delay_line(char *buf, int *flags_p)
 		*flags_p = 0;
 
 	if (sscanf(bp, "%x ", &mode) != 1) {
-	  invalid_data:
-		rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: invalid data in delete-delay file.\n");
-		return -1;
+		goto invalid_data;
 	}
-	past_space = strchr(bp, ' ') + 1;
+	past_space = strchr(bp, ' ');
+	if (!past_space) {
+		goto invalid_data;
+	}
+	past_space++;
 	len = j - read_pos - (past_space - bp) + 1; /* count the '\0' */
 	read_pos = j + 1;
 
@@ -247,6 +249,10 @@ static int read_delay_line(char *buf, int *flags_p)
 	memcpy(buf, past_space, len);
 
 	return mode;
+
+invalid_data:
+	rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: invalid data in delete-delay file.\n");
+	return -1;
 }
 
 static void do_delayed_deletions(char *delbuf)
@@ -875,9 +881,12 @@ static struct file_struct *find_fuzzy(struct file_struct *file, struct file_list
 			len = strlen(name);
 			suf = find_filename_suffix(name, len, &suf_len);
 
-			dist = fuzzy_distance(name, len, fname, fname_len);
-			/* Add some extra weight to how well the suffixes match. */
-			dist += fuzzy_distance(suf, suf_len, fname_suf, fname_suf_len) * 10;
+			dist = fuzzy_distance(name, len, fname, fname_len, lowest_dist);
+			/* Add some extra weight to how well the suffixes match unless we've already disqualified
+			 * this file based on a heuristic. */
+			if (dist < 0xFFFF0000U) {
+				dist += fuzzy_distance(suf, suf_len, fname_suf, fname_suf_len, 0xFFFF0000U) * 10;
+			}
 			if (DEBUG_GTE(FUZZY, 2)) {
 				rprintf(FINFO, "fuzzy distance for %s = %d.%05d\n",
 					f_name(fp, NULL), (int)(dist>>16), (int)(dist&0xFFFF));
@@ -981,7 +990,7 @@ static int try_dests_reg(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, int ndx,
 		if (find_exact_for_existing) {
 			if (alt_dest_type == LINK_DEST && real_st.st_dev == sxp->st.st_dev && real_st.st_ino == sxp->st.st_ino)
 				return -1;
-			if (do_unlink(fname) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+			if (do_unlink_at(fname) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
 				goto got_nothing_for_ya;
 		}
 #ifdef SUPPORT_HARD_LINKS
@@ -1109,7 +1118,7 @@ static int try_dests_non(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, int ndx,
 		 && !IS_SPECIAL(file->mode) && !IS_DEVICE(file->mode)
 #endif
 		 && !S_ISDIR(file->mode)) {
-			if (do_link(cmpbuf, fname) < 0) {
+			if (do_link_at(cmpbuf, fname) < 0) {
 				rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
 					"failed to hard-link %s with %s",
 					cmpbuf, fname);
@@ -1312,7 +1321,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 				}
 			}
 			if (relative_paths && !implied_dirs && file->mode != 0
-			 && do_stat(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
+			 && do_stat_at(dn, &sx.st) < 0) {
 				if (dry_run)
 					goto parent_is_dry_missing;
 				if (make_path(fname, MKP_DROP_NAME | MKP_SKIP_SLASH) < 0) {
@@ -1424,7 +1433,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 			 && (stype == FT_DIR
 			  || delete_item(fname, sx.st.st_mode, del_opts | DEL_FOR_DIR) != 0))
 				goto cleanup; /* Any errors get reported later. */
-			if (do_mkdir(fname, (file->mode|added_perms) & 0700) == 0)
+			if (do_mkdir_at(fname, (file->mode|added_perms) & 0700) == 0)
 				file->flags |= FLAG_DIR_CREATED;
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
@@ -1466,10 +1475,10 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 			itemize(fnamecmp, file, ndx, statret, &sx,
 				statret ? ITEM_LOCAL_CHANGE : 0, 0, NULL);
 		}
-		if (real_ret != 0 && do_mkdir(fname,file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
+		if (real_ret != 0 && do_mkdir_at(fname,file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
 			if (!relative_paths || errno != ENOENT
 			 || make_path(fname, MKP_DROP_NAME | MKP_SKIP_SLASH) < 0
-			 || (do_mkdir(fname, file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)) {
+			 || (do_mkdir_at(fname, file->mode|added_perms) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)) {
 				rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
 					"recv_generator: mkdir %s failed",
 					full_fname(fname));
@@ -1496,7 +1505,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
 		if (!am_root && (file->mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU && dir_tweaking) {
 			mode_t mode = file->mode | S_IRWXU;
-			if (do_chmod(fname, mode) < 0) {
+			if (do_chmod_at(fname, mode) < 0) {
 				rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
 					"failed to modify permissions on %s",
 					full_fname(fname));
@@ -1795,7 +1804,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 
 	if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) {
 		/* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */
-		if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0)
+		if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0)
 			real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp);
 	}
 
@@ -1805,7 +1814,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 		;
 	else if (quick_check_ok(FT_REG, fnamecmp, file, &sx.st)) {
 		if (partialptr) {
-			do_unlink(partialptr);
+			do_unlink_at(partialptr);
 			handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
 		}
 		set_file_attrs(fname, file, &sx, NULL, maybe_ATTRS_REPORT | maybe_ATTRS_ACCURATE_TIME);
@@ -1864,7 +1873,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 	}
 
 	/* open the file */
-	if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
+	if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
 		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing",
 			full_fname(fnamecmp));
 	  pretend_missing:
@@ -1893,7 +1902,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
 			back_file = NULL;
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
-		if ((f_copy = do_open(backupptr, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
+		if ((f_copy = do_open_at(backupptr, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(backupptr));
 			unmake_file(back_file);
 			back_file = NULL;
@@ -2013,7 +2022,7 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
 
 	if (slnk) {
 #ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
-		if (do_symlink(slnk, create_name) < 0) {
+		if (do_symlink_at(slnk, create_name) < 0) {
 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "symlink %s -> \"%s\" failed",
 				full_fname(create_name), slnk);
 			return 0;
@@ -2029,7 +2038,7 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
 		return 0;
 #endif
 	} else {
-		if (do_mknod(create_name, file->mode, rdev) < 0) {
+		if (do_mknod_at(create_name, file->mode, rdev) < 0) {
 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "mknod %s failed",
 				full_fname(create_name));
 			return 0;
@@ -2037,10 +2046,14 @@ int atomic_create(struct file_struct *file, char *fname, const char *slnk, const
 	}
 
 	if (!skip_atomic) {
-		if (do_rename(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
+		if (do_rename_at(tmpname, fname) < 0) {
+			char *full_tmpname = strdup(full_fname(tmpname));
+			if (full_tmpname == NULL)
+				out_of_memory("atomic_create");
 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\" failed",
-				full_fname(tmpname), full_fname(fname));
-			do_unlink(tmpname);
+				full_tmpname, full_fname(fname));
+			free(full_tmpname);
+			do_unlink_at(tmpname);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2104,7 +2117,7 @@ static void touch_up_dirs(struct file_list *flist, int ndx)
 			continue;
 		fname = f_name(file, NULL);
 		if (fix_dir_perms)
-			do_chmod(fname, file->mode);
+			do_chmod_at(fname, file->mode);
 		if (need_retouch_dir_times) {
 			STRUCT_STAT st;
 			if (link_stat(fname, &st, 0) == 0 && mtime_differs(&st, file)) {
@@ -2139,6 +2152,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
 			if (send_failed)
 				ndx = get_hlink_num();
 			flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.1");
+			if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 			file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
 			assert(file->flags & FLAG_HLINKED);
 			if (send_failed)
@@ -2167,6 +2182,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
 
 			flist = cur_flist;
 			cur_flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.2");
+			if (ndx < cur_flist->ndx_start)
+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 
 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
 			if (solo_file)

hashtable.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Routines to provide a memory-efficient hashtable.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2007-2020 Wayne Davison
+ * Copyright (C) 2007-2022 Wayne Davison
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ void *hashtable_find(struct hashtable *tbl, int64 key, void *data_when_new)
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 */
 
+#define NON_ZERO_32(x) ((x) ? (x) : (uint32_t)1)
+#define NON_ZERO_64(x, y) ((x) || (y) ? (y) | (int64)(x) << 32 | (y) : (int64)1)
+
 uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
 {
   uint32_t a,b,c;                                          /* internal state */
@@ -390,7 +393,7 @@ uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
     case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[2])<<16;   /* fall through */
     case 2 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[1])<<8;    /* fall through */
     case 1 : a+=k8[0]; break;
-    case 0 : return c;
+    case 0 : return NON_ZERO_32(c);
     }
   } else if (HASH_LITTLE_ENDIAN && ((u.i & 0x1) == 0)) {
     const uint16_t *k = (const uint16_t *)key;         /* read 16-bit chunks */
@@ -436,7 +439,7 @@ uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
              break;
     case 1 : a+=k8[0];
              break;
-    case 0 : return c;                     /* zero length requires no mixing */
+    case 0 : return NON_ZERO_32(c);         /* zero length requires no mixing */
     }
 
   } else {                        /* need to read the key one byte at a time */
@@ -489,10 +492,171 @@ uint32_t hashlittle(const void *key, size_t length)
 	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
     case 1 : a+=k[0];
              break;
-    case 0 : return c;
+    case 0 : return NON_ZERO_32(c);
     }
   }
 
   final(a,b,c);
-  return c;
+  return NON_ZERO_32(c);
 }
+
+#if SIZEOF_INT64 >= 8
+/*
+ * hashlittle2: return 2 32-bit hash values joined into an int64.
+ *
+ * This is identical to hashlittle(), except it returns two 32-bit hash
+ * values instead of just one.  This is good enough for hash table
+ * lookup with 2^^64 buckets, or if you want a second hash if you're not
+ * happy with the first, or if you want a probably-unique 64-bit ID for
+ * the key.  *pc is better mixed than *pb, so use *pc first.  If you want
+ * a 64-bit value do something like "*pc + (((uint64_t)*pb)<<32)".
+ */
+int64 hashlittle2(const void *key, size_t length)
+{
+  uint32_t a,b,c;                                          /* internal state */
+  union { const void *ptr; size_t i; } u;     /* needed for Mac Powerbook G4 */
+
+  /* Set up the internal state */
+  a = b = c = 0xdeadbeef + ((uint32_t)length);
+
+  u.ptr = key;
+  if (HASH_LITTLE_ENDIAN && ((u.i & 0x3) == 0)) {
+    const uint32_t *k = (const uint32_t *)key;         /* read 32-bit chunks */
+    const uint8_t  *k8;
+
+    /*------ all but last block: aligned reads and affect 32 bits of (a,b,c) */
+    while (length > 12)
+    {
+      a += k[0];
+      b += k[1];
+      c += k[2];
+      mix(a,b,c);
+      length -= 12;
+      k += 3;
+    }
+
+    /*----------------------------- handle the last (probably partial) block */
+    k8 = (const uint8_t *)k;
+    switch(length)
+    {
+    case 12: c+=k[2]; b+=k[1]; a+=k[0]; break;
+    case 11: c+=((uint32_t)k8[10])<<16;  /* fall through */
+    case 10: c+=((uint32_t)k8[9])<<8;    /* fall through */
+    case 9 : c+=k8[8];                   /* fall through */
+    case 8 : b+=k[1]; a+=k[0]; break;
+    case 7 : b+=((uint32_t)k8[6])<<16;   /* fall through */
+    case 6 : b+=((uint32_t)k8[5])<<8;    /* fall through */
+    case 5 : b+=k8[4];                   /* fall through */
+    case 4 : a+=k[0]; break;
+    case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[2])<<16;   /* fall through */
+    case 2 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[1])<<8;    /* fall through */
+    case 1 : a+=k8[0]; break;
+    case 0 : return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);
+    }
+  } else if (HASH_LITTLE_ENDIAN && ((u.i & 0x1) == 0)) {
+    const uint16_t *k = (const uint16_t *)key;         /* read 16-bit chunks */
+    const uint8_t  *k8;
+
+    /*--------------- all but last block: aligned reads and different mixing */
+    while (length > 12)
+    {
+      a += k[0] + (((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
+      b += k[2] + (((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
+      c += k[4] + (((uint32_t)k[5])<<16);
+      mix(a,b,c);
+      length -= 12;
+      k += 6;
+    }
+
+    /*----------------------------- handle the last (probably partial) block */
+    k8 = (const uint8_t *)k;
+    switch(length)
+    {
+    case 12: c+=k[4]+(((uint32_t)k[5])<<16);
+             b+=k[2]+(((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
+             a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
+             break;
+    case 11: c+=((uint32_t)k8[10])<<16;     /* fall through */
+    case 10: c+=k[4];
+             b+=k[2]+(((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
+             a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
+             break;
+    case 9 : c+=k8[8];                      /* fall through */
+    case 8 : b+=k[2]+(((uint32_t)k[3])<<16);
+             a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
+             break;
+    case 7 : b+=((uint32_t)k8[6])<<16;      /* fall through */
+    case 6 : b+=k[2];
+             a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
+             break;
+    case 5 : b+=k8[4];                      /* fall through */
+    case 4 : a+=k[0]+(((uint32_t)k[1])<<16);
+             break;
+    case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k8[2])<<16;      /* fall through */
+    case 2 : a+=k[0];
+             break;
+    case 1 : a+=k8[0];
+             break;
+    case 0 : return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);  /* zero length strings require no mixing */
+    }
+
+  } else {                        /* need to read the key one byte at a time */
+    const uint8_t *k = (const uint8_t *)key;
+
+    /*--------------- all but the last block: affect some 32 bits of (a,b,c) */
+    while (length > 12)
+    {
+      a += k[0];
+      a += ((uint32_t)k[1])<<8;
+      a += ((uint32_t)k[2])<<16;
+      a += ((uint32_t)k[3])<<24;
+      b += k[4];
+      b += ((uint32_t)k[5])<<8;
+      b += ((uint32_t)k[6])<<16;
+      b += ((uint32_t)k[7])<<24;
+      c += k[8];
+      c += ((uint32_t)k[9])<<8;
+      c += ((uint32_t)k[10])<<16;
+      c += ((uint32_t)k[11])<<24;
+      mix(a,b,c);
+      length -= 12;
+      k += 12;
+    }
+
+    /*-------------------------------- last block: affect all 32 bits of (c) */
+    switch(length)                   /* all the case statements fall through */
+    {
+    case 12: c+=((uint32_t)k[11])<<24;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 11: c+=((uint32_t)k[10])<<16;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 10: c+=((uint32_t)k[9])<<8;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 9 : c+=k[8];
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 8 : b+=((uint32_t)k[7])<<24;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 7 : b+=((uint32_t)k[6])<<16;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 6 : b+=((uint32_t)k[5])<<8;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 5 : b+=k[4];
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 4 : a+=((uint32_t)k[3])<<24;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 3 : a+=((uint32_t)k[2])<<16;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 2 : a+=((uint32_t)k[1])<<8;
+	     /* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case 1 : a+=k[0];
+             break;
+    case 0 : return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);
+    }
+  }
+
+  final(a,b,c);
+  return NON_ZERO_64(b, c);
+}
+#else
+#define hashlittle2(key, len) hashlittle(key, len)
+#endif

hlink.c

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void match_gnums(int32 *ndx_list, int ndx_count)
 	struct ht_int32_node *node = NULL;
 	int32 gnum, gnum_next;
 
-	qsort(ndx_list, ndx_count, sizeof ndx_list[0], (int (*)()) hlink_compare_gnum);
+	qsort(ndx_list, ndx_count, sizeof ndx_list[0], (int (*)(const void*, const void*))hlink_compare_gnum);
 
 	for (from = 0; from < ndx_count; from++) {
 		file = hlink_flist->sorted[ndx_list[from]];
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ int hard_link_check(struct file_struct *file, int ndx, char *fname,
 int hard_link_one(struct file_struct *file, const char *fname,
 		  const char *oldname, int terse)
 {
-	if (do_link(oldname, fname) < 0) {
+	if (do_link_at(oldname, fname) < 0) {
 		enum logcode code;
 		if (terse) {
 			if (!INFO_GTE(NAME, 1))

io.c

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ extern int read_batch;
 extern int compat_flags;
 extern int protect_args;
 extern int checksum_seed;
+extern int xfer_sum_len;
 extern int daemon_connection;
 extern int protocol_version;
 extern int remove_source_files;
@@ -1089,6 +1090,9 @@ static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
 {
 	struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "got_flist_entry_status");
 
+	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+
 	if (remove_source_files) {
 		active_filecnt--;
 		active_bytecnt -= F_LENGTH(flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start]);
@@ -1157,8 +1161,8 @@ void set_io_timeout(int secs)
 
 static void check_for_d_option_error(const char *msg)
 {
-	static char rsync263_opts[] = "BCDHIKLPRSTWabceghlnopqrtuvxz";
-	char *colon;
+	static const char rsync263_opts[] = "BCDHIKLPRSTWabceghlnopqrtuvxz";
+	const char *colon;
 	int saw_d = 0;
 
 	if (*msg != 'r'
@@ -1784,6 +1788,13 @@ int32 read_int(int f)
 	return num;
 }
 
+uint32 read_uint(int f)
+{
+	char b[4];
+	read_buf(f, b, 4);
+	return IVAL(b, 0);
+}
+
 int32 read_varint(int f)
 {
 	union {
@@ -1857,6 +1868,45 @@ int64 read_varlong(int f, uchar min_bytes)
 	return u.x;
 }
 
+/* Read an int32 and verify lo <= v <= hi. On out-of-range, abort with a
+ * protocol error naming "what". The bound is co-located with the read so it
+ * cannot be forgotten by a downstream user. */
+int32 read_int_bounded(int f, int32 lo, int32 hi, const char *what)
+{
+	int32 v = read_int(f);
+	if (v < lo || v > hi) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "wire value %s out of range: %ld not in [%ld,%ld] [%s]\n",
+			what, (long)v, (long)lo, (long)hi, who_am_i());
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	}
+	return v;
+}
+
+/* As read_int_bounded but for varint-encoded values. */
+int32 read_varint_bounded(int f, int32 lo, int32 hi, const char *what)
+{
+	int32 v = read_varint(f);
+	if (v < lo || v > hi) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "wire value %s out of range: %ld not in [%ld,%ld] [%s]\n",
+			what, (long)v, (long)lo, (long)hi, who_am_i());
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	}
+	return v;
+}
+
+/* Read a varint that will be used as a size_t. Rejects negative values
+ * (which would wrap to ~SIZE_MAX) and values exceeding the supplied max. */
+size_t read_varint_size(int f, size_t max, const char *what)
+{
+	int32 v = read_varint(f);
+	if (v < 0 || (size_t)v > max) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "wire size %s out of range: %ld > %lu [%s]\n",
+			what, (long)v, (unsigned long)max, who_am_i());
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	}
+	return (size_t)v;
+}
+
 int64 read_longint(int f)
 {
 #if SIZEOF_INT64 >= 8
@@ -1963,6 +2013,21 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum)
 			(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 	}
+	/* Guard against integer overflow in downstream allocations sized by
+	 * count*element_size. my_alloc uses divide-not-multiply so it is
+	 * already wraparound-safe, but checking here gives a clearer error
+	 * and also covers the (size_t)count * xfer_sum_len arithmetic that
+	 * is performed *before* reaching my_alloc. */
+	if (xfer_sum_len > 0 && (size_t)sum->count > SIZE_MAX / (size_t)xfer_sum_len) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum count %ld (too large) [%s]\n",
+			(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	}
+	if ((size_t)sum->count > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(struct sum_buf)) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum count %ld (sum_buf overflow) [%s]\n",
+			(long)sum->count, who_am_i());
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	}
 	sum->blength = read_int(f);
 	if (sum->blength < 0 || sum->blength > max_blength) {
 		rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid block length %ld [%s]\n",
@@ -1970,7 +2035,7 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum)
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 	}
 	sum->s2length = protocol_version < 27 ? csum_length : (int)read_int(f);
-	if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) {
+	if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > xfer_sum_len) {
 		rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum length %d [%s]\n",
 			sum->s2length, who_am_i());
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);

lib/md-defines.h

@@ -1,11 +1,28 @@
 /* Keep this simple so both C and ASM can use it */
 
+/* These allow something like CFLAGS=-DDISABLE_SHA512_DIGEST */
+#ifdef DISABLE_SHA256_DIGEST
+#undef SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#endif
+#ifdef DISABLE_SHA512_DIGEST
+#undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#endif
+
 #define MD4_DIGEST_LEN 16
 #define MD5_DIGEST_LEN 16
+#if defined SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#elif defined SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#elif defined SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#else
 #define MAX_DIGEST_LEN MD5_DIGEST_LEN
+#endif
 
 #define CSUM_CHUNK 64
 
+#define CSUM_gone -1
 #define CSUM_NONE 0
 #define CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC 1
 #define CSUM_MD4_BUSTED 2
@@ -15,3 +32,6 @@
 #define CSUM_XXH64 6
 #define CSUM_XXH3_64 7
 #define CSUM_XXH3_128 8
+#define CSUM_SHA1 9
+#define CSUM_SHA256 10
+#define CSUM_SHA512 11

lib/md5.c

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 
 #include "rsync.h"
 
-#if !defined USE_OPENSSL || USE_MD5_ASM /* { */
 void md5_begin(md_context *ctx)
 {
 	ctx->A = 0x67452301;
@@ -224,7 +223,6 @@ void md5_result(md_context *ctx, uchar digest[MD5_DIGEST_LEN])
 	SIVALu(digest, 8, ctx->C);
 	SIVALu(digest, 12, ctx->D);
 }
-#endif /* } */
 
 #ifdef TEST_MD5 /* { */
 

lib/mdigest.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /* The include file for both the MD4 and MD5 routines. */
 
 #ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-#include "openssl/md4.h"
-#include "openssl/md5.h"
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #endif
 #include "md-defines.h"
 
@@ -17,14 +17,6 @@ void mdfour_begin(md_context *md);
 void mdfour_update(md_context *md, const uchar *in, uint32 length);
 void mdfour_result(md_context *md, uchar digest[MD4_DIGEST_LEN]);
 
-#if defined USE_OPENSSL && !defined USE_MD5_ASM
-#define md5_context MD5_CTX
-#define md5_begin MD5_Init
-#define md5_update MD5_Update
-#define md5_result(cptr, digest) MD5_Final(digest, cptr)
-#else
-#define md5_context md_context
 void md5_begin(md_context *ctx);
 void md5_update(md_context *ctx, const uchar *input, uint32 length);
 void md5_result(md_context *ctx, uchar digest[MD5_DIGEST_LEN]);
-#endif

lib/pool_alloc.c

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ struct alloc_pool
 	size_t			size;		/* extent size		*/
 	size_t			quantum;	/* allocation quantum	*/
 	struct pool_extent	*extents;	/* top extent is "live" */
-	void			(*bomb)();	/* called if malloc fails */
+	void			(*bomb)(const char*, const char*, int);	/* called if malloc fails */
 	int			flags;
 
 	/* statistical data */

loadparm.c

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static char *expand_vars(const char *str)
 
 	for (t = buf, f = str; bufsize && *f; ) {
 		if (*f == '%' && isUpper(f+1)) {
-			char *percent = strchr(f+1, '%');
+			const char *percent = strchr(f+1, '%');
 			if (percent && percent - f < bufsize) {
 				char *val;
 				strlcpy(t, f+1, percent - f);

log.c

@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ extern int protocol_version;
 extern int always_checksum;
 extern int preserve_mtimes;
 extern int msgs2stderr;
-extern int xfersum_type;
-extern int checksum_type;
 extern int stdout_format_has_i;
 extern int stdout_format_has_o_or_i;
 extern int logfile_format_has_i;
@@ -62,6 +60,8 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
 extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
 extern const char undetermined_hostname[];
 
+extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni, *file_sum_nni;
+
 static int log_initialised;
 static int logfile_was_closed;
 static FILE *logfile_fp;
@@ -456,11 +456,17 @@ void rsyserr(enum logcode code, int errcode, const char *format, ...)
 	char buf[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
 	size_t len;
 
+	/* snprintf returns the would-have-been length on truncation, so
+	 * each cumulative call must be guarded; if not, sizeof buf - len
+	 * can underflow when promoted to size_t and the next call writes
+	 * past the buffer. */
 	len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, RSYNC_NAME ": [%s] ", who_am_i());
 
-	va_start(ap, format);
-	len += vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len, format, ap);
-	va_end(ap);
+	if (len < sizeof buf) {
+		va_start(ap, format);
+		len += vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len, format, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+	}
 
 	if (len < sizeof buf) {
 		len += snprintf(buf + len, sizeof buf - len,
@@ -680,12 +686,12 @@ static void log_formatted(enum logcode code, const char *format, const char *op,
 			n = NULL;
 			if (S_ISREG(file->mode)) {
 				if (always_checksum)
-					n = sum_as_hex(checksum_type, F_SUM(file), 1);
+					n = sum_as_hex(file_sum_nni->num, F_SUM(file), 1);
 				else if (iflags & ITEM_TRANSFER)
-					n = sum_as_hex(xfersum_type, sender_file_sum, 0);
+					n = sum_as_hex(xfer_sum_nni->num, sender_file_sum, 0);
 			}
 			if (!n) {
-				int sum_len = csum_len_for_type(always_checksum ? checksum_type : xfersum_type,
+				int sum_len = csum_len_for_type(always_checksum ? file_sum_nni->num : xfer_sum_nni->num,
 								always_checksum);
 				memset(buf2, ' ', sum_len*2);
 				buf2[sum_len*2] = '\0';

m4/have_type.m4

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 dnl AC_HAVE_TYPE(TYPE,INCLUDES)
 AC_DEFUN([AC_HAVE_TYPE], [
-AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC])
 cv=`echo "$1" | sed 'y%./+- %__p__%'`
 AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1)
 AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_type_$cv],

main.c

@@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ void write_del_stats(int f)
 
 void read_del_stats(int f)
 {
-	stats.deleted_files = read_varint(f);
-	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs = read_varint(f);
-	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = read_varint(f);
-	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices = read_varint(f);
-	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = read_varint(f);
+	stats.deleted_files = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_files");
+	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_dirs = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_dirs");
+	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_symlinks = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_symlinks");
+	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_devices = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_devices");
+	stats.deleted_files += stats.deleted_specials = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT, "deleted_specials");
 }
 
 static void become_copy_as_user()
@@ -392,9 +392,18 @@ static void output_itemized_counts(const char *prefix, int *counts)
 		counts[0] -= counts[1] + counts[2] + counts[3] + counts[4];
 		for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
 			if (counts[j]) {
+				/* snprintf can return more than its size arg
+				 * on truncation; keep len <= sizeof buf - 2 so
+				 * the closing ')' and trailing NUL always
+				 * have room and the next iteration's
+				 * sizeof buf - len - 2 cannot underflow. */
+				if (len >= (int)sizeof buf - 2)
+					break;
 				len += snprintf(buf+len, sizeof buf - len - 2,
 					"%s%s: %s",
 					pre, labels[j], comma_num(counts[j]));
+				if (len > (int)sizeof buf - 2)
+					len = (int)sizeof buf - 2;
 				pre = ", ";
 			}
 		}
@@ -660,6 +669,16 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in
 	return pid;
 }
 
+/* Older versions turn an empty string as a reference to the current directory.
+ * We now treat this as an error unless --old-args was used. */
+static char *dot_dir_or_error()
+{
+	if (old_style_args || am_server)
+		return ".";
+	rprintf(FERROR, "Empty destination arg specified (use \".\" or see --old-args).\n");
+	exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+}
+
 /* The receiving side operates in one of two modes:
  *
  * 1. it receives any number of files into a destination directory,
@@ -687,9 +706,8 @@ static char *get_local_name(struct file_list *flist, char *dest_path)
 	if (!dest_path || list_only)
 		return NULL;
 
-	/* Treat an empty string as a copy into the current directory. */
 	if (!*dest_path)
-		dest_path = ".";
+		dest_path = dot_dir_or_error();
 
 	if (daemon_filter_list.head) {
 		char *slash = strrchr(dest_path, '/');
@@ -1432,6 +1450,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 			if (argc > 1) {
 				p = argv[--argc];
+				if (!*p)
+					p = dot_dir_or_error();
 				remote_argv = argv + argc;
 			} else {
 				static char *dotarg[1] = { "." };
@@ -1557,6 +1577,10 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
 			shell_user = shell_machine;
 			shell_machine = p+1;
 		}
+		if (*shell_machine == '-') {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid remote host: hostnames may not start with '-'.\n");
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (DEBUG_GTE(CMD, 2)) {
@@ -1743,6 +1767,17 @@ int main(int argc,char *argv[])
 
 	unset_env_var("DISPLAY");
 
+#if defined USE_OPENSSL && defined SET_OPENSSL_CONF
+#define TO_STR2(x) #x
+#define TO_STR(x) TO_STR2(x)
+	/* ./configure --with-openssl-conf=/etc/ssl/openssl-rsync.cnf
+	 * defines SET_OPENSSL_CONF as that unquoted pathname. */
+	if (!getenv("OPENSSL_CONF")) /* Don't override it if it's already set. */
+		set_env_str("OPENSSL_CONF", TO_STR(SET_OPENSSL_CONF));
+#undef TO_STR
+#undef TO_STR2
+#endif
+
 	memset(&stats, 0, sizeof(stats));
 
 	/* Even a non-daemon runs needs the default config values to be set, e.g.

match.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1996 Andrew Tridgell
  * Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
- * Copyright (C) 2003-2020 Wayne Davison
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-2022 Wayne Davison
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
 
 extern int checksum_seed;
 extern int append_mode;
-extern int xfersum_type;
+
+extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
+extern int xfer_sum_len;
 
 int updating_basis_file;
 char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -145,6 +147,9 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
 	int more;
 	schar *map;
 
+	// prevent possible memory leaks
+	memset(sum2, 0, sizeof sum2);
+
 	/* want_i is used to encourage adjacent matches, allowing the RLL
 	 * coding of the output to work more efficiently. */
 	want_i = 0;
@@ -230,7 +235,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
 				done_csum2 = 1;
 			}
 
-			if (memcmp(sum2,s->sums[i].sum2,s->s2length) != 0) {
+			if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0) {
 				false_alarms++;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
 					if (i != aligned_i) {
 						if (sum != s->sums[aligned_i].sum1
 						 || l != s->sums[aligned_i].len
-						 || memcmp(sum2, s->sums[aligned_i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
+						 || memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, aligned_i), s->s2length) != 0)
 							goto check_want_i;
 						i = aligned_i;
 					}
@@ -269,7 +274,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
 						if (sum != s->sums[i].sum1)
 							goto check_want_i;
 						get_checksum2((char *)map, l, sum2);
-						if (memcmp(sum2, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
+						if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0)
 							goto check_want_i;
 						/* OK, we have a re-alignment match.  Bump the offset
 						 * forward to the new match point. */
@@ -288,7 +293,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
 			 && (!updating_basis_file || s->sums[want_i].offset >= offset
 			  || s->sums[want_i].flags & SUMFLG_SAME_OFFSET)
 			 && sum == s->sums[want_i].sum1
-			 && memcmp(sum2, s->sums[want_i].sum2, s->s2length) == 0) {
+			 && memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, want_i), s->s2length) == 0) {
 				/* we've found an adjacent match - the RLL coder
 				 * will be happy */
 				i = want_i;
@@ -356,15 +361,13 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
  **/
 void match_sums(int f, struct sum_struct *s, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T len)
 {
-	int sum_len;
-
 	last_match = 0;
 	false_alarms = 0;
 	hash_hits = 0;
 	matches = 0;
 	data_transfer = 0;
 
-	sum_init(xfersum_type, checksum_seed);
+	sum_init(xfer_sum_nni, checksum_seed);
 
 	if (append_mode > 0) {
 		if (append_mode == 2) {
@@ -405,22 +408,22 @@ void match_sums(int f, struct sum_struct *s, struct map_struct *buf, OFF_T len)
 		matched(f, s, buf, len, -1);
 	}
 
-	sum_len = sum_end(sender_file_sum);
+	sum_end(sender_file_sum);
 
 	/* If we had a read error, send a bad checksum.  We use all bits
 	 * off as long as the checksum doesn't happen to be that, in
 	 * which case we turn the last 0 bit into a 1. */
 	if (buf && buf->status != 0) {
 		int i;
-		for (i = 0; i < sum_len && sender_file_sum[i] == 0; i++) {}
-		memset(sender_file_sum, 0, sum_len);
-		if (i == sum_len)
+		for (i = 0; i < xfer_sum_len && sender_file_sum[i] == 0; i++) {}
+		memset(sender_file_sum, 0, xfer_sum_len);
+		if (i == xfer_sum_len)
 			sender_file_sum[i-1]++;
 	}
 
 	if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 2))
 		rprintf(FINFO,"sending file_sum\n");
-	write_buf(f, sender_file_sum, sum_len);
+	write_buf(f, sender_file_sum, xfer_sum_len);
 
 	if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 2)) {
 		rprintf(FINFO, "false_alarms=%d hash_hits=%d matches=%d\n",

mkgitver

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ if [ ! -f git-version.h ]; then
     touch git-version.h
 fi
 
-if [ -e "$srcdir/.git" ]; then
-    gitver=`git describe --abbrev=8 2>/dev/null | sed -n '/^v3\.[0-9][0-9]*\.[0-9][0-9]*\(-\|$\)/p'`
-    if [ -n "$gitver" ]; then
+if test -d "$srcdir/.git" || test -f "$srcdir/.git"; then
+    gitver=`git describe --abbrev=8 2>/dev/null`
+    # NOTE: I'm avoiding "|" in sed since I'm not sure if sed -r is portable and "\|" fails on some OSes.
+    verchk=`echo "$gitver-" | sed -n '/^v3\.[0-9][0-9]*\.[0-9][0-9]*\(pre[0-9]*\)*-/p'`
+    if [ -n "$verchk" ]; then
 	echo "#define RSYNC_GITVER \"$gitver\"" >git-version.h.new
 	if ! diff git-version.h.new git-version.h >/dev/null; then
 	    echo "Updating git-version.h"

options.c

@@ -113,11 +113,20 @@ int mkpath_dest_arg = 0;
 int allow_inc_recurse = 1;
 int xfer_dirs = -1;
 int am_daemon = 0;
+/* Set after a successful per-module chroot ("use chroot = yes") in
+ * clientserver.c. NOT set for the daemon-level "daemon chroot = /X"
+ * chroot: that confines path resolution to /X, but module paths
+ * /X/modA, /X/modB, etc. are not chroot boundaries, so the per-module
+ * symlink-race defenses (secure_relative_open() / do_*_at() in
+ * syscall.c, gated by `am_daemon && !am_chrooted`) must still fire
+ * even when the daemon is inside a daemon chroot. */
+int am_chrooted = 0;
 int connect_timeout = 0;
 int keep_partial = 0;
 int safe_symlinks = 0;
 int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
 int munge_symlinks = 0;
+int use_secure_symlinks = 0;
 int size_only = 0;
 int daemon_bwlimit = 0;
 int bwlimit = 0;
@@ -1155,7 +1164,7 @@ static time_t parse_time(const char *arg)
 {
 	const char *cp;
 	time_t val, now = time(NULL);
-	struct tm t, *today = localtime(&now);
+	struct tm t, tmp, *today = localtime_r(&now, &tmp);
 	int in_date, old_mday, n;
 
 	memset(&t, 0, sizeof t);
@@ -1372,6 +1381,10 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
 	if (pc)
 		poptFreeContext(pc);
 	pc = poptGetContext(RSYNC_NAME, argc, argv, long_options, 0);
+	if (pc == NULL) {
+		strlcpy(err_buf, "poptGetContext returned NULL\n", sizeof err_buf);
+		return 0;
+	}
 	if (!am_server) {
 		poptReadDefaultConfig(pc, 0);
 		popt_unalias(pc, "--daemon");
@@ -1926,7 +1939,7 @@ int parse_arguments(int *argc_p, const char ***argv_p)
 		saw_stderr_opt = 1;
 
 	if (version_opt_cnt) {
-		print_rsync_version(FINFO);
+		print_rsync_version(version_opt_cnt > 1 && !am_server ? FNONE : FINFO);
 		exit_cleanup(0);
 	}
 

packaging/lsb/rsync.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Summary: A fast, versatile, remote (and local) file-copying tool
 Name: rsync
-Version: 3.2.6
+Version: 3.2.7
 %define fullversion %{version}
 Release: 1
 %define srcdir src
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %dir /etc/rsync-ssl/certs
 
 %changelog
-* Fri Sep 09 2022 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
-Released 3.2.6.
+* Thu Oct 20 2022 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
+Released 3.2.7.
 
 * Fri Mar 21 2008 Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
 Added installation of /etc/xinetd.d/rsync file and some commented-out

packaging/openssl-rsync.cnf

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# This config file can be used with rsync to enable legacy digests
+# (such as MD4) by using the OPENSSL_CONF environment variable.
+# See rsync's configure --with-openssl-conf=/path/name option.
+
+openssl_conf = openssl_init
+
+[openssl_init]
+providers = provider_sect
+
+[provider_sect]
+default = default_sect
+legacy = legacy_sect
+
+[default_sect]
+activate = 1
+
+[legacy_sect]
+activate = 1

packaging/pkglib.py

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ def mandate_gensend_hook():
         print('Creating hook file:', hook)
         cmd_chk(['./rsync', '-a', 'packaging/pre-push', hook])
     else:
-        ct = cmd_txt(['fgrep', 'make gensend', hook], discard='output')
+        ct = cmd_txt(['grep', 'make gensend', hook], discard='output')
         if ct.rc:
             die('Please add a "make gensend" into your', hook, 'script.')
 

packaging/release-rsync

@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ def main():
         if not re.match(r'^del', ans, flags=re.I):
             die("Aborted")
         cmd_chk(['git', 'tag', '-d', v_ver])
+        if os.path.isdir('patches/.git'):
+            cmd_chk(f"cd patches && git tag -d '{v_ver}'")
 
     version = re.sub(r'[-.]*pre[-.]*', 'pre', version)
     if 'pre' in version and not curversion.endswith('dev'):
@@ -254,7 +256,7 @@ About to:
 """)
     ans = input("<Press Enter OR 'y' to continue> ")
 
-    s = cmd_run(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f'Preparing for release of {version}'])
+    s = cmd_run(['git', 'commit', '-a', '-m', f'Preparing for release of {version} [buildall]'])
     if s.returncode:
         die('Aborting')
 

popt/poptparse.c

@@ -36,9 +36,15 @@ int poptDupArgv(int argc, const char **argv,
     dst += (argc + 1) * sizeof(*argv);
 
     /*@-branchstate@*/
-    for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-	argv2[i] = dst;
-	dst += strlcpy(dst, argv[i], nb) + 1;
+    {
+	char * const end_buf = (char *)argv2 + nb;
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+	    argv2[i] = dst;
+	    /* nb is the TOTAL buffer size, not the remaining bytes; use the
+	     * remaining bytes from dst to end_buf so glibc 2.39+ fortified
+	     * strlcpy doesn't trip __bos() and abort. */
+	    dst += strlcpy(dst, argv[i], end_buf - dst) + 1;
+	}
     }
     /*@=branchstate@*/
     argv2[argc] = NULL;

receiver.c

@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ extern int inplace;
 extern int inplace_partial;
 extern int allowed_lull;
 extern int delay_updates;
-extern int xfersum_type;
 extern BOOL want_progress_now;
 extern mode_t orig_umask;
 extern struct stats stats;
@@ -67,6 +66,11 @@ extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
 extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
 extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
 extern OFF_T preallocated_len;
+extern int fuzzy_basis;
+
+extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
+extern int xfer_sum_len;
+extern int use_secure_symlinks;
 
 static struct bitbag *delayed_bits = NULL;
 static int phase = 0, redoing = 0;
@@ -211,7 +215,12 @@ int open_tmpfile(char *fnametmp, const char *fname, struct file_struct *file)
 	 * access to ensure that there is no race condition.  They will be
 	 * correctly updated after the right owner and group info is set.
 	 * (Thanks to snabb@epipe.fi for pointing this out.) */
-	fd = do_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
+	/* When use_secure_symlinks is on (non-chroot daemon with munge_symlinks),
+	 * use secure_mkstemp to prevent symlink race attacks on parent directories. */
+	if (use_secure_symlinks)
+		fd = secure_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
+	else
+		fd = do_mkstemp(fnametmp, (file->mode|added_perms) & INITACCESSPERMS);
 
 #if 0
 	/* In most cases parent directories will already exist because their
@@ -240,7 +249,6 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 	static char file_sum1[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
 	struct map_struct *mapbuf;
 	struct sum_struct sum;
-	int sum_len;
 	int32 len;
 	OFF_T total_size = F_LENGTH(file);
 	OFF_T offset = 0;
@@ -280,7 +288,7 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 	} else
 		mapbuf = NULL;
 
-	sum_init(xfersum_type, checksum_seed);
+	sum_init(xfer_sum_nni, checksum_seed);
 
 	if (append_mode > 0) {
 		OFF_T j;
@@ -310,7 +318,12 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 		}
 	}
 
-	while ((i = recv_token(f_in, &data)) != 0) {
+	while (1) {
+		data = NULL;
+		i = recv_token(f_in, &data);
+		if (i == 0)
+			break;
+
 		if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
 			show_progress(offset, total_size);
 
@@ -318,6 +331,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 			maybe_send_keepalive(time(NULL), MSK_ALLOW_FLUSH | MSK_ACTIVE_RECEIVER);
 
 		if (i > 0) {
+			if (!data) {
+				rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid literal token with no data [%s]\n", who_am_i());
+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+			}
 			if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
 				rprintf(FINFO,"data recv %d at %s\n",
 					i, big_num(offset));
@@ -335,6 +352,11 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 		}
 
 		i = -(i+1);
+		if (i < 0 || i >= sum.count) {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid block index %d (count=%ld) [%s]\n",
+				i, (long)sum.count, who_am_i());
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
 		offset2 = i * (OFF_T)sum.blength;
 		len = sum.blength;
 		if (i == (int)sum.count-1 && sum.remainder != 0)
@@ -393,7 +415,7 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 	if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
 		end_progress(total_size);
 
-	sum_len = sum_end(file_sum1);
+	sum_end(file_sum1);
 
 	if (do_fsync && fd != -1 && fsync(fd) != 0) {
 		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "fsync failed on %s", full_fname(fname));
@@ -403,10 +425,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
 	if (mapbuf)
 		unmap_file(mapbuf);
 
-	read_buf(f_in, sender_file_sum, sum_len);
+	read_buf(f_in, sender_file_sum, xfer_sum_len);
 	if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 2))
 		rprintf(FINFO,"got file_sum\n");
-	if (fd != -1 && memcmp(file_sum1, sender_file_sum, sum_len) != 0)
+	if (fd != -1 && memcmp(file_sum1, sender_file_sum, xfer_sum_len) != 0)
 		return 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -434,7 +456,7 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
 			}
 			/* We don't use robust_rename() here because the
 			 * partial-dir must be on the same drive. */
-			if (do_rename(partialptr, fname) < 0) {
+			if (do_rename_at(partialptr, fname) < 0) {
 				rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
 					"rename failed for %s (from %s)",
 					full_fname(fname), partialptr);
@@ -450,7 +472,10 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
 static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
 {
 	struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
-	struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+	struct file_struct *file;
+	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
 
 	rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
 		is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
@@ -550,6 +575,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 	progress_init();
 
 	while (1) {
+		const char *basedir = NULL;
+
 		cleanup_disable();
 
 		/* This call also sets cur_flist. */
@@ -585,6 +612,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 
 		if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
+		else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 		else
 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
 		fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
@@ -715,28 +744,34 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 				fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
 				break;
 			case FNAMECMP_FUZZY:
+				if (fuzzy_basis == 0) {
+					rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious fuzzy operation for %s\n", xname);
+					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+				}
 				if (file->dirname) {
-					pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
-					fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
-				} else
-					fnamecmp = xname;
+					basedir = file->dirname;
+				}
+				fnamecmp = xname;
 				break;
 			default:
 				if (fnamecmp_type > FNAMECMP_FUZZY && fnamecmp_type-FNAMECMP_FUZZY <= basis_dir_cnt) {
 					fnamecmp_type -= FNAMECMP_FUZZY + 1;
 					if (file->dirname) {
-						stringjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
-							   basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], "/", file->dirname, "/", xname, NULL);
-					} else
-						pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], xname);
+						pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], file->dirname);
+						basedir = fnamecmpbuf;
+					} else {
+						basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type];
+					}
+					fnamecmp = xname;
 				} else if (fnamecmp_type >= basis_dir_cnt) {
 					rprintf(FERROR,
 						"invalid basis_dir index: %d.\n",
 						fnamecmp_type);
 					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
-				} else
-					pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basis_dir[fnamecmp_type], fname);
-				fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+				} else {
+					basedir = basis_dir[fnamecmp_type];
+					fnamecmp = fname;
+				}
 				break;
 			}
 			if (!fnamecmp || (daemon_filter_list.head
@@ -759,25 +794,31 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 		}
 
 		/* open the file */
-		fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
+		fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
 
 		if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
 			if (fnamecmp != fname) {
 				fnamecmp = fname;
 				fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
-				fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
+				fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY);
 			}
 
 			if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
 				/* pre-29 allowed only one alternate basis */
-				pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf,
-					 basis_dir[0], fname);
-				fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+				basedir = basis_dir[0];
+				fnamecmp = fname;
 				fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_LOW;
-				fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
+				fd1 = secure_relative_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
 			}
 		}
 
+		if (basedir) {
+			// for the following code we need the full
+			// path name as a single string
+			pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, basedir, fnamecmp);
+			fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+		}
+
 		one_inplace = inplace_partial && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR;
 		updating_basis_or_equiv = one_inplace
 		    || (inplace && (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP));
@@ -838,11 +879,21 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 		/* We now check to see if we are writing the file "inplace" */
 		if (inplace || one_inplace)  {
 			fnametmp = one_inplace ? partialptr : fname;
-			fd2 = do_open(fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
+			/* When use_secure_symlinks is on (non-chroot daemon),
+			 * use secure open to prevent symlink race attacks where an
+			 * attacker could switch a directory to a symlink between
+			 * path validation and file open. */
+			if (use_secure_symlinks)
+				fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
+			else
+				fd2 = do_open(fnametmp, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0600);
 #ifdef linux
 			if (fd2 == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
 				/* Maybe the error was due to protected_regular setting? */
-				fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
+				if (use_secure_symlinks)
+					fd2 = secure_relative_open(NULL, fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
+				else
+					fd2 = do_open(fname, O_WRONLY, 0600);
 			}
 #endif
 			if (fd2 == -1) {
@@ -894,7 +945,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 				recv_ok = -1;
 			else if (fnamecmp == partialptr) {
 				if (!one_inplace)
-					do_unlink(partialptr);
+					do_unlink_at(partialptr);
 				handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE);
 			}
 		} else if (keep_partial && partialptr && (!one_inplace || delay_updates)) {
@@ -903,7 +954,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 					"Unable to create partial-dir for %s -- discarding %s.\n",
 					local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, NULL),
 					recv_ok ? "completed file" : "partial file");
-				do_unlink(fnametmp);
+				do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
 				recv_ok = -1;
 			} else if (!finish_transfer(partialptr, fnametmp, fnamecmp, NULL,
 						    file, recv_ok, !partial_dir))
@@ -914,7 +965,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 			} else
 				partialptr = NULL;
 		} else if (!one_inplace)
-			do_unlink(fnametmp);
+			do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
 
 		cleanup_disable();
 

rsync.1.md

@@ -152,7 +152,43 @@ rsync daemon by leaving off the module name:
 
 >     rsync somehost.mydomain.com::
 
-See the following section for more details.
+## COPYING TO A DIFFERENT NAME
+
+When you want to copy a directory to a different name, use a trailing slash on
+the source directory to put the contents of the directory into any destination
+directory you like:
+
+>     rsync -ai foo/ bar/
+
+Rsync also has the ability to customize a destination file's name when copying
+a single item.  The rules for this are:
+
+- The transfer list must consist of a single item (either a file or an empty
+  directory)
+- The final element of the destination path must not exist as a directory
+- The destination path must not have been specified with a trailing slash
+
+Under those circumstances, rsync will set the name of the destination's single
+item to the last element of the destination path.  Keep in mind that it is best
+to only use this idiom when copying a file and use the above trailing-slash
+idiom when copying a directory.
+
+The following example copies the `foo.c` file as `bar.c` in the `save` dir
+(assuming that `bar.c` isn't a directory):
+
+>     rsync -ai src/foo.c save/bar.c
+
+The single-item copy rule might accidentally bite you if you unknowingly copy a
+single item and specify a destination dir that doesn't exist (without using a
+trailing slash).  For example, if `src/*.c` matches one file and `save/dir`
+doesn't exist, this will confuse you by naming the destination file `save/dir`:
+
+>     rsync -ai src/*.c save/dir
+
+To prevent such an accident, either make sure the destination dir exists or
+specify the destination path with a trailing slash:
+
+>     rsync -ai src/*.c save/dir/
 
 ## SORTED TRANSFER ORDER
 
@@ -400,7 +436,7 @@ has its own detailed description later in this manpage.
 --append-verify          --append w/old data in file checksum
 --dirs, -d               transfer directories without recursing
 --old-dirs, --old-d      works like --dirs when talking to old rsync
---mkpath                 create the destination's path component
+--mkpath                 create destination's missing path components
 --links, -l              copy symlinks as symlinks
 --copy-links, -L         transform symlink into referent file/dir
 --copy-unsafe-links      only "unsafe" symlinks are transformed
@@ -580,11 +616,14 @@ expand it.
 
 0.  `--version`, `-V`
 
-    Print the rsync version plus other info and exit.
+    Print the rsync version plus other info and exit.  When repeated, the
+    information is output is a JSON format that is still fairly readable
+    (client side only).
 
-    The output includes the default list of checksum algorithms, the default
-    list of compression algorithms, a list of compiled-in capabilities, a link
-    to the rsync web site, and some license/copyright info.
+    The output includes a list of compiled-in capabilities, a list of
+    optimizations, the default list of checksum algorithms, the default list of
+    compression algorithms, the default list of daemon auth digests, a link to
+    the rsync web site, and a few other items.
 
 0.  `--verbose`, `-v`
 
@@ -856,7 +895,7 @@ expand it.
     that until a bunch of recursive copying has finished).  However, these
     early directories don't yet have their completed mode, mtime, or ownership
     set -- they have more restrictive rights until the subdirectory's copying
-    actually begins.  This early-creation idiom can be avoiding by using the
+    actually begins.  This early-creation idiom can be avoided by using the
     [`--omit-dir-times`](#opt) option.
 
     Incremental recursion can be disabled using the
@@ -1110,23 +1149,28 @@ expand it.
 
 0.  `--mkpath`
 
-    Create a missing path component of the destination arg.  This allows rsync
-    to create multiple levels of missing destination dirs and to create a path
-    in which to put a single renamed file.  Keep in mind that you'll need to
-    supply a trailing slash if you want the entire destination path to be
-    treated as a directory when copying a single arg (making rsync behave the
-    same way that it would if the path component of the destination had already
-    existed).
+    Create all missing path components of the destination path.
 
-    For example, the following creates a copy of file foo as bar in the sub/dir
-    directory, creating dirs "sub" and "sub/dir" if either do not yet exist:
+    By default, rsync allows only the final component of the destination path
+    to not exist, which is an attempt to help you to validate your destination
+    path.  With this option, rsync creates all the missing destination-path
+    components, just as if `mkdir -p $DEST_PATH` had been run on the receiving
+    side.
 
-    >     rsync -ai --mkpath foo sub/dir/bar
+    When specifying a destination path, including a trailing slash ensures that
+    the whole path is treated as directory names to be created, even when the
+    file list has a single item. See the [COPYING TO A DIFFERENT NAME](#)
+    section for full details on how rsync decides if a final destination-path
+    component should be created as a directory or not.
 
-    If you instead ran the following, it would have created file foo in the
-    sub/dir/bar directory:
+    If you would like the newly-created destination dirs to match the dirs on
+    the sending side, you should be using [`--relative`](#opt) (`-R`) instead
+    of `--mkpath`.  For instance, the following two commands result in the same
+    destination tree, but only the second command ensures that the
+    "some/extra/path" components match the dirs on the sending side:
 
-    >     rsync -ai --mkpath foo sub/dir/bar/
+    >     rsync -ai --mkpath host:some/extra/path/*.c some/extra/path/
+    >     rsync -aiR host:some/extra/path/*.c ./
 
 0.  `--links`, `-l`
 
@@ -1557,6 +1601,15 @@ expand it.
     will make the update fairly efficient if the files haven't actually
     changed, you're much better off using `-t`).
 
+    A modern rsync that is using transfer protocol 30 or 31 conveys a modify
+    time using up to 8-bytes. If rsync is forced to speak an older protocol
+    (perhaps due to the remote rsync being older than 3.0.0) a modify time is
+    conveyed using 4-bytes. Prior to 3.2.7, these shorter values could convey
+    a date range of 13-Dec-1901 to 19-Jan-2038.  Beginning with 3.2.7, these
+    4-byte values now convey a date range of 1-Jan-1970 to 7-Feb-2106.  If you
+    have files dated older than 1970, make sure your rsync executables are
+    upgraded so that the full range of dates can be conveyed.
+
 0.  `--atimes`, `-U`
 
     This tells rsync to set the access (use) times of the destination files to
@@ -1727,6 +1780,7 @@ expand it.
     - `xxh64` (aka `xxhash`)
     - `md5`
     - `md4`
+    - `sha1`
     - `none`
 
     Run `rsync --version` to see the default checksum list compiled into your
@@ -2384,6 +2438,8 @@ expand it.
 
     This option tells rsync to stop trying to protect the arg values on the
     remote side from unintended word-splitting or other misinterpretation.
+    It also allows the client to treat an empty arg as a "." instead of
+    generating an error.
 
     The default in a modern rsync is for "shell-active" characters (including
     spaces) to be backslash-escaped in the args that are sent to the remote
@@ -3524,13 +3580,17 @@ expand it.
 
     >     rsync -av --list-only foo* dest/
 
-    Starting with rsync 3.1.0, the sizes output by `--list-only` are affected
-    by the [`--human-readable`](#opt) option.  By default they will contain
-    digit separators, but higher levels of readability will output the sizes
-    with unit suffixes.  Note also that the column width for the size output
-    has increased from 11 to 14 characters for all human-readable levels.  Use
-    `--no-h` if you want just digits in the sizes, and the old column width of
-    11 characters.
+    This option always uses an output format that looks similar to this:
+
+    >     drwxrwxr-x          4,096 2022/09/30 12:53:11 support
+    >     -rw-rw-r--             80 2005/01/11 10:37:37 support/Makefile
+
+    The only option that affects this output style is (as of 3.1.0) the
+    [`--human-readable`](#opt) (`-h`) option.  The default is to output sizes
+    as byte counts with digit separators (in a 14-character-width column).
+    Specifying at least one `-h` option makes the sizes output with unit
+    suffixes.  If you want old-style bytecount sizes without digit separators
+    (and an 11-character-width column) use `--no-h`.
 
     Compatibility note: when requesting a remote listing of files from an rsync
     that is version 2.6.3 or older, you may encounter an error if you ask for a

rsync.c

@@ -437,7 +437,10 @@ int read_ndx_and_attrs(int f_in, int f_out, int *iflag_ptr, uchar *type_ptr, cha
   */
 void free_sums(struct sum_struct *s)
 {
-	if (s->sums) free(s->sums);
+	if (s->sums) {
+		free(s->sums);
+		free(s->sum2_array);
+	}
 	free(s);
 }
 
@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
 		if (am_root >= 0) {
 			uid_t uid = change_uid ? (uid_t)F_OWNER(file) : sxp->st.st_uid;
 			gid_t gid = change_gid ? (gid_t)F_GROUP(file) : sxp->st.st_gid;
-			if (do_lchown(fname, uid, gid) != 0) {
+			if (do_lchown_at(fname, uid, gid) != 0) {
 				/* We shouldn't have attempted to change uid
 				 * or gid unless have the privilege. */
 				rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "%s %s failed",
@@ -654,7 +657,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
 	if (!BITS_EQUAL(sxp->st.st_mode, new_mode, CHMOD_BITS)) {
-		int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod(fname, new_mode);
+		int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod_at(fname, new_mode);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
 				"failed to set permissions on %s",
@@ -755,7 +758,7 @@ int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
 			full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
 		if (!partialptr || (ret == -2 && temp_copy_name)
 		 || robust_rename(fnametmp, partialptr, NULL, file->mode) < 0)
-			do_unlink(fnametmp);
+			do_unlink_at(fnametmp);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (ret == 0) {
@@ -771,7 +774,7 @@ int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
 		       ok_to_set_time ? ATTRS_ACCURATE_TIME : ATTRS_SKIP_MTIME | ATTRS_SKIP_ATIME | ATTRS_SKIP_CRTIME);
 
 	if (temp_copy_name) {
-		if (do_rename(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
+		if (do_rename_at(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\"",
 				full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
 			return 0;

rsync.h

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4)	/* sender */
 #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4)	/* generator */
 #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5)	/* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
+#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
 #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6)	/* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
 #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6)	/* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
 #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7)	/* receiver/generator */
@@ -162,6 +163,29 @@
 /* For compatibility with older rsyncs */
 #define OLD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ((int32)1 << 29)
 
+/* Policy ceilings on attacker-controlled wire values. Picked well above any
+ * legitimate filesystem / protocol traffic but well below sizes that could
+ * cause integer overflow or DoS-grade allocations. See input_checking.txt.
+ *
+ * Note on MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN: xattr datum size is bounded only by the
+ * wire-format maximum (signed int32 varint, ~2GB). macOS resource forks
+ * are transferred as the com.apple.ResourceFork xattr and can legitimately
+ * be many GB; --max-alloc (default 1GB, configurable) is the real
+ * allocation cap. read_varint_size() still rejects negative values so a
+ * hostile peer cannot wrap to ~SIZE_MAX. */
+#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_COUNT   65536
+#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_NAMELEN 4096
+#define MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN ((int32)0x7fffffff)
+#define MAX_WIRE_ACL_COUNT     65536
+#define MAX_WIRE_NSEC          999999999
+/* MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT is the per-category cap for read_del_stats() in main.c,
+ * which accumulates 5 wire-supplied counts into the int32 stats.deleted_files
+ * accumulator.  Capped at 2^28 so 5 * 2^28 = 1.34 GB stays under INT32_MAX
+ * (2.15 GB) with margin -- a higher cap (e.g. 2^30) would let a hostile peer
+ * supplying 3+ max-sized counts overflow the accumulator, which is signed-int
+ * UB.  2^28 is still well above any plausible real transfer's deletion count. */
+#define MAX_WIRE_DEL_STAT      ((int32)1 << 28)
+
 #define ROUND_UP_1024(siz) ((siz) & (1024-1) ? ((siz) | (1024-1)) + 1 : (siz))
 
 #define IOERR_GENERAL	(1<<0) /* For backward compatibility, this must == 1 */
@@ -366,16 +390,10 @@ enum delret {
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#else
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
 #include <sys/time.h>
-#else
+#endif
 #include <time.h>
-#endif
-#endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
 #include <fcntl.h>
@@ -826,6 +844,7 @@ extern int uid_ndx;
 extern int gid_ndx;
 extern int acls_ndx;
 extern int xattrs_ndx;
+extern int file_sum_extra_cnt;
 
 #ifdef USE_FLEXIBLE_ARRAY
 #define FILE_STRUCT_LEN (sizeof (struct file_struct))
@@ -836,7 +855,7 @@ extern int xattrs_ndx;
 #define DEV_EXTRA_CNT 2
 #define DIRNODE_EXTRA_CNT 3
 #define EXTRA64_CNT ((sizeof (union file_extras64) + EXTRA_LEN - 1) / EXTRA_LEN)
-#define SUM_EXTRA_CNT ((MAX_DIGEST_LEN + EXTRA_LEN - 1) / EXTRA_LEN)
+#define SUM_EXTRA_CNT file_sum_extra_cnt
 
 #define REQ_EXTRA(f,ndx) ((union file_extras*)(f) - (ndx))
 #define OPT_EXTRA(f,bump) ((union file_extras*)(f) - file_extra_cnt - 1 - (bump))
@@ -963,12 +982,12 @@ struct sum_buf {
 	uint32 sum1;	        /**< simple checksum */
 	int32 chain;		/**< next hash-table collision */
 	short flags;		/**< flag bits */
-	char sum2[SUM_LENGTH];	/**< checksum  */
 };
 
 struct sum_struct {
 	OFF_T flength;		/**< total file length */
 	struct sum_buf *sums;	/**< points to info for each chunk */
+	char *sum2_array;	/**< checksums of length xfer_sum_len */
 	int32 count;		/**< how many chunks */
 	int32 blength;		/**< block_length */
 	int32 remainder;	/**< flength % block_length */
@@ -987,6 +1006,8 @@ struct map_struct {
 	int status;		/* first errno from read errors		*/
 };
 
+#define sum2_at(s, i)	((s)->sum2_array + ((size_t)(i) * xfer_sum_len))
+
 #define NAME_IS_FILE		(0)    /* filter name as a file */
 #define NAME_IS_DIR		(1<<0) /* filter name as a dir */
 #define NAME_IS_XATTR		(1<<2) /* filter name as an xattr */
@@ -1023,6 +1044,7 @@ typedef struct filter_struct {
 		int slash_cnt;
 		struct filter_list_struct *mergelist;
 	} u;
+	uchar elide;
 } filter_rule;
 
 typedef struct filter_list_struct {
@@ -1162,16 +1184,16 @@ typedef struct {
 #define NSTR_COMPRESS 1
 
 struct name_num_item {
-	int num;
-	const char *name, *main_name;
+	int num, flags;
+	const char *name;
+	struct name_num_item *main_nni;
 };
 
 struct name_num_obj {
 	const char *type;
-	const char *negotiated_name;
+	struct name_num_item *negotiated_nni;
 	uchar *saw;
 	int saw_len;
-	int negotiated_num;
 	struct name_num_item *list;
 };
 

rsyncd.conf.5.md

@@ -164,6 +164,16 @@ the values of parameters.  See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
     available in this module.  You must specify this parameter for each module
     in `rsyncd.conf`.
 
+    If the value contains a "/./" element then the path will be divided at that
+    point into a chroot dir and an inner-chroot subdir.  If [`use chroot`](#)
+    is set to false, though, the extraneous dot dir is just cleaned out of the
+    path.  An example of this idiom is:
+
+    >     path = /var/rsync/./module1
+
+    This will (when chrooting) chroot to "/var/rsync" and set the inside-chroot
+    path to "/module1".
+
     You may base the path's value off of an environment variable by surrounding
     the variable name with percent signs.  You can even reference a variable
     that is set by rsync when the user connects.  For example, this would use
@@ -187,29 +197,47 @@ the values of parameters.  See the GLOBAL PARAMETERS section for more details.
     path, and of complicating the preservation of users and groups by name (see
     below).
 
-    As an additional safety feature, you can specify a dot-dir in the module's
-    "[path](#)" to indicate the point where the chroot should occur.  This allows
-    rsync to run in a chroot with a non-"/" path for the top of the transfer
-    hierarchy.  Doing this guards against unintended library loading (since
-    those absolute paths will not be inside the transfer hierarchy unless you
-    have used an unwise pathname), and lets you setup libraries for the chroot
-    that are outside of the transfer.  For example, specifying
-    "/var/rsync/./module1" will chroot to the "/var/rsync" directory and set
-    the inside-chroot path to "/module1".  If you had omitted the dot-dir, the
-    chroot would have used the whole path, and the inside-chroot path would
-    have been "/".
+    If `use chroot` is not set, it defaults to trying to enable a chroot but
+    allows the daemon to continue (after logging a warning) if it fails. The
+    one exception to this is when a module's [`path`](#) has a "/./" chroot
+    divider in it -- this causes an unset value to be treated as true for that
+    module.
 
-    When both "use chroot" and "[daemon chroot](#)" are false, OR the inside-chroot
-    path of "use chroot" is not "/", rsync will: (1) munge symlinks by default
-    for security reasons (see "[munge symlinks](#)" for a way to turn this off, but
-    only if you trust your users), (2) substitute leading slashes in absolute
-    paths with the module's path (so that options such as `--backup-dir`,
-    `--compare-dest`, etc. interpret an absolute path as rooted in the module's
-    "[path](#)" dir), and (3) trim ".." path elements from args if rsync believes
-    they would escape the module hierarchy.  The default for "use chroot" is
-    true, and is the safer choice (especially if the module is not read-only).
+    Prior to rsync 3.2.7, the default value was "true".  The new "unset"
+    default makes it easier to setup an rsync daemon as a non-root user or to
+    run a daemon on a system where chroot fails.  Explicitly setting the value
+    to "true" in rsyncd.conf will always require the chroot to succeed.
 
-    When this parameter is enabled *and* the "[name converter](#)" parameter is
+    It is also possible to specify a dot-dir in the module's "[path](#)" to
+    indicate that you want to chdir to the earlier part of the path and then
+    serve files from inside the latter part of the path (with sanitizing and
+    default symlink munging).  This can be useful if you need some library dirs
+    inside the chroot (typically for uid & gid lookups) but don't want to put
+    the lib dir into the top of the served path (even though they can be hidden
+    with an [`exclude`](#) directive).  However, a better choice for a modern
+    rsync setup is to use a [`name converter`](#)" and try to avoid inner lib
+    dirs altogether.  See also the [`daemon chroot`](#) parameter, which causes
+    rsync to chroot into its own chroot area before doing any path-related
+    chrooting.
+
+    If the daemon is serving the "/" dir (either directly or due to being
+    chrooted to the module's path), rsync does not do any path sanitizing or
+    (default) munging.
+
+    When it has to limit access to a particular subdir (either due to chroot
+    being disabled or having an inside-chroot path set), rsync will munge
+    symlinks (by default) and sanitize paths.  Those that dislike munged
+    symlinks (and really, really trust their users to not break out of the
+    subdir) can disable the symlink munging via the "[munge symlinks](#)"
+    parameter.
+
+    When rsync is sanitizing paths, it trims ".." path elements from args that
+    it believes would escape the module hierarchy. It also substitutes leading
+    slashes in absolute paths with the module's path (so that options such as
+    `--backup-dir` & `--compare-dest` interpret an absolute path as rooted in
+    the module's "[path](#)" dir).
+
+    When a chroot is in effect *and* the "[name converter](#)" parameter is
     *not* set, the "[numeric ids](#)" parameter will default to being enabled
     (disabling name lookups).  This means that if you manually setup
     name-lookup libraries in your chroot (instead of using a name converter)

sender.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int log_before_transfer;
 extern int stdout_format_has_i;
 extern int logfile_format_has_i;
 extern int want_xattr_optim;
+extern int xfer_sum_len;
 extern int csum_length;
 extern int append_mode;
 extern int copy_links;
@@ -47,6 +48,8 @@ extern int make_backups;
 extern int inplace;
 extern int inplace_partial;
 extern int batch_fd;
+extern int use_secure_symlinks;
+extern char *module_dir;
 extern int write_batch;
 extern int file_old_total;
 extern BOOL want_progress_now;
@@ -94,10 +97,11 @@ static struct sum_struct *receive_sums(int f)
 		return(s);
 
 	s->sums = new_array(struct sum_buf, s->count);
+	s->sum2_array = new_array(char, (size_t)s->count * xfer_sum_len);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < s->count; i++) {
 		s->sums[i].sum1 = read_int(f);
-		read_buf(f, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length);
+		read_buf(f, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length);
 
 		s->sums[i].offset = offset;
 		s->sums[i].flags = 0;
@@ -136,6 +140,8 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
 		return;
 
 	flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "successful_send");
+	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 	file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
 	if (!change_pathname(file, NULL, 0))
 		return;
@@ -260,6 +266,8 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
 
 		if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
+		else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 		else
 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
 		if (F_PATHNAME(file)) {
@@ -348,7 +356,25 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
 			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
 		}
 
-		fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
+		if (use_secure_symlinks) {
+			/* Open from module root to prevent TOCTOU race where
+			 * change_pathname's chdir follows a directory symlink.
+			 * Reconstruct the full path relative to module_dir
+			 * from F_PATHNAME (path) and f_name (fname). */
+			char secure_path[MAXPATHLEN];
+			int slen = snprintf(secure_path, sizeof secure_path, "%s%s%s", path, slash, fname);
+			if (slen >= (int)sizeof secure_path) {
+				io_error |= IOERR_GENERAL;
+				rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "path too long: %s%s%s\n", path, slash, fname);
+				free_sums(s);
+				if (protocol_version >= 30)
+					send_msg_int(MSG_NO_SEND, ndx);
+				continue;
+			}
+			fd = secure_relative_open(module_dir, secure_path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+		} else {
+			fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+		}
 		if (fd == -1) {
 			if (errno == ENOENT) {
 				enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING;

simd-checksum-x86_64.cpp

@@ -347,8 +347,7 @@ __attribute__ ((target("avx2"))) MVSTATIC int32 get_checksum1_avx2_64(schar* buf
 	__m128i tmp = _mm_load_si128((__m128i*) mul_t1_buf);
         __m256i mul_t1 = _mm256_cvtepu8_epi16(tmp);
 	__m256i mul_const = _mm256_broadcastd_epi32(_mm_cvtsi32_si128(4 | (3 << 8) | (2 << 16) | (1 << 24)));
-        __m256i mul_one;
-       	    mul_one = _mm256_abs_epi8(_mm256_cmpeq_epi16(mul_one,mul_one)); // set all vector elements to 1
+        __m256i mul_one = _mm256_set1_epi8(1);
 
         for (; i < (len-64); i+=64) {
             // Load ... 4*[int8*16]
@@ -548,6 +547,118 @@ int main() {
 #pragma clang optimize on
 #endif /* BENCHMARK_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 */
 
+#ifdef TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1
+
+static uint32 checksum_via_default(char *buf, int32 len)
+{
+    uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
+    get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
+    return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
+}
+
+static uint32 checksum_via_sse2(char *buf, int32 len)
+{
+    int32 i;
+    uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
+    i = get_checksum1_sse2_32((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
+    get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
+    return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
+}
+
+static uint32 checksum_via_ssse3(char *buf, int32 len)
+{
+    int32 i;
+    uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
+    i = get_checksum1_ssse3_32((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
+    get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
+    return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
+}
+
+static uint32 checksum_via_avx2(char *buf, int32 len)
+{
+    int32 i;
+    uint32 s1 = 0, s2 = 0;
+#ifdef USE_ROLL_ASM
+    i = get_checksum1_avx2_asm((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
+#else
+    i = get_checksum1_avx2_64((schar*)buf, len, 0, &s1, &s2);
+#endif
+    get_checksum1_default_1((schar*)buf, len, i, &s1, &s2);
+    return (s1 & 0xffff) + (s2 << 16);
+}
+
+int main()
+{
+    static const int sizes[] = {1, 4, 31, 32, 33, 63, 64, 65, 128, 129, 256, 700, 1024, 4096, 65536};
+    int num_sizes = sizeof(sizes) / sizeof(sizes[0]);
+    int max_size = sizes[num_sizes - 1];
+    int failures = 0;
+
+    /* Allocate with extra bytes for unaligned test */
+    unsigned char *raw = (unsigned char *)malloc(max_size + 64 + 1);
+    if (!raw) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "malloc failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Fill with deterministic data */
+    for (int i = 0; i < max_size + 64 + 1; i++)
+        raw[i] = (i + (i % 3) + (i % 11)) % 256;
+
+    /* Test with aligned buffer (64-byte aligned) */
+    unsigned char *aligned = raw + (64 - ((uintptr_t)raw % 64));
+
+    /* Test with unaligned buffer (+1 byte offset) */
+    unsigned char *unaligned = aligned + 1;
+
+    struct { const char *name; unsigned char *buf; } buffers[] = {
+        {"aligned", aligned},
+        {"unaligned", unaligned},
+    };
+
+    for (int b = 0; b < 2; b++) {
+        char *buf = (char *)buffers[b].buf;
+        const char *bname = buffers[b].name;
+
+        for (int s = 0; s < num_sizes; s++) {
+            int32 len = sizes[s];
+            uint32 ref = checksum_via_default(buf, len);
+            uint32 cs_sse2 = checksum_via_sse2(buf, len);
+            uint32 cs_ssse3 = checksum_via_ssse3(buf, len);
+            uint32 cs_avx2 = checksum_via_avx2(buf, len);
+            uint32 cs_auto = get_checksum1(buf, len);
+
+            if (cs_sse2 != ref) {
+                printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: SSE2=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_sse2, ref);
+                failures++;
+            }
+            if (cs_ssse3 != ref) {
+                printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: SSSE3=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_ssse3, ref);
+                failures++;
+            }
+            if (cs_avx2 != ref) {
+                printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: AVX2=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_avx2, ref);
+                failures++;
+            }
+            if (cs_auto != ref) {
+                printf("FAIL %-9s size=%5d: auto=%08x ref=%08x\n", bname, len, cs_auto, ref);
+                failures++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    free(raw);
+
+    if (failures) {
+        printf("%d checksum mismatches!\n", failures);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    printf("All SIMD checksum tests passed.\n");
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* TEST_SIMD_CHECKSUM1 */
+
 #endif /* } USE_ROLL_SIMD */
 #endif /* } __cplusplus */
 #endif /* } __x86_64__ */

socket.c

@@ -47,21 +47,23 @@ static struct sigaction sigact;
 
 static int sock_exec(const char *prog);
 
+#define PROXY_BUF_SIZE 1024
+
 /* Establish a proxy connection on an open socket to a web proxy by using the
  * CONNECT method.  If proxy_user and proxy_pass are not NULL, they are used to
  * authenticate to the proxy using the "Basic" proxy-authorization protocol. */
 static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_user, char *proxy_pass)
 {
-	char *cp, buffer[1024];
-	char *authhdr, authbuf[1024];
+	char *cp, buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
+	char *authhdr, authbuf[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
 	int len;
 
 	if (proxy_user && proxy_pass) {
-		stringjoin(buffer, sizeof buffer,
+		stringjoin(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE,
 			 proxy_user, ":", proxy_pass, NULL);
 		len = strlen(buffer);
 
-		if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= (int)sizeof authbuf - 3) {
+		if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 3) {
 			rprintf(FERROR,
 				"authentication information is too long\n");
 			return -1;
@@ -74,14 +76,14 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
 		authhdr = "";
 	}
 
-	len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
-	assert(len > 0 && len < (int)sizeof buffer);
+	len = snprintf(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
+	assert(len > 0 && len < PROXY_BUF_SIZE);
 	if (write(fd, buffer, len) != len) {
 		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to write to proxy");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
+	for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]; cp++) {
 		if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
 			rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to read from proxy");
 			return -1;
@@ -90,11 +92,13 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
 			break;
 	}
 
-	if (*cp != '\n')
-		cp++;
-	*cp-- = '\0';
-	if (*cp == '\r')
-		*cp = '\0';
+	if (cp == &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "proxy response line too long\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*cp = '\0';
+	if (cp > buffer && cp[-1] == '\r')
+		cp[-1] = '\0';
 	if (strncmp(buffer, "HTTP/", 5) != 0) {
 		rprintf(FERROR, "bad response from proxy -- %s\n",
 			buffer);
@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
 	}
 	/* throw away the rest of the HTTP header */
 	while (1) {
-		for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
+		for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE]; cp++) {
 			if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
 				rsyserr(FERROR, errno,
 					"failed to read from proxy");

support/json-rsync-version

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+
+import sys, argparse, subprocess, json
+
+TWEAK_NAME = {
+        'asm': 'asm_roll',
+        'ASM': 'asm_roll',
+        'hardlink_special': 'hardlink_specials',
+        'protect_args': 'secluded_args',
+        'protected_args': 'secluded_args',
+        'SIMD': 'SIMD_roll',
+    }
+
+MOVE_OPTIM = set('asm_roll SIMD_roll'.split())
+
+def main():
+    if not args.rsync or args.rsync == '-':
+        ver_out = sys.stdin.read().strip()
+    else:
+        ver_out = subprocess.check_output([args.rsync, '--version', '--version'], encoding='utf-8').strip()
+    if ver_out.startswith('{'):
+        print(ver_out)
+        return
+    info = { }
+    misplaced_optims = { }
+    for line in ver_out.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith('rsync '):
+            prog, vstr, ver, pstr, vstr2, proto = line.split()
+            info['program'] = prog
+            if ver.startswith('v'):
+                ver = ver[1:]
+            info[vstr] = ver
+            if '.' not in proto:
+                proto += '.0'
+            else:
+                proto = proto.replace('.PR', '.')
+            info[pstr] = proto
+        elif line.startswith('Copyright '):
+            info['copyright'] = line[10:]
+        elif line.startswith('Web site: '):
+            info['url'] = line[10:]
+        elif line.startswith('  '):
+            if not saw_comma and ',' in line:
+                saw_comma = True
+                info[sect_name] = { }
+            if saw_comma:
+                for x in line.strip(' ,').split(', '):
+                    if ' ' in x:
+                        val, var = x.split(' ', 1)
+                        if val == 'no':
+                            val = False
+                        elif val.endswith('-bit'):
+                            var = var[:-1] + '_bits'
+                            val = int(val.split('-')[0])
+                    else:
+                        var = x
+                        val = True
+                    var = var.replace(' ', '_').replace('-', '_')
+                    if var in TWEAK_NAME:
+                        var = TWEAK_NAME[var]
+                    if sect_name[0] != 'o' and var in MOVE_OPTIM:
+                        misplaced_optims[var] = val
+                    else:
+                        info[sect_name][var] = val
+            else:
+                info[sect_name] += [ x for x in line.split() if not x.startswith('(') ]
+        elif line == '':
+            break
+        else:
+            sect_name = line.strip(' :').replace(' ', '_').lower()
+            info[sect_name] = [ ]
+            saw_comma = False
+    for chk in 'capabilities optimizations'.split():
+        if chk not in info:
+            info[chk] = { }
+    if misplaced_optims:
+        info['optimizations'].update(misplaced_optims)
+    for chk in 'checksum_list compress_list daemon_auth_list'.split():
+        if chk not in info:
+            info[chk] = [ ]
+    info['license'] = 'GPLv3' if ver[0] == '3' else 'GPLv2'
+    info['caveat'] = 'rsync comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY'
+    print(json.dumps(info))
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Output rsync's version data in JSON format, even if the rsync doesn't support a native json-output method.", add_help=False)
+    parser.add_argument('rsync', nargs='?', help="Specify an rsync command to run. Otherwise stdin is consumed.")
+    parser.add_argument("--help", "-h", action="help", help="Output this help message and exit.")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    main()
+
+# vim: sw=4 et

t_chmod_secure.c

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * Test harness for do_chmod_at(). Confirms the symlink-TOCTOU
+ * primitive used by CVE-2026-29518 (and its incomplete-fix follow-up
+ * for chmod) is closed by do_chmod_at(): a parent directory component
+ * being a symlink that escapes the receiver's confinement must be
+ * rejected, while a parent symlink that resolves *within* the tree
+ * must still work (so legitimate dir-symlinks are not regressed).
+ *
+ * Not linked into rsync itself.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include "rsync.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+int dry_run = 0;
+int am_root = 0;
+int am_sender = 0;
+int read_only = 0;
+int list_only = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
+
+short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
+
+static int errs = 0;
+
+static void check(const char *label, int actual_rc, int expect_ok,
+		  const char *path, mode_t expected_mode)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int got_ok = (actual_rc == 0);
+	if (got_ok != expect_ok) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: rc=%d errno=%d (%s), expected %s\n",
+			label, actual_rc, errno, strerror(errno),
+			expect_ok ? "success" : "rejection");
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (path && stat(path, &st) < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: stat(%s) failed: %s\n",
+			label, path, strerror(errno));
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (path && (st.st_mode & 07777) != expected_mode) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"FAIL [%s]: %s mode is 0%o, expected 0%o\n",
+			label, path, st.st_mode & 07777, expected_mode);
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "OK   [%s]\n", label);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <module-dir>\n", argv[0]);
+		return 2;
+	}
+	if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
+		perror("chdir");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	/* Simulate the daemon-without-chroot deployment that do_chmod_at()
+	 * defends. With am_daemon=0 or am_chrooted=1 the wrapper falls
+	 * through to plain do_chmod() and the symlink-race test would be
+	 * meaningless. */
+	am_daemon = 1;
+	am_chrooted = 0;
+
+	/* Test layout (all inside the directory we just chdir'd to):
+	 *
+	 *     ./realdir/sentinel        -- regular target file
+	 *     ./inside_link -> realdir  -- legitimate dir-symlink within the tree
+	 *     ./escape_link -> ../trap  -- attacker swap, target outside tree
+	 *     ../trap/sentinel          -- the file the attacker wants to alter
+	 *
+	 * The shell wrapper that calls this helper has set both sentinel
+	 * files to mode 0600 so we have a clean baseline to compare.
+	 */
+
+	/* Scenario A: legitimate parent dir-symlink, chmod must succeed. */
+	int rc = do_chmod_at("inside_link/sentinel", 0640);
+	check("A: legit dir-symlink within tree",
+	      rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0640);
+
+	/* Scenario B: parent symlink escapes the tree -- chmod must be
+	 * rejected and the outside file's mode must be unchanged. */
+	rc = do_chmod_at("escape_link/sentinel", 0666);
+	check("B: parent symlink escapes tree (the attack)",
+	      rc, 0, "../trap/sentinel", 0600);
+
+	/* Scenario C: plain relative path with no symlink components,
+	 * regression check that the safe wrapper doesn't break the
+	 * normal case. */
+	rc = do_chmod_at("realdir/sentinel", 0644);
+	check("C: plain relative path (regression check)",
+	      rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0644);
+
+	/* Scenario D: top-level file, no parent directory component.
+	 * Falls back to do_chmod(); should succeed. */
+	rc = do_chmod_at("topfile", 0640);
+	check("D: top-level file, no parent component",
+	      rc, 1, "topfile", 0640);
+
+	if (errs)
+		fprintf(stderr, "%d failure(s)\n", errs);
+	return errs ? 1 : 0;
+}

t_secure_relpath.c

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*
+ * Test harness for secure_relative_open()'s front-door input
+ * validation. Codex audit Finding 5 noted that the existing check
+ *
+ *     if (strncmp(relpath, "../", 3) == 0 || strstr(relpath, "/../"))
+ *
+ * catches "../foo" and "foo/../bar" but misses bare ".." (an actual
+ * one-level escape on platforms that fall back to the per-component
+ * walk), as well as "a/..", "foo/..", and any other form that
+ * decomposes to a ".." component when split on "/". The kernel-
+ * enforced RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) and O_RESOLVE_BENEATH
+ * (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) reject these in-kernel; the per-
+ * component fallback used on NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, Cygwin and
+ * pre-5.6 Linux does not, so the validation must happen at the
+ * front door.
+ *
+ * This helper invokes secure_relative_open() with each suspect
+ * input and checks both the failure (rc < 0) and the errno
+ * (EINVAL means "rejected at the front door"). Pre-fix, the kernel
+ * may reject with a different errno (EXDEV from RESOLVE_BENEATH);
+ * post-fix, the front-door check catches every variant up front
+ * with a consistent EINVAL across platforms.
+ *
+ * Not linked into rsync itself.
+ */
+
+#include "rsync.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+int dry_run = 0;
+int am_root = 0;
+int am_sender = 0;
+int read_only = 0;
+int list_only = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
+
+short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
+
+static int errs = 0;
+
+static void check_relpath(const char *relpath)
+{
+	int fd;
+	int saved_errno;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	fd = secure_relative_open(NULL, relpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"FAIL [relpath=%-12s]: returned valid fd %d (escape) -- expected -1 EINVAL\n",
+			relpath, fd);
+		close(fd);
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (saved_errno != EINVAL) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"FAIL [relpath=%-12s]: rejected but errno=%d (%s), expected EINVAL\n",
+			relpath, saved_errno, strerror(saved_errno));
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "OK   [relpath=%-12s]: rejected with EINVAL\n", relpath);
+}
+
+static void check_basedir(const char *basedir)
+{
+	int fd;
+	int saved_errno;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	fd = secure_relative_open(basedir, "ok", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"FAIL [basedir=%-12s]: returned valid fd %d -- expected -1 EINVAL\n",
+			basedir, fd);
+		close(fd);
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (saved_errno != EINVAL) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"FAIL [basedir=%-12s]: rejected but errno=%d (%s), expected EINVAL\n",
+			basedir, saved_errno, strerror(saved_errno));
+		errs++;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "OK   [basedir=%-12s]: rejected with EINVAL\n", basedir);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <test-dir>\n", argv[0]);
+		return 2;
+	}
+	if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
+		perror("chdir");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	/* secure_relative_open's daemon-only confinement protections only
+	 * fire when am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the threat model is the
+	 * daemon-no-chroot deployment), but the front-door input
+	 * validation runs unconditionally. We set am_daemon anyway so the
+	 * helper exercises the same code shape the receiver does. */
+	am_daemon = 1;
+	am_chrooted = 0;
+
+	mkdir("subdir", 0755);
+
+	/* Each of these relpaths must be rejected with EINVAL at the
+	 * secure_relative_open() front door. ".." is the actual one-level
+	 * escape; the others ("subdir/..", "subdir/../subdir") resolve
+	 * back to the start dir on systems that allow them, but we still
+	 * reject them as defence-in-depth: a path containing a ".." token
+	 * is suspicious and the caller should normalise before passing
+	 * it in. The "../foo" / "foo/../bar" / "/foo" / "/" cases are
+	 * regression checks for the existing checks. */
+	check_relpath("..");
+	check_relpath("../foo");
+	check_relpath("subdir/..");
+	check_relpath("subdir/../subdir");
+	check_relpath("foo/../bar");
+	check_relpath("/foo");
+	check_relpath("/");
+
+	/* Same checks against basedir (which the codex Finding 2 fix
+	 * routes through the same RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent). Absolute
+	 * basedirs are operator-trusted and intentionally not validated
+	 * here. */
+	check_basedir("..");
+	check_basedir("../subdir");
+	check_basedir("subdir/..");
+	check_basedir("foo/../bar");
+
+	if (errs)
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n%d failure(s)\n", errs);
+	return errs ? 1 : 0;
+}

t_stub.c

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 
 int do_fsync = 0;
 int inplace = 0;
+int am_daemon = 0;
+int am_chrooted = 0;
 int modify_window = 0;
 int preallocate_files = 0;
 int protect_args = 0;

t_unsafe.c

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0;
 int am_sender = 1;
 int read_only = 0;
 int list_only = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+
 short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
 
 int

testsuite/acls-default.test

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 . $suitedir/rsync.fns
 
-$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] ACLs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
+$RSYNC -VV | grep '"ACLs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
 
 case "$setfacl_nodef" in
 true) test_skipped "I don't know how to use your setfacl command" ;;

testsuite/acls.test

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 . $suitedir/rsync.fns
 
-$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] ACLs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
+$RSYNC -VV | grep '"ACLs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without ACL support"
 
 makepath "$fromdir/foo"
 echo something >"$fromdir/file1"

testsuite/alt-dest-symlink-race.test

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for the basedir-confinement gap in
+# secure_relative_open(). The function opens basedir with a plain
+# openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY), without
+# RESOLVE_BENEATH or a per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk, so a parent
+# symlink ON basedir is followed unrestrictedly. RESOLVE_BENEATH is
+# then applied only to relpath, anchored at the wrong directory.
+#
+# The receiver's basis-file lookup at receiver.c passes
+# basis_dir[fnamecmp_type] (from --copy-dest / --link-dest /
+# --compare-dest -- all sender-controllable in daemon mode) as
+# basedir. A daemon-module attacker with write access can plant a
+# symlink at module/cd -> /outside, then run --link-dest=cd to
+# make the daemon's basis-file lookup resolve into /outside,
+# leaking the contents of daemon-readable files via the rsync
+# delta-rolling read-disclosure primitive.
+#
+# We detect the escape by leveraging --link-dest: when basis
+# matches source exactly (content + mtime + mode), --link-dest
+# hard-links the destination to the basis file. With the bug, the
+# destination ends up as a hard link to the outside-the-module
+# file (same inode). With the fix, no basis is found and the
+# destination is a fresh copy (different inode).
+#
+# The vulnerable code path is the same on every platform
+# (including the per-component fallback on systems without
+# RESOLVE_BENEATH), so this test is not platform-gated.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+mod="$scratchdir/module"
+outside="$scratchdir/outside"
+src="$scratchdir/src"
+conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
+
+rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+
+# Portable inode-number helper (GNU coreutils stat -c, BSD stat -f).
+file_inode() {
+    stat -c %i "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %i "$1"
+}
+
+# Outside-the-module file an attacker would like the daemon to
+# treat as a basis.
+echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
+chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
+
+# The symlink trap planted in the module by the local attacker.
+ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
+
+# Source file matches outside/target.txt exactly (content + mtime
+# + mode) so --link-dest will hard-link the destination to the
+# basis file iff the daemon's basedir lookup reaches outside/.
+echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$src/target.txt"
+touch -r "$outside/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"
+chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
+
+# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by
+# default, which can't write into the test scratch dir. Force the
+# daemon to keep our uid/gid in that case so the basis-link
+# transfer can actually create the destination file. (Non-root
+# can't specify uid/gid in rsyncd.conf -- comment them out then.)
+my_uid=`get_testuid`
+root_uid=`get_rootuid`
+root_gid=`get_rootgid`
+uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
+gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
+if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
+    uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
+    gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
+fi
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+$uid_setting
+$gid_setting
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+EOF
+
+# Recursive --link-dest push directly into the module root. We
+# avoid pushing into a destination subdir because the receiver
+# would chdir into it before resolving --link-dest, making the
+# relative basedir "cd" resolve in the wrong CWD and masking the
+# bug. The realistic attack pushes into the module root (or the
+# attacker uses a basedir path that resolves correctly from
+# whichever subdir the receiver chdirs into).
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+    $RSYNC -rtp --link-dest=cd "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/ \
+    >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+if [ ! -f "$mod/target.txt" ]; then
+    test_fail "destination file was not created -- daemon transfer failed before the test could observe the basedir behaviour"
+fi
+
+outside_inode=$(file_inode "$outside/target.txt")
+dst_inode=$(file_inode "$mod/target.txt")
+
+if [ "$outside_inode" = "$dst_inode" ]; then
+    test_fail "basedir-escape: --link-dest hard-linked module/target.txt to outside/target.txt (inode $outside_inode); daemon's basis-file lookup followed the parent symlink on the basedir"
+fi
+
+exit 0

testsuite/atimes.test

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 . "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
 
-$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] atimes" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without atimes support"
+$RSYNC -VV | grep '"atimes": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without atimes support"
 
 mkdir "$fromdir"
 

testsuite/bare-do-open-symlink-race.test

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for codex audit Findings 3b and 3c:
+#
+#   3b: generator.c:1905 -- the in-place backup creation opens
+#       backupptr via bare do_open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_EXCL).
+#       With --backup-dir set to an attacker-planted parent symlink,
+#       the backup file is written outside the module under the
+#       daemon's authority.
+#
+#   3c-symlink: syscall.c:207 -- do_symlink_at falls through to bare
+#       do_symlink for am_root < 0 (fake-super), which then opens
+#       the destination path with bare open() (final-component
+#       fake-super file). A parent symlink on the destination path
+#       redirects the file creation outside the module.
+#
+#   3c-mknod: syscall.c:506 -- do_mknod_at falls through to bare
+#       do_mknod for am_root < 0, same path-based open(). For
+#       FIFOs/sockets/devices the bare path is also used.
+#
+# Each scenario plants a "secret" file outside the module at a
+# location the symlink trap points to. The check is that the
+# outside file's content and mode are unchanged after the attack
+# attempt.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+# All three scenarios depend on receiver-side daemon code paths
+# that are only secured on platforms with a working
+# secure_relative_open. The chdir/chmod tests already skip the
+# same set; mirror that.
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
+        test_skipped "secure_relative_open relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
+        ;;
+esac
+
+mod="$scratchdir/module"
+outside="$scratchdir/outside"
+src="$scratchdir/src"
+conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
+
+# Portable inode-and-mode helpers.
+file_mode() {
+    stat -c %a "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp "$1"
+}
+
+setup() {
+    rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+    mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+
+    echo "OUTSIDE_PROTECTED_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
+    chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
+    outside_pristine="$scratchdir/outside-pristine.txt"
+    cp -p "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"
+
+    ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
+}
+
+verify_outside_unchanged() {
+    label="$1"
+    mode=$(file_mode "$outside/target.txt")
+    case "$mode" in
+        644|0644) ;;
+        *) test_fail "$label: outside/target.txt mode changed from 644 to $mode" ;;
+    esac
+    if ! cmp -s "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"; then
+        test_fail "$label: outside/target.txt content changed -- daemon followed the cd symlink"
+    fi
+}
+
+verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent() {
+    label="$1"
+    target="$2"  # specific file under outside/ to check absence of
+    if [ -e "$outside/$target" ]; then
+        test_fail "$label: outside/$target was created -- daemon followed the cd symlink"
+    fi
+}
+
+# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by default
+# and fail to write into the test scratch dir. Force it to keep our
+# uid/gid in that case so the receiver actually runs the code paths
+# we want to test.
+my_uid=`get_testuid`
+root_uid=`get_rootuid`
+root_gid=`get_rootgid`
+uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
+gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
+if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
+    uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
+    gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
+fi
+
+
+############################################################
+# Scenario 3b: --inplace --backup --backup-dir=cd
+#
+# Pre-create module/target.txt so the receiver enters the in-place
+# update path; a backup of the existing content must be made
+# before the update. With --backup-dir=cd, backupptr resolves to
+# "cd/target.txt"; with the bug, robust_unlink and the bare
+# do_open at generator.c:1905 both follow the cd symlink, the
+# unlink deletes outside/target.txt and the create writes the
+# pre-existing module/target.txt content there.
+############################################################
+
+setup
+echo "EXISTING_MODULE_DATA" > "$mod/target.txt"
+chmod 0666 "$mod/target.txt"
+echo "NEW_DATA_FROM_SENDER" > "$src/target.txt"
+chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+$uid_setting
+$gid_setting
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+EOF
+
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+    $RSYNC --inplace --backup --backup-dir=cd "$src/target.txt" \
+    rsync://localhost/upload/target.txt >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+verify_outside_unchanged "3b inplace+backup-dir=cd"
+
+
+############################################################
+# Scenario 3c-symlink: fake-super symlink push to a path with a
+# symlinked parent
+#
+# With "fake super = yes" set on the module, the receiver
+# represents symlinks as fake-super files (regular files with the
+# link target written to them). The path-based open() in
+# do_symlink's fake-super branch follows parent symlinks. We push
+# a single symlink to the destination path "cd/sym" so the
+# receiver's create-file call lands at "cd/sym" relative to the
+# module root, where cd is the symlink trap.
+############################################################
+
+setup
+
+mkdir -p "$src/cd"
+ln -s /etc/passwd "$src/cd/sym"
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+$uid_setting
+$gid_setting
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload_fake]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+    fake super = yes
+EOF
+
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+    $RSYNC -rl "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload_fake/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent "3c-symlink fake-super symlink push" "sym"
+
+
+############################################################
+# Scenario 3c-mknod: fake-super FIFO push to a path with a
+# symlinked parent
+#
+# Similar to 3c-symlink but for special files. mkfifo works
+# without root; we push a FIFO and verify the receiver doesn't
+# create a fake-super file at outside/fifo.
+############################################################
+
+setup
+
+mkdir -p "$src/cd"
+mkfifo "$src/cd/fifo" 2>/dev/null
+if [ ! -p "$src/cd/fifo" ]; then
+    test_skipped "mkfifo unavailable; cannot exercise 3c-mknod"
+fi
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+$uid_setting
+$gid_setting
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload_fake]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+    fake super = yes
+EOF
+
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+    $RSYNC -rD "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload_fake/ >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+verify_outside_unchanged_or_absent "3c-mknod fake-super FIFO push" "fifo"
+
+exit 0

testsuite/chdir-symlink-race.test

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug at the receiver's
+# chdir(). After the CVE-2026-29518 fix to secure_relative_open(), an
+# attack remained where the receiver's chdir() into a destination
+# subdirectory followed an attacker-planted symlink, escaping the
+# module. Every subsequent path-relative syscall (open, chmod, lchown,
+# utimes, etc.) inherited the escape -- secure_relative_open's
+# RESOLVE_BENEATH anchor itself was outside the module by then, so it
+# stopped protecting against anything.
+#
+# This test runs an actual rsync daemon (via RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG to
+# avoid the network) configured with "use chroot = no", plants a
+# symlink at module/subdir -> ../outside, and runs four flavours of
+# rsync transfer that previously all reached files in ../outside:
+#
+#   1. single-file dest = subdir/target.txt    (the original poc_chmod)
+#   2. -r src/subdir/ to upload/subdir/        (the chdir-escape case)
+#   3. -r src/subdir/ to upload/subdir/        (no --size-only: forces basis read+write)
+#   4. -r src/ to upload/                      (was already protected by the
+#                                               original CVE-2026-29518 fix;
+#                                               regression-checked here)
+#
+# All four must leave the outside-the-module sentinel file's mode AND
+# content unchanged.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
+	test_skipped "secure chdir relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
+	;;
+esac
+
+mod="$scratchdir/module"
+outside="$scratchdir/outside"
+src="$scratchdir/src"
+conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
+
+rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src" "$src/subdir"
+
+# Portable octal-mode helper -- macOS and FreeBSD's stat use -f, GNU
+# coreutils stat uses -c.
+file_mode() {
+    stat -c %a "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp "$1"
+}
+
+# The "secret" file outside the module the attacker is trying to alter.
+# Save a pristine copy alongside it so we can compare with cmp(1) rather
+# than depending on sha1sum/shasum/sha1, which differ across platforms.
+echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
+chmod 0600 "$outside/target.txt"
+outside_pristine="$scratchdir/outside-pristine.txt"
+cp -p "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"
+
+# Symlink trap planted in the module by the local attacker.
+ln -s "$outside" "$mod/subdir"
+
+# Source files the sender will push: same size as the outside target,
+# different content, mode 0666 (the perms the attacker tries to push).
+SIZE=$(stat -c %s "$outside/target.txt" 2>/dev/null \
+       || stat -f %z "$outside/target.txt")
+head -c "$SIZE" /dev/urandom > "$src/target.txt"
+head -c "$SIZE" /dev/urandom > "$src/subdir/target.txt"
+chmod 0666 "$src/target.txt" "$src/subdir/target.txt"
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+EOF
+
+reset_outside() {
+    chmod 0600 "$outside/target.txt"
+    echo "OUTSIDE_SECRET_DATA" > "$outside/target.txt"
+}
+
+verify_unchanged() {
+    label="$1"
+    mode=$(file_mode "$outside/target.txt")
+    case "$mode" in
+	600|0600) ;;
+	*) test_fail "$label: outside file mode changed from 600 to $mode (chmod escape)" ;;
+    esac
+    if ! cmp -s "$outside/target.txt" "$outside_pristine"; then
+	test_fail "$label: outside file content changed (write escape)"
+    fi
+}
+
+run_attack() {
+    label="$1"; shift
+    reset_outside
+    RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+	$RSYNC "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    verify_unchanged "$label"
+}
+
+# 1. The original poc_chmod scenario: single file, dest path with
+#    the symlinked subdir as a path component. With --size-only the
+#    receiver normally skips the basis open and goes straight to chmod
+#    -- only the chdir-escape blocks the chmod from reaching outside.
+run_attack "single-file --size-only" \
+    -tp --size-only \
+    "$src/target.txt" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/target.txt
+
+# 2. -r push into the symlinked subdir: receiver chdir's into "subdir",
+#    follows the symlink, ends up in outside.
+run_attack "-r --size-only into subdir/" \
+    -rtp --size-only \
+    "$src/subdir/" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/
+
+# 3. Same but no --size-only -- forces the basis-file open and a real
+#    rename, so this exercises the read-disclosure and write-escape
+#    paths together.
+run_attack "-r without --size-only into subdir/" \
+    -rtp \
+    "$src/subdir/" rsync://localhost/upload/subdir/
+
+# 4. -r src/ to upload/ -- this case was already covered by the
+#    original CVE-2026-29518 fix because the receiver stays at module
+#    root and operates on slashed paths. Regression check.
+run_attack "-r --size-only into upload/ root" \
+    -rtp --size-only \
+    "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/
+
+exit 0

testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug applied to
+# chmod() on the receiver side. The CVE-2026-29518 fix used
+# secure_relative_open() for the basis-file open, but every other
+# path-based syscall the receiver runs on sender-controllable paths
+# is vulnerable to the same primitive: a local attacker swaps a
+# symlink into one of the parent directory components between the
+# receiver's check and its act, and the syscall escapes the module.
+#
+# This test exercises the new do_chmod_at() wrapper via the
+# t_chmod_secure helper. The helper sets up two scenarios:
+#   - a parent dir-symlink that resolves WITHIN the module tree
+#     (legitimate -K-style use, must continue to work)
+#   - a parent dir-symlink that escapes the module tree (the
+#     attack, must be rejected)
+# plus two regression scenarios (plain relative path, top-level
+# file) that just confirm the safe wrapper doesn't break the
+# normal case.
+#
+# The kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path resolution is
+# only available on Linux 5.6+, FreeBSD 13+, and macOS 15+.
+# Skip on platforms that fall back to per-component O_NOFOLLOW
+# (Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Cygwin); the per-component fallback
+# would also reject the attack but the legitimate dir-symlink
+# scenario would fail there.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
+	test_skipped "do_chmod_at relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
+	;;
+esac
+
+mod="$scratchdir/module"
+trap_outside="$scratchdir/trap"
+rm -rf "$mod" "$trap_outside"
+mkdir -p "$mod/realdir" "$trap_outside"
+
+# Set up the four file-system objects the helper expects:
+echo bystander > "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
+chmod 0600 "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
+echo target > "$trap_outside/sentinel"
+chmod 0600 "$trap_outside/sentinel"
+ln -s realdir "$mod/inside_link"
+ln -s ../trap "$mod/escape_link"
+echo top > "$mod/topfile"
+chmod 0600 "$mod/topfile"
+
+"$TOOLDIR/t_chmod_secure" "$mod" || \
+    test_fail "t_chmod_secure reported failures (see stderr above)"
+
+# Sanity-check from the shell side too: the outside file's mode must
+# still be 0600 -- the helper checked this, but a second look from
+# the shell guards against a helper-internal stat() bug.
+mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null \
+       || stat -f '%Lp' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null)
+if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then
+    test_fail "outside sentinel mode changed from 600 to $mode -- chmod escaped the module"
+fi
+
+exit 0

testsuite/chown.test

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 case $0 in
 *fake*)
-    $RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] xattrs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync needs xattrs for fake device tests"
+    $RSYNC -VV | grep '"xattrs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync needs xattrs for fake device tests"
     RSYNC="$RSYNC --fake-super"
     TLS_ARGS="$TLS_ARGS --fake-super"
     case "$HOST_OS" in

testsuite/clean-fname-underflow.test

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# clean-fname-underflow.test
+# Ensure clean_fname() does not read-before-buffer when collapsing "..".
+# This exercises the --server path where a crafted merge filename hits clean_fname().
+#
+# Usage:
+#   ./configure && make
+#   make check TESTS='clean-fname-underflow.test'
+
+set -eu
+
+# clean_fname() is platform-agnostic; the test only needs to run on one
+# host. Skip on non-Linux to avoid quirks in older /bin/sh implementations
+# (Solaris exited silently here, producing an empty log under set -eu).
+# runtests.sh expects $scratchdir/whyskipped to exist when a test exits 77.
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+  Linux) ;;
+  *)
+    if [ -n "${scratchdir:-}" ]; then
+      echo "Linux-only test (uname -s = $(uname -s))" > "$scratchdir/whyskipped"
+    fi
+    exit 77 ;;
+esac
+
+# Try to find the just-built rsync binary if RSYNC_BIN isn't set.
+if [ -z "${RSYNC_BIN:-}" ]; then
+  if [ -x "./rsync" ]; then
+    RSYNC_BIN=$(pwd)/rsync
+  elif [ -x "../rsync" ]; then
+    RSYNC_BIN=$(cd .. && pwd)/rsync
+  else
+    RSYNC_BIN=rsync
+  fi
+fi
+
+workdir="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/rsync-clean-fname.$$"
+mkdir -p "$workdir"
+trap 'rm -rf "$workdir"' EXIT INT TERM
+cd "$workdir"
+
+# Minimal rsyncd.conf using chroot so the crafted path reaches the server parser.
+cat > rsyncd.conf <<'EOF'
+pid file = rsyncd.pid
+use chroot = true
+[mod]
+    path = ./mod
+    read only = false
+EOF
+mkdir -p mod
+
+# Start daemon on a random high port.
+PORT=$(awk 'BEGIN{srand(); printf "%d", 20000+int(rand()*20000)}')
+"$RSYNC_BIN" --daemon --no-detach --config=rsyncd.conf --port="$PORT" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+DAEMON_PID=$!
+# Give the daemon a moment to come up.
+# Use integer second; subsecond sleep is not portable (e.g. Solaris /usr/bin/sleep).
+sleep 1
+
+# Invoke the server-side path. We don't need a real transfer; we just want to
+# ensure clean_fname() doesn't crash when given "a/../test" via --filter=merge.
+EXIT_OK=0
+if "$RSYNC_BIN"     --server --sender -vlr     --filter='merge a/../test'     . mod/  >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  EXIT_OK=1
+else
+  status=$?
+  # Non-zero exit is expected for bogus input; ensure it wasn't a signal/crash.
+  if [ $status -lt 128 ]; then
+    EXIT_OK=1
+  fi
+fi
+
+kill "$DAEMON_PID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+if [ "$EXIT_OK" -ne 1 ]; then
+  echo "clean-fname-underflow.test: rsync exited due to a signal or unexpected status"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "OK: clean_fname() handled 'a/../test' without crashing"
+exit 0

testsuite/copy-dest-source-symlink.test

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for codex audit Finding 3a: copy_file()'s source
+# open in copy_altdest_file() is via do_open_nofollow(), which only
+# refuses a final-component symlink. Parent components are still
+# resolved with normal symlink-following. A daemon module attacker
+# who plants a parent symlink at module/cd -> /outside, then runs
+# --copy-dest=cd against a source file matching the size+mtime of
+# /outside/target.txt, drives the receiver to:
+#
+#   1. Find a match-level >= 2 basis at "cd/target.txt"
+#   2. Call copy_altdest_file -> copy_file(src="cd/target.txt", ...)
+#   3. do_open_nofollow follows the "cd" parent symlink and reads
+#      the contents of /outside/target.txt under the daemon's
+#      authority
+#   4. Copy that content into the module destination
+#
+# Result: outside/target.txt content lands at module/target.txt,
+# accessible to the attacker on a subsequent pull.
+#
+# We detect by content: src/target.txt and outside/target.txt have
+# identical metadata (size + mtime + mode) but different content.
+# After the transfer, module/target.txt should match src (no
+# basedir escape) -- if it matches outside, the bug copied across
+# the symlink boundary.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+mod="$scratchdir/module"
+outside="$scratchdir/outside"
+src="$scratchdir/src"
+conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
+
+rm -rf "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside" "$src"
+
+# Outside-the-module file the daemon should not read on the
+# attacker's behalf.
+echo "OUTSIDE_LEAKED_DATA!" > "$outside/target.txt"
+chmod 0644 "$outside/target.txt"
+
+# The symlink trap.
+ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
+
+# Source: same size, same mtime, same mode as outside -- so the
+# generator's link_stat + quick_check_ok finds a match-level >= 2
+# basis and calls copy_altdest_file.
+echo "ATTACKER_KNOWN_DATA!" > "$src/target.txt"
+touch -r "$outside/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"
+chmod 0644 "$src/target.txt"
+
+# When running as root the daemon would drop to "nobody" by
+# default and fail to mkstemp in the scratch dir; force it to
+# keep our uid/gid in that case.
+my_uid=`get_testuid`
+root_uid=`get_rootuid`
+root_gid=`get_rootgid`
+uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
+gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
+if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
+    uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
+    gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
+fi
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+$uid_setting
+$gid_setting
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+EOF
+
+# --copy-dest push to module root.
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+    $RSYNC -rtp --copy-dest=cd "$src/" rsync://localhost/upload/ \
+    >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+if [ ! -f "$mod/target.txt" ]; then
+    test_fail "destination file was not created -- daemon transfer failed before the test could observe the basedir behaviour"
+fi
+
+if cmp -s "$mod/target.txt" "$outside/target.txt"; then
+    test_fail "basedir-escape via copy_file source: module/target.txt now contains the contents of outside/target.txt -- daemon read /outside via the cd symlink and copied it into the module"
+fi
+
+if ! cmp -s "$mod/target.txt" "$src/target.txt"; then
+    test_fail "destination doesn't match source content (and isn't outside content either): unexpected state"
+fi
+
+exit 0

testsuite/crtimes.test

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 . "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
 
-$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] crtimes" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without crtimes support"
+$RSYNC -VV | grep '"crtimes": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without crtimes support"
 
 # Setting an older time via touch sets the create time to the mtime.
 # Setting it to a newer time affects just the mtime.

testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for GHSA-rjfm-3w2m-jf4f: a hostname-based "hosts deny"
+# rule must still match when the daemon performs a 'daemon chroot' and
+# the chroot does not contain the NSS files glibc needs for reverse DNS.
+#
+# Pre-fix, reverse DNS happened *after* the daemon chroot. With an empty
+# chroot the NSS lookup failed, client_name() returned "UNKNOWN", and a
+# deny rule referring to the connecting hostname silently failed to
+# match.
+#
+# Two scenarios are exercised so we can distinguish the case the fix
+# definitely covers from the per-module path that may still be
+# vulnerable:
+#   A. global  "reverse lookup = yes"           (covered by b6abdb4c)
+#   B. only module "reverse lookup = yes"       (gap to verify)
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+case `uname -s` in
+Linux*) ;;
+*) test_skipped "test is Linux-specific (uses chroot+unshare)" ;;
+esac
+
+# We need CAP_SYS_CHROOT. Re-exec under a user namespace if not root.
+if ! chroot / /bin/true 2>/dev/null; then
+    if [ -z "$RSYNC_UNSHARED" ] && unshare --user --map-root-user true 2>/dev/null; then
+	echo "Re-running under unshare --user --map-root-user..."
+	RSYNC_UNSHARED=1 exec unshare --user --map-root-user "$SHELL_PATH" $RUNSHFLAGS "$0"
+    fi
+    test_skipped "need CAP_SYS_CHROOT (root or unshare --user --map-root-user)"
+fi
+
+# We need 127.0.0.1 to reverse-resolve to a real hostname while NSS is
+# still working (i.e. before the daemon's chroot). The daemon will
+# look that name up itself as part of its hostname-based ACL check;
+# we then deny that name and assert the connection is rejected.
+client_hostname=`getent hosts 127.0.0.1 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $2}'`
+if [ -z "$client_hostname" ] || [ "$client_hostname" = "127.0.0.1" ]; then
+    test_skipped "no reverse DNS for 127.0.0.1"
+fi
+
+chrootdir="$scratchdir/chroot"
+rm -rf "$chrootdir"
+mkdir -p "$chrootdir/modroot"
+echo "from chroot" > "$chrootdir/modroot/file1"
+
+conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
+logfile="$scratchdir/rsyncd.log"
+
+write_conf() {
+    cat >"$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+log file = $logfile
+daemon chroot = $chrootdir
+reverse lookup = $1
+hosts deny = $client_hostname
+max verbosity = 4
+
+[chrootmod]
+    path = /modroot
+    read only = yes
+    reverse lookup = $2
+EOF
+}
+
+# Run a transfer and return 0 if the daemon refused with @ERROR access
+# denied (the expected outcome when the deny rule matches).
+run_check() {
+    label="$1"
+
+    rm -f "$logfile"
+    rm -rf "$todir"
+    mkdir -p "$todir"
+
+    out="$scratchdir/run.out"
+
+    RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+	$RSYNC -av localhost::chrootmod/ "$todir/" >"$out" 2>&1
+    rc=$?
+
+    echo "----- $label (rsync exit $rc):"
+    cat "$out"
+    echo "----- daemon log:"
+    [ -f "$logfile" ] && cat "$logfile"
+    echo "-----"
+
+    grep -q '@ERROR.*access denied' "$out"
+}
+
+# Scenario A: global reverse lookup. Covered by b6abdb4c.
+write_conf yes yes
+if ! run_check "Scenario A (global reverse lookup = yes)"; then
+    test_fail "Scenario A: hostname deny rule was bypassed"
+fi
+
+# Scenario B: only the per-module reverse-lookup setting is enabled.
+# The b6abdb4c fix only pre-warms client_name()'s cache when the
+# global setting is on, so the post-chroot lookup in this path may
+# still produce "UNKNOWN" and bypass the deny rule.
+write_conf no yes
+if ! run_check "Scenario B (per-module reverse lookup only)"; then
+    test_fail "Scenario B: hostname deny rule was bypassed (per-module reverse lookup with daemon chroot still has the bypass)"
+fi
+
+exit 0

testsuite/daemon-refuse-compress.test

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Test that a daemon module configured with "refuse options = compress"
+# rejects clients that ask for compression and still serves the same
+# transfer when the client does not.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+build_rsyncd_conf
+
+# Append a module that refuses --compress (-z).
+cat >>"$conf" <<EOF
+
+[no-compress]
+	path = $fromdir
+	read only = yes
+	refuse options = compress
+EOF
+
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon"
+export RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG
+
+hands_setup
+
+# Build a reference tree mirroring the daemon's global exclude rule.
+$RSYNC -av --exclude=foobar.baz "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+
+# A compressed transfer must be refused.
+errlog="$scratchdir/refuse.err"
+if $RSYNC -avz localhost::no-compress/ "$todir/" >/dev/null 2>"$errlog"; then
+    cat "$errlog" >&2
+    test_fail "compressed transfer was not refused"
+fi
+
+grep -- '--compress' "$errlog" >/dev/null || {
+    cat "$errlog" >&2
+    test_fail "expected refuse error mentioning --compress"
+}
+
+# The same transfer without -z must succeed.
+rm -rf "$todir"
+mkdir "$todir"
+checkit "$RSYNC -av localhost::no-compress/ '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+
+# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
+exit 0

testsuite/daemon.test

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ drwxr-xr-x         DIR ####/##/## ##:##:## foo
 EOT
 diff $diffopt "$chkfile" "$outfile" || test_fail "test 3 failed"
 
-if $RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] atimes" >/dev/null; then
+if $RSYNC -VV | grep '"atimes": true' >/dev/null; then
     checkdiff "$RSYNC -rU localhost::test-from/f*" \
 	"sed -e '$FILE_REPL' -e '$DIR_REPL' -e '$LS_REPL'" <<EOT
 drwxr-xr-x         DIR ####/##/## ##:##:##                     foo

testsuite/devices.test

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 case $0 in
 *fake*)
-    $RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] xattrs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync needs xattrs for fake device tests"
+    $RSYNC -VV | grep '"xattrs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync needs xattrs for fake device tests"
     RSYNC="$RSYNC --fake-super"
     TLS_ARGS="$TLS_ARGS --fake-super"
     case "$HOST_OS" in
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ esac
 
 # TODO: Need to test whether hardlinks are possible on this OS/filesystem
 
-$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] hardlink-special" >/dev/null && CAN_HLINK_SPECIAL=yes || CAN_HLINK_SPECIAL=no
+$RSYNC -VV | grep '"hardlink_specials": true' >/dev/null && CAN_HLINK_SPECIAL=yes || CAN_HLINK_SPECIAL=no
 
 mkdir "$fromdir"
 mkdir "$todir"

testsuite/exclude-lsh.test

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+exclude.test

testsuite/exclude.test

@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@
 CVSIGNORE='*.junk'
 export CVSIGNORE
 
+case $0 in
+*-lsh.*)
+    RSYNC_RSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
+    export RSYNC_RSH
+    rpath=" --rsync-path='$RSYNC'"
+    host='lh:'
+    ;;
+*)
+    rpath=''
+    host=''
+    ;;
+esac
+
 # Build some files/dirs/links to copy
 
 makepath "$fromdir/foo/down/to/you"
@@ -106,8 +119,8 @@ home-cvs-exclude
 EOF
 
 # Start with a check of --prune-empty-dirs:
-$RSYNC -av -f -_foo/too/ -f -_foo/down/ -f -_foo/and/ -f -_new/ "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
-checkit "$RSYNC -av --prune-empty-dirs '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" -f -_foo/too/ -f -_foo/down/ -f -_foo/and/ -f -_new/ "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+checkit "$RSYNC -av$rpath --prune-empty-dirs '$host$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
 rm -rf "$todir"
 
 # Add a directory symlink.
@@ -120,7 +133,7 @@ touch "$scratchdir/up1/same-newness" "$scratchdir/up2/same-newness"
 touch "$scratchdir/up1/extra-src" "$scratchdir/up2/extra-dest"
 
 # Create chkdir with what we expect to be excluded.
-checkit "$RSYNC -avv '$fromdir/' '$chkdir/'" "$fromdir" "$chkdir"
+checkit "$RSYNC -avv$rpath '$host$fromdir/' '$chkdir/'" "$fromdir" "$chkdir"
 sleep 1 # Ensures that the rm commands will tweak the directory times.
 rm -r "$chkdir"/foo/down
 rm -r "$chkdir"/mid/for/foo/and
@@ -135,12 +148,12 @@ touch "$scratchdir/up1/src-newness" "$scratchdir/up2/dst-newness"
 
 # Un-tweak the directory times in our first (weak) exclude test (though
 # it's a good test of the --existing option).
-$RSYNC -av --existing --include='*/' --exclude='*' "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --existing --include='*/' --exclude='*' "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
 
 # Now, test if rsync excludes the same files.
 
-checkit "$RSYNC -avv --exclude-from='$excl' \
-    --delete-during '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+checkit "$RSYNC -avv$rpath --exclude-from='$excl' \
+    --delete-during '$host$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
 
 # Modify the chk dir by removing cvs-ignored files and then tweaking the dir times.
 
@@ -150,13 +163,15 @@ rm "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/foo/*.junk
 rm "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/home-cvs-exclude
 rm "$chkdir"/mid/one-in-one-out
 
-$RSYNC -av --existing --filter='exclude,! */' "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --existing --filter='exclude,! */' "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
 
 # Now, test if rsync excludes the same files, this time with --cvs-exclude
 # and --delete-excluded.
 
-checkit "$RSYNC -avvC --filter='merge $excl' --delete-excluded \
-    --delete-during '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+# The -C option gets applied in a different order when pushing & pulling, so we instead
+# add the 2 --cvs-exclude filter rules (":C" & "-C") via -f to keep the order the same.
+checkit "$RSYNC -avv$rpath --filter='merge $excl' -f:C -f-C --delete-excluded \
+    --delete-during '$host$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
 
 # Modify the chk dir for our merge-exclude test and then tweak the dir times.
 
@@ -165,19 +180,19 @@ rm "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/bar/baz/*.deep
 cp_touch "$fromdir"/bar/down/to/foo/*.junk "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/foo
 cp_touch "$fromdir"/bar/down/to/foo/to "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/foo
 
-$RSYNC -av --existing -f 'show .filt*' -f 'hide,! */' --del "$fromdir/" "$todir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --existing -f 'show .filt*' -f 'hide,! */' --del "$host$fromdir/" "$todir/"
 
 echo retained >"$todir"/bar/down/to/bar/baz/nodel.deep
 cp_touch "$todir"/bar/down/to/bar/baz/nodel.deep "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/bar/baz
 
-$RSYNC -av --existing --filter='-! */' "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --existing --filter='-! */' "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
 
 # Now, test if rsync excludes the same files, this time with a merge-exclude
 # file.
 
 checkit "sed '/!/d' '$excl' |
-    $RSYNC -avv -f dir-merge_.filt -f merge_- \
-    --delete-during '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+    $RSYNC -avv$rpath -f dir-merge_.filt -f merge_- \
+    --delete-during '$host$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
 
 # Remove the files that will be deleted.
 
@@ -188,14 +203,14 @@ rm "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/foo/.filt2
 rm "$chkdir"/bar/down/to/bar/.filt2
 rm "$chkdir"/mid/.filt
 
-$RSYNC -av --protocol=28 --existing --include='*/' --exclude='*' "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --existing --include='*/' --exclude='*' "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
 
 # Now, try the prior command with --delete-before and some side-specific
 # rules.
 
 checkit "sed '/!/d' '$excl' |
-    $RSYNC -avv -f :s_.filt -f .s_- -f P_nodel.deep \
-    --delete-before '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+    $RSYNC -avv$rpath -f :s_.filt -f .s_- -f P_nodel.deep \
+    --delete-before '$host$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
 
 # Next, we'll test some rule-restricted filter files.
 
@@ -206,26 +221,26 @@ cat >"$fromdir/bar/down/to/foo/.excl" <<EOF
 + file3
 *.bak
 EOF
-$RSYNC -av --del "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --del "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
 rm "$chkdir/bar/down/to/foo/file1.bak"
 rm "$chkdir/bar/down/to/foo/file3"
 rm "$chkdir/bar/down/to/foo/+ file3"
-$RSYNC -av --existing --filter='-! */' "$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
-$RSYNC -av --delete-excluded --exclude='*' "$fromdir/" "$todir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --existing --filter='-! */' "$host$fromdir/" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" --delete-excluded --exclude='*' "$host$fromdir/" "$todir/"
 
-checkit "$RSYNC -avv -f dir-merge,-_.excl \
-    '$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
+checkit "$RSYNC -avv$rpath -f dir-merge,-_.excl \
+    '$host$fromdir/' '$todir/'" "$chkdir" "$todir"
 
 relative_opts='--relative --chmod=Du+w --copy-unsafe-links'
-$RSYNC -av $relative_opts "$fromdir/foo" "$chkdir/"
+$RSYNC -av --rsync-path="$RSYNC" $relative_opts "$host$fromdir/foo" "$chkdir/"
 rm -rf "$chkdir$fromdir/foo/down"
 $RSYNC -av $relative_opts --existing --filter='-! */' "$fromdir/foo" "$chkdir/"
 
-checkit "$RSYNC -avv $relative_opts --exclude='$fromdir/foo/down' \
-    '$fromdir/foo' '$todir'" "$chkdir$fromdir/foo" "$todir$fromdir/foo"
+checkit "$RSYNC -avv$rpath $relative_opts --exclude='$fromdir/foo/down' \
+    '$host$fromdir/foo' '$todir'" "$chkdir$fromdir/foo" "$todir$fromdir/foo"
 
 # Now we'll test the --update option.
-checkdiff "$RSYNC -aiiO --update --info=skip '$scratchdir/up1/' '$scratchdir/up2/'" \
+checkdiff "$RSYNC -aiiO$rpath --update --info=skip '$host$scratchdir/up1/' '$scratchdir/up2/'" \
 	"grep -v '^\.d$allspace'" <<EOT
 dst-newness is newer
 >f$all_plus extra-src

testsuite/itemize.test

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ln "$fromdir/foo/config1" "$fromdir/foo/extra"
 rm -f "$to2dir"
 
 # Check if rsync is set to hard-link symlinks.
-if $RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] hardlink-symlinks" >/dev/null; then
+if $RSYNC -VV | grep '"hardlink_symlinks": true' >/dev/null; then
     L=hL
     sym_dots="$allspace"
     L_sym_dots=".L$allspace"
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ case "$RSYNC" in
     T=.T
     ;;
 *)
-    if $RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] symtimes" >/dev/null; then
+    if $RSYNC -VV | grep '"symtimes": true' >/dev/null; then
 	T=.t
     else
 	T=.T

testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for the off-by-one stack OOB write in
+# establish_proxy_connection() in socket.c when a malicious or
+# man-in-the-middle HTTP proxy returns a first response line of
+# 1023+ bytes without a '\n' terminator.
+#
+# Pre-fix: the read loop walked buffer[0..sizeof-2] one byte at a
+# time, then post-loop logic did "if (*cp != '\n') cp++; *cp-- =
+# '\0';".  If no newline arrived before the loop filled the buffer,
+# cp was left at &buffer[sizeof-1] (never written by the loop),
+# *cp held stale stack bytes, and cp++ pushed cp one past the array.
+# The null-termination then wrote one byte out of bounds on the
+# stack.  AddressSanitizer reports stack-buffer-overflow at the
+# null-termination site.
+#
+# Post-fix: the bound-exhaustion case is detected by position and
+# rejected with an "proxy response line too long" message, so no
+# OOB write occurs and rsync exits with a non-signal status.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || test_skipped "python3 not available"
+
+workdir="$scratchdir/workdir"
+mkdir -p "$workdir"
+cd "$workdir"
+
+port_file="$workdir/port"
+proxy_log="$workdir/proxy.log"
+
+# A minimal TCP listener: binds to an ephemeral port on 127.0.0.1,
+# writes the chosen port to $port_file *before* accept() so the test
+# can synchronise without a sleep, accepts one connection, reads
+# until end-of-headers or 64 KiB, sends exactly 1023 bytes of 'X'
+# with no '\n', then closes.
+python3 - "$port_file" >"$proxy_log" 2>&1 <<'PYEOF' &
+import socket, sys, os
+port_file = sys.argv[1]
+s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+port = s.getsockname()[1]
+tmp = port_file + ".tmp"
+with open(tmp, "w") as fp:
+    fp.write("%d\n" % port)
+os.rename(tmp, port_file)   # atomic visibility to the shell side
+s.listen(1)
+conn, _ = s.accept()
+conn.settimeout(5)
+try:
+    data = b""
+    while b"\r\n\r\n" not in data and len(data) < 65536:
+        chunk = conn.recv(8192)
+        if not chunk:
+            break
+        data += chunk
+except socket.timeout:
+    pass
+conn.sendall(b"X" * 1023)    # exactly the buffer-1 trigger size
+try:
+    conn.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
+except OSError:
+    pass
+conn.close()
+s.close()
+PYEOF
+proxy_pid=$!
+
+# Wait up to ~10s for the listener to publish its port.
+i=0
+while [ ! -s "$port_file" ] && [ $i -lt 10 ]; do
+    sleep 1
+    i=$((i + 1))
+done
+
+if [ ! -s "$port_file" ]; then
+    kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null
+    cat "$proxy_log" >&2 2>/dev/null
+    test_fail "proxy listener never published a port"
+fi
+
+port=`cat "$port_file"`
+case "$port" in
+    *[!0-9]*|"") kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null; test_fail "bogus port from listener: '$port'" ;;
+esac
+
+# Run rsync through the malicious proxy.  Any rsync:// URL works:
+# the proxy intercepts the CONNECT and never forwards anywhere.
+rsync_err="$workdir/rsync.err"
+
+# rsync MUST exit non-zero here (the proxy is misbehaving).
+# Use `|| status=$?` so we capture the real exit code under `sh -e`;
+# `if ! cmd; then status=$?` would only ever see 0 because the `!`
+# is the last command before `$?`.
+status=0
+RSYNC_PROXY="127.0.0.1:$port" \
+    $RSYNC rsync://example.invalid:873/whatever/ "$workdir/out/" \
+    >/dev/null 2>"$rsync_err" || status=$?
+
+# Reap the listener.
+wait "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# 1. rsync must not have crashed (SIGSEGV/SIGABRT report >= 128).
+if [ "$status" -ge 128 ]; then
+    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
+    test_fail "rsync killed by signal (status=$status) -- possible stack OOB regression"
+fi
+
+# 2. rsync must have actually exited non-zero (i.e. saw the bad proxy).
+if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then
+    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
+    test_fail "rsync returned success despite malformed proxy response"
+fi
+
+# 3. The new error message must appear.
+if ! grep -q "proxy response line too long" "$rsync_err"; then
+    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
+    test_fail "expected 'proxy response line too long' in rsync stderr"
+fi
+
+echo "OK: over-long proxy response line rejected cleanly without crashing"
+exit 0

testsuite/safe-links.test

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+test_symlink() {
+	is_a_link "$1" || test_fail "File $1 is not a symlink"
+}
+
+test_regular() {
+	if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
+		test_fail "File $1 is not regular file or not exists"
+	fi
+}
+
+test_notexist() {
+        if [ -e "$1" ]; then
+                test_fail "File $1 exists"
+	fi
+        if [ -h "$1" ]; then
+                test_fail "File $1 exists as a symlink"
+	fi
+}
+
+cd "$tmpdir"
+
+mkdir from
+
+mkdir "from/safe"
+mkdir "from/unsafe"
+
+mkdir "from/safe/files"
+mkdir "from/safe/links"
+
+touch "from/safe/files/file1"
+touch "from/safe/files/file2"
+touch "from/unsafe/unsafefile"
+
+ln -s ../files/file1 "from/safe/links/"
+ln -s ../files/file2 "from/safe/links/"
+ln -s ../../unsafe/unsafefile "from/safe/links/"
+ln -s a/a/a/../../../unsafe2 "from/safe/links/"
+
+#echo "LISTING FROM"
+#ls -lR from
+
+echo "rsync with relative path and just -a"
+$RSYNC -avv --safe-links from/safe/ to
+
+#echo "LISTING TO"
+#ls -lR to
+
+test_symlink to/links/file1
+test_symlink to/links/file2
+test_notexist to/links/unsafefile
+test_notexist to/links/unsafe2

testsuite/secure-relpath-validation.test

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for codex audit Finding 5: secure_relative_open()'s
+# front-door input check rejects "../foo" and "foo/../bar" but
+# misses bare "..", "subdir/..", and other variants whose "/"-split
+# components contain a literal "..". The kernel-enforced
+# RESOLVE_BENEATH (Linux 5.6+) and O_RESOLVE_BENEATH
+# (FreeBSD 13+, macOS 15+) reject these in-kernel; the per-component
+# walk fallback used on NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, Cygwin and pre-5.6
+# Linux does not -- so the validation must happen at the front door.
+#
+# This test invokes the t_secure_relpath helper, which calls
+# secure_relative_open() with each suspect input and verifies the
+# return value is -1 with errno == EINVAL. EINVAL is the marker
+# that the front-door rejected the input, not the kernel; pre-fix
+# the kernel returns -1 with EXDEV (or, on the per-component
+# fallback, may return a valid fd at all -- "escape").
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+testdir="$scratchdir/relpath-test"
+rm -rf "$testdir"
+mkdir -p "$testdir"
+
+if ! "$TOOLDIR/t_secure_relpath" "$testdir"; then
+    test_fail "t_secure_relpath rejected one or more inputs incorrectly (see stderr above for the specific case)"
+fi
+
+exit 0

testsuite/sender-flist-symlink-leak.test

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
+
+# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
+# COPYING).
+
+# Regression test for codex re-check finding: the sender-side file-
+# list generator can still follow an attacker-planted symlink out of
+# the module via change_pathname() -> change_dir(...,CD_SKIP_CHDIR)
+# followed by change_dir(...,CD_NORMAL). The CD_SKIP_CHDIR sets
+# skipped_chdir=1, and the next CD_NORMAL call's secure-branch in
+# util1.c is gated on `!skipped_chdir`, so the secure path is
+# bypassed and a raw chdir(curr_dir) follows attacker-controlled
+# symlinks during flist generation.
+#
+# Reach: rsync daemon module with `use chroot = no`. A local
+# attacker plants module/cd -> /outside. A client (innocent or
+# malicious) pulls rsync://<daemon>/<module>/cd/. The daemon, as
+# sender, enumerates files in /outside and ships their metadata
+# (names, sizes, modes, mtimes) to the client. The actual content
+# transfer fails later at the secure_relative_open step with EXDEV,
+# but by then the metadata has already leaked.
+#
+# We detect by running a dry-run pull of the symlinked subdir and
+# checking whether the client's --list-only output mentions any
+# file from /outside. With the bug, /outside/secret.txt appears in
+# the list with its size; with the fix, the daemon's chdir into
+# the symlinked subdir is rejected and no /outside file is listed.
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
+        test_skipped "secure change_dir relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
+        ;;
+esac
+
+mod="$scratchdir/module"
+outside="$scratchdir/outside"
+listfile="$scratchdir/listed.txt"
+conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
+
+rm -rf "$mod" "$outside"
+mkdir -p "$mod" "$outside"
+
+# Outside-the-module file the daemon should NOT enumerate to clients.
+# A distinctive name + non-trivial size makes the leak easy to spot.
+echo "OUTSIDE_PROTECTED_FILE_USED_AS_LEAK_DETECTOR" > "$outside/leak_marker.txt"
+chmod 0644 "$outside/leak_marker.txt"
+
+# The symlink trap planted by the local attacker.
+ln -s "$outside" "$mod/cd"
+
+my_uid=`get_testuid`
+root_uid=`get_rootuid`
+root_gid=`get_rootgid`
+uid_setting="uid = $root_uid"
+gid_setting="gid = $root_gid"
+if test x"$my_uid" != x"$root_uid"; then
+    uid_setting="#$uid_setting"
+    gid_setting="#$gid_setting"
+fi
+
+cat > "$conf" <<EOF
+use chroot = no
+$uid_setting
+$gid_setting
+log file = $scratchdir/rsyncd.log
+[upload]
+    path = $mod
+    use chroot = no
+    read only = no
+EOF
+
+# Pull recursively into the symlinked subdir with dry-run + verbose,
+# capturing the daemon's flist (file list) on stdout. If the daemon
+# enumerates /outside, leak_marker.txt will appear in the listing.
+RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
+    $RSYNC -nrv rsync://localhost/upload/cd/ "$scratchdir/dst/" \
+    > "$listfile" 2>&1 || true
+
+if grep -q "leak_marker\.txt" "$listfile"; then
+    echo "----- leaked listing follows" >&2
+    sed 's/^/    /' "$listfile" >&2
+    echo "----- leaked listing ends" >&2
+    test_fail "sender flist leak: outside/leak_marker.txt was enumerated to the client (daemon's chdir followed the cd symlink during flist generation)"
+fi
+
+exit 0

testsuite/simd-checksum.test

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Test SIMD checksum implementations against the C reference
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+if ! test -x "$TOOLDIR/simdtest"; then
+    test_skipped "simdtest not built (SIMD not available)"
+fi
+
+"$TOOLDIR/simdtest"

testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Test that updating a file through a directory symlink works when using
+# -K (--copy-dirlinks). This is a regression test for:
+#   https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715
+#
+# The CVE fix in commit c35e283 introduced secure_relative_open() which
+# uses O_NOFOLLOW on all path components, breaking legitimate directory
+# symlinks on the receiver side. The fix splits the path into basedir
+# (dirname, symlinks followed) and basename (O_NOFOLLOW) so that
+# directory symlinks are traversed while the final file component is
+# still protected.
+#
+# The regression only manifests when delta matching is triggered (i.e.,
+# the sender finds matching blocks in the old file). Small files with
+# completely different content are transferred in full and don't trigger
+# the bug. We use a large file with a small modification to ensure
+# delta transfer is used.
+#
+# In addition to the original regression, this test covers edge cases
+# in the fix itself:
+#   - --backup with directory symlinks (finish_transfer pointer identity)
+#   - --partial-dir with protocol < 29 (fnamecmp != partialptr guard)
+#   - --inplace with directory symlinks (updating_basis_or_equiv check)
+#   - Files without a dirname (top-level files, no split needed)
+
+. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
+
+# secure_relative_open() uses kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" via
+# openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux 5.6+ and openat(O_RESOLVE_BENEATH)
+# on FreeBSD 13+. Other platforms fall back to a per-component
+# O_NOFOLLOW walk that rejects every symlink including legitimate
+# directory symlinks -- the very case this test exercises. Skip on
+# those rather than report a known failure.
+case "$(uname -s)" in
+    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
+	test_skipped "secure_relative_open lacks RESOLVE_BENEATH equivalent on $(uname -s); issue #715 still affects this platform"
+	;;
+esac
+
+RSYNC_RSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
+export RSYNC_RSH
+
+# $HOME is set to $scratchdir by rsync.fns
+# localhost: destination will cd to $HOME (i.e., $scratchdir)
+
+# Helper: create a large file suitable for delta transfers.
+# ~32KB is large enough for rsync's block matching to find matches.
+make_testfile() {
+    dd if=/dev/urandom of="$1" bs=1024 count=32 2>/dev/null \
+	|| test_fail "failed to create test file $1"
+}
+
+# Set up source tree
+srcbase="$tmpdir/src"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 1: Basic directory symlink update (the original issue #715)
+######################################################################
+
+mkdir -p "$HOME/real-dir"
+ln -s real-dir "$HOME/dir"
+
+mkdir -p "$srcbase/dir"
+make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+# First transfer (initial): should create the file through the symlink
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 1: initial transfer failed"
+
+if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" ]; then
+    test_fail "test 1: initial transfer did not create file through symlink"
+fi
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 1: initial transfer content mismatch"
+
+# Small modification to trigger delta transfer
+echo "appended update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+# Second transfer (update): was failing with "failed verification"
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 1: update through directory symlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 1: update transfer content mismatch"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 2: Compression (-z) as in the original reproducer
+######################################################################
+
+echo "another line" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptzv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 2: compressed update through directory symlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 2: compressed update content mismatch"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 3: Nested directory symlinks (nested/sub/data.txt where
+#          "nested" is a symlink to "nested_real")
+######################################################################
+
+mkdir -p "$HOME/nested_real/sub"
+ln -s nested_real "$HOME/nested"
+
+mkdir -p "$srcbase/nested/sub"
+make_testfile "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 3: initial nested transfer failed"
+
+echo "appended nested" >> "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 3: update through nested directory symlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt" "$HOME/nested_real/sub/data.txt" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 3: nested update content mismatch"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 4: --backup with directory symlinks
+#
+# Exercises the finish_transfer() "fnamecmp == fname" pointer
+# comparison that determines whether to update fnamecmp to the
+# backup name. If broken, --backup would reference a renamed file
+# for xattr handling.
+######################################################################
+
+# Reset destination
+rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
+
+make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 4: initial transfer for backup test failed"
+
+echo "backup update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --backup --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 4: update with --backup through directory symlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 4: backup update content mismatch"
+
+if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file~" ]; then
+    test_fail "test 4: backup file was not created"
+fi
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 5: --inplace with directory symlinks
+#
+# Exercises the updating_basis_or_equiv check which uses
+# "fnamecmp == fname". With --inplace, rsync writes directly to
+# the destination file instead of a temp file.
+######################################################################
+
+rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
+
+make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 5: initial inplace transfer failed"
+
+echo "inplace update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 5: inplace update through directory symlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 5: inplace update content mismatch"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 6: Top-level file (no dirname, no split needed)
+#
+# Ensures the dirname/basename split is not attempted for files
+# at the top level (file->dirname is NULL).
+######################################################################
+
+make_testfile "$srcbase/topfile"
+mkdir -p "$HOME"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 6: initial top-level transfer failed"
+
+echo "toplevel update" >> "$srcbase/topfile"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/topfile"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 6: top-level update failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/topfile" "$HOME/topfile" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 6: top-level update content mismatch"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 7: --partial-dir with protocol < 29
+#
+# For protocol < 29, fnamecmp_type stays FNAMECMP_FNAME even when
+# fnamecmp is set to partialptr. The dirname/basename split must
+# NOT trigger in this case (guarded by "fnamecmp == fname").
+######################################################################
+
+rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
+make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
+    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 7: initial proto28 partial-dir transfer failed"
+
+echo "partial-dir update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
+    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update through dirlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update content mismatch"
+
+######################################################################
+# Test 8: Protocol < 29 basic directory symlink update
+#
+# Exercises the protocol < 29 code path and its fallback logic
+# (clearing basedir on retry).
+######################################################################
+
+rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
+make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
+    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 8: initial proto28 transfer failed"
+
+echo "proto28 update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
+sleep 1
+touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
+
+(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
+    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
+    || test_fail "test 8: proto28 update through directory symlink failed"
+
+diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
+    || test_fail "test 8: proto28 update content mismatch"
+
+# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
+exit 0

testsuite/unsafe-byname.test

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test_unsafe ..//../dest 		from/dir			unsafe
 test_unsafe ..				from/file			safe
 test_unsafe ../..			from/file			unsafe
 test_unsafe ..//..			from//file			unsafe
-test_unsafe dir/..			from				safe
+test_unsafe dir/..			from				unsafe
 test_unsafe dir/../..			from				unsafe
 test_unsafe dir/..//..			from				unsafe
 

testsuite/xattrs.test

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 . $suitedir/rsync.fns
 lnkdir="$tmpdir/lnk"
 
-$RSYNC --version | grep "[, ] xattrs" >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without xattr support"
+$RSYNC -VV | grep '"xattrs": true' >/dev/null || test_skipped "Rsync is configured without xattr support"
 
 case "$HOST_OS" in
 darwin*)
@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ EOF
     xls() {
 	for fn in "${@}"; do
 	    runat "$fn" "$SHELL_PATH" <<EOF
-for x in *; do echo "\$x=\`cat \$x\`"; done
+for x in *; do
+    case "\$x" in SUNWattr_*) continue;; esac
+    echo "\$x=\`cat \$x\`"
+done
 EOF
        done
     }

tls.c

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0;
 int link_times = 0;
 int link_owner = 0;
 int nsec_times = 0;
+int safe_symlinks = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
 
 #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
 
@@ -124,7 +127,7 @@ static void storetime(char *dest, size_t destsize, time_t t, int nsecs)
 {
 	if (t) {
 		int len;
-		struct tm *mt = gmtime(&t);
+		struct tm tmp, *mt = gmtime_r(&t, &tmp);
 
 		len = snprintf(dest, destsize,
 			" %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",

token.c

@@ -291,6 +291,14 @@ static int32 simple_recv_token(int f, char **data)
 		int32 i = read_int(f);
 		if (i <= 0)
 			return i;
+		/* simple_send_token caps each literal chunk at CHUNK_SIZE;
+		 * reject anything larger so a hostile peer cannot drive the
+		 * read_buf below past our static CHUNK_SIZE buffer. */
+		if (i > CHUNK_SIZE) {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "invalid uncompressed token length %ld [%s]\n",
+				(long)i, who_am_i());
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
 		residue = i;
 	}
 
@@ -493,9 +501,52 @@ static char *cbuf;
 static char *dbuf;
 
 /* for decoding runs of tokens */
+#define MAX_TOKEN_INDEX ((int32)0x7ffffffe)
+
 static int32 rx_token;
 static int32 rx_run;
 
+static NORETURN void invalid_compressed_token(void)
+{
+	rprintf(FERROR, "invalid token number in compressed stream\n");
+	exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+}
+
+static int32 recv_compressed_token_num(int f, int32 flag)
+{
+	if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+		int32 incr = flag & 0x3f;
+		if (rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - incr)
+			invalid_compressed_token();
+		rx_token += incr;
+		flag >>= 6;
+	} else {
+		rx_token = read_int(f);
+		if (rx_token < 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
+			invalid_compressed_token();
+	}
+
+	if (flag & 1) {
+		rx_run = read_byte(f);
+		rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+		if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - rx_run)
+			invalid_compressed_token();
+		recv_state = r_running;
+	}
+
+	return -1 - rx_token;
+}
+
+static int32 recv_compressed_token_run(void)
+{
+	if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token >= MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
+		invalid_compressed_token();
+	++rx_token;
+	if (--rx_run == 0)
+		recv_state = r_idle;
+	return -1 - rx_token;
+}
+
 /* Receive a deflated token and inflate it */
 static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
 {
@@ -586,17 +637,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
 			}
 
 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
-			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
-				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
-				flag >>= 6;
-			} else
-				rx_token = read_int(f);
-			if (flag & 1) {
-				rx_run = read_byte(f);
-				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
-				recv_state = r_running;
-			}
-			return -1 - rx_token;
+			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
 
 		case r_inflating:
 			rx_strm.next_out = (Bytef *)dbuf;
@@ -616,10 +657,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
 			break;
 
 		case r_running:
-			++rx_token;
-			if (--rx_run == 0)
-				recv_state = r_idle;
-			return -1 - rx_token;
+			return recv_compressed_token_run();
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -828,17 +866,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
 				return 0;
 			}
 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
-			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
-				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
-				flag >>= 6;
-			} else
-				rx_token = read_int(f);
-			if (flag & 1) {
-				rx_run = read_byte(f);
-				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
-				recv_state = r_running;
-			}
-			return -1 - rx_token;
+			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
 
 		case r_inflated: /* zstd doesn't get into this state */
 			break;
@@ -869,10 +897,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
 			break;
 
 		case r_running:
-			++rx_token;
-			if (--rx_run == 0)
-				recv_state = r_idle;
-			return -1 - rx_token;
+			return recv_compressed_token_run();
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -992,17 +1017,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
 			}
 
 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
-			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
-				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
-				flag >>= 6;
-			} else
-				rx_token = read_int(f);
-			if (flag & 1) {
-				rx_run = read_byte(f);
-				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
-				recv_state = r_running;
-			}
-			return -1 - rx_token;
+			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
 
 		case r_inflating:
 			avail_out = LZ4_decompress_safe(next_in, dbuf, avail_in, size);
@@ -1018,10 +1033,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
 			break;
 
 		case r_running:
-			++rx_token;
-			if (--rx_run == 0)
-				recv_state = r_idle;
-			return -1 - rx_token;
+			return recv_compressed_token_run();
 		}
 	}
 }

trimslash.c

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0;
 int am_sender = 1;
 int read_only = 1;
 int list_only = 0;
+int copy_links = 0;
+int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
 
 int
 main(int argc, char **argv)

usage.c

@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
 #include "latest-year.h"
 #include "git-version.h"
 #include "default-cvsignore.h"
+#include "itypes.h"
 
-extern struct name_num_obj valid_checksums;
-extern struct name_num_obj valid_compressions;
+extern struct name_num_obj valid_checksums, valid_compressions, valid_auth_checksums;
 
 static char *istring(const char *fmt, int val)
 {
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ static char *istring(const char *fmt, int val)
 static void print_info_flags(enum logcode f)
 {
 	STRUCT_STAT *dumstat;
-	char line_buf[75];
+	BOOL as_json = f == FNONE ? 1 : 0; /* We use 1 == first attribute, 2 == need closing array */
+	char line_buf[75], item_buf[32];
 	int line_len, j;
 	char *info_flags[] = {
 
@@ -164,46 +165,137 @@ static void print_info_flags(enum logcode f)
 
 	for (line_len = 0, j = 0; ; j++) {
 		char *str = info_flags[j], *next_nfo = str ? info_flags[j+1] : NULL;
-		int str_len = str && *str != '*' ? strlen(str) : 1000;
 		int need_comma = next_nfo && *next_nfo != '*' ? 1 : 0;
-		if (line_len && line_len + 1 + str_len + need_comma >= (int)sizeof line_buf) {
-			rprintf(f, "   %s\n", line_buf);
+		int item_len;
+		if (!str || *str == '*')
+			item_len = 1000;
+		else if (as_json) {
+			char *space = strchr(str, ' ');
+			int is_no = space && strncmp(str, "no ", 3) == 0;
+			int is_bits = space && isDigit(str);
+			char *quot = space && !is_no && !is_bits ? "\"" : "";
+			char *item = space ? space + 1 : str;
+			char *val = !space ? "true" : is_no ? "false" : str;
+			int val_len = !space ? 4 : is_no ? 5 : space - str;
+			if (is_bits && (space = strchr(val, '-')) != NULL)
+			    val_len = space - str;
+			item_len = snprintf(item_buf, sizeof item_buf,
+					   " \"%s%s\": %s%.*s%s%s", item, is_bits ? "bits" : "",
+					   quot, val_len, val, quot, need_comma ? "," : "");
+			if (is_bits)
+				item_buf[strlen(item)+2-1] = '_'; /* Turn the 's' into a '_' */
+			for (space = item; (space = strpbrk(space, " -")) != NULL; space++)
+				item_buf[space - item + 2] = '_';
+		} else
+			item_len = snprintf(item_buf, sizeof item_buf, " %s%s", str, need_comma ? "," : "");
+		if (line_len && line_len + item_len >= (int)sizeof line_buf) {
+			if (as_json)
+				printf("   %s\n", line_buf);
+			else
+				rprintf(f, "   %s\n", line_buf);
 			line_len = 0;
 		}
 		if (!str)
 			break;
 		if (*str == '*') {
-			rprintf(f, "%s:\n", str+1);
-			continue;
+			if (as_json) {
+				if (as_json == 2)
+					printf("  }");
+				else
+					as_json = 2;
+				printf(",\n  \"%c%s\": {\n", toLower(str+1), str+2);
+			} else
+				rprintf(f, "%s:\n", str+1);
+		} else {
+			strlcpy(line_buf + line_len, item_buf, sizeof line_buf - line_len);
+			line_len += item_len;
 		}
-		line_len += snprintf(line_buf+line_len, sizeof line_buf - line_len, " %s%s", str, need_comma ? "," : "");
 	}
+	if (as_json == 2)
+		printf("  }");
 }
 
+static void output_nno_list(enum logcode f, const char *name, struct name_num_obj *nno)
+{
+	char namebuf[64], tmpbuf[256];
+	char *tok, *next_tok, *comma = ",";
+	char *cp;
+
+	/* Using '(' ensures that we get a trailing "none" but also includes aliases. */
+	get_default_nno_list(nno, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf - 1, '(');
+	if (f != FNONE) {
+		rprintf(f, "%s:\n", name);
+		rprintf(f, "    %s\n", tmpbuf);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	strlcpy(namebuf, name, sizeof namebuf);
+	for (cp = namebuf; *cp; cp++) {
+		if (*cp == ' ')
+			*cp = '_';
+		else if (isUpper(cp))
+			*cp = toLower(cp);
+	}
+
+	printf(",\n  \"%s\": [\n   ", namebuf);
+
+	for (tok = strtok(tmpbuf, " "); tok; tok = next_tok) {
+		next_tok = strtok(NULL, " ");
+		if (*tok != '(') /* Ignore the alises in the JSON output */
+			printf(" \"%s\"%s", tok, comma + (next_tok ? 0 : 1));
+	}
+
+	printf("\n  ]");
+}
+
+/* A request of f == FNONE wants json on stdout. */
 void print_rsync_version(enum logcode f)
 {
-	char tmpbuf[256], *subprotocol = "";
+	char copyright[] = "(C) 1996-" LATEST_YEAR " by Andrew Tridgell, Wayne Davison, and others.";
+	char url[] = "https://rsync.samba.org/";
+	BOOL first_line = 1;
 
+#define json_line(name, value) \
+	do { \
+		printf("%c\n  \"%s\": \"%s\"", first_line ? '{' : ',', name, value); \
+		first_line = 0; \
+	} while (0)
+
+	if (f == FNONE) {
+		char verbuf[32];
+		json_line("program", RSYNC_NAME);
+		json_line("version", rsync_version());
+		(void)snprintf(verbuf, sizeof verbuf, "%d.%d", PROTOCOL_VERSION, SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION);
+		json_line("protocol", verbuf);
+		json_line("copyright", copyright);
+		json_line("url", url);
+	} else {
 #if SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION != 0
-	subprotocol = istring(".PR%d", SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION);
+		char *subprotocol = istring(".PR%d", SUBPROTOCOL_VERSION);
+#else
+		char *subprotocol = "";
 #endif
-	rprintf(f, "%s  version %s  protocol version %d%s\n",
-		RSYNC_NAME, rsync_version(), PROTOCOL_VERSION, subprotocol);
-
-	rprintf(f, "Copyright (C) 1996-" LATEST_YEAR " by Andrew Tridgell, Wayne Davison, and others.\n");
-	rprintf(f, "Web site: https://rsync.samba.org/\n");
+		rprintf(f, "%s  version %s  protocol version %d%s\n",
+			RSYNC_NAME, rsync_version(), PROTOCOL_VERSION, subprotocol);
+		rprintf(f, "Copyright %s\n", copyright);
+		rprintf(f, "Web site: %s\n", url);
+	}
 
 	print_info_flags(f);
 
 	init_checksum_choices();
 
-	rprintf(f, "Checksum list:\n");
-	get_default_nno_list(&valid_checksums, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, '(');
-	rprintf(f, "    %s\n", tmpbuf);
+	output_nno_list(f, "Checksum list", &valid_checksums);
+	output_nno_list(f, "Compress list", &valid_compressions);
+	output_nno_list(f, "Daemon auth list", &valid_auth_checksums);
 
-	rprintf(f, "Compress list:\n");
-	get_default_nno_list(&valid_compressions, tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, '(');
-	rprintf(f, "    %s\n", tmpbuf);
+	if (f == FNONE) {
+		json_line("license", "GPLv3");
+		json_line("caveat", "rsync comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY");
+		printf("\n}\n");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		return;
+	}
 
 #ifdef MAINTAINER_MODE
 	rprintf(f, "Panic Action: \"%s\"\n", get_panic_action());
@@ -265,11 +357,13 @@ void daemon_usage(enum logcode F)
 
 const char *rsync_version(void)
 {
+	char *ver;
 #ifdef RSYNC_GITVER
-	return RSYNC_GITVER;
+	ver = RSYNC_GITVER;
 #else
-	return RSYNC_VERSION;
+	ver = RSYNC_VERSION;
 #endif
+	return *ver == 'v' ? ver+1 : ver;
 }
 
 const char *default_cvsignore(void)

util1.c

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int set_times(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *stp)
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
 #include "case_N.h"
-		if (do_utimensat(fname, stp) == 0)
+		if (do_utimensat_at(fname, stp) == 0)
 			break;
 		if (errno != ENOSYS)
 			return -1;
@@ -336,7 +336,13 @@ static int unlink_and_reopen(const char *dest, mode_t mode)
 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
 #endif
 	mode &= INITACCESSPERMS;
-	if ((ofd = do_open(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, mode)) < 0) {
+	/* Use do_open_at so the create/truncate goes through a secure
+	 * parent dirfd in the daemon-no-chroot deployment. Otherwise
+	 * an attacker could swap a parent component with a symlink in
+	 * the window between robust_unlink (which uses do_unlink_at,
+	 * already secure) and the create here, and redirect the new
+	 * file outside the module. */
+	if ((ofd = do_open_at(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, mode)) < 0) {
 		int save_errno = errno;
 		rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, save_errno, "open %s", full_fname(dest));
 		errno = save_errno;
@@ -360,12 +366,23 @@ static int unlink_and_reopen(const char *dest, mode_t mode)
  * --copy-dest options. */
 int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
 {
+	extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
 	int ifd, ofd;
 	char buf[1024 * 8];
 	int len;   /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
 	OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0;
 
-	if ((ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
+	/* On a daemon without chroot, route the source open through
+	 * secure_relative_open so a parent-symlink on the source path
+	 * (e.g. --copy-dest=cd where cd is a symlink to an outside
+	 * directory) cannot redirect the read to a file the daemon can
+	 * see but the attacker should not. Plain do_open_nofollow only
+	 * refuses a final-component symlink; parents are still followed. */
+	if (am_daemon && !am_chrooted && source && *source && source[0] != '/')
+		ifd = secure_relative_open(NULL, source, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
+	else
+		ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY);
+	if (ifd < 0) {
 		int save_errno = errno;
 		rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source));
 		errno = save_errno;
@@ -479,13 +496,13 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
 int robust_unlink(const char *fname)
 {
 #ifndef ETXTBSY
-	return do_unlink(fname);
+	return do_unlink_at(fname);
 #else
 	static int counter = 1;
 	int rc, pos, start;
 	char path[MAXPATHLEN];
 
-	rc = do_unlink(fname);
+	rc = do_unlink_at(fname);
 	if (rc == 0 || errno != ETXTBSY)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -515,7 +532,7 @@ int robust_unlink(const char *fname)
 	}
 
 	/* maybe we should return rename()'s exit status? Nah. */
-	if (do_rename(fname, path) != 0) {
+	if (do_rename_at(fname, path) != 0) {
 		errno = ETXTBSY;
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -538,7 +555,7 @@ int robust_rename(const char *from, const char *to, const char *partialptr,
 		return 0;
 
 	while (tries--) {
-		if (do_rename(from, to) == 0)
+		if (do_rename_at(from, to) == 0)
 			return 0;
 
 		switch (errno) {
@@ -559,7 +576,7 @@ int robust_rename(const char *from, const char *to, const char *partialptr,
 			}
 			if (copy_file(from, to, -1, mode) != 0)
 				return -2;
-			do_unlink(from);
+			do_unlink_at(from);
 			return 1;
 		default:
 			return -1;
@@ -942,7 +959,7 @@ int count_dir_elements(const char *p)
  * resulting name would be empty, returns ".". */
 int clean_fname(char *name, int flags)
 {
-	char *limit = name - 1, *t = name, *f = name;
+	char *limit = name, *t = name, *f = name;
 	int anchored;
 
 	if (!name)
@@ -987,9 +1004,13 @@ int clean_fname(char *name, int flags)
 					f += 2;
 					continue;
 				}
-				while (s > limit && *--s != '/') {}
-				if (s != t - 1 && (s < name || *s == '/')) {
-					t = s + 1;
+				/* backing up for ".." — avoid reading before 'name' */
+				while (s > limit && s[-1] != '/')
+					s--;
+
+				/* If found prior '/', or we reached the start, adjust t. */
+				if (s != t - 1 && (s <= name || *s == '/')) {
+					t = (s == name) ? name : s + 1;
 					f += 2;
 					continue;
 				}
@@ -1112,6 +1133,7 @@ char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth, i
  * Also cleans the path using the clean_fname() function. */
 int change_dir(const char *dir, int set_path_only)
 {
+	extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
 	static int initialised, skipped_chdir;
 	unsigned int len;
 
@@ -1150,10 +1172,57 @@ int change_dir(const char *dir, int set_path_only)
 			curr_dir[curr_dir_len++] = '/';
 		memcpy(curr_dir + curr_dir_len, dir, len + 1);
 
-		if (!set_path_only && chdir(curr_dir)) {
-			curr_dir_len = save_dir_len;
-			curr_dir[curr_dir_len] = '\0';
-			return 0;
+		if (!set_path_only) {
+			int chdir_failed;
+			/* In the daemon-without-chroot deployment we must not
+			 * follow a symlink in any component of the chdir
+			 * target -- otherwise CWD escapes the module and
+			 * every subsequent path-relative syscall (open,
+			 * chmod, lchown, ...) inherits the escape, which
+			 * defeats secure_relative_open's RESOLVE_BENEATH
+			 * anchor and re-opens the CVE-2026-29518 class of
+			 * symlink TOCTOU attacks. Use the secure resolver
+			 * to get a confined dirfd, then fchdir() to it.
+			 *
+			 * If skipped_chdir is set, a previous CD_SKIP_CHDIR
+			 * call buffered an absolute prefix in curr_dir
+			 * (e.g. change_pathname's CD_SKIP_CHDIR to orig_dir)
+			 * without syncing the kernel's CWD. Resolve `dir`
+			 * relative to that prefix as basedir so the secure
+			 * branch still anchors at the operator-trusted
+			 * directory rather than wherever the kernel CWD
+			 * happens to be. */
+			if (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) {
+				const char *basedir = NULL;
+				char prefix[MAXPATHLEN];
+				int dfd;
+				if (skipped_chdir) {
+					if (save_dir_len >= sizeof prefix) {
+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+						chdir_failed = 1;
+						goto chdir_cleanup;
+					}
+					memcpy(prefix, curr_dir, save_dir_len);
+					prefix[save_dir_len] = '\0';
+					basedir = prefix;
+				}
+				dfd = secure_relative_open(basedir, dir,
+					O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
+				if (dfd < 0) {
+					chdir_failed = 1;
+				} else {
+					chdir_failed = fchdir(dfd) != 0;
+					close(dfd);
+				}
+			} else {
+				chdir_failed = chdir(curr_dir) != 0;
+			}
+		chdir_cleanup:
+			if (chdir_failed) {
+				curr_dir_len = save_dir_len;
+				curr_dir[curr_dir_len] = '\0';
+				return 0;
+			}
 		}
 		skipped_chdir = set_path_only;
 	}
@@ -1281,20 +1350,20 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create)
 	dir = partial_fname;
 	if (create) {
 		STRUCT_STAT st;
-		int statret = do_lstat(dir, &st);
+		int statret = do_lstat_at(dir, &st);
 		if (statret == 0 && !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
-			if (do_unlink(dir) < 0) {
+			if (do_unlink_at(dir) < 0) {
 				*fn = '/';
 				return 0;
 			}
 			statret = -1;
 		}
-		if (statret < 0 && do_mkdir(dir, 0700) < 0) {
+		if (statret < 0 && do_mkdir_at(dir, 0700) < 0) {
 			*fn = '/';
 			return 0;
 		}
 	} else
-		do_rmdir(dir);
+		do_rmdir_at(dir);
 	*fn = '/';
 
 	return 1;
@@ -1318,7 +1387,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create)
  *
  * "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level
  * of the referenced symlink.  This is usually the symlink's full path
- * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. */
+ * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this also rejects dest names with a .. component in other
+ * than the first component of the name ie. it rejects names such as
+ * a/b/../x/y. This needs to be done as the leading subpaths 'a' or
+ * 'b' could later be replaced with symlinks such as a link to '.'
+ * resulting in the link being transferred now becoming unsafe
+ */
 int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
 {
 	const char *name, *slash;
@@ -1328,6 +1404,23 @@ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
 	if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/')
 		return 1;
 
+	// reject destinations with /../ in the name other than at the start of the name
+	const char *dest2 = dest;
+	while (strncmp(dest2, "../", 3) == 0) {
+	    dest2 += 3;
+	    while (*dest2 == '/') {
+		// allow for ..//..///../foo
+		dest2++;
+	    }
+	}
+	if (strstr(dest2, "/../"))
+	    return 1;
+
+	// reject if the destination ends in /..
+	const size_t dlen = strlen(dest);
+	if (dlen > 3 && strcmp(&dest[dlen-3], "/..") == 0)
+	    return 1;
+
 	/* find out what our safety margin is */
 	for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
 		/* ".." segment starts the count over.  "." segment is ignored. */
@@ -1365,8 +1458,13 @@ char *timestring(time_t t)
 	static int ndx = 0;
 	static char buffers[4][20]; /* We support 4 simultaneous timestring results. */
 	char *TimeBuf = buffers[ndx = (ndx + 1) % 4];
-	struct tm *tm = localtime(&t);
-	int len = snprintf(TimeBuf, sizeof buffers[0], "%4d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
+	struct tm tmp, *tm = localtime_r(&t, &tmp);
+	int len;
+	if (!tm) {
+		strlcpy(TimeBuf, "(time out of range)", sizeof buffers[0]);
+		return TimeBuf;
+	}
+	len = snprintf(TimeBuf, sizeof buffers[0], "%4d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
 		 (int)tm->tm_year + 1900, (int)tm->tm_mon + 1, (int)tm->tm_mday,
 		 (int)tm->tm_hour, (int)tm->tm_min, (int)tm->tm_sec);
 	assert(len > 0); /* Silence gcc warning */
@@ -1487,12 +1585,19 @@ const char *find_filename_suffix(const char *fn, int fn_len, int *len_ptr)
 
 #define UNIT (1 << 16)
 
-uint32 fuzzy_distance(const char *s1, unsigned len1, const char *s2, unsigned len2)
+uint32 fuzzy_distance(const char *s1, unsigned len1, const char *s2, unsigned len2, uint32 upperlimit)
 {
 	uint32 a[MAXPATHLEN], diag, above, left, diag_inc, above_inc, left_inc;
 	int32 cost;
 	unsigned i1, i2;
 
+	/* Check to see if the Levenshtein distance must be greater than the
+	 * upper limit defined by the previously found lowest distance using
+	 * the heuristic that the Levenshtein distance is greater than the
+	 * difference in length of the two strings */
+	if ((len1 > len2 ? len1 - len2 : len2 - len1) * UNIT > upperlimit)
+		return 0xFFFFU * UNIT + 1;
+
 	if (!len1 || !len2) {
 		if (!len1) {
 			s1 = s2;
@@ -1683,6 +1788,8 @@ void *expand_item_list(item_list *lp, size_t item_size, const char *desc, int in
 				new_ptr == lp->items ? " not" : "");
 		}
 
+		memset((char *)new_ptr + lp->malloced * item_size, 0,
+		       (expand_size - lp->malloced) * item_size);
 		lp->items = new_ptr;
 		lp->malloced = expand_size;
 	}

util2.c

@@ -79,9 +79,7 @@ void *my_alloc(void *ptr, size_t num, size_t size, const char *file, int line)
 			who_am_i(), do_big_num(max_alloc, 0, NULL), src_file(file), line);
 		exit_cleanup(RERR_MALLOC);
 	}
-	if (!ptr)
-		ptr = malloc(num * size);
-	else if (ptr == do_calloc)
+	if (!ptr || ptr == do_calloc)
 		ptr = calloc(num, size);
 	else
 		ptr = realloc(ptr, num * size);

version.h

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-#define RSYNC_VERSION "3.2.6"
+#define RSYNC_VERSION "3.2.7"
 #define MAINTAINER_TZ_OFFSET -7.0

wildtest.c

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ int fnmatch_errors = 0;
 
 int wildmatch_errors = 0;
 
+#if !defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || __STDC_VERSION__ < 202311L
 typedef char bool;
+#endif
 
 int output_iterations = 0;
 int explode_mod = 0;

xattrs.c

@@ -39,9 +39,13 @@ extern int preserve_specials;
 extern int checksum_seed;
 extern int saw_xattr_filter;
 
+extern struct name_num_item *xattr_sum_nni;
+extern int xattr_sum_len;
+
 #define RSYNC_XAL_INITIAL 5
 #define RSYNC_XAL_LIST_INITIAL 100
 
+#define MAX_XATTR_DIGEST_LEN MD5_DIGEST_LEN
 #define MAX_FULL_DATUM 32
 
 #define HAS_PREFIX(str, prfx) (*(str) == *(prfx) && strncmp(str, prfx, sizeof (prfx) - 1) == 0)
@@ -269,8 +273,8 @@ static int rsync_xal_get(const char *fname, item_list *xalp)
 
 		if (datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM) {
 			/* For large datums, we store a flag and a checksum. */
-			name_offset = 1 + MAX_DIGEST_LEN;
-			sum_init(-1, checksum_seed);
+			name_offset = 1 + MAX_XATTR_DIGEST_LEN;
+			sum_init(xattr_sum_nni, checksum_seed);
 			sum_update(ptr, datum_len);
 			free(ptr);
 
@@ -377,20 +381,14 @@ static int64 xattr_lookup_hash(const item_list *xalp)
 {
 	const rsync_xa *rxas = xalp->items;
 	size_t i;
-	int64 key = hashlittle(&xalp->count, sizeof xalp->count);
+	int64 key = hashlittle2(&xalp->count, sizeof xalp->count);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < xalp->count; i++) {
-		key += hashlittle(rxas[i].name, rxas[i].name_len);
+		key += hashlittle2(rxas[i].name, rxas[i].name_len);
 		if (rxas[i].datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM)
-			key += hashlittle(rxas[i].datum, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
+			key += hashlittle2(rxas[i].datum, xattr_sum_len);
 		else
-			key += hashlittle(rxas[i].datum, rxas[i].datum_len);
-	}
-
-	if (key == 0) {
-		/* This is very unlikely, but we should never
-		 * return 0 as hashtable_find() doesn't like it. */
-		return 1;
+			key += hashlittle2(rxas[i].datum, rxas[i].datum_len);
 	}
 
 	return key;
@@ -435,7 +433,7 @@ static int find_matching_xattr(const item_list *xalp)
 			if (rxas1[j].datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM) {
 				if (memcmp(rxas1[j].datum + 1,
 					   rxas2[j].datum + 1,
-					   MAX_DIGEST_LEN) != 0)
+					   xattr_sum_len) != 0)
 					break;
 			} else {
 				if (memcmp(rxas1[j].datum, rxas2[j].datum,
@@ -471,8 +469,6 @@ static int rsync_xal_store(item_list *xalp)
 
 	if (rsync_xal_h == NULL)
 		rsync_xal_h = hashtable_create(512, HT_KEY64);
-	if (rsync_xal_h == NULL)
-		out_of_memory("rsync_xal_h hashtable_create()");
 
 	new_ref = new0(rsync_xa_list_ref);
 	new_ref->ndx = ndx;
@@ -535,7 +531,7 @@ int send_xattr(int f, stat_x *sxp)
 #endif
 			write_buf(f, name, name_len);
 			if (rxa->datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM)
-				write_buf(f, rxa->datum + 1, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
+				write_buf(f, rxa->datum + 1, xattr_sum_len);
 			else
 				write_bigbuf(f, rxa->datum, rxa->datum_len);
 		}
@@ -588,7 +584,7 @@ int xattr_diff(struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp, int find_all)
 		else if (snd_rxa->datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM) {
 			same = cmp == 0 && snd_rxa->datum_len == rec_rxa->datum_len
 			    && memcmp(snd_rxa->datum + 1, rec_rxa->datum + 1,
-				      MAX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0;
+				      xattr_sum_len) == 0;
 			/* Flag unrequested items that we need. */
 			if (!same && find_all && snd_rxa->datum[0] == XSTATE_ABBREV)
 				snd_rxa->datum[0] = XSTATE_TODO;
@@ -701,6 +697,13 @@ int recv_xattr_request(struct file_struct *file, int f_in)
 	rxa = lst->items;
 	num = 0;
 	while ((rel_pos = read_varint(f_in)) != 0) {
+		/* Detect signed overflow before the accumulating add. A hostile
+		 * peer could otherwise wrap 'num' to land on an arbitrary value. */
+		if ((rel_pos > 0 && num > INT_MAX - rel_pos)
+		 || (rel_pos < 0 && num < INT_MIN - rel_pos)) {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "xattr rel_pos accumulation overflow [%s]\n", who_am_i());
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
 		num += rel_pos;
 		if (am_sender) {
 			/* The sender-related num values are only in order on the sender.
@@ -746,7 +749,7 @@ int recv_xattr_request(struct file_struct *file, int f_in)
 		}
 
 		old_datum = rxa->datum;
-		rxa->datum_len = read_varint(f_in);
+		rxa->datum_len = read_varint_size(f_in, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN, "xattr datum_len");
 
 		if (SIZE_MAX - rxa->name_len < rxa->datum_len)
 			overflow_exit("recv_xattr_request");
@@ -787,7 +790,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if ((count = read_varint(f)) != 0) {
+	count = read_varint_bounded(f, 0, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_COUNT, "xattr count");
+	if (count != 0) {
 		(void)EXPAND_ITEM_LIST(&temp_xattr, rsync_xa, count);
 		temp_xattr.count = 0;
 	}
@@ -795,9 +799,9 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
 	for (num = 1; num <= count; num++) {
 		char *ptr, *name;
 		rsync_xa *rxa;
-		size_t name_len = read_varint(f);
-		size_t datum_len = read_varint(f);
-		size_t dget_len = datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM ? 1 + MAX_DIGEST_LEN : datum_len;
+		size_t name_len = read_varint_size(f, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_NAMELEN, "xattr name_len");
+		size_t datum_len = read_varint_size(f, MAX_WIRE_XATTR_DATALEN, "xattr datum_len");
+		size_t dget_len = datum_len > MAX_FULL_DATUM ? 1 + (size_t)xattr_sum_len : datum_len;
 		size_t extra_len = MIGHT_NEED_RPRE ? RPRE_LEN : 0;
 		if (SIZE_MAX - dget_len < extra_len || SIZE_MAX - dget_len - extra_len < name_len)
 			overflow_exit("receive_xattr");
@@ -812,7 +816,7 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
 			read_buf(f, ptr, dget_len);
 		else {
 			*ptr = XSTATE_ABBREV;
-			read_buf(f, ptr + 1, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
+			read_buf(f, ptr + 1, xattr_sum_len);
 		}
 
 		if (saw_xattr_filter) {
@@ -864,8 +868,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
 		rxa->num = num;
 	}
 
-	if (need_sort && count > 1)
-		qsort(temp_xattr.items, count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
+	if (need_sort && temp_xattr.count > 1)
+		qsort(temp_xattr.items, temp_xattr.count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
 
 	ndx = rsync_xal_store(&temp_xattr); /* adds item to rsync_xal_l */
 
@@ -943,7 +947,7 @@ static int rsync_xal_set(const char *fname, item_list *xalp,
 	rsync_xa *rxas = xalp->items;
 	ssize_t list_len;
 	size_t i, len;
-	char *name, *ptr, sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	char *name, *ptr, sum[MAX_XATTR_DIGEST_LEN];
 #ifdef HAVE_LINUX_XATTRS
 	int user_only = am_root <= 0;
 #endif
@@ -958,7 +962,6 @@ static int rsync_xal_set(const char *fname, item_list *xalp,
 		name = rxas[i].name;
 
 		if (XATTR_ABBREV(rxas[i])) {
-			int sum_len;
 			/* See if the fnamecmp version is identical. */
 			len = name_len = rxas[i].name_len;
 			if ((ptr = get_xattr_data(fnamecmp, name, &len, 1)) == NULL) {
@@ -975,10 +978,10 @@ static int rsync_xal_set(const char *fname, item_list *xalp,
 				goto still_abbrev;
 			}
 
-			sum_init(-1, checksum_seed);
+			sum_init(xattr_sum_nni, checksum_seed);
 			sum_update(ptr, len);
-			sum_len = sum_end(sum);
-			if (memcmp(sum, rxas[i].datum + 1, sum_len) != 0) {
+			sum_end(sum);
+			if (memcmp(sum, rxas[i].datum + 1, xattr_sum_len) != 0) {
 				free(ptr);
 				goto still_abbrev;
 			}
@@ -1091,7 +1094,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
 	 && !S_ISLNK(sxp->st.st_mode)
 #endif
 	 && access(fname, W_OK) < 0
-	 && do_chmod(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
+	 && do_chmod_at(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
 		added_write_perm = 1;
 
 	ndx = F_XATTR(file);
@@ -1099,7 +1102,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
 	lst = &glst->xa_items;
 	int return_value = rsync_xal_set(fname, lst, fnamecmp, sxp);
 	if (added_write_perm) /* remove the temporary write permission */
-		do_chmod(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
+		do_chmod_at(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
 	return return_value;
 }
 
@@ -1216,7 +1219,7 @@ int set_stat_xattr(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, mode_t new_mode)
 	mode = (fst.st_mode & _S_IFMT) | (fmode & ACCESSPERMS)
 	     | (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode) ? 0700 : 0600);
 	if (fst.st_mode != mode)
-		do_chmod(fname, mode);
+		do_chmod_at(fname, mode);
 	if (!IS_DEVICE(fst.st_mode))
 		fst.st_rdev = 0; /* just in case */
 
@@ -1254,7 +1257,12 @@ int set_stat_xattr(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, mode_t new_mode)
 
 int x_stat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *fst, STRUCT_STAT *xst)
 {
-	int ret = do_stat(fname, fst);
+	/* Use the *_at variants so that on a daemon-no-chroot deployment
+	 * the metadata read goes through a secure parent dirfd instead
+	 * of bare path resolution. The *_at wrappers fall through to
+	 * plain do_stat outside the daemon-no-chroot context, so this
+	 * change is transparent for non-daemon use. */
+	int ret = do_stat_at(fname, fst);
 	if ((ret < 0 || get_stat_xattr(fname, -1, fst, xst) < 0) && xst)
 		xst->st_mode = 0;
 	return ret;
@@ -1262,7 +1270,7 @@ int x_stat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *fst, STRUCT_STAT *xst)
 
 int x_lstat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *fst, STRUCT_STAT *xst)
 {
-	int ret = do_lstat(fname, fst);
+	int ret = do_lstat_at(fname, fst);
 	if ((ret < 0 || get_stat_xattr(fname, -1, fst, xst) < 0) && xst)
 		xst->st_mode = 0;
 	return ret;

zlib/adler32.c

@@ -62,10 +62,7 @@ local uLong adler32_combine_ OF((uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off64_t len2));
 #endif
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-uLong ZEXPORT adler32(adler, buf, len)
-    uLong adler;
-    const Bytef *buf;
-    uInt len;
+uLong ZEXPORT adler32(uLong adler, const Bytef *buf, uInt len)
 {
     unsigned long sum2;
     unsigned n;
@@ -133,10 +130,7 @@ uLong ZEXPORT adler32(adler, buf, len)
 }
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-local uLong adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2)
-    uLong adler1;
-    uLong adler2;
-    z_off64_t len2;
+local uLong adler32_combine_(uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off64_t len2)
 {
     unsigned long sum1;
     unsigned long sum2;
@@ -162,18 +156,12 @@ local uLong adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2)
 }
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine(adler1, adler2, len2)
-    uLong adler1;
-    uLong adler2;
-    z_off_t len2;
+uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine(uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off_t len2)
 {
     return adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2);
 }
 
-uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine64(adler1, adler2, len2)
-    uLong adler1;
-    uLong adler2;
-    z_off64_t len2;
+uLong ZEXPORT adler32_combine64(uLong adler1, uLong adler2, z_off64_t len2)
 {
     return adler32_combine_(adler1, adler2, len2);
 }

zlib/compress.c

@@ -19,12 +19,7 @@
    memory, Z_BUF_ERROR if there was not enough room in the output buffer,
    Z_STREAM_ERROR if the level parameter is invalid.
 */
-int ZEXPORT compress2 (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen, level)
-    Bytef *dest;
-    uLongf *destLen;
-    const Bytef *source;
-    uLong sourceLen;
-    int level;
+int ZEXPORT compress2 (Bytef *dest, uLongf *destLen, const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen, int level)
 {
     z_stream stream;
     int err;
@@ -59,11 +54,7 @@ int ZEXPORT compress2 (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen, level)
 
 /* ===========================================================================
  */
-int ZEXPORT compress (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen)
-    Bytef *dest;
-    uLongf *destLen;
-    const Bytef *source;
-    uLong sourceLen;
+int ZEXPORT compress (Bytef *dest, uLongf *destLen, const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen)
 {
     return compress2(dest, destLen, source, sourceLen, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION);
 }
@@ -72,8 +63,7 @@ int ZEXPORT compress (dest, destLen, source, sourceLen)
      If the default memLevel or windowBits for deflateInit() is changed, then
    this function needs to be updated.
  */
-uLong ZEXPORT compressBound (sourceLen)
-    uLong sourceLen;
+uLong ZEXPORT compressBound (uLong sourceLen)
 {
     return sourceLen + (sourceLen >> 12) + (sourceLen >> 14) +
            (sourceLen >> 25) + 13;

zlib/crc32.c

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ local void make_crc_table OF((void));
   allow for word-at-a-time CRC calculation for both big-endian and little-
   endian machines, where a word is four bytes.
 */
-local void make_crc_table()
+local void make_crc_table(void)
 {
     z_crc_t c;
     int n, k;
@@ -164,9 +164,7 @@ local void make_crc_table()
 }
 
 #ifdef MAKECRCH
-local void write_table(out, table)
-    FILE *out;
-    const z_crc_t FAR *table;
+local void write_table(FILE *out, const z_crc_t FAR *table)
 {
     int n;
 
@@ -187,7 +185,7 @@ local void write_table(out, table)
 /* =========================================================================
  * This function can be used by asm versions of crc32()
  */
-const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table()
+const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table(void)
 {
 #ifdef DYNAMIC_CRC_TABLE
     if (crc_table_empty)
@@ -201,10 +199,7 @@ const z_crc_t FAR * ZEXPORT get_crc_table()
 #define DO8 DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1; DO1
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-unsigned long ZEXPORT crc32(crc, buf, len)
-    unsigned long crc;
-    const unsigned char FAR *buf;
-    uInt len;
+unsigned long ZEXPORT crc32(unsigned long crc, const unsigned char FAR *buf, uInt len)
 {
     if (buf == Z_NULL) return 0UL;
 
@@ -244,10 +239,7 @@ unsigned long ZEXPORT crc32(crc, buf, len)
 #define DOLIT32 DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4; DOLIT4
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-local unsigned long crc32_little(crc, buf, len)
-    unsigned long crc;
-    const unsigned char FAR *buf;
-    unsigned len;
+local unsigned long crc32_little(unsigned long crc, const unsigned char FAR *buf, unsigned len)
 {
     register z_crc_t c;
     register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
@@ -284,10 +276,7 @@ local unsigned long crc32_little(crc, buf, len)
 #define DOBIG32 DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4; DOBIG4
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
-    unsigned long crc;
-    const unsigned char FAR *buf;
-    unsigned len;
+local unsigned long crc32_big(unsigned long crc, const unsigned char FAR *buf, unsigned len)
 {
     register z_crc_t c;
     register const z_crc_t FAR *buf4;
@@ -322,9 +311,7 @@ local unsigned long crc32_big(crc, buf, len)
 #define GF2_DIM 32      /* dimension of GF(2) vectors (length of CRC) */
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-local unsigned long gf2_matrix_times(mat, vec)
-    unsigned long *mat;
-    unsigned long vec;
+local unsigned long gf2_matrix_times(unsigned long *mat, unsigned long vec)
 {
     unsigned long sum;
 
@@ -339,9 +326,7 @@ local unsigned long gf2_matrix_times(mat, vec)
 }
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-local void gf2_matrix_square(square, mat)
-    unsigned long *square;
-    unsigned long *mat;
+local void gf2_matrix_square(unsigned long *square, unsigned long *mat)
 {
     int n;
 
@@ -350,10 +335,7 @@ local void gf2_matrix_square(square, mat)
 }
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-local uLong crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2)
-    uLong crc1;
-    uLong crc2;
-    z_off64_t len2;
+local uLong crc32_combine_(uLong crc1, uLong crc2, z_off64_t len2)
 {
     int n;
     unsigned long row;
@@ -406,18 +388,12 @@ local uLong crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2)
 }
 
 /* ========================================================================= */
-uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine(crc1, crc2, len2)
-    uLong crc1;
-    uLong crc2;
-    z_off_t len2;
+uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine(uLong crc1, uLong crc2, z_off_t len2)
 {
     return crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2);
 }
 
-uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine64(crc1, crc2, len2)
-    uLong crc1;
-    uLong crc2;
-    z_off64_t len2;
+uLong ZEXPORT crc32_combine64(uLong crc1, uLong crc2, z_off64_t len2)
 {
     return crc32_combine_(crc1, crc2, len2);
 }